Mifgash rishon. ʻAl ha-nefesh ṿe-ʻal ha-ʻarakhim -- Mifgash sheni. Pitui, akhzariyut ṿe-nashiyut -- Mifgash shelishi. Shomre ha-ḥayim, shomre ha-maṿet ṿe-shomre ha-seder, torat ha-yetsarim shel Zigmond Froid.

This essay defends two theses regarding the explanation, or ground, of modality in the early modern period. First, for philosophers in the period, essences ground a range of important modal facts. Second, as the period progresses, we witness increased skepticism about certain modal facts, due to a growing skepticism about the scope or existence of essences. These theses are supported by examination of three case studies: Descartes’ treatment of substance and mode (which forms the core of his ontology); Malebranche’s treatment (...) of causation (which bears on his defense of occasionalism); and Locke’s treatment of necessary connections among properties (which is related to his accounts of individuals and kinds). It is shown that in each case, claims about necessity and possibility take center stage, and that in each case, the status of these claims hinges on the status of claims about essences. (shrink)

Many historical and philosophical studies treat infinity as an exclusively quantitative notion, whose proper domain of application is mathematics and physics. The main aim of this paper is to disentangle, by critically examining, three notions of infinity in the early modern period, and to argue that one—but only one—of them is quantitative. One of these non-quantitative notions concerns being or reality, while the other concerns a particular iterative property of an aggregate. These three notions will emerge through examination of three (...) central figures in the period: Locke, Descartes, and Leibniz. (shrink)

This study examined the representation of women in the world press, through the coverage of two very different events during 1995: The 50th anniversary of the surrender of Nazi Germany and the end of World War II, and the 4th Conference on Women in Beijing. Using the first level of the agenda-setting approach as well as the second level we analyzed the content of more than 10,000 stories which appeared in the news around the world. The findings show that women's (...) presence is still not felt in the world's press, that is, they are not there in great frequency or quantity, regardless of the event, and even when they are present, they are associated more with the private than with the public sphere. Second level agenda-setting research would suggest that this might simply reinforce existing stereotypes. (shrink)

Descartes’s metaphysics posits a sharp distinction between two types of non-finitude, or unlimitedness: whereas God alone is infinite, numbers, space, and time are indefinite. The distinction has proven difficult to interpret in a way that abides by the textual evidence and conserves the theoretical roles that the distinction plays in Descartes’s philosophy—in particular, the important role it plays in the causal proof for God’s existence in the Meditations. After formulating the interpretive task, I criticize extant interpretations of the distinction. I (...) then propose an alternative at whose core is the idea that whereas the indefinite is a structural, iterative notion, designating the absence of an upper bound, the infinite is an ontic notion, signifying being in general, or what is, without qualification. (shrink)

As the range of potential uses for Artificial Intelligence, in particular machine learning, has increased, so has awareness of the associated ethical issues. This increased awareness has led to the realisation that existing legislation and regulation provides insufficient protection to individuals, groups, society, and the environment from AI harms. In response to this realisation, there has been a proliferation of principle-based ethics codes, guidelines and frameworks. However, it has become increasingly clear that a significant gap exists between the theory of (...) AI ethics principles and the practical design of AI systems. In previous work, we analysed whether it is possible to close this gap between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of AI ethics through the use of tools and methods designed to help AI developers, engineers, and designers translate principles into practice. We concluded that this method of closure is currently ineffective as almost all existing translational tools and methods are either too flexible or too strict. This raised the question: if, even with technical guidance, AI ethics is challenging to embed in the process of algorithmic design, is the entire pro-ethical design endeavour rendered futile? And, if no, then how can AI ethics be made useful for AI practitioners? This is the question we seek to address here by exploring why principles and technical translational tools are still needed even if they are limited, and how these limitations can be potentially overcome by providing theoretical grounding of a concept that has been termed ‘Ethics as a Service.’. (shrink)

