Das Buch geht der Frage nach, wie Metaphern in Sehflächen verankert sind. Um eine fundierte Antwort geben zu können, setzt sich die Verfasserin mit einschlägigen sprachlichen, kognitiven und visuellen Metapherntheorien auseinander und entwickelt ein Modell speziell zur Analyse zeichensystemübergreifender Strukturmetaphern. Das Modell wird mit dem Fokus auf Zeitmetaphern an ausgwählten Werbeanzeigen und Kunstwerken erprobt. Da Zeit in Text-Bild-Gefügen zudem in Form sprachlich determinierter bildlicher Orientierungsmetaphern codiert ist, werden auch diese in bestimmten Flächen- und Farbgestaltungen identifiziert. Ferner werden beide Metaphernarten im (...) dichtesten Konglomerat der ikonischen Typografie und Kalligrafie aufgespürt. Sämtliche Analysen und die daraus hervorgehenden Deutungen der Sehflächen repräsentieren den gegenwärtigen Zeitbegriff in unserer Gesellschaft, welcher über zwei feldtheoretische Karten aufgerissen wird. (shrink)

Die Schriften der aristotelischen Logik sind in der Spatantike aussergewohnlich intensiv kommentiert worden. Die auch heute noch mit dem Titel 'Organon' bezeichnete Textsammlung der logischen Schriften des Aristoteles wird von den spatantiken Interpreten als Einheit aufgefasst, die von den 'Kategorien' bis zur 'Poetik' reicht. Ihre Bezeichnung als 'Organon' hat die Textsammlung von der ihr zugewiesenen Funktion erhalten: Denn es besteht zwischen den spatantiken Interpreten Konsens daruber, dass die aristotelische Logik ein 'Organon', ein Werkzeug, nicht aber ein Teil der Philosophie ist. (...) Die zentrale Frage, um welche die Untersuchung des Grundcharakters der aristotelischen Logik gemass ihren antiken Interpreten kreist, lautet daher, inwiefern die aristotelische Logik ein Werkzeug der Philosophie - und auch der Mathematik - ist und nur sein kann. Erst von dieser dienenden Funktion der Logik her wird der inhaltliche Zusammenhang zwischen den einzelnen Schriften des 'Organon' und der weite Begriff von Logik in dieser Tradition verstandlich. (shrink)

This book focuses on yoga’s transcultural dissemination in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In the course of this process, the term “yoga” has been associated with various distinctive blends of mental and physical exercises performed in order to achieve some sort of improvement, whether understood in terms of esotericism, fitness, self-actualization, body aesthetics, or health care. The essays in this volume explore some of the turning points in yoga’s historico-spatial evolution and their relevance to its current appeal. The authors focus (...) on central motivations, sites, and agents in the spread of posture-based yoga as well as on its successive (re-)interpretation and diversification, addressing questions such as: Why has yoga taken its various forms? How do time and place influence its meanings, social roles, and associated experiences? How does the transfer into new settings affect the ways in which yogic practice has been conceptualized as a system, and on what basis is it still identified as (Indian) yoga? The initial section of the volume concentrates on the re-evaluation of yoga in Indian and Western settings in the first half of the twentieth century. The following chapters link global discourses to particular local settings and explore meaning production at the micro-social level, taking Germany as the focal site. The final part of the book focuses on yoga advertising and consumption across national, social, and discursive boundaries, taking a closer look at transnational and deterritorialized yoga markets, as well as at various classes of mobile yoga practitioners. (shrink)

The tendency of individuals to protect their own worldview by rejecting information and phenomena that cannot be reconciled with it is a significant issue in today’s polarised society. This paper aims to gain a deeper insight into this tendency towards exclusion and the impact it has on worldview by examining a particular interpretation of worldview developed in the late 1930s by Martin Heidegger. It is a radical account that portrays a highly restrictive and extremely closed-off model of worldview, within which (...) exclusion plays a key role. The impact of this exclusion on the nature and shape of worldview is explored by analysing worldview from three distinct perspectives focusing on (1) its appearance, marked by freedom and safety, (2) its inner dynamic, marked by absolute control, and (3) its affective background, marked by frantic struggle and dread. The analysis reveals a dread-fuelled, highly reactionary, and thus extremely fragile structure that is fundamentally shaped by the endless effort to conceal the exclusion on which it is built, resulting in a complete inability to engage with that which is excluded without severely endangering the very existence of that worldview. (shrink)

