A critical survey of various positions on the nature, use, possession, and analysis of normative concepts. We frame our treatment around G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument, and the ways metaethicists have responded by departing from a Classical Theory of concepts. In addition to the Classical Theory, we discuss synthetic naturalism, noncognitivism (expressivist and inferentialist), prototype theory, network theory, and empirical linguistic approaches. Although written for a general philosophical audience, we attempt to provide a new perspective and highlight some underappreciated problems (...) about normative concepts. (shrink)

Upon doing something generous for someone with whom you are close, some kind of reciprocity may be appropriate. But it often seems wrong to actually request reciprocity. This chapter explores the wrongness in making these requests, and why they can nevertheless appear appropriate. After considering several explanations for the wrongness at issue (involving, e.g. distinguishing oughts from obligation, the suberogatory, imperfect duties, and gift-giving norms), a novel proposal is advanced. The requests are disrespectful; they express that their agent insufficiently trusts (...) the hearer to recognize their own reasons to reciprocate, and the close relationship between them morally requires this kind of trust. This proposal is articulated and situated in the recent discussion of the normativity of requests. The chapter concludes by explaining how these requests may appear appropriate. Agents in these relationships often have standing to make requests, though the standing is lacking in these particular cases. (shrink)

How does thinking affect doing? There is a widely held view that thinking about what you are doing, as you are doing it, hinders performance. Once you have acquired the ability to putt a golf ball, play an arpeggio on the piano, or parallel-park, reflecting on your actions leads to inaccuracies, blunders, and sometimes even utter paralysis--that's what is widely believed. But is it true? After exploring some of the contemporary and historical manifestations of the idea, Barbara Gail Montero (...) develops a theory of expertise which emphasizes the role of the conscious mind in expert action. She aims to dispel various myths about experts who proceed without any understanding of what guides their action, and she analyzes research in both philosophy and psychology that is taken to show that conscious control and explicit monitoring of one's movements impedes well practiced skills. Montero explores a wide range of real-life examples of optimal performance, in sports, the performing arts, healthcare, the military, and other fields, and draws from psychology, neuroscience, and literature to offer a refreshing and persuasive view of expertise, according to which expert action generally is and ought to be thoughtful, effortful, and reflective. (shrink)

This book examines the birth of the scientific understanding of motion. It investigates which logical tools and methodological principles had to be in place to give a consistent account of motion, and which mathematical notions were introduced to gain control over conceptual problems of motion. It shows how the idea of motion raised two fundamental problems in the 5th and 4th century BCE: bringing together being and non-being, and bringing together time and space. The first problem leads to the exclusion (...) of motion from the realm of rational investigation in Parmenides, the second to Zeno's paradoxes of motion. Methodological and logical developments reacting to these puzzles are shown to be present implicitly in the atomists, and explicitly in Plato who also employs mathematical structures to make motion intelligible. With Aristotle we finally see the first outline of the fundamental framework with which we conceptualise motion today. (shrink)

We work in the context of ω-stable theories. We obtain a natural, algebraic equivalent of ENI-NDOP and discuss recent joint proofs with Shelah that if an ω-stable theory has either ENI-DOP or is ENI-NDOP and is ENI-deep, then the set of models of T with universe ω is Borel complete.

Are words like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biological features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism from Jennifer Saul that Esa Diaz-Leon develops doesn't exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political (...) practices concerning our uses of these words. I then float the view that terms like 'woman' or 'man' are polysemous, arguing that it makes better sense of the significance of some forms of criticisms of mainstream gender ideology. (shrink)

We show that if T is a trivial uncountably categorical theory of Morley Rank 1 then T is model complete after naming constants for a model.

This book is an introduction to the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, written in a lively, personal style.

