Being and Nothingness is without doubt one of the most significant books of the twentieth century. The central work by one of the world's most influential thinkers, it altered the course of western philosophy. Its revolutionary approach challenged all previous assumptions about the individual's relationship with the world. Known as 'the Bible of existentialism', its impact on culture and literature was immediate and was felt worldwide, from the absurd drama of Samuel Beckett to the soul-searching cries of the (...) Beat poets. Being and Nothingness is one of those rare books whose influence has affected the mind-set of subsequent generations. Sixty years after its first publication, its message remains as potent as ever - challenging the reader to confront the fundamental dilemmas of human freedom, responsibility and action. (shrink)

_Being and Nothingness_ is without doubt one of the most significant books of the twentieth century. The central work by one of the world's most influential thinkers, it altered the course of western philosophy. Its revolutionary approach challenged all previous assumptions about the individual's relationship with the world. Known as 'the Bible of existentialism', its impact on culture and literature was immediate and was felt worldwide, from the absurd drama of Samuel Beckett to the soul-searching cries of the Beat poets. (...) _Being and Nothingness_ is one of those rare books whose influence has affected the mind-set of subsequent generations. Sixty years after its first publication, its message remains as potent as ever - challenging the reader to confront the fundamental dilemmas of human freedom, responsibility and action. (shrink)

Sartre explains the theory of existential psychoanalysis in this treatise on human reality.

In this paper, I present an interpretation of Wittgenstein's remarks on the experience of wonder at the existence of the world. According to this interpretation, Wittgenstein's feeling of wonder stems from perceiving the existence of the world as an absolute miracle, that is, as a fact that is in principle beyond explanation. Based on this analysis, I will suggest that Wittgenstein's experience is akin to what has been described by other authors such as Coleridge, Pessoa, Heidegger, Scheler, Sartre, and Hadot, (...) among many others. Through a comparison between Wittgenstein and Coleridge on the experience of existence, I shall highlight some core features of this experience, chief among them the use of the notion of nothingness in clarifying what is understood in the experience, the role of intuition, and the presence of a specific pathos. As a whole, this paper aims to provide a contribution to the project of a phenomenology of the experience of existence and intends to create a bridge for a dialogue between Wittgenstein and the phenomenological tradition on the enigma of existence. (shrink)

The philosophy developed by Sartre is the philosophy of freedom. This is confirmed by his work, whether in literary or theatrical texts, in political interventions and even in travel reports; but it is in technical works that this concern is even more evident: Sartre sustains that his philosophy must fulfill three tasks, of which the first – and most important – is the metaphysical liberation of men and women. Being and Nothingness fulfills precisely this task; it is against (...) Kant and distancing itself from Husserl and Heidegger that, first, freedom reveals itself as phenomenological truth: I am freedom; second, against all determinism, whether of externality, such as History (situation, class, etc.), or of interiority, such as Ego (transcendental Self, character, etc.), Sartre shows that freedom is also the foundation of History and the beginning of every individual adventure (life story, Psyche), both expressions of the same genesis: the singularity of freedom, self-sustaining process of being-in-the-world, is the only source of what man is and, consequently, of everything that can come to Being. Phenomenological ontology is the foundational work of the philosophy of freedom. (shrink)

Graham Priest’s Theory of Gluons concerns the problem of unity, i.e. what makes an object into a unity? Based on his theory of Gluons, Priest gives his accounts of being and nothingness. In this paper, I will explore the relationship between nothingness and the being of the totality of every object, and then, I will try to demonstrate that, according to Gluon Theory, these two have the same properties, or in other words, nothingness is the (...) being of the totality of every object. (shrink)

There is a common belief that non-being and nothingness are identical, a widespread, even general delusion the wrongness of which I will try to demonstrate in this work. And which I consider even more important, that is to define nothingness for further determination of “its” place and role in the reality and especially in human life.