As the range of potential uses for Artificial Intelligence (AI), in particular machine learning (ML), has increased, so has awareness of the associated ethical issues. This increased awareness has led to the realisation that existing legislation and regulation provides insufficient protection to individuals, groups, society, and the environment from AI harms. In response to this realisation, there has been a proliferation of principle-based ethics codes, guidelines and frameworks. However, it has become increasingly clear that a significant gap exists between the (...) theory of AI ethics principles and the practical design of AI systems. In previous work , we analysed whether it is possible to close this gap between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of AI ethics through the use of tools and methods designed to help AI developers, engineers, and designers translate principles into practice. We concluded that this method of closure is currently ineffective as almost all existing translational tools and methods are either too flexible (and thus vulnerable to ethics washing) or too strict (unresponsive to context). This raised the question: if, even with technical guidance, AI ethics is challenging to embed in the process of algorithmic design, is the entire pro-ethical design endeavour rendered futile? And, if no, then how can AI ethics be made useful for AI practitioners? This is the question we seek to address here by exploring why principles and technical translational tools are still needed even if they are limited, and how these limitations can be potentially overcome by providing theoretical grounding of a concept that has been termed ‘Ethics as a Service’. (shrink)

John Locke’s treatment of quantity in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding is not nearly as extensive or as well-known as his treatment of quality and his distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Yet I contend that a close examination of Locke’s comments on quantity in the Essay reveals that he endorses a general theory of quantity that not only distinguishes quantities from qualities, but also plays several other important roles in his overall philosophy—particularly in his treatments of infinity and demonstrative (...) knowledge. Moreover, I argue that this theory does not appear out of thin air, but is in certain respects one and the same as the approach to quantity found in Aristotle and developed by medieval Aristotelian thinkers. Identifying the core tenets of this approach in the texts of Aristotle and medieval Aristotelians, and formulating them clearly enough to shed light on Locke’s theory of quantity in the Essay, is the principal task of this paper. (shrink)

We present experimental evidence that supports the thesis :602–625, 2015, Br J Philos Sci 70:77–102, 2019; Bradley in Decisions theory with a human face, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017; Goldschmidt and Nissan-Rozen in Synthese 198:7553–7575, 2021) that people might positively or negatively desire risky prospects conditional on only some of the prospects’ outcomes obtaining. We argue that this evidence has important normative implications for the central debate in normative decision theory between two general approaches on how to rationalize several common (...) patterns of preference, which are ruled out as irrational by orthodox decision theory, namely the re-individuation approach and the non-expected utility approach. (shrink)

In this article I suggest a way of overcoming the traditional dichotomy between analytic and continental philosophy by pointing at some similarities between apparently disparate philosophical approaches, viz. those of Michael Dummett and Jürgen Habermas. The comparison revolves around the so-called 'paradox of analysis', which poses a dilemma concerning philosophical propositions: these are allegedly shown to be either trivial or unsecured. Both Dummett and Habermas offer ways out of the dilemma, through recognition of the intersection of analysis with life. A (...) transcendentally characterized conception of language is conceived by both as the only way to overcome the haunting objective -subjective distinction. Thus they offer fresh insights into the nature of meaning and truth, and the place these occupy within philosophical systems. Both philosophers take the notions of justification and procedural rationality to be primary in the order of philosophical explanation. Meaning is not conceived in terms of representation and truth conditions, but in terms of validity claims. Truth is not viewed as independent and static, but as historically conditioned and constantly unfolding. As a result, even the statements of logic, and certainly those of philosophy, find a place between the alleged emptiness of analyticity and the robust empirical character of science. This common ground represents, I believe, one of the new faces of post-analytic -and hence also post-continental -philosophy. Parts of it are shared by other contemporary philosophers, such as Derrida and Brandom. What marks this new Weltanschauung is the way it surpasses the current eliminativist trends in philosophy. (shrink)

Modernism can be characterised by the acute attention it gives to language, to its potential and its limitations. Philosophers, artists and literary critics working in the first third of the twentieth century emphasized language’s creative potential, but also stressed its inability to express meaning completely and accurately. In particular, modernists shared the belief that the kind of truth sub specie aeterni that was sought by philosophers was either meaningless or was more appropriately expressed by the arts – especially by literature (...) and poetry. Modernism and the Language of Philosophy addresses the challenge this belief presented to philosophy, and argues that the modernist assumption rests upon a host of unacknowledged, repressed or denied dogmas or tacit images. Drawing in particular upon the work of Michale Dummett and Jacques Derrida, this book explores a new solution to this crisis in philosophical language, and it is these two philosophers who drive the narrative of the book and offer perspectives through which both past and present day philosophers are examined.  . (shrink)