Fix a weakly minimal (i.e. superstable U-rank 1) structure M. Let M∗ be an expansion by constants for an elementary substructure, and let A be an arbitrary subset of the universe M. We show that all formulas in the expansion (M∗,A) are equivalent to bounded formulas, and so (M,A) is stable (or NIP) if and only if the M-induced structure AM on A is stable (or NIP). We then restrict to the case that M is a pure abelian group with (...) a weakly minimal theory, and AM is mutually algebraic (equivalently, weakly minimal with trivial forking). This setting encompasses most of the recent research on stable expansions of (Z,+). Using various characterizations of mutual algebraicity, we give new examples of stable structures of the form (M,A). Most notably, we show that if (G,+) is a weakly minimal additive subgroup of the algebraic numbers, A⊆G is enumerated by a homogeneous linear recurrence relation with algebraic coefficients, and no repeated root of the characteristic polynomial of A is a root of unity, then (G,+,B) is superstable for any B⊆A. (shrink)

This volume explores the cross-linguistic diversity, and possibly inconsistency, of the span of linguistic means that signal reported speech and thought. The integration of broad linguistic (viewpoint in conversation and narrative) and cognitive (theory of mind and understanding the inner life and thought of others) strategies for handling mixed points of view will be considered.

It is often said that normative properties are “just too different” to reduce to other kinds of properties. This suggests that many philosophers find it difficult to believe reductive theses in ethics. I argue that the distinctiveness of the normative concepts we use in thinking about reductive theses offers a more promising explanation of this psychological phenomenon than the falsity of Reductive Realism. To identify the distinctiveness of normative concepts, I use resources from familiar Hybrid views of normative language and (...) thought to develop a Hybrid view of normative concepts. In addition to using this new Hybrid view to explain why reductive theses are difficult to believe, I show how to preserve several patterns of inference involving normative concepts that, intuitively, it is possible to make, and hence answer an important recent challenge to Hybrid views from Mark Schroeder. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the "Normativity Objection," that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non-reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. (...) We argue that the exclusively negative attention that the objection has received has been a mistake. On our reading, Parfit's Normativity Objection poses a serious threat to reductivism, as it exposes the uneasy relationship between our a priori knowledge of a range of distinctly normative truths and the typical package of semantic commitments that reductivists have embraced since the Kripkean revolution. (shrink)

Barbara Herman argues for a radical shift in the way we perceive Kant's ethics. She convincingly reinterprets the key texts, at once allowing Kant to mean what he says while showing that what Kant says makes good moral sense. She urges us to abandon the tradition that describes Kantian ethics as a deontology, a moral system of rules of duty. She finds the central idea of Kantian ethics not in duty but in practical rationality as a norm of unconditioned (...) goodness. This book both clarifies Kant's own theory and adds programmatic vitality to modern moral philosophy. (shrink)

Is the neurophysiology of pain all there is to pain? How do words and mental pictures come to represent things in the world? Do computers think, and if so, are their thought processes significantly similar to our thought processes? Or is there something distinctive about human thought thatprecludes replication in a computer? These are some of the puzzles that motivate the philosophical discipline called "philosophy of mind," a central area of philosophy.This Very Short Introduction introduces the philosophy of mind, and (...) looks at some of the most interesting and important topics in this fascinating field, including the mind-body problem and dualism. Barbara Montero also discusses minds other than our own, and the problems associated with definingconsciousness in animals, aliens and machines. Considering these and other such thorny issues such as physicalism and intentionality, she demonstrates how questions of the philosophy of mind also infiltrate disciplines outside of philosophy, including psychology, neuroscience, economics,evolutionary biology, and linguistics. As she observes, most everyone, at some time or another, has ruminated over the relation between mind and matter.ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, andenthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable. (shrink)

This volume is dedicated to Barbara Skarga -- her works, profile and biography. It is a unique character in the Polish intellectual life, but also virtually unknown abroad, except a meager milieu of her reeadership in France. Dubbed 'the first lady of Polish philosophy' for a good reason, she contributed not only to [the] shape of Polish philosophy but to the style of public debate too. The problem areas initiating her philosophy stemmed from the group of scholars called the (...) Warsaw school of history of ideas' with its flagship names such as Leszek Kolakowski, Brinisław Baczko, or Andrzej Walicki. On the other hand, her output originates from the extraordinary and dramatic events of her life. The philosophical outpout of Barbara Skarga is thus a proof of continuity and longevity of an important tradition of the 20th century Polish Philosophy. (shrink)

