(2000). CASSIRER, SCHLICK AND ‘STRUCTURAL’ REALISM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EXACT SCIENCES IN THE BACKGROUND TO EARLY LOGICAL EMPIRICISM. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 71-106.

The central theme running throughout this outstanding new survey is the nature of the philosophical debate created by modern science's foundation in experimental and mathematical method. More recently, recognition that reasoning in science is probabilistic generated intense debate about whether and how it should be constrained so as to ensure the practical certainty of the conclusions drawn. These debates brought to light issues of a philosophical nature which form the core of many scientific controversies today. _Scientific Method: A Historical and (...) Philosophical Introduction_ presents these debates through clear and comparative discussion of key figures in the history of science. Key chapters critically discuss * Galileo's demonstrative method, Bacon's inductive method, and Newton's rules of reasoning * the rise of probabilistic `Bayesian' methods in the eighteenth century * the method of hypotheses through the work of Herschel, Mill and Whewell * the conventionalist views of Poincaré and Duhem * the inductivism of Peirce, Russell and Keynes * Popper's falsification compared with Reichenbach's enumerative induction * Carnap's scientific method as Bayesian reasoning The debates are brought up to date in the final chapters by considering the ways in which ideas about method in the physical and biological sciences have affected thinking about method in the social sciences. This debate is analyzed through the ideas of key theorists such as Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend. (shrink)

The central theme running throughout this outstanding new survey is the nature of the philosophical debate created by modern science's foundation in experimental and mathematical method. More recently, recognition that reasoning in science is probabilistic generated intense debate about whether and how it should be constrained so as to ensure the practical certainty of the conclusions drawn. These debates brought to light issues of a philosophical nature which form the core of many scientific controversies today. _Scientific Method: A Historical and (...) Philosophical Introduction_ presents these debates through clear and comparative discussion of key figures in the history of science. Key chapters critically discuss * Galileo's demonstrative method, Bacon's inductive method, and Newton's rules of reasoning * the rise of probabilistic `Bayesian' methods in the eighteenth century * the method of hypotheses through the work of Herschel, Mill and Whewell * the conventionalist views of Poincaré and Duhem * the inductivism of Peirce, Russell and Keynes * Popper's falsification compared with Reichenbach's enumerative induction * Carnap's scientific method as Bayesian reasoning The debates are brought up to date in the final chapters by considering the ways in which ideas about method in the physical and biological sciences have affected thinking about method in the social sciences. This debate is analyzed through the ideas of key theorists such as Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:David Hume and the Probability of Miracles Barry Gower 1. Introduction Oflate there have been published several discussions ofDavid Hume's famous essay "Of Miracles" which attempt to make precise the reasoning it contains. This, it turns out, requires the use of certain mathematical rules and theorems of the probability calculus which were unknown to Hume or, indeed, to anyone else when the essay was first published. It is suggested, (...) in particular, that the claims he made can best be understood in the light of a theorem of the probability calculus which we now name after a celebrated eighteenth century probabilist, Thomas Bayes. However, the so-called "Bayesian" interpretation of the argument against miracles misrepresents Hume's reasoning in that the manner in which he expressed his thinking does not fit such an interpretation. Moreover, this error needs to be rectified, not just because it involves a mistaken view about the past but, more importantly, because it obscures the legacy of a different mode of thinking evident in Hume's writing about probabilistic inference which deserves to be recovered. Our thinkingisimpoverishedifcertain presumptions aboutprobability become so entrenched that we have great difficulty in seeing them as anything other than obvious. By imputing them to Hume we overlook their contestability and so lose an opportunity to recapture an alternative way of understanding probabilistic reasoning. As is well known, the argument against miracles, though not published until 1748, had been worked out some twelve or thirteen years earlier during Hume's stay at the Jesuit college of La Fleche, where he wrote most of A Treatise of Human Nature. A chapter entitled "Reasonings concerning Miracles" had been written but, at the last moment, it was suppressed for fear that such an explicit attack on religion would give offence and thus deflect attention from the book's main philosophical aim which was to put an end to controversy. On the other hand, Thomas Bayes's famous memoir on probability was not published until 1764, andit is unlikely that Hume knew ofits existence until Richard Price mentionedit, though without identifyingits author, in an elaborate mathematical footnote to a dissertation containing remarks on the probability of miracles, published in 1767. Had Hume taken the trouble to follow up this reference, he would almost certainly Volume XVI Number 1 17 BARRY GOWER have been either baffled by its mathematics or discouraged by its lack of practical advice. That, at least, seems to have been the reaction of Hume's contemporaries, for apart from Price none of them seems to have paid any attention to the memoir. Even today, when anyone with the slightest acquaintance with probability can recite a version of Bayes's theorem, it is hard to follow the reasoning of the memoir and to appreciate the significance of the ideas it contains. As an historian of statistics has recently said, "Bayes's contemporaries were stymied by the work, and modern readers unwilling to devote many hours to it are likely to gain only a superficial understanding ofit." One paradoxical feature of attributing Bayesianism to Hume concerns the role of Richard Price. His dissertation, which had, it seems, been written some years before it was published — perhaps in the early 1750's — is sharply critical of Hume's argument against miracles. Yet it was Price himself who was responsible for the posthumous publication of Bayes's memoir, and his introduction and commentary clearly express approval of its methods and conclusions. We are, then, faced with the suggestion that Hume, not having heard of Bayes, was applying Bayesian ideas about "inverse" inference to miraculous events, whereas Price, who was not only familiar with but also endorsed Bayes's ideas, preferred a quite different approach to reasoning about miracles and about the credibility of testimony generally. Can Hume really be described as a "better intuitive Bayesian" than Price? Before embracing such aparadoxical conclusion we should consider whether it is really justified by what Hume said about the probability ofmiracles. First, though, some attention needs to be paid to a way ofthinking about probable arguments which does not conform to convention, and which implies a non-Bayesian interpretation of the question about miracles. 2. Jakob Bernoulli and the Combination... (shrink)

