Christian-Muslim Relations, a Bibliographical History 1 is a history of all the known works on Christian-Muslim relations from 600 to 1500. It comprises introductory essays and over 200 detailed entries containing descriptions, assessments and compehensive bibliographical details of individual works.

Clinician scientists have gained institutional support in the era of translational research, as the key solution to closing the ‘translational gap’ between biomedical research and medical practice. However, clinician scientists remain an ‘endangered species’ in search of a secure niche, while new grants and training programs attempt to counteract their measurable decline in numbers over the past decades. Our study asks how an occupational space for clinician scientists is currently situated between the politics of translation, professional dynamics, and the specialization (...) of academic disciplines. We interviewed clinician scientists, their adjacent professions—clinicians and biomedical researchers—, and contrast their views with expectations from the discourse on clinician scientists in the biomedical and policy literature. We identify professionalizable work and tasks that relate to, first, being able to speak the two languages of both clinic and research, second, translating patients’ needs and clinical experience for further research, and third, counteracting the trends towards specialization by providing an inclusive point of view. We find that clinician scientists are overburdened with fulfilling a hybrid role of simultaneously being clinicians and scientists. Based on these findings, we suggest a path for the future professional development of clinician scientists towards the role of a translator. (shrink)

Originally published in 1920, this book was intended as a brief outline of psychoanalysis for those interested in the subject, but without the time to study the work of Freud and his followers first hand.

Kathryn Morgan has introduced us to a typology of ‘the ways in which women’s moral voice and her sense of moral integrity are twisted and destroyed by patriarchal ideology and lived experience.’ She claims that this experience can induce in women ‘a sense of confusion and genuine moral madness.’I am in agreement with much of what Morgan says. However, I suspect that some others might find her case less convincing than I for the reason that she supports her claims by (...) an appeal to classical philosophical literature and what we might loosely call ‘sociological observations.’ One can imagine the easy retort—‘Yes, well, it’s true that Aristotle, Aquinas, Rousseau and Kant did say those silly things about women, but their remarks were mere asides and no one takes them seriously in this matter any more anyway. (shrink)

Large parts of the Taiping jing from the outgoing Han dynasty are presented as dialogues between a heaven-sent teacher and his disciples or, fewer in number, between a celestial spirit and an eager practitioner of Daoist ways of self-cultivation. It is argued that dialogue forms played a particular role in a text like the Taiping jing that is written in non-standard language and was meant to address a wider audience that reached beyond the educated elite. Despite their widespread use in (...) Chinese ancient and medieval philosophical writings, dialogue forms have, with the exception of Michael Nylan’s 1997 study, attracted little scholarly attention. According to Charles Kahn’s observation, this is not much different for European antiquity. This paper attempts to show that for the authors of the Taiping jing, dialogue forms are an essential tool for expressing their demands for social and political reforms. It is proposed that dialogue forms signify the personal involvement of speakers, facilitate the presentation of alternative positions, and have a proselytizing function, thus improving the text’s accessibility, argumentative strength, and intellectual and religious relevance. (shrink)

Landau also pushes the role of syntax and its mapping to semantics in learning what some would consider “easy words”—the simplest spatial prepositions in English, in and on. Taking as a starting point that the syntactic distribution of a word is a reflex of its meaning, Landau shows that careful study of how children and adults linguistically encode a range of containment and support configurations reveals a special status for “core” configurations in each domain. She proposes that children come to (...) learning spatial terms with the expectation that configurations reflecting core concepts of containment and support will be expressed with the maximally simple, unmarked, linguistic expression. (shrink)