The present booklet contains ten short philosophical writings, which are not so much intended for a narrow circle of people, by education of philosophers, but by a wider readership. Specifically, they are for the homeless, the (long-term) unemployed, the elderly, people with mental health problems, people with special needs and so on, as well as for the general public in general. So they are for people who are not close to philosophy, especially for those who need the help of others (...) the most. The red thread of the collection is an attempt to answer the question of why philosophy for them. The records collected here were created in the period 2015-2019 and were also published in newspapers or magazines.--Publisher's website. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Mark's Story: ‘It was like Line Dancing for the First Time’ Carl's Story: ‘Everyone Avoids the Front and Center in Class’ Jake's Story: ‘The only Judging going on is in my Own Head’ Competing against their own Bodies (but is it More than a Workout?) Competing against other People (perhaps the Real Competition is within Yourself) Competing against their Own Egos (Playing Nice with your Ego).

The exchange between the Borg and Captain Jean‐Luc Picard illustrates what's truly horrifying about the Borg. In philosophical terms, the Borg strips the assimilated of their autonomy. Choice is essential to autonomy, but autonomy means more than the freedom to act on whims. Autonomous can be applied to two different sorts of things: there are autonomous beings and autonomous actions. Beings that can rationally deliberate in the face of amoral choice are called autonomous, and many of their actions display autonomy. (...) Autonomous actions are done intentionally, with understanding, and without controlling influences that determine. As crucial as the idea of autonomy seems to be to the moral life, it is also been criticized for relying on a highly individualistic and overly rationalistic notion of humanity. Autonomy is a good thing that we can encourage in others by helping them develop deliberative skills and by interacting with them during decision making. (shrink)

Many prominent ethicists, including Shelly Kagan, John Rawls, and Thomas Scanlon, accept a kind of epistemic modesty thesis concerning our capacity to carry out the project of ethical theorizing. But it is a thesis that has received surprisingly little explicit and focused attention, despite its widespread acceptance. After explaining why the thesis is true, I argue that it has several implications in metaethics, including, especially, implications that should lead us to rethink our understanding of Reductive Realism. In particular, the thesis (...) of epistemic modesty in ethics implies a kind of epistemic modesty about the metaphysical nature of ethics, if Reductive Realism about the metaphysical nature of ethics is true, and it implies that normative concepts are indispensable to practical deliberation in a way that answers an influential objection to Reductive Realism from Jonathan Dancy, David Enoch, William FitzPatrick, and Derek Parfit. (shrink)

We study for each computably bounded $\Pi ^0_1$ class P the set of degrees of c.e. paths in P. We show, amongst other results, that for every c.e. degree a there is a perfect $\Pi ^0_1$ class where all c.e. members have degree a. We also show that every $\Pi ^0_1$ set of c.e. indices is realized in some perfect $\Pi ^0_1$ class, and classify the sets of c.e. degrees which can be realized in some $\Pi ^0_1$ class as exactly (...) those with a computable representation. (shrink)

Dworkin's theoretical disagreement argument, developed in Law's Empire, is presented in that work as the motivator for his interpretive account of law. Like Dworkin's earlier arguments critical of legal positivism, the argument from theoretical disagreement has generated a lively exchange with legal positivists. It has motivated three of them to develop innovative positivist positions. In its original guise, the argument from theoretical disagreement is presented as ‘the semantic sting argument’. However, the argument from theoretical disagreement has more than one version. (...) This article briefly discusses two versions and the leading replies to them, then focuses on the most influential version, directed at Hartian positivism. The article surveys the leading positivist rejoinders to the recast version, indicating key Dworkinian replies or assessing the strength of these rejoinders, and concludes with a rejoinder of its own, making a new case that the argument from theoretical disagreement isn't fatal for Hartian legal positivism. (shrink)

We define a new topology on the space of strong types of a given theory and use it to state an omitting types theorem for countably saturated models of the theory. As an application we show that if T is a small, stable theory of finite weight such that every elementary extension of the countably saturated model is ω-saturated then every weakly saturated model is ω-saturated.