Sartre’s analysis of intersubjectivity in the third part of Being and Nothingness is guided by two main motives1. First of all, Sartre is simply expanding his ontological investigation of the essential structure of and relation between the for-itself (pour-soi) and the in-itself (en-soi). For as he points out, I need the Other in order fully to understand the structure of my own being, since the for-itself refers to the for-others (EN 267/303, 260/298); moreover, as he later adds, (...) a treatment of the relation to the in-itself must necessarily include an analysis of the Other precisely because this relation is played out in the presence of the Other (EN 410/472). Secondly, Sartre wants to supply a concrete solution to the problem of solipsism (EN 289/329, 296/337). This problem was already preoccupying him in The Transcendence of the Ego, but at that time, Sartre argued that solipsism could be avoided by means of a non-egological theory of consciousness, since such a theory—which sees the transcendental field of consciousness as non-personal and the I as a product of reflection (TE 36/52-53, 63/80- 81)—would no longer confer a privileged status to the I vis-à-vis the Other (TE 85/104). In Being and Nothingness, however, Sartre concedes that this renunciation of the transcendental I has in fact been of no help in overcoming solipsism (EN 280/318). The problem remains and has to be solved. As he is quick to add, however, a proper solution will not involve any proof of the existence of Others; rather, it will be a question of revealing the foundation of our “pre-ontological” certainty with regard to the existence of the Other (EN.. (shrink)

O artigo tenta mostrar como a dialética sartreana do ser e do nada se afasta da concepção fundamental heideggeriana do Dasein enquanto ser-no-mundo, na medida em que seu modo de ser e autocompreensão existenciais conduzem-no em última análise à sua práxis histórica de libertação.

Bergson imputes the generation of false problems in philosophy to the idea of nothingness and negative concepts. Yet, all his books are fraught with oppositional thinking, such as the oppositions between space and time, quantity and quality, life and matter. Understandably, this apparent discrepancy has led a philosopher like Merleau-Ponty to speak of inconsistency, while Jankélévitch and others counter the charge of inconsistency by arguing that Bergsonism embraces operational opposition as opposed to substantial opposition. This article disagrees with both (...) interpretations and proposes a solution based on the need to distinguish between the level of intuitive vision of the unity of nature and the level of representative analysis whose defining feature is that it operates by means of opposing concepts. The progression from representation to intuition transcends opposition and unites life and matter in the vision of a self-surpassing effort or élan. (shrink)

Graham Priest’s Theory of Gluons concerns the problem of unity, i.e. what makes an object into a unity? Based on his theory of Gluons, Priest gives his accounts of being and nothingness. In this paper, I will explore the relationship between nothingness and the being of the totality of every object, and then, I will try to demonstrate that, according to Gluon Theory, these two have the same properties, or in other words, nothingness is the (...) being of the totality of every object. (shrink)

This paper intends to recover the “phenomenological” basis of Sartre’s trajectory since his very first reception of Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s philosophies until the moment in which the main synthesis of his existentialism is published, entitled Being and Nothingness (1943). In this sense, the paper situates the status of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies for Sartrean thought, as well as the originality of Being and Nothingness, which is also influenced by a very particular interpretation of Hegelian (...) negation. (shrink)

Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, by SartreJean-Paul, translated by Sarah Richmond. Abingdon: Routledge, 2018. Pp. xlvii + 848.

Sebastian Gardner competently tackles one of Sartre's more complex and challenging works in this new addition to the Reader's Guides series.

