The quasivariety of BCK-algebras is widely known and investigated class of algebras. It is a natural semantic for the BCK-logic but there are also others quasivarieties of algebras with the above property and there are even some varieties among them. The aim of this note is to bring to the reader’s a attention the lattice they form. In what follows we shall only consider classes of algebras of type.

The following logics are the most noteworthy from the perspective of the calculus of combinators: the Hilbert’s positive implicational logic , the Church’s weak theory of implication , the BCK-logic, and the BCI-logic. Their significance is due to a certain correspondence between combinators and implicational formulas . The first three logics mentioned have been immensely investigated but it was not so in case of the remaining one. The BCI-logics was mentioned by A. N. Prior in the second edition of his (...) Formal Logic of 1962 where it was credited to C. A. Meredith and dated in 1956 . A. (shrink)

The logic FBCI given by linearly ordered BCI-matrices is known not to be an axiomatic extension of the well-known BCI logic. In this paper we axiomatize FBCI by adding a recursively enumerable set of schemes of inference rules to BCI and show that there is no finite axiomatization for FBCI.

In "Variations on a theme of Curry," Humberstone conjectured that a certain logic, intermediate between BCI and BCK, is none other than monothetic BCI—the smallest extension of BCI in which all theorems are provably equivalent. In this note, we present a proof of this conjecture.

Humberstone asks whether every theorem of BCI provably implies $\phi\to\phi$ for some formula $\phi$. Meyer conjectures that the axiom $\mathbf{B}$ does not imply any such "self-implication." We prove a slightly stronger result, thereby confirming Meyer's conjecture.

We show the admissibility for BCI of a rule form of the characteristic implicational axiom of abelian logic, this rule taking us from →β to α. This is done in Section 8, with surrounding sections exploring the admissibility and derivability of various related rules in several extensions of BCI.

Neutrosophic set is a new mathematical tool for handling problems involving imprecise, indetermi nacy and inconsistent data. Pseudo-BCI algebra is a kind of non-classical logic algebra in close connection with various non-commutative fuzzy logics. Recently, we applied neutrosophic set theory to pseudo-BCI al gebras. In this paper, we study neutrosophic filters in pseudo-BCI algebras. The concepts of neutrosophic regular filter, neutrosophic closed filter and fuzzy regular filter in pseudo-BCI algebras are introduced, and some basic properties are discussed. Moreover, the relationships (...) among neutrosophic regular filter, fuzzy filters and anti-grouped neutrosophic filters are prese nted, and the results are proved: a neutrosophic filter (fuzzy filter) is a neutrosophic regular filter (fuzzy regular filter), if and only if it is both a neutrosophic closed filter (fuzzy closed filter) and an anti-grouped neutrosophic filter (fuzzy anti-grouped filter). (shrink)

More general form of -neutrosophic ideal is introduced, and their properties are investigated. Relations between -neutrosophic ideal and )-neutrosophic ideal are discussed. Characterizations of )-neutrosophic ideal are discussed, and conditions for a neutrosophic set to be an )-neutrosophic ideal are displayed.

Based on the hesitant fuzzy set theory which is introduced by Torra in the paper [12], the notions of Inf-hesitant fuzzy subalgebras, Inf-hesitant fuzzy ideals and Inf-hesitant fuzzy p-ideals in BCK/BCI-algebras are introduced, and their relations and properties are investigated. Characterizations of an Inf-hesitant fuzzy subalgebras, an Inf-hesitant fuzzy ideals and an Inf-hesitant fuzzy p-ideal are considered. Using the notion of BCK-parts, an Inf-hesitant fuzzy ideal is constructed. Conditions for an Inf-hesitant fuzzy ideal to be an Inf-hesitant fuzzy p-ideal are (...) discussed. Using the notion of Inf-hesitant fuzzy ideals, a characterization of a p-semisimple BCI-algebra is provided. Extension properties for an Inf-hesitant fuzzy p-ideal is established. (shrink)

Given i, j, k ∈ {1,2,3,4}, the notion of -length neutrosophic subalgebras in BCK=BCI-algebras is introduced, and their properties are investigated. Characterizations of length neutrosophic subalgebras are discussed by using level sets of interval neutrosophic sets. Conditions for level sets of interval neutrosophic sets to be subalgebras are provided.