This volume shows how nanotechnology takes on a wide range of socio-historically specific meanings in the context of globalization, across multiple localities, institutions and collaborations, through diverse industries, research labs, and government agencies and in a variety of discussions within the public sphere itself. It explores the early origins of nanotechnologies; the social, economic, and political organization of the field; and the cultural and subjective meanings ascribed to nanotechnologies in social settings.

Ethicists struggle to take reductive views seriously. They also have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures. Understanding why provides further evidence for a kind of hybrid view of normative concept use.

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Tèubingen, 2012 under the title: Weisheit der Befreiung im Dialog: engagierter Buddhismus und Befreiungstheologie im Vergleich ihrer wirtschaftsethischen Perspektiven und praktisch-theologischen Konsequenzen.

L'auteur conteste l'interprétation de Nietzsche qui met le corps "à la place de l'âme et de la conscience". Selon elle, le "concept de Dionysos" ne conduit pas à l'affirmation de la vie, mais à sa critique.

Der Begriff »Solidarität« erlebt gegenwärtig eine Renaissance: In Zeiten ökonomischer Krisen scheint eine Rückbesinnung auf solidarische Werte auch in der Gesundheitsversorgung angebracht. Anknüpfend an die internationale Bio- und Medizinethikdebatte entwickeln die Autorinnen ein neues Solidaritätsverständnis: Anstatt den Begriff nur auf der abstrakten Ebene zu behandeln, zeigen sie anhand konkreter Fallbeispiele, etwa der Schweinegrippe-Pandemie von 2009/10 oder lebensstilbedingten Krankheiten, wie ethische Regelwerke und regulatorische Instrumente aus dem Blickwinkel der Solidarität verändert und verbessert werden können.

Analytic reductivism in metaethics has long been out of philosophical vogue. In Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normativity (2014), Stephen Finlay tries to resuscitate it by developing an analytic metaethical reductive naturalistic semantics for ‘good.’ He argues that an end-relational semantics is the simplest account that can explain all of the data concerning the term, and hence the most plausible theory of it. I argue that there are several assumptions that a reductive naturalist would need to make about contextual (...) parameter completion to derive reductive naturalism from an end-relational semantics—assumptions that nonnaturalists might forcefully resist. I also argue for the claim that an end-relational semantics could provide surprising resources for nonnaturalists to address semantic worries about their views—the upshot of which paints the way for a new and sophisticated nonnaturalism about the semantics of moral discourse. Nonnaturalists have long suspected that they need not worry about semantics and this paper lends support to that suspicion. (shrink)

In The Othering of Women in Silent Film: Cultural, Historical, and Literary Contexts, Barbara Tepa Lupack explores the rampant racial and gender stereotyping in early cinema and demonstrates how that imagery helped shape American attitudes and practices.

In times of global economic and political crises, the notion of solidarity is gaining new currency. This book argues that a solidarity-based perspective can help us to find new ways to address pressing problems. Exemplified by three case studies from the field of biomedicine: databases for health and disease research, personalised healthcare, and organ donation, it explores how solidarity can make a difference in how we frame problems, and in the policy solutions that we can offer.

In der 1970 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien veröffentlicht. Gründungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), Günther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von Jürgen Mittelstraß mitherausgegeben.

- Topic of popular interest addressed by a popular author.