Modernism can be characterised by the acute attention it gives to language, to its potential and its limitations. Philosophers, artists and literary critics working in the first third of the twentieth century emphasized language’s creative potential, but also stressed its inability to express meaning completely and accurately. In particular, modernists shared the belief that the kind of truth _sub specie aeterni_ that was sought by philosophers was either meaningless or was more appropriately expressed by the arts – especially by literature (...) and poetry. _Modernism and the Language of Philosophy_ addresses the challenge this belief presented to philosophy, and argues that the modernist assumption rests upon a host of unacknowledged, repressed or denied dogmas or tacit images. Drawing in particular upon the work of Michale Dummett and Jacques Derrida, this book explores a new solution to this crisis in philosophical language, and it is these two philosophers who drive the narrative of the book and offer perspectives through which both past and present day philosophers are examined. (shrink)

This article charts the contiguity of farming and film, blending permaculture and cinema to advance a modality of sustainable film theory and practice we call “permacinema.” As an alternative approach to looking and labour, permaculture exhibits a suite of cinematic concerns, and offers a model for cinematic creativity that is environmentally accountable and sensitive to multispecies entanglements. Through the peaceable gestures of cultivation and restraint, permacinema proposes an ecologically attentive philosophy of moving images in accordance with permaculture’s three ethics: care (...) of earth, care of people, and fair share. We focus on work by Indigenous artists in which plants are encountered not only as raw material or as aesthetic resource but as ingenious agents and insightful teachers whose pedagogical and creative inputs are welcomed into the filmmaking process. By integrating Indigenous epistemologies and cosmologies we hope to situate permacinema in the wider project of cinema’s decolonization and rewilding. (shrink)

En este artículo se esboza un mapa fenomenológico de la afectividad a partir de la clasificación propuesta por Scheler en la que se distingue el "percibir afectivo" (Fühlen), que es intencional y tiene por objeto los valores, y los "estados sentimentales" (Gefühlszustände), que carecen de la intencionalidad estricta del percibir afectivo. Las clásicas emociones se inscriben en los estados sentimentales divididas en dos grupos: las "respuestas afectivas" y las "meras emociones" (las "reacciones de respuesta emocionales" [emotionale 'Antwortsreaktionen'] y las "emociones" (...) [Affekte], en terminología scheleriana). Las respuestas afectivas carecen de la intencionalidad estricta del percibir afectivo, pero poseen una "intencionalidad secundaria" que es correcta por adecuarse al percibir afectivo; en las meras emociones la intencionalidad secundaria es incorrecta o llega incluso a desaparecer. This article outlines a phenomenological map of affectivity, based on the classification proposed by Scheler. Two faculties are distinguished: "affective perception" (Fühlen) -which is intentional and aims to values- and "emotional states" (Gefühlszustände) -which lack the strict intentionality of affective perception-. Classic emotions are included in emotional states and divided into two groups: "affective responses" and "mere emotions" (emotionale 'Antwortsreaktionen' and Affekte in Scheler's terminology). Affective responses lack the strict intentionality of affective perception but possess a "secondary intentionality" which is "right" due to its adequacy to affective perception; in mere emotions the secondary intentionality is "unright" or even disappears. (shrink)