Sartre on Sin: Between Being and Nothingness argues that Jean-Paul Sartre's early, anti-humanist philosophy is indebted to the Christian doctrine of original sin. On the standard reading, Sartre's most fundamental and attractive idea is freedom: he wished to demonstrate the existence of human freedom, and did so by connecting consciousness with nothingness. Focusing on Being and Nothingness, Kate Kirkpatrick demonstrates that Sartre's concept of nothingness (le néant) has a Christian genealogy which has been overlooked (...) in philosophical and theological discussions of his work. Previous scholars have noted the resemblance between Sartre's and Augustine's ontologies: to name but one shared theme, both thinkers describe the human as the being through which nothingness enters the world. However, there has been no previous in-depth examination of this 'resemblance'. Using historical, exegetical, and conceptual methods, Kirkpatrick demonstrates that Sartre's intellectual formation prior to his discovery of phenomenology included theological elements-especially concerning the compatibility of freedom with sin and grace. -/- After outlining the French Augustinianisms by which Sartre's account of the human as 'between being and nothingness' was informed, Kirkpatrick offers a close reading of Being and Nothingness which shows that the psychological, epistemological, and ethical consequences of Sartre's le néant closely resemble the consequences of its theological predecessor; and that his account of freedom can be read as an anti-theodicy. Sartre on Sin illustrates that Sartre' s insights are valuable resources for contemporary hamartiology. (shrink)

The article below is the summary of two earlier works of mine, An Endeavor of New Concept of Being and Non-Being and Non-Being and Nothingness. Only being and nothingness in their unity characterize the environment in which the human being is finding itself, and any non-metaphysical philosophy must consider such an understanding of Reality as the utmost category which is above being, Universe, etc.

Late in his career, Sartre told us that “subjectivity (in Being and Nothingness) is not what it is for me now,” but I do not think that this should be understood as simple rejection. Rather, I think that his notion of the “spiral” best expresses his meaning. The development of his thought progressed through levels of integrating new experience with the past and, in the process, refigured the past. Sartre was, all along, a philosopher protective of subjectivity and (...) freedom, but these notionsunderwent transformation over time, preserved and modified in their surpassing. Sartre’s philosophical itinerary follows the model of the spiral, and in that way, he is his own best commentator. (shrink)

본 논문의 목적은 마르틴 하이데거(M. Heidegger)와 장-폴 사르트르(J.-P. Sartre)의 현상학적 신체론의 유사성을 드러내는 것이다. 널리 알려져 있듯이 두 현상학자는 서로 신체에 대해서 현상학적으로 제대로 접근하지 못했다고 비판한다. 그러나 잘 살펴보면 두 사람의 신체론에서는 몇 가지 공통점이 발견된다. 우선 하이데거는 ‘탈존’(Ex-sistenz) 혹은 ‘세계형성’(Weltbildung)이, 그리고 사르트르는 ‘무화’(néantisation)하면서 존재함이 신체적으로 존재함보다 더 존재론적으로 앞선다고 주장하지만, 공통적으로 우리가 신체적으로 존재하면서만 탈존하고 무화할 수 있다고 주장한다. 두 사람에게 있어서 신체는 탈존 혹은 무화가 일어나는 장소로 간주되는 것이다. 두 번째로 두 사람 모두 전통적인 견해와는 다르게 감각과 (...) 지각이 분리되어 있지 않다고 본다. 우리는 대상이 가지는 각각의 성질들을 독립적으로 감각하고서 그것을 대상으로서 구성해내는것이 아니다. 우리는 단번에 대상을 ‘~으로서’ 지각한다. 세 번째로 신체는 ‘결여’의 형식으로 자신을 드러낸다는 점을 두 사람은 인정한다. 우리가 신체를 통해서 대상과 관계 맺을 때 신체는 자신을 드러내지 않는 방식으로 자신과 대상을 드러내는 것이다. 이러한 공통점들은 두 철학자가 우리의 신체에 대해서 현상학적으로 접근했기 때문에 드러날 수 있는 신체현상이라 할 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

I understand Sartre's ontology to develop in three stages: first, through Being and Nothingness and Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr; second, through the Critique of Dialectical Reason; and, finally, as it unfolds in The Family Idiot. Each stage depends upon the former and deepens the original ontology, while still introducing novel elements. For example, in Being and Nothingness, the in-itself, which is the source of our world-making, develops in the Critique into the practico-inert, which is the (...) world made artifact, and in The Family Idiot, both the in-itself and the practico-inert unite to become the Spirit of the Age, joining our adventure with nature to that of our adventure with our family and our history. My reflection will be developed in four stages: first, a general overview; second, a more extended study of what Sartre calls the problematic of human reality; third, a brief reflection on Sartre's methodology; and finally, a concluding survey. (shrink)

