This paper argues that functionalist metasemantic views, such as Conceptual Role Semantics and Interpretivism, face a Euthyphro challenge. The challenge, put roughly, is this: functionalist metasemantic views reverse the order of explanation. According to such views, representational mental states have the contents that they do partly because they play certain roles in our mental lives. According to an intuitive picture of the roles that representational mental states play in our mental lives, however, these states play the roles they do partly (...) because they have the contents that they do. Since explanations—even partial ones—are asymmetric (call this principle ‘the Euthyphro Principle’), we can’t accept both this intuitive picture and a functionalist metasemantics. Hence, we should reject all versions of the latter. This paper can be seen as an attempt to better articulate an intuition that has been suggested in various forms in the literature. The paper proceeds as follows. First, it shows that functionalist metasemantic views imply certain ‘partly because’ claims. Second, it argues for the Euthyphro Principle. Third, it defends the intuitive picture of representational mental states and shows that it implies ‘partly because’ claims that conflict with those made by functionalist metasemantic views. Finally, it considers ways of relaxing the intuitive picture and finds them all wanting. (shrink)

Naive realism in philosophy of perception is the view that (successful) perception involves a direct relation between perceiving subjects and the world. The naive realist says that your perception of a cat on the mat is a worldly relation which is partially constituted by the cat and the mat; a spatio-temporal chunk of the world is presenting itself to you. Recently, Elijah Chudnoff and John Bengson have independently developed an extension of this view to intellectual experiences, or intuitions, for traditionally (...) a priori domains. We argue that this view, which we call ‘Intuitional Naive Realism’ (INR), will not have the epistemic advantages that Chudnoff and Bengson claim that it does. In perception, but not intuition, there is a deeper explanation of what makes it the case that one experience is constituted by the world while another is not. Whether or not INR is true, then, it does no interesting epistemological work for traditionally a priori domains. (shrink)

This Great Debates volume grew out of exchanges that followed the 2012 publication of a Festschrift volume for Crispin Wright, just over a decade ago (Coliva 2012). As often happens in Philosophy, the process of trying to clarify and iron out apparently local points of disagreement between us has unearthed deeper divergences concerning larger issues in the philosophy of language and mind, in epistemology, and in the theory of action. Such is our profession.

This article explores attempts at legalization of the practice of euthanasia and assisted suicide. Although in many countries there have been high levels of public support for euthanasia and assisted suicide, in most of them, no legislative activity has taken place concerning these practices, and there is a lack of clarity about what is permitted and what is not. I argue that accurate definition of the relevant concepts and a clear delineation of the territory of the debate would help draw (...) a coherent roadmap for legalization. To this end, I analyze five legal approaches to the legalization euthanasia: maintenance of the status quo, legal defenses, de-prioritization, de-criminalization, and legislation. I conclude with a discussion of the moral and legal implications of the foregoing analysis. (shrink)

Ordinarily, if a person produces a nonreflective, ‘unstudied’ self-attribution of a present mental state – an avowal – we do not presume that they have produced the avowal on some specific epistemic basis; and we do not expect them to know how they know the self-attribution to be true. This no-‘how’ character of basic self-knowledge is puzzling, given that we regard avowals as manifesting factual, and indeed privileged, knowledge. I am here interested in views that accommodate both the baseless, no-‘how’ (...) and the factual, privileged character of basic self-knowledge. I argue that leading constitutivist views, which embrace both, fail properly to meet the doxastic (as opposed to justificatory) requirement on basic self-knowledge, thereby failing to preserve its genuinely factual character. I then argue that an alternative, neo-expressivist approach is better placed to meet the doxastic requirement, as well as being at least as well-placed as constitutivist views to address the justificatory requirement on baseless self-knowledge. (shrink)