_Abstract_: As many theoretical psychologists turn to the humanities to construct a psychological science that does not shortchange human subjectivity, many humanities scholars have turned to the sciences to bolster their declining standing in the academy. In juxtaposing these trends, I consider how epistemic and methodological wars in the humanities echo those that have plagued psychology and so call into question their use to remedy an allegedly scientistic “mainstream” psychology. By failing to grapple with this most relevant controversy, theoretical psychologists (...) may be jeopardizing their efforts to put a more human face on scientific psychology. _Keywords_: Epistemic Wars; Scientism; Humanities; Psychology; Psychological Humanities _I conflitti epistemici nelle scienze umanistiche e il loro impiego teorico contro il presunto scientismo della psicologia_ _Riassunto_: Molti teorici della psicologia si rivolgono alle discipline umanistiche per costruire una scienza psicologica che non sottovaluti la soggettività umana, mentre molti studiosi attivi nel campo delle discipline umanistiche si rivolgono alle scienze per puntellare la loro autorità all’interno dell’accademia. Nel porre a confronto queste due linee di tendenza mostrerò come i conflitti epistemici e metodologici all’interno delle discipline umanistiche riecheggino quelli che hanno gravato sulla psicologia. A partire da qui metterò in discussione il loro uso per fare da correttivo a una presunta psicologia dominante che sarebbe troppo “scientistica”. Sottraendosi alla trattazione di questo problema, che è di estrema importanza, i teorici della psicologia rischiano di compromettere i loro sforzi volti a dare un volto più umano alla psicologia scientifica. _Parole chiave_: Conflitti epistemici; Scientismo; Scienze umane; Psicologia; Psychological Humanities. (shrink)

This would have been a better book if Sampson had argued his main point, the usefulness of the Simonian principle as an explanation of the evolution, structure, and acquisition of language, on its own merits, instead of making it subsidiary to his attack on ‘limited-minders’ (e.g., Noam Chomsky). The energy he has spent on the attack he might then have been willing and able to employ in developing his argument at reasonable length and detail. He might then have found that (...) argument faulty, or even wrong. Underdeveloped as it is, however, his point about the Simonian principle does seem to have thepossibility of some significance in understanding the empirical issues of this book (and the dichotomy of ‘limited’ and ‘creative’ minds is certainly not one of these).What Sampson has done inMaking Sense has the appearance of science, and theoretical linguistics, and therefore it is somewhat puzzling to find the conclusions that the human mind cannot be scientifically studied (p. 10), and that theoretical linguistics is a “mirage” (p. 210). His statement that It may still seem worthwhile to some to work out the exact implications for present-day linguistic structure of the fact that languages are evolved systems, but I cannot see that there is much glamour or, indeed, much substance in this task (p. 210) would surely be surprising to a geneticist or ethologist. We hope his apparent misunderstanding on this point will not lead him to give up his profession, in which he seems willing and able to make a significant contribution.What in particular is required is a clear indication of how the Simonian principle imposes itself in the ontogenesis of language. Consider Chomsky's example of the rule for forming questions in English. For sentence (1) below, children able to deal with such examples would give (2) but not (3) as the corresponding question (Chomsky, 1975, p. 31).The man who is tall is in the room.Is the man who is tall in the room?*Is the man who tall is in the room?Now compare Sampson's evolutionary explanation for the structure-dependence of rules which is illustrated in (1)-(3): “once a behavior-pattern has become thoroughly established, it will tend to be treated as a fixed given when used as a constituent of a more complex, later-learned behavior-pattern” (p. 183). In order for this to account for Chomsky's example it would have to be the case that children learn relative clauses before they learn questions, which simply isn't true.In conclusion, we wish not to seem unaware of the problems with the position Sampson is attacking, or unaware of the sometimes dogmatic way it too has been presented. Chomsky's hypothesis of innate linguistic ideas seems, fundamentally, to derive from the claimed rapidity and uniformity of language acquisition in the face of limited and degenerate data. Chomsky appears to have been unwilling to argue these points directly or to show their relation to others, for which he has argued, for example, the implausibility of some abstract constraint's having been learned (cf. 1971, pp. 22–44; 1975, pp. 30–33; 1980, pp. 35–52). And almost from his first invoking of rationalism in support of his linguistic method, Chomsky has himself resorted to an unnecessarily polemical attack on empiricism (cf. 1965, p. 58, n. 33). The innateness issue is just not clear or simple enough to justify so much animus, or even conviction. (shrink)

Intellectual property rights present an increasingly important challenge to social ethicists. An analysis of ethical issues raised by TRIPS—the international agreement protecting intellectual property rights—can illuminate an insufficiently acknowledged shift in Catholic thought about property rights. Vatican statements on AIDS drugs are one example of how intellectual property policies can be held accountable to the "option for the poor" and the common good.

