IndividuelleFreiheitindividuelleAutonomieAutonomie wird allgemein als die Fähigkeit von Personen verstanden, über ihr eigenes Leben bestimmen zu können, ihr eigenes Leben zu führen anhand von Gründen, Überlegungen, Motiven, Wünschen, die ihre eigenen sind und ihnen nicht von anderen – aus persönlichen oder politischen Gründen – aufgezwungen, die aber immer in Beziehung mit anderen entwickelt werden. Deshalb begründet Autonomie VerantwortlichkeitVerantwortungFreiheit als Bedingung für Verantwortung und fordert Respekt von anderen. Autonomie ist seit der Aufklärung einer der zentralen, leitenden Begriffe sowohl in der Ethik wie (...) in der Politischen Philosophie. (shrink)

The article first develops an account of autonomy, explaining individual autonomy by means of three normative components and then discussing two objections. The first objection claims that autonomy has to be thought of as essentially relational; this objection is refuted. The second objection, labeled the skeptical objection, claims that we simply do not live autonomously, nor could we ever. Reference is made to novels by Iris Murdoch to present a skeptical solution to this objection.

: The article first develops an account of autonomy, explaining individual autonomy by means of three normative components and then discussing two objections. The first objection claims that autonomy has to be thought of as essentially relational; this objection is refuted. The second objection, labeled the skeptical objection, claims that we simply do not live autonomously, nor could we ever. Reference is made to novels by Iris Murdoch to present a skeptical solution to this objection.

Starting from the given societal fact of an unequal ‘worth of freedom’ for men and women in pursuing possible plans of life, and the assumption that this difference is due to the distinction between the private and public realm, the author investigates into the gender-structure of recent political theories. Following the lines of the debate between communitarians and liberals she argues for the thesis that while communitarians try to ‘privatize’ the public sphere on the model of the ideal family or (...) given traditions of communities and thus cannot account for the idea of emancipation from given structures and roles, liberals have to ‘publicize’ the private in order to give substance to the idea of an ‘equal worth of freedom’ for men and women. Thus, liberalism has to rethink the theoretical distinction of the private and the public sphere and its practical consequences. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 65 Heft: 6 Seiten: 1127-1133.

Is it necessary and is it possible to develop and justify a meaningful concept of women’s solidarity? In this contribution, I will answer both of these questions in the affirmative. Starting by developing a concept of solidarity, I then move on to discussing the intricate question of a consistent and meaningful concept of ‘woman’. After suggesting a solution to the semantic as well as ontological problems, I turn to the idea of collective experiences of oppression as a possible basis or (...) at least a starting point for women’s solidarity. The idea of collective experiences has tobe enriched, however, by referring to the idea of political imagination in order to demonstrate a way of providing convincing interpretations of shared experiences. In a last step, I discuss – following Habermas – the relation between solidarity and justice, since it is solely the idea of justice which can motivate as well as justify claims to solidarity. I end by having a brief look at conflicting claims of solidarity and the problem of intersectionality. (shrink)

A revision of the author's thesis (doctoral)--Freie Universitèat Berlin, 1988.