BackgroundThe values and attitudes of healthcare professionals influence their handling of ‘do-not-attempt-resuscitation’ (DNAR) orders. The aim of this study was a) to describe attitudes, perceptions and practices among Swedish physicians and nurses towards discussing cardiopulmonary resuscitation and DNAR orders with patients and their relatives, and b) to investigate if the physicians and nurses were familiar with the national ethical guidelines for cardiopulmonary resuscitation.MethodsThis was a retrospective observational study based on a questionnaire and was conducted at 19 wards in two regional (...) hospitals and one county hospital.Results210 physicians and 312 nurses (n = 522) responded to the questionnaire. Every third (35%) professional had read the guidelines with a lower proportion of physicians (29%) compared to nurses (38%). Around 40% of patients had the opportunity or ability to participate in the DNAR discussion. The DNAR decision was discussed with 38% of patients and the prognosis with 46%. Of the patients who were considered to have the ability to participate in the discussion, 79% did so. The majority (81%) of physicians and nurses believed that patients should always be asked about their preferences before a DNAR decision was made.ConclusionsSwedish healthcare professionals take a patient’s autonomy into account regarding DNAR decisions. Nevertheless, as 50% of patients were considered unable to participate in the DNAR discussion, questions remain about the timing of patient participation and whether more discussions could have been conducted earlier. Given the uncertainty about timing, the majority of patients deemed competent participated in DNAR discussions. (shrink)

I argue against the intellectualist view of love according to which we (must) love for reasons so that love is rational. Engaging primarily with the quality appraisal view of love, I concede that qualities can cause love but insist that it is misguided to think of love as having reasons. A number of features of human psychology complicate the issue of how lover relates to beloved's qualities. (a) The lover may be attracted to a quality without appraising that quality reflectively. (...) (b) Personal qualities are not perceived in isolation; rather, our assessment of one quality will affect how we perceive another. In fact, we tend to posit essences in persons, and these guide our interpretation of their other qualities. (c) We do not see persons as bundles of qualities but as unique wholes. This is due to our capacity to fetishize particulars, and it dispels the problem of fungibility. (d) We have a tendency to see meaning in things retrospectively—philosophers have mistaken this sense of meaning for rationality. The philosophical movement to incorporate love into rationality fails to recognize that there is a folk metaphysics built deep into our psyches that does not correspond to the worldview of contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

The article briefly introduces an academic debate between two different responses to the predicament of the human in the ecological crisis, namely the object-oriented ontology and the vitalist response to that approach. Based on that introduction, it argues for the need of a complementing analytical tool and sketches the contours of such a tool by suggesting an epistemological tactic for a decolonizing human distinctiveness. The article suggests an analytical maneuver to be used by scholars who aim at decolonizing nature from (...) human oppression, a tool that enables illumination and critical scrutiny of the epistemological role of the human as one stage toward destabilizing the notion of human distinctiveness. The article, thus, introduces an approach where human distinctiveness is not understood as a factual distinctiveness—not an essential difference between the human and the nonhuman world—but where human distinctiveness is critically viewed as a discursive role in theoretical work, a role that can be temporarily put to use by the scholar as a decolonizing epistemological tactic. In other words, human distinctiveness is here tactically used as a tool to critically scrutinize the idea of human distinctiveness rather than to safeguard it. (shrink)

Self-blame is an integral part of our lives. We often blame ourselves for our failings and experience familiar unpleasant emotions such as guilt, shame, regret, or remorse. Self-blame is also what we often aim for when we blame others: we want the people we blame to recognize their wrongdoing and blame themselves for it. Moreover, self-blame is typically considered a necessary condition for forgiveness. However, until now, self-blame has not been an integral part of the theoretical debate on moral responsibility. (...) This volume presents twelve new essays by leading moral philosophers, who set out bold new theories of the nature and ethics of self-blame, and the interconnection between self-blame and moral responsibility. The essays cast new light on traditional problems in the debate on moral responsibility and open new, exciting avenues for research in moral philosophy, moral psychology and the philosophy of punishment. (shrink)

