It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view’s failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I (...) argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage. (shrink)

It is usually agreed that reality is temporal in the sense of containing entities that exist in time, but some philosophers, roughly those who have been traditionally called A-theorists, hold that reality is temporal in a far more profound sense than what is implied by the mere existence of such entities. This hypothesis of deep temporality typically involves two ideas: that reality is temporally compartmentalised into distinct present, past, and future ‘realms’, and that this compartmentalisation is temporally dynamic in the (...) sense that the boundaries of those temporal realms change from one moment to the next. The truth of something like this hypothesis is commonly thought to require that at least some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality be tensed. While this seems plausible, realism about fundamental tensed facts does not seem to entail deep temporality. Nor is it clear exactly what realism about tense amounts to, given that no informative answer has been given to the question of what it is for a fact to be tensed. In this paper, I introduce a novel approach, perspectivalism about temporal reality, that seeks to vindicate the hypothesis of deep temporality by ascribing to reality a certain kind of temporally perspectival structure, which also provides a straightforward answer to the question of what the tensedness of facts consists in as well as to the question of what it is for reality to be constituted by such facts. (shrink)

Realists about tense, or A-theorists of time, believe that some of the facts that fundamentally constitute reality are tensed, and most of them seem to think that those tensed facts are to be understood as fixing the way things are, absolutely speaking, or simpliciter. But there is a simple yet powerful argument, the argument from atemporality, to the effect that realists should reject the absolutist conception of reality’s constitution by facts because, despite appearances to the contrary, that conception is in (...) fact inconsistent with realism about tense. After presenting the argument, I investigate why the relevant inconsistency has not been recognised so far and point to one possible explanation. (shrink)

Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This chapter argues that evaluativism, in both of its doxastic and perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterises the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever towards its evaluative status at all, (...) perceptual evaluativism cannot even properly apply to the large class of standing desires. It is also argued that evaluativism about desire is not even well-motivated in the first place: the theory is supposed to solve a particular puzzle about the role desires play in the explanation of action, yet, in fact, it does not offer any help whatsoever in dealing with the relevant puzzle. (shrink)

In spite of the fact that there is a common reality, people know very little about death. However, the person who sees the limited life as an obstacle in the way of encountering in life has always been in search of immortality. As a result of this quest, death has occupied different positions in human life. These positions can be grouped under three headings as tamed death, foreign death, and unspoken death. In this context, according to the last approach which (...) is effective in the modern world, the death which is completely removed from the life of the individual has been turned into a phenomenon which should be avoided/ postponed, not something to be dealt with. Thus, death, becoming a lonely phenomenon rather than a social phenomenon, has become a business problem rather than an occupation that people are interested in. Death, on the other hand, must be a criterion that determines life rather than being an object determined by life. The purpose of studying in this context is to question the position occupied in the life of the modern individual by moving from the understanding of deaths developed in the historical process. (shrink)

In his stimulating recent book Reasons without Persons, Brian Hedden develops a novel theory of rationality that he calls Time-Slice Rationality. One of the main theses of TSR is that all rational requirements are synchronic. We argue here first that this thesis is not well-motivated. We also demonstrate that Hedden is in fact committed to an even stronger claim about the rationality of an agent at a time. Finally, we provide some arguments against the conception of rationality that results from (...) this stronger claim. (shrink)

This article exemplifies research on the subjective life experiences of women with breast cancer, designed from a psychoanalytic perspective. Such research aims to reveal the subjective intrapsychic processes of women suffering from breast cancer, which can provide researchers and health care professionals with useful insight. Using Biographic narrative interpretative method, the study reveals some common denominators in the subjective life experiences of women with breast cancer. The study revealed that the subjects consider the diagnosis of breast cancer as one of (...) the four main events in their lives. Even though these events are very different from each other, in terms of type and severity, the results indicate a common process in the way these life events are experienced by the participants. These results are relevant for health care practitioners in structuring their psychosocial support programs so as to better accommodate their patients' psychological needs. (shrink)

This paper focuses specifically on how religions shape attitudes towards ethics of tax evasion. Firstly, the paper begins with an overview of the four views on the ethics of tax evasion that have emerged over the centuries, then goes on to review some of the theoretical and empirical literature on the subject. The empirical part of the study examines attitudes toward tax evasion in 57 countries from the perspectives of six religions using the data from Wave 6 of the World (...) Values Survey. The sample population is more than 52,000. More than a dozen demographic variables were examined. The results study found that attitude toward cheating on taxes does differ by religion. (shrink)