Slovenian philosopher bad boy Slavoj Žižek is one of the most famous intellectuals in the world. He publishes at a breakneck speed and lectures around the world. He has an unmistakable speaking style and set of mannerisms that have made him ripe material for internet humor and meme culture. YouTube clips of his talks, interviews, and media appearances often have tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of views. How did an intellectual from a remote Eastern European country come (...) to such notoriety? In this book, sociologist Eliran Bar-El plumbs the "phenomenon called 'Žižek;'" its origin, emergence, and development over the years. He begins with Žižek's early years as a thinker and political figure in Slovenian civil society. There, Žižek became a philosopher, immersed himself in Marxist debates both within academia as well as in activist circles, and even ran for office. Bar-El then turns to Žižek's emergence in the English-speaking world as an intellectual celebrity in the 1990s and the development and perfection of his unique performative style and rhetorical arsenal (Žižek's language of "Hegelacanese"). Post 9/11, Žižek goes global, becoming a well-known op-ed writer and TV commentator on pop culture and large-scale global events such as the War on Terror, the financial crisis of 2008, and the Arab Spring of 2011. Things took a turn when Žižek was almost entirely estranged from the normal workings of academia and increasingly became the target of other of other thinkers-Noam Chomsky, notably-who singled him out as an example of intellectual imposture, as well as others outraged by the non-politically correct views he professes. Ultimately, Bar-El shows how Žižek harnessed the power of the digital era in his own self-fashioning as an intellectual, remaking and capitalizing on the shifting intellectual landscape and what Bar-El calls our "knowledge societies." Throughout the book, Bar-El shows how Žižek has navigated different audiences and publics, developing a hybrid language capable of speaking to specialists and laypeople alike, using globally traumatic events as the subject of his often irreverent analyses, combining high and low registers, and flaunting his own lack of expertise and specialization and his "outsider" status as a way to form a substantial extra-academic public and to engage with current events. (shrink)

El presente artículo recoge un texto inédito hasta la fecha del filósofo español Manuel Sacristán Sacristán (1925-1985) en torno al libro El futuro del Partido Comunista Francés, un ensayo de Waldeck Rochet (1969), entonces secretario general del PCF. En el mismo pueden observarse motivaciones políticas de Sacristán características de su tiempo que parecen prefigurar parte de la caracterización que más adelante realizará en torno al eurocomunismo, donde la firme defensa de los valores democráticos en el marxismo no es incompatible con (...) críticas a determinadas involuciones político-institucionales en el campo de los partidos comunistas europeos de la época. (shrink)

Erotic Counter Education is the educational position of the late Ilan Gur- Ze'ev. In ECE Gur-Ze'ev combines two opposing positions in the philosophy of education, one teleological and anti-utopian, the other teleological and utopian. In light of this unique combination, I ask what mediates between these two poles and suggest that the answer lies in the concept of eros. Following a preliminary presentation of the concept of eros in ECE, I define it as a form of transcendental cognition that distinguishes (...) between ‘what is to be perceived’, conceptual and human, and ‘what is not to be perceived’, divine and absolute. I subsequently show how the ‘nature’ of this conception of eros permits the establishment of a normative meta-theory of education that gains its strength from critical theory and counter education. (shrink)

Esta selección representativa de la obra filosófica de Manuel Sacristán, esta llamada a ser punto de referencia obligado del pensamiento hispánico. Si su autor es conocido sobre todo por su compromiso político y social, como filosofo político por sus interesante y peculiar reflexión en la tradición e Marx, o como profesor y traductor de excepcional categoría, en estos PAPELES surge otra imagen destacadísima suya: la del filosofo del rigor y de la maestra metodológica puestos al servicio de un pensamiento vivo (...) que explora los problemas fundamentales de nuestro tiempo. Los textos contenidos en este volumen, unos inéditos, otros dispersos y en general poco accesibles hasta ahora, documentan más de treinta años del itinerario intelectual y profesional seguido por el autor en el campo de la filosofía. El libro arranca con una sangrienta parodia de la filosofía oficial española de los años 50 y prosigue con trabajos publicados en la inolvidable revista LAYE, una de las primeras brechas significativas en el universo ideológico del franquismo abierta por inspiración de Manuel Sacristán. Dentro de la amplia temática que abarcan los PAPELES destacan como puntos de gravedad: El extenso estudio sobre la primera etapa del pensamiento de Heidegger –el análisis ontológico-existencial- situada, a partir de una “humilde lectura literal” (M.S.), en la mas pura tradición empirista y positivista europea; tres grandes ensayos dedicados a la formal y alas diversas posturas que configuran el marco de discusión sobre esta disciplina, abierto a partir de la Escuela de Viena, sobre ubicación, rendimiento cognoscitivo y fundamentación filosófico-científica de la lógica; dos exposiciones de la historia de la filosofía contemporánea en sus rasgos mas significativos y su génesis dentro del espacio de dos siglos de tradición del pensamiento moderno. Los ensayos más recientes dan cuenta de un giro de extrema necesidad en el pensamiento crítico y responsable de los años 80 a la vista del asalto a las últimas garantías de integridad y supervivencia en y de nuestro planeta. (shrink)

Este artículo plantea una relectura de John Dewey con la intención de analizar y dar algunas respuestas a la actual crisis de la democracia representativa o liberal. Esta crisis guarda relación con procesos globalizadores contradictorios que, de un lado, alimentan una utopía futurista confiada en el progreso tecnológico, y de otro, el regreso “retrotópico”, nostálgico y emocional, a lo tribal. Esta relectura se centra en obras fundamentales de Dewey, pero especialmente Democracia y Educación y otros textos de carácter pedagógico. El (...) artículo desarrolla una serie de argumentos que concluyen en torno a la idea de “democracia creativa”, que Dewey planteó en su madurez, como referencia para una deseable reactivación de la democracia entendida como ideal ético. (shrink)

