The 2012 Varsity Medical Debate between Oxford University and Cambridge University provided a stage for representatives from these famous institutions to debate the motion “This house believes that trainee doctors should be able to use the developing world to gain clinical experience.” This article brings together many of the arguments put forward during the debate, centring around three major points of contention: the potential intrinsic wrong of ‘using’ patients in developing countries; the effects on the elective participant; and the effects (...) on the host community. The article goes on to critically appraise overseas elective programmes, offering a number of solutions that would help optimise their effectiveness in the developing world. (shrink)

When an individual facing intractable pain is given an estimate of a few months to live, does hastening death become a viable and legitimate alternative for willing patients? Has the time come for physicians to do away with the traditional notion of healthcare as maintaining or improving physical and mental health, and instead accept their own limitations by facilitating death when requested? The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge held the 2013 Varsity Medical Debate on the motion “This House Would Legalise (...) Assisted Dying”. This article summarises the key arguments developed over the course of the debate. We will explore how assisted dying can affect both the patient and doctor; the nature of consent and limits of autonomy; the effects on society; the viability of a proposed model; and, perhaps most importantly, the potential need for the practice within our current medico-legal framework. (shrink)

Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book.

Ethicist assumptions about the causes and solutions of environmental problems are widely held within environmental philosophy. It is typically assumed that an important cause of problems are the attitudes towards the natural environment held by individuals and that problems can be solved by getting people to adopt a more ethical orientation towards the environment. This article analyses and criticises these claims. Both the highly mediated nature of the relationship between individuals and the natural environment and the pervasive pressure on firms (...) in market economies to reduce their costs provide reasons to question the ethicist assumptions. (shrink)

Rage against the system : the unity of truth -- A philosophy of hope? The universality of truth -- Absolutely no absolutes? Ricœur's encounter with Thévenaz -- Finitude and the infinite : the God of the philosophers -- Finitude and evil : the crucial distinction -- Rightly relating evil and finitude -- The poetic symbol of creation -- The mysterious unity of creation -- The original goodness of creation -- Conclusion. New frontiers between philosophy and theology.

The everyday concept of a social group is approached by examining the concept of going for a walk together, an example of doing something together, or "shared action". Two analyses requiring shared personal goals are rejected, since they fail to explain how people walking together have obligations and rights to appropriate behavior, and corresponding rights of rebuke. An alternative account is proposed: those who walk together must constitute the "plural subject" of a goal. The nature of plural subjecthood, the thesis (...) that social groups are plural subjects, and the relation of these ideas to Rousseau's and Hobbes 's, are briefly explored. (shrink)

_Arguing with People_ brings developments from the field of Argumentation Theory to bear on critical thinking in a clear and accessible way. This book expands the critical thinking toolkit, and shows how those tools can be applied in the hurly-burly of everyday arguing. Gilbert emphasizes the importance of understanding real arguments, understanding just who you are arguing with, and knowing how to use that information for successful argumentation. Interesting examples and partner exercises are provided to demonstrate tangible ways in (...) which the book’s lessons can be applied. (shrink)

The paper aims to investigate the thesis of the so-called Neue Mythologie within the fragment entitled “Das älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus” [“The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism”]. The latter presents a revolutionary project of social pedagogy linked to the use of the aesthetic character of myth and poetry in the formation of the conscience and the intellect of the people. The program, therefore, formulates a fertile dialogue between the emancipatory potential of the Enlightenment and Jena Romanticism, in that (...) it proposes a re-evaluation of feelings and Sinnlichkeit [sensuousness] in connection to modern rationality and freedom. The links between the rational mythology of the program and Hegelian philosophy will be explored, starting from his early writings, which are strictly concerned with the importance of a popular and sensuous religion (Volksreligion). Secondly, the work will retrace the same sensuous externalization of philosophical ideas within the relationships between art, religion and philosophy in the mature system, addressing the problem of Hegel’s change of heart regarding art and mythology between the two phases of his thought. In the end the value of symbolical mediation of concepts and idea will be established. (shrink)

We study a modal system ¯T, that extends the classical (prepositional) modal system T and whose language is provided with modal operators M inn (nN) to be interpreted, in the usual kripkean semantics, as there are more than n accessible worlds such that.... We find reasonable axioms for ¯T and we prove for it completeness, compactness and decidability theorems.