At the end of the essay “Silhouettes” in Either/Or , Kierkegaard writes, “only the person who has been bitten by snakes knows what one who has been bitten by snakes must suffer.” I interpret this as an allusion to Alcibiades' speech in Plato's Symposium. Kierkegaard invites the reader to compare Socrates to Don Giovanni, and Alcibiades to the seduced women. Socrates' philosophical method, in this light, is a deceptive seduction: just as Don Giovanni's seduction leads his conquests to unhappy love—what (...) Kierkegaard terms “reflective sorrow”—so the elenctic method leads Socrates' interlocutors to aporia, not to knowledge. I offer a critique of Socratic irony, a stance reflected in the theory of love Socrates presents in the Symposium, and suggest that philosophy should instead be modeled on Alcibiades' and the Silhouettes' approach to love. (shrink)

Objective: To evaluate whether ethics rounds stimulated ethical reflection. Methods: Philosopher-ethicist-led interprofessional team ethics rounds concerning dialysis patient care problems were applied at three Swedish hospitals. The philosophers were instructed to stimulate ethical reflection and promote mutual understanding between professions but not to offer solutions. Questionnaires directly before and after rounds were answered by 194 respondents. The analyses were primarily content analysis with Boyd’s framework but were also statistical in nature. Findings: Seventy-six per cent of the respondents reported a moderate (...) to high rating regarding new insights on ethical problem identification, but the ethics rounds did not seem to stimulate the ethical reflection that the respondents had expected (p<0.001). Dominant new insights did not seem to fit into traditional normative ethics but were instead interpreted as hermeneutic ethics. This was illustrated in the extended perspective on the patient and increased awareness of relations to other professions. Regarding insights into how to solve ethical problems, the request for further interprofessional dialogue dominated both before and after rounds. Conclusion: The findings show the need for interprofessional reflective ethical practice but a balance between ethical reflection and problem solving is suggested if known patients are discussed. Further research is needed to explore the most effective leadership for reflective ethical practice. (shrink)

It is often assumed that we are only blameworthy for that over which we have control. In recent years, however, several philosophers have argued that we can be blameworthy for occurrences that appear to be outside our control, such as attitudes, beliefs and omissions. This has prompted the question of why control should be a condition on blameworthiness. This paper aims at defending the control condition by developing a new conception of blameworthiness: To be blameworthy, I argue, is most fundamentally (...) to deserve to feel guilty. Being blamed by someone else is not necessarily harmful to the wrongdoer. The blame might not be expressed, or the wrongdoer might not care. But to blame oneself necessarily involves suffering. This conception of blameworthiness explains why the control condition should obtain: We are morally blameworthy for A only if A was under our control because to be blameworthy is to deserve to feel guilty, to feel guilty is to suffer, and one deserves to suffer for A only if A was under one’s control. (shrink)

Responsibility as accountability is normally taken to have stricter control conditions than responsibility as attributability. A common way to argue for this claim is to point to differences in the harmfulness of blame involved in these different kinds of responsibility. This paper argues that this explanation does not work once we shift our focus from other-directed blame to self-blame. To blame oneself in the accountability sense is to feel guilt and feeling guilty is to suffer. To blame oneself in the (...) attributability sense, it will be argued, is to feel shame and feeling shame is also to suffer. The different control conditions cannot be explained by a difference in the harm of blame. Instead, this paper argues that accountability and attributability are governed by different kinds of appropriateness: an agent S is accountability blameworthy for X only if S deserves to feel guilty; an agent S is attributability blameworthy for X only if it is fitting that S feels shame for X. (shrink)

According to Kantian ethics, immoral actions convey disrespect. This negative attitude makes injuries inflicted by other persons worse than injuries caused by nature, ceteris paribus. As Strawson would later put it, the perpetrator’s attitude of disregard prompts in the victim the reactive attitude of resentment. But, I point out, we harbour and display plenty of other negative attitudes toward people aside from disrespect. What, if any, reactive attitudes are natural and appropriate in response to these? In unrequited love, for example, (...) the beloved denies the lover a certain kind of recognition that she desires. I claim that this often prompts resentment in the lover, despite the fact that she has suffered no moral wrongdoing—that her injury is, as I term it, ‘tragic’. If this is so, we must reconceive the meaning of resentment, distinguishing it sharply from indignation. After offering such a reinterpretation of resentment and indignation, I show how ‘tragic resentment’ might be warranted despite lacking a moral claim. If the beloved bears a deep responsibility for not reciprocating the love, then he is subject to negative reactive attitudes for it, despite the fact that he cannot choose whom to love and has no obligation to love. (shrink)

Although we find the idea of representation by similarities attractive as such, we have two main objections to the specific proposal of Edelman. First, he does not consider complexity issues in terms of storage and speed of recall for recognition. Related to this, the appearance of objects depends on far more factors than just shape, illumination, and pose. This requires an intermediate shape abstraction process that extracts category-specific shape properties from the mixed appearance of images.