In a Preface, the translator says: “This is a translation of all of Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’être et le Néant.” She earned hard and earned well the right to make this satisfied statement. It was a task of intimidating dimensions. Sartre’s vocabulary and style, in this, his major philosophical opus, are grim, graceless and disheartening. Seldom has the French language had to suffer so much in giving birth to a philosopher’s ideas. American translations of the minor works, hitherto available, have sometimes (...) had the effect of making the obscure absurd; their explanatory introductions have sometimes been quite silly. Of Miss Barnes’s translation, it must be said that she has succeeded admirably in being both accurate and readable. She has not just transposed Sartre’s words but his thought into an English which “reads English” and not just transliterated French, and which makes Sartre not less understandable in translation than he was in the original. Where the translation remains barely intelligible, the fault is not hers. The Introduction, too, is of high quality and gives us, in forty pages, an intelligent exposition and acute appraisal of Sartre’s ontology which compares favourably with anything hitherto written about Sartre in English. There is a useful and accurate glossary of technical terms of Sartrean philosophy and a Name Index which give the English volume important advantages over the French. (shrink)

The first English version of Sartre's major work. Only time and use can decide the adequacy of a translation of a work so large and important, but on first examination the translator seems to have done an accurate and responsible job. There are extensive notes marking deviations from the French text and idiom, and an Introduction deals with certain Sartrean problems and criticisms, though not in a very enlightening way.--L. M.

I am attracted to ontological pluralism, the doctrine that some things exist in a different way than other things.1 For the ontological pluralist, there is more to learn about an object’s existential status than merely whether it is or is not: there is still the question of how that entity exists. By contrast, according to the ontological monist, either something is or it isn’t, and that’s all there is say about a thing’s existential status. We appear to be to be (...) ontological committed to what I will call almost nothings. Examples of almost nothings include holes, cracks, and shadows; almost nothings thrive in the absence of ‘positive’ entities such as donuts, walls, and sunlight. Let’s focus on holes, since the literature on them is voluminous.2 We quantify over holes, and even count them: we say, for example, that there are some holes in the cheese, seven to be precise. We ascribe features to them and talk as though they stand in relations: that hole is three feet wide, much wider than that tire over there. Holes apparently persist through time, as evidenced by the fact that my sweater has the same hole in it as the last time you saw me wear it. We even talk as though holes are causally efficacious: my ankle was badly sprained because I stepped in that hole in the sidewalk.3 It seems then that we believe in holes. If our beliefs are true, holes must enjoy some kind of reality. This puts the ontological monist in an uncomfortable position. According to her, everything that there is enjoys the same kind of reality, which is the kind of reality enjoyed by full-fledged concrete entities such as ourselves. She is committed to the unpleasant claim that holes are just as real as concretia, a claim that is apt to be met with incredulous stares by those not acquainted with contemporary metaphysics. Roy Sorensen (2008, p. 19) notes the tension almost nothings generate for ontological monists: ‘… it feels paradoxical to say that absences exist—but no better to say that absences do not exist’.. (shrink)

This brief essay unpretentiously seeks to highlight the relevance of some of the central questions in Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness, thus aiming to contribute to broadening the scope of the French philosopher's ideas. Without fearing controversy, it presents the correlation between the concept of freedom and the responsibility necessarily implied. Such concepts remind us that this work is current, for it demands to assume its political and ethical unfoldings as unavoidable demands. The debate is built, then, through (...) Sartre's encounters with his peers, highlighting the interlocutions and controversial divergences that mark his itinerary. Finally, the timeliness of the work seems to reside in the historical failure of the humanist project, that is, Being and Nothingness continues to be current, because we are still incapable of promoting a historical situation in which the human being is free. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre's account of the Look in Being and Nothingness is not straightforward and many conflicting interpretations have arisen due to apparent contradictions in Sartre's own writing. The Look, for Sartre, demonstrates how the self gains thematic awareness of the body, forming a public and self-conscious sense of how the body appears to others and, furthermore, illustrates affective and social aspects of embodied being. In this article, I will critically explore Sartre's oft-cited voyeur vignette in order to (...) provide a coherent account of the Look and to illustrate the significance of intersubjectivity and self-consciousness in Sartre's work. Through considering Sartre's voyeur vignette and other examples of reflective self-consciousness, this article will examine epistemological, self-evaluative and ontological concerns in the constitution of reflective self-consciousness. It will be contended that Sartre's accounts of the Look and reflective self-consciousness within social relations can provide insight into the intersubjective nature of the shaping of the body and the significance of self-presentation within the social realm. (shrink)

