The core of Kelsen's strong views on authority emerging from his concept of law is this:Authority of law, authority in law and authority about law are one and the same thing. The conceptual problems suggested by these three different prepositions must and can be solved in one fell swoop. Kelsen's core view will first be probed by giving an account of what is a promising approach offered in a fairly early text, Das Problem der Souveränität, namely, what it means to (...) `set' or `posit' the law. Inevitably, this leads to an interpretation of the Grundnorm, one that intends to accommodate as many Kelsenian emphases as possible. The Grundnorm will be presented as a shield against hypostatising authority. From there, some characteristics will be inferred of the type of authority that arises from Kelsen's account of legal knowledge, which will be called, somewhat polemically, authority without an author. (shrink)

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as (...) the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view. (shrink)

Making a first sketch of philosophical issues arising from European Community law I want to present a series of more or less obvious, and more or less interrelated dilemmas, or even ‘double binds’. (i) Deepening the community becomes incompatible with widening membership. (ii) National states seem both necessary for and obstructive in articulating transnational problems. (iii) The more democracy is needed as a warrant for the public exercise of political power in Europe, the more the very concept of democracy on (...) a European scale evades understanding. (iv) European unity presupposes a unifying rule of law, while member states have radically different conceptions of this principle. (v) Even the very core of European integration, the common market, is subject to two conflicting and, indeed, incompatible doctrines of competition. In explaining the nature of each dilemma I will try to take my cue from the Maastricht Treaty wherever this seems suitable. Then I will elaborate on the jurisprudential problems involved in it. Finally, each section will be closed by an attempt to state the nature of these problems in philosophical terms. (shrink)

Responsibility disappears into the background of private law as it deals with imputation of liability. Fitness to be held liable is determined by normative viewpoints different from moral ones, in particular by convictions on how society ought to be organized so as to avoid or end conflict between private citizens. Modes of discursive control are geared to making authoritative decisions in view of the same end, and corporate agency is created, restricted or enlarged to undercut or to impose individual liability.