The Proceedings present the contributions to the 13th International Kant Congress which was held at the University of Oslo, August 6-9, 2019. The congress, which hosted speakers from more than thirty countries and five continents, was dedicated to the topic of the court of reason. The idea that reason stands before itself as a tribunal characterizes the whole of Kant's critical project. Without such a court, reason falls into conflict with itself. With such a court in place, however, it may (...) succeed in establishing the possibility and limits of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, law and science. The idea of reason being its own judge is not only pivotal to a proper understanding of Kant's philosophy, but can also shed light on the burgeoning fields of meta-philosophy and philosophical methodology. The 2019 Kant Congress put special emphasis on Kant's methodology, his account of conceptual critique, and the relevance of his ideas to current issues in especially political philosophy and the philosophy of law. Additional sections discussed a wide range of topics in Kant's philosophy. The Proceedings will provide anyone who is interested in exploring the variety of present-day work on Kant and Kantian themes with a wealth of fruitful inspiration. (shrink)

We show that Stoffregen & Bardy's arguments against the assumption of separately functioning senses have more historical antecedents than they give credit for, and that multimodal functioning does not require this assumption. What is needed is evidence that biological organisms are indeed detecting and acting upon information in a multimodal (or global) array.

Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have proposed an “argumentative theory of rea-soning” in which the function of reasoning is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Mercier and Sperber note that the theory does not work when we reason alone or with people who share our beliefs. However, the theory also fails in deliberations involving “framework beliefs”—beliefs that are only indirectly related to empirical evidence but that have a particular importance for the believer because of their centrality to a (...) dense web of other beliefs and their connections to social practices. Framework beliefs not only include many ethical, religious, and political beliefs, but also paradigmatic scientific beliefs. An alterna-tive theory of reasoning, derived from philosophical pragmatism, is presented that explains the rigidity of framework beliefs and is more optimistic about individual reasoning. A consequence of the pragmatist theory is that certain types of bias and polarization are functional. (shrink)

We argue that lateralities are not merely a result of phylogenetic processes but reflect probability functions that are influenced by task characteristics and extended practice. We support our argument by empirical findings on lateral biases in early infancy in general, and footedness in particular, and on hand preferences in nonhuman primates.

The Proceedings present the contributions to the 13th International Kant Congress which was held at the University of Oslo, August 6-9, 2019. The congress, which hosted speakers from more than thirty countries and five continents, was dedicated to the topic of the court of reason. The idea that reason stands before itself as a tribunal characterizes the whole of Kant's critical project. Without such a court, reason falls into conflict with itself. With such a court in place, however, it may (...) succeed in establishing the possibility and limits of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, law and science. The idea of reason being its own judge is not only pivotal to a proper understanding of Kant's philosophy, but can also shed light on the burgeoning fields of meta-philosophy and philosophical methodology. The 2019 Kant Congress put special emphasis on Kant's methodology, his account of conceptual critique, and the relevance of his ideas to current issues in especially political philosophy and the philosophy of law. Additional sections discussed a wide range of topics in Kant's philosophy. The Proceedings will provide anyone who is interested in exploring the variety of present-day work on Kant and Kantian themes with a wealth of fruitful inspiration. (shrink)

A case study of growers conception of irrigation strategies indicates that pot plant growers in Scandinavia base their management approaches on experientially based art. The study also indicates that there is a gap between experientially based art and available greenhouse technology. In order to standardize production and produce quality, both the grower’s experience and available technology should be taken into account. In order to achieve this, the present study proposes to arrange reflection on reflection in action with a group of (...) growers by means of the dialogue seminar method. The concept of reflection on reflection in action is novel to horticultural practice. Therefore, we suggest future inter- and multidisciplinary research within this domain. (shrink)

It is argued that a better theory neither (I) proves better at enabling us to realize our goals, nor (II) enables us to make more accurate predictions than a worse theory. (I) fails because it, tacitly, erroneously assumes, in talking of our goals, that individual preferences for theories can be aggregated into a social preference ordering; (II) fails because it cannot distinguish between important and unimportant predictions. Neither of these failures can be patched up by appealing to the notion of (...) a true theory. The conclusion is that we as yet possess no adequate understanding of the relationships among theoretical progress, goal realization, and predictive accuracy. (shrink)

This volume, edited by a philosopher and an anthropologist, is a collection of essays on the philosophical implications of laboratory and field research. While neither the best nor the worst of the genre, it is a collection that offers a representative sample of traditional themes. As practicing scientists who view the implications of behavioural research from a somewhat different perspective we offer this critical review.