We introduce several restricted versions of the structural rules in the implicational fragment of Gentzen's sequent calculus LJ. For example, we permit the applications of a structural rule only if its principal formula is an implication. We investigate cut-eliminability and theorem-equivalence among various combinations of them. The results include new cut-elimination theorems for the implicational fragments of the following logics: relevant logic E, strict implication S4, and their neighbors (e.g., E-W and S4-W); BCI-logic, BCK-logic, relevant logic R, and the intuitionistic (...) logic. (shrink)

As a generation of fuzzy set, the notion of complex fuzzy set which is an innovative concept is introduced by Ramot, Milo, Friedman and Kandel. The purpose of this article is to apply complex fuzzy set to BCK/BCI-algebras. The notions of a complex subalgebra and a complex left reduced ideal in a BCK/BCI- algebra are introduced, and related properties are investigated. Characterizations of a complex subalgebra are provided, and the homomorphic image of a complex subalgebra and a complex left reduced (...) ideal. (shrink)

This paper provides a finer analysis of the well-known form of the Local Deduction Theorem in contraction-free logics . An infinite hierarchy of its natural strengthenings is introduced and studied. The main results are the separation of its initial four members and the subsequent collapse of the hierarchy.

In an article dating back in 1992, Kosta Došen initiated a project of modal translations in substructural logics, aiming at generalising the well-known Gödel–McKinsey–Tarski translation of intuitionistic logic into S4. Došen's translation worked well for (variants of) BCI and stronger systems (BCW, BCK), but not for systems below BCI. Dropping structural rules results in logic systems without distribution. In this article, we show, via translation, that every substructural (indeed, every non-distributive) logic is a fragment of a corresponding sorted, residuated (multi) (...) modal logic. At the conceptual and philosophical level, the translation provides a classical interpretation of the meaning of the logical operators of various non-distributive propositional calculi. Technically, it allows for an effortless transfer of results, such as compactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem property and it opens up new directions for deducing properties of substructural logic systems by establishing appropriate transfer theorems. (shrink)

We give a proof of the finite model property of some fragments of commutative and noncommutative linear logic: the Lambek calculus, BCI, BCK and their enrichments, MALL and Cyclic MALL. We essentially simplify the method used in [4] for proving fmp of BCI and the Lambek ca culus and in [5] for proving fmp of MALL. Our construction of finite models also differs from that used in Lafont [8] in his proof of fmp of MALL.

After an introduction to set the stage, we consider some variations on the reasoning behind Curry's Paradox arising against the background of classical propositional logic and of BCI logic and one of its extensions, in the latter case treating the "paradoxicality" as a matter of nonconservative extension rather than outright inconsistency. A question about the relation of this extension and a differently described (though possibly identical) logic intermediate between BCI and BCK is raised in a final section, which closes with (...) a handful of questions left unanswered by our discussion. (shrink)

I read Stefan Collini’s What are Universities For? last week with very mixed feelings. In the past, I’ve much admired his polemical essays on the REF, “impact”, the Browne Report, etc. in the London Review of Books and elsewhere: they speak to my heart. If you don’t know those essays, you can get some of their flavour from his latest article in the Guardian yesterday. But I found the book a disappointment. Perhaps the trouble is that Collini is too decent, (...) too high-minded, has too unrealistically exalted a view about what actually happens in universities which is too coloured by attitudes appropriate to the traditional humanities. And he is optimistic to the point of fantasy if he thinks that people are so susceptible to “the romance of ideas and the power of beauty” that they will want, or can be brought to want, lots and lots of universities in order to promote the ideas (as if they would suppose that the task of “conserving, understanding, extending and handing on to subsequent generations the intellectual, scientific, and artistic heritage of mankind” was clearly ill-served when there were only forty universities in England, as opposed to a hundred and whatever). (shrink)

A common reaction to Hegel’s suggestion that we collapse Kant’s distinction between form and content is that, since such a move would also deprive us of any way of distinguishing the merely logical from the real possibility of our concepts, it is incoherent and ought to be rejected. It is true that these two distinctions are intimately related in Kant, such that if one goes, the other does as well. But it is less obvious that giving them up as Kant (...) conceives them is as incoherent a proposal as many of Hegel’s critics think. It has been the point of a recent account of Hegel’s idealism to demonstrate that his critique of Kant’s dichotomy between form and content or concept and intuition does not commit him to the view that human cognition is materially creative of its content in the manner of a God-like or intuitive intellect—does not, in other words, signify a return to a pre-Critical metaphysics. This is the interpretative stance I adopt here as well, in hope of giving defenders of Kant reasons for taking Hegel more seriously. (shrink)