The paper concerns the problem of the legal responsibility of autonomous machines. In our opinion it boils down to the question of whether such machines can be seen as real agents through the prism of folk-psychology. We argue that autonomous machines cannot be granted the status of legal agents. Although this is quite possible from purely technical point of view, since the law is a conventional tool of regulating social interactions and as such can accommodate various legislative constructs, including legal (...) responsibility of autonomous artificial agents, we believe that it would remain a mere ‘law in books’, never materializing as ‘law in action’. It is not impossible to imagine that the evolution of our conceptual apparatus will reach a stage, when autonomous robots become full-blooded moral and legal agents. However, today at least, we seem to be far from this point. (shrink)

This article outlines the contributions of the Kraków School to the field of science and religion. The Kraków School is a group of philosophers, scientists, and theologians who belong to the milieu of the Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Studies. The members of the group are engaged in inquiries pertaining to the relationship between theology and various sciences, in particular cosmology, evolutionary theory, and neuroscience. The article includes a presentation of the historical background of the School, as well as its main (...) original contributions pertaining to the history of the interactions between science and religion, the rationality and mathematicity of the universe, theology of science, and the role of logic in theology. (shrink)

The Logic of Legal Requirements. Essays on Defeasibility, edited by Jordi Ferrer Beltrán and Giovanni Battista Ratti, and published by Oxford University Press in 2012, is a very much welcome contribution to one of the most discussed topics in the contemporary legal theory and philosophy. Defeasibility is connected to many essential issues such as the nature of legal reasoning, the structure of legal norms and legal system, the concept of legal validity, as well as the mechanisms and limits of..

The goal in this short paper is to argue that so-called intermediary concepts play an essential role in organizing and generating legal knowledge. The point of departure is a reconstruction and a critique of Alf Ross’s analysis of such concepts. His goal was to argue that there exist concepts in the law which have no semantic reference, yet it is reasonable to use them as they perform some useful function regarding the presentation of legal rules. The author believes that Ross (...) is wrong on both counts: his argument to the effect that intermediary concepts have no reference is flawed, and his characterization of the functions such concepts play in the law is too limiting. (shrink)

This book examines the fundamental issues in neuroscience from methodological and philosophical perspectives. The reader will learn about the methodological difficulties connected with the use of neuroscientific experiments in philosophical argumentation and about the nature of scientific explanation in neuroscience. In addition, the book includes case studies of several issues lying at the intersection of neuroscience and philosophy, such as theory of mind, self-consciousness, self-deception, depression, and morality.

This paper addresses the black-box problem in artificial intelligence (AI), and the related problem of explainability of AI in the legal context. We argue, first, that the black box problem is, in fact, a superficial one as it results from an overlap of four different – albeit interconnected – issues: the opacity problem, the strangeness problem, the unpredictability problem, and the justification problem. Thus, we propose a framework for discussing both the black box problem and the explainability of AI. We (...) argue further that contrary to often defended claims the opacity issue is not a genuine problem. We also dismiss the justification problem. Further, we describe the tensions involved in the strangeness and unpredictability problems and suggest some ways to alleviate them. (shrink)

This handbook offers a deep analysis of the main forms of legal reasoning and argumentation from both a logical-philosophical and legal perspective. These forms are covered in an exhaustive and critical fashion, and the handbook accordingly divides in three parts: the first one introduces and discusses the basic concepts of practical reasoning. The second one discusses the main general forms of reasoning and argumentation relevant for legal discourse. The third one looks at their application in law as well as at (...) the different areas of legal reasoning. The handbook’s division in three parts reflects its conceptual architecture, since legal reasoning and argumentation are considered in relation to the more general types of reasoning. (shrink)

The goal of the paper is to reply to David Duarte’s critique of the partial reducibility thesis―a claim I defended in one of my books that analogy is partly reducible to the balancing of legal principles. In the first part of the paper I sketch the framework against which the thesis was formulated, i.e. Robert Alexy’s theory of legal reasoning. In the second part I attempt to rebut Duarte’s objections, pointing out that they do not take into account the Alexian (...) background of my considerations. Finally, I suggest that some aspects of my theory of analogical reasoning are independent of its theoretical background and may be of value for any conceptualization of analogy in the law. (shrink)