"[A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness] represents, I believe, a very important beginning of a deservingly serious effort to make the whole ...

Human suffering is a complex phenomenon that can manifest physically or psychologically. As the negative valence of affective phenomena, with the positive being pleasure or happiness, human suffering could easily be interpreted as something to avoid. Sartre explored existential aspects of human suffering in Being and Nothingness. Examining each occurrence of the word suffering in that work provides a basis for understanding the roles Sartre assigned to it within the human experience and consequently provides a more nuanced (...) appreciation of this complex phenomenon. An electronic copy of Being and Nothingness was searched for all occurrences of the word suffering (N = 50), tabularized using the Key Word In Context (KWIC) approach at the sentence level, resulting in 40 sentences for thematic analysis. That analysis resulted in 5 themes, showing the complexity of suffering in Sartre’s major philosophical work and suggesting that suffering is quintessentially human, unavoidable, and potentially liberating. (shrink)

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre explains that being-in-itself is transphenomenal and becomes a phenomenon only through the process by which consciousness qualifies itself as its negation. Thus, there can be no phenomenon except as the object that consciousness negates. This ontology of phenomena proves contradictory because one does not understand how consciousness can negate what does not appear to it, especially if it needs to do so as an existentialist freedom, which has to choose the end towards (...) which it negates being. Sartre's theory of facticity as 'body' then comes as an alternative conception of phenomena, answering these problems by ultimately tending to present being-in-itself as a non-objective, hence non-conscious, phenomenon. Intentional consciousness thus becomes a transcendental condition for objectivity only and not for phenomenality in general. (shrink)

In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre boldly asserts that: “To be dead is to be a prey for theliving.”1 In the following paper, I argue that Sartre’s rather pessimistic understanding of death isunwarranted. In fact, Herbert Marcuse forcefully suggests that Sartre is one of the “betrayers of Utopia”because Sartre’s notion of death stifles efforts towards true liberation. By returning to Eros andCivilization, I explain and further substantiate Marcuse’s critique of Sartrean freedom as originallypresented in Marcuse’s essay, “Existentialism: Remarks (...) on Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’Etre et le Neant.”. (shrink)

In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre boldly asserts that: “To be dead is to be a prey for theliving.”1 In the following paper, I argue that Sartre’s rather pessimistic understanding of death isunwarranted. In fact, Herbert Marcuse forcefully suggests that Sartre is one of the “betrayers of Utopia”because Sartre’s notion of death stifles efforts towards true liberation. By returning to Eros andCivilization, I explain and further substantiate Marcuse’s critique of Sartrean freedom as originallypresented in Marcuse’s essay, “Existentialism: Remarks (...) on Jean-Paul Sartre’s L’Etre et le Neant.”. (shrink)

This essay argues that an adequate account of bad faith cannot be given without taking the second half of Being and Nothingness into consideration. There are two separate but related reasons for this. First, the objectifying gaze of Others provides a necessary condition for the possibility of bad faith. Sartre, however, does not formally introduce analysis of Others until Parts III and IV. Second, upon the introduction of Others, Sartre revises his view of absolute freedom. Sartre's considered view (...) of freedom helps to make sense out of bad faith in a way that does not seem possible were freedom absolute. (shrink)