As widely acknowledged, the epistemological turn of early modernity was based on the Cartesian method of doubt and negation, which primarily relates to the world of objects. The methodological negation and separation of sensible qualities and subjective attributes of objects left behind residual entities, which, from the Cartesian res extensa to the Kantian thing-initself, explicates an important basic feature of a historically unfolding transcendentalism: the reduction of objects to a mere givenness and the directional conditionality of epistemology that presupposes it. (...) The following paper examines how and to what extent modern epistemology tacitly assumes an epistemic directionality, and accordingly reduces the world of objects to its mere givenness by subordinating the objects to a hierarchical structure of cognition. The investigation is carried out both in a theoretical-philosophical as well as in a historical framework. (shrink)

This is a confusing attempt to reconcile realist philosophy with an aesthetic stand. The book includes a discussion of the contributions of artists, philosophers, and critics to the formulation of an aesthetic viewpoint; a brief history of idealistic aesthetic theory embodied in the ideas of Kant, Hegel, Croce, and Tolstoy; a definition and defense of "excellence" as the criterion in the evaluation of art; and a justification for the continued inclusion of aesthetics as a philosophical endeavor. Realists, with their emphasis (...) on the scientific approach, verification, and measurement have always had a certain amount of understandable trouble with the arts, a field known for its fluidity and willful perversity regarding attempts to establish permanent, stable criteria of evaluation. Gibson draws heavily on Wittgenstein's idea of "family resemblances" and Weitz's application of that idea to art. In doing so, however, he ignores Weitz's warning that since art has no set of necessary properties and since, therefore, it is impossible to formulate theoretical definitions of it, aestheticians might better spend their time on other issues. Gibson builds his case around a family resemblance of various, so-called permanent excellences such as "significant form," "expressiveness," and "communicative efficacy" which, he insists, just happen to converge together in "great" works of art. With this statement, as well as others concerning the effect great art must produce in the beholder, Gibson has returned to the idea of an Absolute definition which, though pluralistic in scope, is still as rigid, exclusive, and closed a concept as the ones he denounces, despite his statements of "proof" to the contrary. Mention should also be made of the weakness of the overall structure of the book. Ideas and explanations become confusing when they are dropped in driblets throughout diverse chapters. This book adds nothing to the ideas of Wittgenstein or Weitz while, at the same time, detracting considerably from the clarity and logic of their concepts.--B. T. (shrink)

This book, an outgrowth of the Bannerstone Division of American Lectures in Philosophy, is an attempt to form the groundwork for an empirical aesthetic that will be flexible and all-inclusive. Berleant bases his ideas on the concept of an open-ended aesthetic field in which art objects are actively experienced. This field consists of the art object, the perceiver, the artist, and the performer. It also includes conditioning factors of a biological, psychological, technological, historical, social, and cultural nature. When the aesthetic (...) field is considered experientially the result is what Berleant terms an "aesthetic transaction." Aesthetics itself must be understood on a level that does not attempt to either translate the art into other terms or to exclude those works of art which do not happen to fit into the particular theory one is espousing. Theories must fit art not the other way around. The predominant characteristics of aesthetic experience are identified as active-receptive, qualitative, sensuous, immediate, intuitive, non-cognitive, unique, intrinsic and integral. One of Berleant's main concerns is to rescue the whole field of aesthetics from its present semantic morass. He does this by shifting the art object from the position of prime importance to just one component of a multifaceted field in which perceiving and experiencing is the main objective. A number of Berleant's statements are questionable: most artists are not as audience-oriented as his theory demands they be; art objects are imbued occasionally with life and abilities which inanimate objects do not have; there is no recognition of the common situation in which only the artist ever sees a particular work so that one person only is the creator, the audience and, the critic--a fact which weakens Berleant's reasons for placing the critic outside the aesthetic field; and finally, there is total avoidance of the psychology of artists. But intelligence and imagination are at work here and the result is a provocative book.--B. T. (shrink)

The stated intent of this book is to use the art of today as an introduction to philosophy and to describe the aesthetic experience. The author also says he wants to take a stand which he solidly does. The issues dealt with are the standard meat of aesthetic discussions and complexities: a comparison of ordinary and aesthetic vision, the art-object, qualities of the aesthetic experience, form, content, process, expression, tragedy, comedy, beauty, and the sublime. Anderson's arguments are based on three (...) main assumptions. Art is separate from life and, since it is external to man, he must struggle to cross into the realm of art, often wading through intentionally ambiguous elements to get to the content of the art-work. A successful art-object revives in the viewer the process of perception and articulation learned as a child. The crux of the aesthetic experience is the disclosure of content to the spectator. Based on this last assumption, the author's standard for judging artists is that some artists are more profound than others because their participation in this disclosure of content is deeper. Therefore, the better artist will try to relate both his activities and his nature to this all-important process. Positive aspects of this book are refreshingly unstereotyped views on the role of art critics and art history ; a recognition that aesthetic response is intuitive and the aesthetic experience is transient; and the raising of some provocative questions regarding the importance of the artist's judgment in determining the value of his own work. Unfortunately, this last point is not discussed after its initial mention. On the negative side, despite Anderson's stated intentions, all specific examples of art-works are drawn from non-contemporary sources. Also, idealism lends itself to a rigid aesthetic hermeneutics which is contrary to the majority of art movements in this century. Indeed, one of the outstanding characteristics of the contemporary arts has been the steady destruction of canons and boundaries. Anderson presents these same canons as relevant and absolute. His emphasis on the disclosure of content and content itself is particularly open to question in the light of conscious attempts by artists to eliminate content as a contentable element.. Some justification for endorsing interpretive aesthetics is needed and is not given. Anderson's greatest success is that he has, indeed, most clearly taken a stand.--B. T. (shrink)