Cilj članka je odgovoriti na kritiko, ki jo je David Duarte usmeril zoper tezo o delni zvedljivosti, tj. trditev, ki jo Brożek zagovarja v eni izmed svojih knjig in pravi, da je analogno sklepanje deloma zvedljivo na tehtanje pravnih načel. Prvi del članka oriše okvir, ki je avtorju služil pri oblikovanju teze o zvedljivosti, tj. Alexyjevo teorijo pravnega sklepanja. Drugi del je namenjen ovrženju Duartejevih ugovorov. Ti naj namreč ne bi upoštevali prej omenjenega okvira. V zadnjem delu avtor še zatrdi, (...) da so nekateri vidiki njegove teorije analognega sklepanja neodvisni od omenjenega teoretskega okvira in zato uporabni za katerokoli pojmovanje analogije v pravu. (shrink)

Avtor zatrjuje, da imajo t. i. posredniški pojmi ključno vlogo pri urejanju in tvorbi pravnega znanja. V izhodišču povzame Rossovo razmišljanje o takšnih pojmih, ki ga nato kritizira. Ross je skušal pokazati, da v pravu obstajajo pojmi, ki nimajo nobenega pomenskega ozira, a je njihova raba kljub temu nekaj razumnega, saj imajo pri predstavitvi pravnih pravil koristno vlogo. Avtor meni, da sta obe Rossovi trditvi napačni: zmoten je njegov sklep, da posredniški pojmi nimajo nobenega pomenskega ozira, Rossova opredelitev njihove vloge (...) v pravu pa je preveč omejujoča. (shrink)

Philosophy in science should be sharply distinguished from the philosophy of science. The latter offers a philosophical reflection on the method of science; the former, on the contrary, is expected to concentrate on the mutual influence between the philosophical ideas and scientific theories and practice. The papers in this book explore both the methodological niveau of the philosophy in science and some particular philosophical issues intertwined with scientific theories. Only such a combination of two perspectives may provide a comprehensive picture (...) of the methods and applications characteristic of philosophy in science. The book includes essays by Sir Roger Penrose, Joseph LeDoux, Francisco J. Ayala, and Michael Heller who won of the Templeton Prize in 2008. (shrink)

El propósito en este breve artículo es argumentar que los llamados conceptos intermediarios juegan un rol esencial en la organización y generación del conocimiento jurídico. El punto de partida es una reconstrucción y crítica del análisis de Alf Ross sobre dichos conceptos. Su objetivo era argumentar que existen conceptos en el derecho que no tienen referencia semántica, pero que aun así es razonable usarlos dado que cumplen con algunas funciones útiles relacionadas con la presentación de las reglas jurídicas. El autor (...) de este artículo afirma que Ross está equivocado en ambos casos: su argumento al efecto de que los conceptos intermediarios no tienen referencia es defectuoso, y su caracterización de las funciones que dichos conceptos cumplen en el derecho es muy limitante. (shrink)

In this paper it has been argued that the theory of conceptual maps developed recently by Paul M. Churchland provides support for Wittgenstein’s claim that language is a tool for acting in the world. The role of language is to coordinate and shape the conceptual maps of the members of the given language community, reducing the cross-individual cognitive idiosyncrasies and paving the way for joint cognitive enterprises. Moreover, Churchland’s theory also explains our tendency to speak of language as consisting of (...) concepts which correspond to things we encounter in the world. The puzzle of common sense reference is no longer a puzzle: while at the fundamental level language remains a tool for orchestrating conceptual maps, the fact that the maps encode some communally shared categorization of experience fuels our talk of concepts capturing the essences of things, natural kinds, prototypes, etc. (shrink)

This edited volume explores ideas of legal realism which emerge through the works of Russian legal philosophers. Apart from the well-known American and Scandinavian versions of legal realism, there also exists a Russian one: readers will discover fresh perspectives and that the collection of early twentieth century ideas on law discussed in Russia can be understood as a unified school of legal thought – as Russian legal realism. These chapters by renowned European and Eastern European legal philosophers add to ongoing (...) discussions about the nature of law, especially in the context of developments around our scientific knowledge about the mind and behaviour. Analyses of legal phenomena carried out by legal realists in Russia offer novel arguments in favour of embracing psychological and sociological perspectives on the law. The book includes analysis of the St. Petersburg school of legal philosophy and Leon Petrażycki’s psychological theory of law. This original and multifaceted research on Russian realists is of considerable value to an international audience. Researchers and postgraduate students of law, legal theory and legal ethics will find the book particularly appealing, but it will also interest those investigating the philosophy or sociology of law, or legal history. (shrink)