La reducción trascendental introdu-cida por Husserl en Ideas I le permite a nuestro autor, ya en Ideas II, definir la “actitud perso-nalista”, donde el “objeto intencional” abre paso a una nueva noción clave que es la de “motivación”. Dada la importancia que tiene la motivación para entender cualquier vida y también, por tanto, la vida moral, mi ponencia busca obtener una clasificación rigurosa de los distintos tipos de motivación que Husserl describe. Su objetivo es mostrar que aunque Husserl concede a (...) la motivación “racional” toda la importancia que merece, no por ello identifica motivación con racionalidad. En la motivación, que cubre por completo el ámbito personalista, Husserl incluye, en efecto, una motivación “prerracional” o asociativa, que nos lleva al terreno de la fenomeno-logía genética.The transcendental reduction introduced by Husserl in Ideas I allows him, in Ideas II, defining the "personalistic attitude" where the "intentional object" gives way to a new key notion, "motivation." Given the importance of motivation to understand any life and, therefore, moral life, my paper seeks a rigorous classification of the different types of motivation that Husserl describes. Its aim is showing that although Husserl gives importance to "rational" motivation, he does not identify motivation with rationality. In the motivation, that covers completely personalistic level, Husserl includes, in effect, a "pre-rational" or associative motivation, which leads us to the field of genetic phenomenology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.1 (2000) 59-73 [Access article in PDF] Thomas Hobbes: Telling the Story of the Science of Politics Anat Biletzki Science and storytelling First, the traditional commonplaces: Science does not tell stories. Disciplines purporting to be sciences eschew their storytelling aspects in favor of axiomatic, deductive, demonstrative, or whatnot essentials of science. Those deeming the story itself essential give up (happily or less willingly) the label (...) of science and locate themselves under other institutionalized labels such as Humanities. 1 Then there are the disciplines that wobble on the fence, desiring, for various reasons that are more readily analyzed by historical sociologists, the epithet of Science, yet not always achieving such recognition. Chief players in this game are history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science. And if my rendition of this conflict between pretensions and performance seem blatantly pejorative, let me rephrase it: their own practitioners--historians, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists--believe the issue of their scientific status a problem of no small import. It is, indeed, the question "Are we a science?" that figures in the most fundamental debates concerning the purpose, essence, and methodology of these disciplines.By use of a case study, I will try to support a seemingly conciliatory thesis: social sciences are, by definition and therefore of necessity, on the fence. On one side of the fence lies Science, the monolithic framework that enslaves its method to a grand purpose--knowledge of reality. On the other lies Humanism, a far less easily defined area about which I would hesitate to use the word framework, but through which one meets a no-less-grandiose focus--knowledge of the human. Why then does it seem natural to foster storytelling on the humanistic side of the fence? Or, alternatively, one can ask about the "why not" of narrative in the sciences.Narrative is storytelling; and stories are about heroes; and heroes conduct their actions in a place through a time. So these three building blocks-- [End Page 59] hero, time, and place--point to a pattern of knowledge that, it seems obvious, cannot, and definitely should not, belong to science in its idealized form. There is, of course, a stronger thesis deriving from the intricacies in (post?)modern discussions: that even the exact and natural sciences use narrative while still remaining sciences. This idea--that science does countenance narrative and, indeed, may even use it beneficially--thereby becomes forceful, since science, with its universalistic airs, pretends to ignore heroes in specific times and places.What of the social sciences? Their claim to science is based on that same universalistic end coupled with an attempt to develop a methodology to fit that end. The rub lies in the subject matter of the social sciences, the human being and society. A strictly positivistic view of such subject matter, or even a generally scientific one, must abstract from any and all "humanistic" traits of the human being and society and objectively treat them on a par with any other "neutral" (some might say, even material) object of research. My weak thesis merely claims that such abstraction is inherently impossible and, furthermore, that an attempt at such abstraction waylays the ultimate end of these "sciences." 2 Yet, such a thesis must contribute more than it eliminates. If the social sciences cannot live up to the original scientific ideal of one side of the fence, and if their product can be valued as more than (or at least different from) a mere story on the other side, a more fruitful characterization than just "sitting on the fence" is called for. It is here that narrative makes its essential contribution: narrative is that pattern of knowledge which can encompass the social sciences, given their necessary turn to the human being. Looked at from the receiving end, the social sciences have no option but to turn to narrative in order to buttress their scientific ideal of explanation. The phenomena they claim to explain are human and social phenomena and, as such, cannot be distanced from narrative. 3I shall try to illustrate my... (shrink)

The debate about the ethical implications of Artificial Intelligence dates from the 1960s :741–742, 1960; Wiener in Cybernetics: or control and communication in the animal and the machine, MIT Press, New York, 1961). However, in recent years symbolic AI has been complemented and sometimes replaced by Neural Networks and Machine Learning techniques. This has vastly increased its potential utility and impact on society, with the consequence that the ethical debate has gone mainstream. Such a debate has primarily focused on principles—the (...) ‘what’ of AI ethics —rather than on practices, the ‘how.’ Awareness of the potential issues is increasing at a fast rate, but the AI community’s ability to take action to mitigate the associated risks is still at its infancy. Our intention in presenting this research is to contribute to closing the gap between principles and practices by constructing a typology that may help practically-minded developers apply ethics at each stage of the Machine Learning development pipeline, and to signal to researchers where further work is needed. The focus is exclusively on Machine Learning, but it is hoped that the results of this research may be easily applicable to other branches of AI. The article outlines the research method for creating this typology, the initial findings, and provides a summary of future research needs. (shrink)

The suicidality hypothesis could be applied to other situations, such as cases in regular military organizations or in “terrorist” groups, where individuals put themselves in circumstances that are directly suicidal. Self-selection in these cases may be motivated by depression or short-term hopelessness. Both violent and charitable acts are over-determined, and a multiplicity of motives should be considered in explaining them.