The meaning of a symbol is determined by its use, but the canonical way of specifying meaning is in a statement of the form "S means...". To be able to provide such a specification is equivalent to being able to translate the symbol S into one's own terms. A change in usage of terms involves a change of meaning iff the correct translation between earlier usage and later usage takes a term into a different expression. Such translation is holistic, a (...) matter of finding the best mapping. Sameness of meaning is a similarity relation, as is sameness of concept. The meaning of a larger expression is derived from the meaning of its parts iff the translation of the whole is derived from the translation of its parts. (shrink)

La pensée philosophique peut-elle faire plus que comprendre les problèmes? Peut-elle être source de solutions pour l'action? Dans ce recueil d'inédits dont le fil directeur est la pensée philosophique, son développement, sa portée et la tâche qui lui incombe, Gilbert Simondon apparaît comme l'homme d'une philosophie aussi exigeante, lucide et probe que réaliste : c'est quand la pensée est vraiment réflexive qu'elle peut être source d'action, donner des normes, se faire vraie morale et vraie politique par-delà les mythes et (...) les partis pris sclérosants, "scolastiques". Ces promesses de la pensée n'ont cessé d'être soulignées dans toute son oeuvre. Un volume qui articule constamment la pensée et l'action, les problèmes posés par le monde actuel et leurs solutions. (shrink)

Challenges, possibilities, and opportunitie for re-founding the tradition of philosophical personalism today.

The intersection of AI and neurotechnology has resulted in an increasing number of medical and non-medical applications and has sparked debate over the need for new human rights, or “neurorights,”...

One important concern regarding implantable Brain Computer Interfaces is the fear that the intervention will negatively change a patient’s sense of identity or agency. In particular, there is concern that the user will be psychologically worse-off following treatment despite postoperative functional improvements. Clinical observations from similar implantable brain technologies, such as deep brain stimulation, show a small but significant proportion of patients report feelings of strangeness or difficulty adjusting to a new concept of themselves characterized by a maladaptive je ne (...) sais quoi despite clear motor improvement. Despite the growing number of cases in the DBS literature, there is currently no accepted or standardized tool in neuroethics specifically designed to capture the phenomenological postoperative experience of patients implanted with DBS or BCI devices. Given potential risks of postoperative maladaptation, it is important for the field of neuroethics to develop a qualitative instrument that can serve as a shared method for capturing postoperative variations in patient experience of identity and agency. The goal of this article is to introduce an instrument we have developed for this purpose and call for further neuroethical efforts to assess the phenomenology of implantable brain device use. (shrink)

We study the following natural strong variant of destroying Borel ideals: $\mathbb {P}$ $+$ -destroys $\mathcal {I}$ if $\mathbb {P}$ adds an $\mathcal {I}$ -positive set which has finite intersection with every $A\in \mathcal {I}\cap V$. Also, we discuss the associated variants $$ \begin{align*} \mathrm{non}^*(\mathcal{I},+)=&\min\big\{|\mathcal{Y}|:\mathcal{Y}\subseteq\mathcal{I}^+,\; \forall\;A\in\mathcal{I}\;\exists\;Y\in\mathcal{Y}\;|A\cap Y| \omega $ ; (4) we characterise when the Laver–Prikry, $\mathbb {L}(\mathcal {I}^*)$ -generic real $+$ -destroys $\mathcal {I}$, and in the case of P-ideals, when exactly $\mathbb {L}(\mathcal {I}^*)$ $+$ -destroys $\mathcal {I}$ ; (...) and (5) we briefly discuss an even stronger form of destroying ideals closely related to the additivity of the null ideal. (shrink)

Les sciences humaines sont en crise. Psychologies, sociologies, histoire et ethnologies ont confondu leur visée, l'Homo sapiens, avec une méthode unidimensionnelle héritée d'une physique périmée depuis l'apparition du " Nouvel Esprit Scientifique ". Gilbert Durand constate que cet échec péremptoire n'est dû qu'à un mirage pédagogique. A travers les recherches de pointe des anthropologues renaît l'aurore de retrouvailles avec le destin immémorial de l'Homo sapiens. Nous assistons progressivement à la résurgence d'une " Science de l'homme " qui, dans sa (...) singularité, retrouve bien des données transmises par les savoirs traditionnels : là où la Méthode exerçait son emprise totalitaire, le pluralisme des singularités - le " polythéisme des valeurs " - devient le garant de l'unité compréhensive du Sapiens. Une " raison autre " reconstitue lentement mais sûrement les assises prometteuses d'un " Nouvel Esprit Anthropologique ". (shrink)

