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  1.  77
    Children’s first and second-order false-belief reasoning in a verbal and a low-verbal task.Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek van Hout & Petra Hendriks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3).
    We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief tasks. In this study (...)
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  2.  80
    Children's first and second-order false-belief reasoning in a verbal and a low-verbal task.Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek Hout & Petra Hendriks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3).
    We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief tasks. In this study (...)
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    Why some children accept under-informative utterances.Alma Veenstra, Bart Hollebrandse & Napoleon Katsos - 2018 - Pragmatics Cognition 24 (2):297-313.
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    Why some children accept under-informative utterances.Alma Veenstra, Bart Hollebrandse & Napoleon Katsos - 2017 - Pragmatics and Cognition 24 (2):297-313.
    Binary judgement on under-informative utterances is the most widely used methodology to test children’s ability to generate implicatures. Accepting under-informative utterances is considered a failure to generate implicatures. We present off-line and reaction time evidence for the Pragmatic Tolerance Hypothesis, according to which some children who accept under-informative utterances are in fact competent with implicature but do not consider pragmatic violations grave enough to reject the critical utterance. Seventy-five Dutch-speaking four to nine-year-olds completed a binary and a ternary judgement task. (...)
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