This study compares the argumentative writing characteristics of students from different sociocultural backgrounds. We focused on Jewish ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) students, educated in a segregated religious school for boys (yeshiva), who are now attempting to integrate in secular higher education in Israel. To better understand the unique characteristics of this population, we reviewed 92 essays written by Haredi students, and compared them with 76 essays by public education (PE) graduates. Our analysis was based on the cognitive and sociocultural perspectives of argumentation. (...) Both bottom-up and top-down criteria were used to elicit the argumentative writing characteristics either emerging from the data or based on existing theories. Our primary findings indicate that Haredi students have distinct argumentative characteristics, including the use of more complex and dialectic arguments and unique persuasive tactics. These findings are discussed in light of previous research on yeshiva learning methods and recommendations are provided for adjusting the existing higher education curricula to suit both PE and Haredi students. (shrink)

Research from the fields of criminology and social psychology suggests that the deterrent effect of security countermeasures is not uniform across individuals. In this study, we examine whether certain individual characteristics (i. e., computer self-efficacy) or work arrangement (i. e., virtual status) moderate the influence of security policies, security education, training, and awareness (SETA) program, and computer monitoring on information systems misuse. The results suggest that computer savvy individuals are less deterred by SETA programs and computer monitoring, while these countermeasures (...) are also less influential (from a deterrence perspective) on employees that spend more working days outside the office. Implications for both the research and practice of information security are discussed. (shrink)

This commentary proposes experiments to examine connections between the presence of out-group members, neurovisceral reactions, religiosity, and ethnocentrism, to clarify the meaning of the correlational findings presented in the target article. It also suggests different ways of describing religious socialization and of viewing assertions about religion and health or about the human ability to detect pathogens.

Four experiments and 2 corpus-based studies demonstrate that negation is a determinant factor affecting novel nonliteral utterance-interpretation by default. For a nonliteral utterance-interpretation to be favored by default, utterances should be potentially ambiguous between literal and nonliteral interpretations. They should therefore be (a) unfamiliar, (b) free of semantic anomaly or any kind of internal incongruity, and (c) unbiased by contextual information. Experiments 1–3 demonstrate that negative utterances, meeting these 3 conditions, were interpreted metaphorically (This is not a safe) or sarcastically (...) (Ambitious she is not) when presented in isolation and were therefore processed faster in contexts strongly biasing them toward their nonliteral than toward their (equally biased) literal interpretation. Experiment 4 reduces the possibility that it is structural markedness on its own that induces nonliteralness. Two corpus-based studies provide corroborating evidence, supporting the view of negation as an operator generating nonliteral interpretations by default. (shrink)

This article motions to a real contradiction between online security and civil rights. It traverses semantic and conceptual elaborations of both security and human rights, narrowing their range to national security and human rather than civil rights, and suggests that the concept of security itself, whether online or not, is a rhetorical instrument in the hands of interested parties, mostly states and militaries. This instrument is used to undermine human rights precisely by means of its association and even identification with (...) military and national settings. Asking whether the same ethics applies in the case of online security (vs. human rights), our tentative conclusion is that a similar moral determination rules in the case of online security, which may be exponentially more complex, but no less ethically compelling. (shrink)