The social fact thesis, is, roughly, that law is ultimately a matter of social fact. Mark Greenberg and Kevin Toh have launched transcendental arguments against important or interesting general versions of the social fact thesis. Together, they can be read as posing a dilemma for the thesis. Suppose that many correct assertions of law are normative. Then, according to Toh, the considerations in virtue of which they are correct cannot ultimately be social facts, because the derivation of any normative conclusion (...) requires a normative premise. Suppose that correct assertions of law are not normative. Then, according to Greenberg, they cannot state legal facts in virtue of social facts alone, because the very nature of law requires a particular kind of rational connection between determinants of legal facts and legal facts. Social facts cannot meet this demand; (non-legal) normative facts are needed. In short, Greenberg and Toh together claim that the social fact thesis is consistent with neither the existence nor the normativity of law. This essay meets their challenge. (shrink)

The article argues that the relationship to time is at the root of what makes us human and that culture arises with and from efforts to transcend death, change and the rhythmicity of the physical environment. Time can be tracked through systems of time measurement and later transformed from a process of nature into clock time, a time to human design that is abstracted from context and content. In this form time can be traded with all other times. With contemporary (...) science and new information and communications technologies, which operate in a new all-encompassing temporal spectrum that extends from nanoseconds to millennia, clock time is no longer appropriate to the associated present-oriented transactions and futures are traversed in the dual sense of the word. By historically locating temporal relations, the article provides both a new understanding of socio-cultural relations and a perspective on social change. (shrink)

At the heart of cognitive science lie two problems: the nature of our knowledge and how it emerges. For many centuries, these issues were the province of philosophers only. Nativists such as René Descartes argued that much of our knowledge was innate, driven by the character of the human mind and only indirectly by the nature of the particular events we might experience. By contrast, empiricists such as John Locke argued that very little of our knowledge was innate; rather, he (...) argued that knowledge was acquired through a lengthy process of learning in which the putative primitive elements of thought – the sensations – came to be associated with each other, yielding higher‐level concepts. While no longer the sole province of philosophy, the nativist and empiricist frameworks have come to organize some of the most important issues in cognitive science today: How can we characterize human knowledge? How does it emerge? What are the relative contributions of innate structure and learning through experience? (shrink)

The role of agape in Christian ethics has been a major concern for twentieth century ethicists. In America, the dominant ethical position has stressed other-regard--often pressed to the point of significant personal sacrifice--as the content of agape. Feminist ethicists are now criticizing an exclusive emphasis on other-regard. They are stressing the need for a healthy self-regard and hence they are exploring mutuality as the most appropriate image of Christian love.

It has been a commonplace from the beginnings of philosophical thought that what distinguishes humans from other species is the ability to reason; reason- ing is held to be an essential characteristic of the species and one that is unique to it. The essence condition requires that all humans possess at least the capacity for reasoning and that it be exercised in many of the ordinary cases of acquiring beliefs. And uniqueness entails that non-humans cannot reason, no matter how much (...) their behavior resembles that of humans. I think that a certain specific model of reasoning has been presupposed by proponents of these claims. And there are grounds to believe that this model is inaccurate in essential respects: if reasoning does correspond to it, then few human beliefs are acquired through reason. However, given a more accurate description of what goes on in normal human reasoning, it is no longer plausible to think that only humans reason. So either the essence or the uniqueness claim must be given up. In this paper I argue for the second option. (shrink)

This article establishes a dialogue between the philosopher Axel Honneth and the feminist scholars Silvia Federici and Nancy Fraser. The aim is to emphasize the limits of Honneth’s philosophical reflections on the normative dimension of the family developed in Freedom’s Right. First, I present his ideas on how a normative expectation of social freedom permeates familial relations. According to him, after women entered the labour market, a normative notion of symmetrical participation in the family was produced. I aim to defend (...) here that, whether normative or not, this idea of family is not only limited but also false, since it does not consider the dilemmas of social reproduction whose consequences contradict social freedom. Next, I develop Federici’s and Fraser’s analyses of how families have always faced conflicts concerning the requirements of social reproduction and have produced diverse forms of subjugation that go against the very idea of the family as an unquestioned sphere of freedom. It is necessary to analyse how families produce new forms of subjugation to transform familial relations into truly possible ways of being socially free – and this requires making visible some figures who structure the family, such as nannies, friends and grandparents. (shrink)

This volume examines 'domestic colonialism' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and analyzes domestic colonies empirically - across several countries using primary, archival, and secondary sources - and theoretically, through the writings of leading thinkers of the period.

Though the Fulton Fish Market no longer resides below the Brooklyn Bridge, the history and energy of this cherished New York City landmark are beautifully preserved in this book.