Oświecenia nie byłoby bez zwrotu w stronę rozumu, a ten nie jest żadną ideą, lecz własnością nader pospolitą – już sto lat wcześniej René Descartes powiadał, że nikt nie uskarża się na jego brak. Osiemnastowieczni filozofowie bodajże po raz pierwszy problematyzują owo nikt, pytając o rozum dzieci, „dzikich”, sawantów, geniuszy, wynalazców, szaleńców, ba – kobiet (dziewczynek, dziewcząt), aktualnych i przyszłych matek „rodu ludzkiego”, a nie tylko o „rozum ludzki”. Ma on zresztą wiele postaci – common sense, zdrowy rozum (rozsądek), „chłopski (...) rozum”, rozum praktyczny, czysty, spekulatywny itd., a także granicę, którą jest utrata rozumu lub zmysłów. Zawsze jednak objawia się wśród ludzi, pośród ludzkich spraw, bez względu na to, czy aktualnie należymy do jakiejś wspólnoty, czy – jak w pewnym momencie Robinson Crusoe albo Denis Diderot – zostaliśmy z niej czasowo wyłączeni. Epoka rozumu, jak zwykło się w skrócie charakteryzować „optymistyczne” Oświecenie, dostrzegała i eksponowała jego faktyczność i jednostkowość – rozum jest zawsze i tylko czyjąśdyspozycją – nie tracąc przy tym z oczu innej jego niezbywalnej cechy: powszechności. Wszystko może nas dzielić – pochodzenie, język, religia, płeć, zamożność, zdrowie, wykształcenie czy upodobania, lecz taki sam i ten sam jest mój i twój rozum. Tom prezentuje wyniki badań nad filozofią Oświecenia prowadzonych w wielu ośrodkach naukowych w kraju. Tym, co łączy wszystkie pomieszczone w nim teksty, jest zwrócenie uwagi na oświeceniowe rozumienie społecznej natury człowieka. Autorzy przedstawiają jej różne aspekty: od funkcjonowania instytucji służących prowadzeniu i upowszechnianiu badań naukowych, przez osiemnastowieczne projekty edukacyjne, kształtowanie się ówczesnych gustów estetycznych i znaczenie przykładane do języków narodowych, aż po społeczny wymiar medycyny. Prace te nie tylko ukazują, jak bardzo złożony jest obraz Oświecenia, ale też przypominają, że depozytariuszami opiewanego w tej epoce rozumu jesteśmy my – poszczególni ludzie, a jego funkcjonowanie wymaga istnienia rozmaitych łączących nas więzi. (shrink)

An analysis of current biomedical research misconduct policy that proposes a new approach emphasizing the context of misconduct and improved oversight. Federal regulations that govern research misconduct in biomedicine have not been able to prevent an ongoing series of high-profile cases of fabricating, falsifying, or plagiarizing scientific research. In this book, Barbara Redman looks critically at current research misconduct policy and proposes a new approach that emphasizes institutional context and improved oversight. Current policy attempts to control risk at the (...) individual level. But Redman argues that a fair and effective policy must reflect the context in which the behavior in question is embedded. As journalists who covered many research misconduct cases observed, the roots of fraud “lie in the barrel, not in the bad apples that occasionally roll into view.” Drawing on literature in related fields—including moral psychology, the policy sciences, the organizational sciences, and law—as well as analyses of misconduct cases, Redman considers research misconduct from various perspectives. She also examines in detail a series of clinical research cases in which repeated misconduct went undetected and finds laxity of oversight, little attention to harm done, and inadequate correction of the scientific record. Study questions enhance the book's value for graduate and professional courses in research ethics. Redman argues that the goals of any research misconduct policy should be to protect scientific capital (knowledge, scientists, institutions, norms of science), support fair competition, contain harms to end users and to the public trust, and enable science to meet its societal obligations. (shrink)

Making room for character -- Pluralism and the community of moral judgment -- A cosmopolitan kingdom of ends --Responsibility and moral competence --Can virtue be taught?: the problem of new moral facts -- Training to autonomy: Kant and the question of moral education -- Bootstrapping -- Rethinking Kant's hedonism -- The scope of moral requirement -- The will and its objects -- Obligatory ends -- Moral improvisation -- Contingency in obligation.

Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning “authoritative (...) normativity”: (1) that motivation for it originates in a parochial conception of “normative flavours”; (2) that arguments against alternative ways of explaining e.g., morality’s importance are overblown; and (3) that there are strong reasons against theorizing in terms of “authoritative normativity”. The overarching aim is not to show that “authoritative normativity” is incoherent or entirely unmotivated. Rather, it is to discuss some of “authoritative normativity’s” deeper commitments to correct the impression that is it largely benign or that it is entailed by familiar and popular “metanormative” positions. Authoritative normativity, it seems to us, is a solution in search of a problem. (shrink)