We investigated cross-language influences from the first and second languages in third language processing, to examine how order of acquisition and proficiency modulate the degree of cross-language influences, and whether these cross-language influences manifest differently in online and offline measures of L3 processing. The study focused on morpho-syntactic processing of English as an L3 among Arabic-Hebrew-English university student trilinguals. Importantly, both L1 and L2 of participants are typologically distant from L3, which allows overcoming confounds of previous research. Performance of trilinguals (...) was compared to that of native English monolingual controls. To investigate the source of cross-language influences, critical stimuli were ungrammatical sentences in English, which when translated could be grammatical in L1, in L2 or in both. Thus, the L3 morpho-syntactic structures included in the study were a mismatch with L1, a mismatch with L2, a Double mismatch, with both L1 and L2, or a no mismatch condition. Participants read the English sentences while their eye-movements were recorded, and they also performed grammaticality judgments following each sentence. Across both measures, cross-language influences were assessed by comparing the performance of the trilinguals in each of the critical interference conditions to the no-interference condition, and by comparing their performance to that of the monolingual controls. L1 interference was evident in first pass sentence reading, and marginally in offline grammaticality judgment, and L2 interference was robust across second pass reading and grammaticality judgments. These results suggest that either L1 or the L2 can be the source of cross-language influences in L3 processing, but with different time-courses. The findings highlight the difference between online and offline measures of performance: processing language in real-time reflects mainly automatic activation of morpho-syntactic structures, whereas offline judgments might also involve strategic and meta-linguistic decision making. Together, the findings show that during L3 processing, trilinguals have access to all previously acquired linguistic knowledge, and that the multilingual language system is fully interactive. (shrink)

Lexical and morphological knowledge of school-aged children are correlated with each other, and are often difficult to distinguish. One reason for this might be that many tasks currently used to assess morphological knowledge require children to inflect or derive real words in the language, thus recruiting their vocabulary knowledge. The current study investigated the possible separability of lexical and morphological knowledge using two complementary approaches. First, we examined the correlations between vocabulary and four morphological tasks tapping different aspects of morphological (...) processing and awareness, and using either real-word or pseudo-word stimuli. Thus, we tested the hypothesis that different morphological tasks recruit lexical knowledge to various degrees. Second, we compared the Hebrew vocabulary and morphological knowledge of 5th grade language minority speaking children to that of their native speaking peers. This comparison allows us to ask whether reduced exposure to the societal language might differentially influence vocabulary and morphological knowledge. The results demonstrate that indeed different morphological tasks rely on lexical knowledge to varying degrees. In addition, language minority students had significantly lower performance in vocabulary and in morphological tasks that recruited vocabulary knowledge to a greater extent. In contrast, both groups performed similarly in abstract morphological tasks with a lower vocabulary load. These results demonstrate that lexical and morphological knowledge may rely on partially separable learning mechanisms, and highlight the importance of distinguishing between these two linguistic components. (shrink)

This is an exploration of women’s tradition of hospitality, the epistemic and moral contribution of their practices of welcoming the other and their historical experience as providers of care. The essay claims that female hospitality has largely consisted of care for others, which challenges a social model based on individualism and self-sufficiency. The argument is rooted in ethnography and Jewish thought and reclaims the home as an ethical space. This text analyses two disturbing and painful stories from the Tanakh that (...) are both examples of the consequences of extreme or absolute hospitality and violence against women. The famous works of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Lévinas on hospitality as ethics and hospitality as the feminine are discussed vis-à-vis anthropological and feminist approaches to the connection between the female welcoming of the other and the ethics of care. Finally, the reflections of the members of Beit Midrash Arevot shed light on a traditionist feminism that develops an ethics and practice of hospitality as welcoming otherness. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to survey some of the most important developments in thinking about essence in the early modern period, highlighting ways in which thinkers in the period gradually depart from the medieval Aristotelian tradition. In this tradition, essence is thought of as selective, explanatory, and kind-determining. Whereas in the beginning of the early modern period some figures (such as René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Margaret Cavendish, and Anne Conway) still adhere to this traditional view, later figures (including (...) Benedict de Spinoza, G.W. Leibniz, and John Locke) reject it. (shrink)

Modernism, in the book under review, is characterized as the belief that "there can be no philosophical language; that the kind of truth sub specie aeterni that was sought by philosophers is either meaningless or more appropriately expressed by the arts -- especially by literature and poetry" (p. xiii). The author wishes to show that this thesis rests upon unquestioned dogmas, presuppositions or presumptions "regarding the distinction between representation and presentation," which should be rejected (p. 9). She proposes to criticize (...) the distinction, along with the other unwarranted distinctions thereby embedded in the central tenet of modernism, and to overcome the "modernist overcoming of metaphysics" by drawing on the works of Jacques Derrida and Michael Dummett. (shrink)