1986 is the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, which is commonly considered one of the most influential books in twentieth-century philosophy. These essays offer a comprehensive appraisal of the influence and impact of Ayer's work and analyze the ways in which Ayer's arguments have been absorbed, modified, or rejected by various philosophers. A noteworthy feature of the book is an original essay by A. J. Ayer that assesses the influence of his work (...) in philosophy over the last fifty years. (shrink)

James Forbes' critical examination of the probabilistic reasoning, which led John Michell to infer a physical connection between optically double and multiple stars, is analysed. It is argued that despite the interpretations of its nineteenth-century defenders, Michell's reasoning has some force which does not depend upon questionable Bayesian principles. Attention is drawn to some of the ambiguities concerning the notion of randomness, and it is shown that these ambiguities render Forbes' objections less than conclusive.

In his account of probable reasoning, Poincaré used the concept, or at least the language, of conventions. In particular, he claimed that the prior probabilities essential for inverse probable reasoning are determined conventionally. This paper investigates, in the light of Poincaré's well known claim about the conventionality of metric geometry, what this could mean, and how it is related to other views about the determination of prior probabilities. Particular attention is paid to the similarities and differences between Poincaré's conventionalism as (...) it applies to probabilities and de Finetti's subjectivism. The aim of the paper is to suggest that in accounts of the development of ideas about probable reasoning, particularly those customarily described as Bayesian, Poincaré's discussion deserves more attention than it has so far received. (shrink)

Socrates is still an enigmatic figure of enormous importance in Western culture. This book introduces both some of Socrates' problems and some of the problems about him. It seeks at the same time to advance new views, arguments and information on Socrates' mission, techniques, ethics and later reception. Composed of new essays by different scholars, some of them primarily Hellenstics, some philosophers, it illustrates both the variety of Plato's literary portrayals of Socrates and the diversity of later and present-day approaches (...) to him. Socratic Questions thus confronts the difficulties, philosophical and biographical, presented by dialogues such as Protagoras and Crito and by the Apology of Socrates. From civil disobedience to ethics, this collection provides stimulating discussions of Socrates' life, thought and historical significance. It will be of great interest to all students of ancient Greek history literature and philosophy. (shrink)