I argue for a type of relativism that allows different people to have conflicting accurate representations of the world. This is contrary to the view of most Anglo-American philosophers, who would, with Paul Boghossian in Fear of Knowledge, deny that “there are many radically different, yet ‘equally valid’ ways of knowing the world.” My argument is not a metaphysical argument about the ultimate nature of the outside world, but a psychological argument about the mental processes of representation. The argument starts (...) from a few principles of naïve (or folk) psychology, but is later extended to apply to mechanisms that do not have a “psychology.” Finally, I briefly discuss the anti-relativist impulse in philosophy, with particular reference to Boghossian’s example of non-scientific beliefs regarding Lakota origins. I argue that both we and the Lakotas have good reason to reject such beliefs while still remaining relativists. Being a relativist does not mean that you get to believe whatever you like. (shrink)

Rational argument doesn't often change minds. I explore the reasons why the usual processes of argument seldom convince people on the other side.

Relativism is a theory about how people organize their beliefs. We construct mental representations of the world—particular configurations of our internal brain stuff—to guide our actions. But our brains contain only a minuscule part of the world’s stuff. Given the limited brain stuff available, we can have detailed representations of some features of the world only if we simplify our representations of other parts. Our internal representational means are thus too meager to accurately represent reality in full. Which representations we (...) adopt will therefore depend upon our purposes: different purposes, different representations, different beliefs. Such a relativism does not deny the reality of the outside world, is not self-contradictory, and allows for progress, moral persuasion, and cross-cultural criticism. (shrink)

A rational man’s beliefs are not logically consistent, and he does not believe all the logical consequences of his beliefs. This is because in any situational context, we only accept certain believed sentences. Within that context, we insist that sentences be logically consistent, and we accept the logical consequences of the other sentences we accept in that context. But such sentences do not have to be consistent with sentences we accept in other contexts, nor will we always accept in that (...) context the logical consequences of sentences that we accept in other contexts. We go through many different situational contexts in the course of a day. For example, in trying to start a car with a dead battery, explaining why the car won’t start may form one context, while explaining how to start it may form a different context; sentences we accept in the first context may be logically inconsistent with sentences we accept in the second. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren damit den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

I argue that quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation is incorrect. the argument exploits the connections between quine's thesis and common sense notions regarding belief. a simple model of belief, taking beliefs to be sets of brain states, is used to give a rigorous restatement of quine's thesis. it is then argued that our need to project the actions of other people from their professions of belief would make the situation quine describes unstable, since persons in that situation (...) would make less accurate predictions of actions than would persons not so situated. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 7 Heft: 1 Seiten: 3-16.

A general introduction to the philosophy of David Hume.

Replies to Hugo Mercier’s and Mike Oaksford’s comments on my paper “Why Do Humans Reason? A Pragmatic Supplement to an Argumentative Theory,” Thinking & Reasoning (August-November 2013) 472-487. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2013.802256.

We all have internal models (or maps) that represent the world. But all models/maps distort. Given the complexity of the world and the psychological limits to our representational ability, we must do with simplified models that work in those situations that are most important for us. But since our wants and situations differ, so will our models. When we encounter people with different models, we may try to convert them, but such conversion is unlikely if their models serve their wants (...) and situations. Once we give up on conversion, we may look for those mutually beneficial accommodations that are possible even when models differ. (shrink)

With good reason, Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power is considered the focal point of his thinking. It allows for exploring the essential features of Nietzsche’s philosophical project, and for critically looking into its viability. Is Nietzsche right to claim that striving for power has to be regarded as the one and only pivotal drive that grounds human activity? Or do we have to assume counterforces, perhaps ethical counterforces in particular, that oppose or ought to oppose power and striving (...) for power?1 Seeking an answer to this question appears to be challenging and puzzling, not least because Nietzsche’s philosophy of power includes and even highlights the aspect of “plurality,” a... (shrink)