In this paper I attempt to unpack the current public debate on racial transformation in South African sport, particularly with regard to the demographic make-up of its national cricket and rugby sides. I ask whether the alleged moral imperative to undertake such transformation is, in fact, a moral imperative at all. I discuss five possible such imperatives: the need to compensate non-white South Africans for the injustices in sport’s racist history, the imperative to return the make-up of our national sides (...) to what they would have been in the absence of that history, the requirement that national sides be representative of the country, the need to eliminate ongoing racial bias in selection, and the obligation to provide all South Africans, regardless of their race, the opportunity to compete as equals for places in the national side. I argue that the first three, drawn from talk of “rectifying the injustices of the past,” “achieving demographic proportionality between the sides and the country,” “representivity,” and “transformation” itself, are not compelling. The remaining two are of great moral import, but that the sorts of phrases just mentioned, and which are frequently used in the debate, have little to do with those genuine moral requirements. (shrink)

Abstract Susan Moller Okin has criticized Michael Sandel's view that the family is an example of an institution that is sometimes ?above? or ?beyond? justice, and for which justice is not, under the best conditions, a virtue. She argues that he both misses the point of justice as a virtue of social institutions and that he idealizes the family, and after undertaking this ?ground-clearing?, goes on to argue that families should be just. This paper offers a qualified defense of Sandel. (...) I argue, first, that Sandel has not missed the point of justice as a virtue of social institutions. But I go on to argue, more centrally, that if we distinguish between what I call ?internal? and ?social? justice of the family, and look carefully at the conclusions of Okin's own arguments, we see that she has really argued for the social justice of the family, and that this can be maintained alongside Sandel's vision of the family as an institution within which considerations of justice are neither central, nor necessarily appropriate. I try to carve out space both for Sandel's vision of the family, and for Okin's substantive feminist conclusions about family-based gender injustice. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a limited defence of “fairness” or “fair play” arguments for political obligation by focussing on one important critique of such arguments, that offered by A. John Simmons. I isolate Simmons's concentration on the idea of “accepting” benefits and argue that, among other difficulties, his criteria for when we can be said to accept a benefit from our political communities are too restrictive. While the scope of the discussion is narrow, I try to sketch ways in (...) which the failings of Simmons's critique are symptomatic of deeper problems with his libertarian approach. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.23(3) 2004: 282-291. (shrink)

?Understanding?, as I use the term, is an affective state which results from the dissolution of condemnatory judging in the face of non-standard sorts of considerations leading to such a dissolution. Rather than being a response to excuse, justification, or lack of responsible agency, understanding flows in a variety of ways from careful attention to the particulars of a wrongdoer's circumstances and situation. In this paper I try to explore why I think it is good to be the sort of (...) person who is willing to thus empathetically identify with wrongdoers and be such that exposure to those circumstances and particulars leads to the dissipation of condemnatory judgement. The suggestion I try to defend is that humility calls for it. I sketch what I take to be a normatively attractive cluster of traits which I identify with humility. And I then try to show how the person who has them will be disposed to understand wrongdoings without denying their wrongness, nor condoning them. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Phenomenological Considerations Addictiveness Dangerousness.

This article explores and unpacks the public debate on the ethics of applying selection quotas to South African international sport sides to achieve transformation, with special attention to cricket and rugby, the Proteas and Springboks respectively. I claim that for quotas to be morally called for, the racial transformation they are in service of must be morally required. Following an earlier article of mine on the subject of transformation in South African sport, I briefly reject two manifestations of the goal (...) of having the sides’ racial demographics match those of the country as a whole, and proceed to defend and develop two different transformational requirements: the ending of ongoing racial bias and the provision of equality of opportunity. I argue that while there may be a place for alternative forms of affirmative selection, the case for rigid quotas is marginal at best. While I do not argue for the claim here, it neither follows from this, nor do I believe, that the use of quotas is morally wrong. I argue only that the case for them is not particularly strong and depends, particularly, on the extent to which ongoing racial bias in selection persists. (shrink)