Educational research in metacognition is based predominantly on a positivist paradigm and empirical epistemological assumptions about human cognition and its investigation. Following recent calls for greater methodological diversity, this paper critically examines the possibility of studying metacognition in education through Karen Barad’s ethico-onto-epistemological framework. In coining the term metacognition, five new propositioning are theorised: metacognition involves a practice of dynamic material configuration of entanglements in which human cognition takes part; meta is inseparable from everything that occurs, relates and emerges in (...) existence; the self is dispersed in becoming, threaded through its relational performances; the apparatus is not separated from the objects and subjects of investigation, and diffraction could potentially open new ways to investigate metacognition in complex natural phenomena. The paper concludes with questioning the potential of studying metacognition in educational research. (shrink)

the meditations on first philosophy presents us with an alleged proof for the existence of God that proceeds from the existence of an idea of an infinite being in the human mind—an idea of God—to the existence of God himself. Insofar as we have an idea of an infinite being, an idea with “infinite objective reality,” we can legitimately ask whence it came to us. The only possible cause of this idea, claims Descartes, is an infinite being, namely, God. The (...) occurrence of just this idea in the proof is essential. In fact, Descartes maintains that any such causal proof for God’s existence crucially relies on this idea: “it seems to me that all these proofs based on his effects are reducible to a single one; and also .. (shrink)

AbstractWe propose an emerging conceptualization of “intervention hesitancy” to address a broad spectrum of hesitancy to disease prevention interventions among healthcare personnel (HCP) beyond vaccine hesitancy. To demonstrate this concept and its analytical benefits, we used a qualitative case-study methodology, identifying a “spectrum” of disease prevention interventions based on (1) the intervention’s effectiveness, (2) how the intervention is regulated among HCP in the Israeli healthcare system, and (3) uptake among HCP in the Israeli healthcare system. Our cases ultimately contribute to (...) a more nuanced conceptualization of hesitancy that HCP express towards disease prevention interventions. Our case interventions included the seasonal influenza vaccine, the Mantoux test, and the hepatitis B (HBV) vaccine. Influenza and HBV are vaccine-preventable diseases, though their respective vaccines vary significantly in effectiveness and uptake among HCP. The Mantoux test is a tuberculin skin test which provides a prevention benchmark for tuberculosis (TB), a non-vaccine preventable disease. We conducted semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders and analyzed them within Israeli and international policy context between 2016 and 2019, a period just prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. We propose the conceptualization of “intervention hesitancy”—beyond “vaccine hesitancy”—as “hesitancy towards a wide range of public health interventions, including but not limited to vaccines”. Results suggested that intervention hesitancy among HCP is rooted in weak trust in their employer, poor employment conditions, as well as mixed institutional guidelines and culture. Conceptualizing intervention hesitancy expands the ability of healthcare systems to understand the root of hesitancy and foster a supportive institutional culture and trust, cognizant of diverse disease prevention interventions beyond vaccination. (shrink)

Descartes notoriously characterizes substance in two ways: first, as an ultimate subject of properties ; second, as an independent entity. The characterizations have appeared to many to diverge on the definition as well as the scope of the notion of substance. For it is often thought that the ultimate subject of properties need not—and, in some cases, cannot—be independent. Drawing on a suite of historical, textual, and philosophical considerations, this essay argues for an interpretation that reconciles Descartes's two characterizations. It (...) proposes that both characterizations invoke a type of independence that obtains just in case there is no relation to another entity that holds by the nature of the entity in question. Even though the ultimate subject of properties is sometimes not independent in other respects, it satisfies this independence-by-nature condition. (shrink)

"There is no God, but ...' : the disavowed presence of the divine -- 'Resolve the religious world into its secular basis' : sense and sensibility -- 'I only have eyes for you' : ethics as meta-politics -- Conclusion: 'Back to the rough ground!'.

Privacy is a sociocultural perception, depending on the dominant values of a society, sociocultural heritage, and contemporary technological developments. This article focuses on privacy perception among adolescents based on a European school survey (PRACTIS), and presents comparative results of an exploratory study conducted among over 1,428 adolescents in six countries. The results reveal that adolescents attribute high value to privacy and are prepared to actively oppose if an online corporation is challenging their personal interests. However, they tend to trade off (...) privacy for other perceived benefits. Adolescents’ privacy perception and data protection are affected by cultural diversity, age, gender, and most of all their various social network sites activities and their attitudes toward importance of sharing and controlling personal information. (shrink)