Expressivism, broadly construed, is the view that the function of utterances in a given area of discourse is to give expression to our sentiments or other (non-cognitive) mental states or attitudes, rather than report or describe some range of facts. This view naturally seems an attractive option wherever it is suspected that there may not be a domain of facts for the given discourse to be describing. Familiarly, to avoid commitment to ethical facts, the ethical expressivist suggests that ethical utterances (...) (e.g., “Gratuitous torture is wrong”, “What John did was morally good”) do not serve to ascribe ethical properties to objects, actions, persons, or states of affairs. Instead, they simply function to give voice to certain of our sentiments (or ‘pro/con’ attitudes). Along similar lines, philosophers have entertained versions of expressivism about the aesthetic, the modal, the mental, what is funny, even about theoretical science and knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Golden Age of the Coffeehouses The Coffeehouses that Roasted Revolution Coffeehouses or Coffee Shops? The Third Place Where Did the Discussion Go? Brewing Social Change.

Articles chiefly on the life of some Buddhist philosophers, who were disciples of Gautama Buddha; includes critical essays on Buddhist literature.

We propose a modification of the exhaustivity operator from Fox Presupposition and implicature in compositional semantics, Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp 71–120, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230210752_4) that on top of negating all the Innocently Excludable alternatives affirms all the ‘Innocently Includable’ ones. The main result of supplementing the notion of Innocent Exclusion with that of Innocent Inclusion is that it allows the exhaustivity operator to identify cells in the partition induced by the set of alternatives whenever possible. We argue for this property of (...) ‘cell identification’ based on the simplification of disjunctive antecedents and the effects on free choice that arise as the result of the introduction of universal quantifiers. We further argue for our proposal based on the interaction of only with free choice disjunction. (shrink)

a single life-span. Philosophers, then, do not see more or know more, and they do not see less or know less. They aim to see less detail and more of the abstract. Their details, if you like, are abstractions. Walking on God’s earth as a pedestrian, as a farmer working his fields or as a passer-by, one’s picture of one’s surroundings is every bit as intelligent as that of the pilot riding the sky. The views of the field are radically (...) different, however. One sees only a specific field and in all lively detail: the exact pattern of the land, or even the exact outline of a given leaf, grasshopper, grain of sand even. Acquaintance with minute detail is not without its price: details may stand in the way of conjuring the big picture. It may be difficult to compare whichever field one happens to be in with far off fields, with respect to their size or shape or any other quality. One may wish to inquire if far off fields were already planted, harvested, or even if they exist. A pedestrian may find it hard or even impossible to do so. The pedestrian view contains fine points that the pilot’s map never would, but it does not necessarily contain more information, for it lacks the general context. After all, there are only so many items that one can observe and account for at a single glance, a single map, a single book, a single life-span. (shrink)

An argument is presented to the effect that the ability to feel or to experience meaning conditions the ability to mean, and is thus essential to our notion of meaning. The experience of meaning is manifested in the "fine shades" of use and behavior. Theses, so obvious in music, constitute understanding music, which makes music understanding so relevant to understanding language. Applying these notions of understanding, feeling, and experience--as well as their explication in terms of comparisons, internal relation, and mastery (...) of technique--to music, where they are so apt and natural, is fertile both for the philosophy of language and the philosophy of music. (edited). (shrink)

People’s attitudes towards social norms play a crucial role in understanding group behavior. Norm psychology accounts focus on processes of norm internalization that influence people’s norm following attitudes but pay considerably less attention to social identity and group identification processes. Social identity theory in contrast studies group identity but works with a relatively thin and instrumental notion of social norms. We argue that to best understand both sets of phenomena, it is important to integrate the insights of both approaches. Social (...) status, social identity, and social norms are considered separate phenomena in evolutionary accounts. We discuss assumptions and views that support this separation, and suggest an integrated view of our own. We argue that we should be open to the early origins of human social complexity, and conjecture that the longer that the human social world involved multi-level societies the more probable it is that norm psychology and social identity interacted in rich ways. (shrink)

This book brings together people’s intuitions, philosophical theories, and principles of Jewish ethics to suggest where our values should lead us. The author argues that a moral freedom of respect upholds freedom of the Self and respect for the Other.

This book brings together people's intuitions, philosophical theories, and principles of Jewish ethics to suggest where our values should lead us. The author argues that a moral freedom of respect upholds freedom of the Self and respect for the Other.