This article compares two attempts to return to realism after Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’. Quentin Meillassoux, representing the ‘speculative realism’ school, rejects both Kantian and post-Kantian idealism in favour of a materialism based on the epistemology of the modern sciences. But Meillassoux is unaware of the element of choice in his philosophical position, and he does not solve the essential problem posed by idealism which concerns the place of the subject in being. Ricœur, on the other hand, sublates Kant by a (...) deeper embrace of finitude that leads to the self-displacement of the subject, and a ‘Second Copernican Revolution’, one that he freely admits can only be arrived at by Jaspersian ‘Philosophical Faith’. The article concludes by showing how crossing the border into theological faith offers a virtue-ethical perspective on the question of realism and idealism: it is in fact the choice between a childlike humility that receives reality as it is, and an arrogant self-positing that puts the subject in the position of God. (shrink)

We present a class of normal modal calculi PFD, whose syntax is endowed with operators M r, one for each r [0,1] : if a is sentence, M r is to he read the probability that a is true is strictly greater than r and to he evaluated as true or false in every world of a F-restricted probabilistic kripkean model. Every such a model is a kripkean model, enriched by a family of regular probability evaluations with range in a (...) fixed finite subset F of [0,1] : there is one such a function for every world w, P F, and this allows to evaluate M ra as true in the world w iff p F r.For every fixed F as before, suitable axioms and rules are displayed, so that the resulting system P FD is complete and compact with respect to the class of all the F-restricted probabilistic kripkean models. (shrink)

We go on along the trend of [2] and [1], giving an axiomatization of S4 0 and proving its completeness and compactness with respect to the usual reflexive and transitive Kripke models. To reach this results, we use techniques from [1], with suitable adaptations to our specific case.

We prove a completeness theorem for Kmath image, the infinitary extension of the graded version K0 of the minimal normal logic K, allowing conjunctions and disjunctions of countable sets of formulas. This goal is achieved using both the usual tools of the normal logics with graded modalities and the machinery of the predicate infinitary logics in a version adapted to modal logic.

This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.

We continue investigating variants of the splitting and reaping numbers introduced in [4]. In particular, answering a question raised there, we prove the consistency of and of. Moreover, we discuss their natural generalisations $\mathfrak {s}_{\rho }$ and $\mathfrak {r}_{\rho }$ for $\rho \in (0,1)$, and show that $\mathfrak {r}_{\rho }$ does not depend on $\rho $.

Underscoring the economic significance of the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty, Don Katzner forcefully challenges the continued dominance of the expected utility model based on subjective probability in macroeconomic analysis and offers in its place a simple yet elegant model of decision making inspired by the pioneering work of G.L.S. Shackle. In doing so, Katzner lends support to a research program to identify a more coherent and empirically grounded theory of decision making under uncertainty. Our paper makes three contributions (...) to this program. First, we argue that the appropriate choice of a model of individual behavior under uncertainty cannot be adjudicated merely on logical, a priori grounds, but must ultimately be based on consistency with observed behavior. There are many internally consistent models and their external conditions of validity hardly ever rely on inconceivable scenarios. Second, while Katzner’s model certainly provides a plausible foundation for understanding choice under uncertainty, we suggest that it is somewhat underdetermined. It requires further theoretical articulation to yield testable predictions which differentiate it from competing approaches. Third, we discuss recent experimental findings that may need to be addressed by any satisfactory theoretical account of decision making under uncertainty. (shrink)

Gilbert Harman, Indeterminacy, Relativity, and Behaviorism: The indeterminacy of radical translation is comparable to the various ways of representing number theory in set theory. Transcendent notions of reference and meaning, which are subject to indeterminacy, can be distinguished from immanent notions that are trivially not subject to indeterminacy. Although Quine's discussions of these issues emphasize behavioral dispositions, he appeals to dispositions as place‐holders for currently unknown underlying physical or functional bases. His discussion in The Roots of Reference shows that (...) considerable understanding can be achieved even at that behavioral level. (shrink)