This book is a joint effort of like-minded researchers to define the concept of process within a psychological setting. Although minor differences exist as regards choice of background theory, their common focus is on personality in a broad psychodynamic context. Their definition of personality rests on a series of test instruments that have been validated during decades of thorough and vigorous empirical work. These were originally designed to open up micro-processes underlying the adaptation to or construction of reality, and have (...) subsequently proven diagnostically efficient. Coming from both sides of the Atlantic, the contributors have their background in psychological as well as medical institutions. The contributions in the book are examples of a vital source sustaining our efforts to get a more profound understanding of the vicissitudes of the human mind. (shrink)

According to the Strawsonian tradition, a person is responsible for an action just in case it is appropriate to hold them responsible for that action. One important way of holding people responsible for wrongdoing is by experiencing and expressing blaming emotions. This raises the questions of what blaming emotions are and in what sense they can be appropriate. In this chapter I will provide an overview of different answers to both these questions. A common thread in the chapter will be (...) a challenge for the Strawsonian tradition. Given that this tradition understands moral responsibility in terms of the appropriateness of blaming emotions, it must provide a realistic picture of these emotions and the practices in which they take part. On the other hand, it also aims to develop a normatively plausible account of the conditions of responsibility. I will try to show that it is often difficult to strike a satisfactory balance between these two aspirations. (shrink)

Victor Eremita proposes that the reader understand parts I and II of Either/Or as parties in a dialogue; most readers in fact view II as a devastating reply to I. I suggest that part I be read as a reaction or follow-up to Kierkegaard’s dissertation. Much of part I presents reflective characters who are aware of their freedom but reluctant or unable to adopt the ethical life. The modern Antigone and the Silhouettes are sisters of Alcibiades—failed students of Socrates. I (...) articulate and defend their modes of loving, which are significantly different from Don Giovanni’s and Johannes the Seducer’s purely aesthetic approaches to love. Such feminine love, I argue, dwells in the disputed territory between passion and action, substance and freedom, the aesthetic and the ethical. Antigone’s love is a passion she both suffers and tries to appropriate. The Silhouettes’ devotion to their beloved makes them dependent on him. I defend this dependence even though it is undoubtedly a form of despair. By appealing to Sartre’s account of love, I argue moreover that this love involves a recognition and appraisal of the beloved absent in the love exemplified by Fear and Trembling’s knight of infinite resignation. (shrink)

First published in 1986, Knowledge, Belief, and Witchcraft remains the only analysis of indigenous discourse about an African belief system undertaken from within the framework of Anglo-American analytical philosophy. Taking as its point of departure W. V. O. Quine's thesis about the indeterminacy of translation, the book investigates questions of Yoruba epistemology and of how knowledge is conceived in an oral culture.

Kierkegaard's preoccupation with a separation between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ runs through his work and is widely thought to belong to his rejection of Hegel's idealist monism. Focusing on The Concept of Irony and Either/Or, I argue that although Kierkegaard believes in various metaphysical distinctions between inside and outside, he nonetheless understands the task of the philosopher as that of making outside and inside converge in a representation. Drawing on Hegel's philosophy of art, I show that Kierkegaard's project in (...) both of these books is the aesthetic project of revealing the inner essence of something in its outward appearance. Kierkegaard's portrait of Socrates in The Concept of Irony is a phenomenology of the spirit of irony. My interpretation adds a new dimension to our understanding of Kierkegaard's aesthetics and his relation to Hegel; it presents him as a follower of Plato, whom he is usually thought to have dismissed; and it uncovers a deep connection between Kierkegaard's first two books, which are never read in conjunction. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...) to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. -/- Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present re-enactment interviewing and to propose that it can be used to reveal tacit caring knowledge. This approach generates knowledge not readily attainable by other research methods, which we demonstrate by analysing the epistemological and methodological underpinnings of re-enactment interviewing. We also give examples from a study where re-enactment was used. As tacit knowledge is often characteristic of care, re-enactment interviewing has the potential to engage the informant in a holistic mode and thereby (...) reveal wisdom of the body. When the care provider recalls an event, the details are articulated, which contributes to in-depth data, which subsequently serves as a basis for trustworthy analysis. (shrink)

There are various equivalent formulations of the Church-Turing thesis. A common one is that every effective computation can be carried out by a Turing machine. The Church-Turing thesis is often misunderstood, particularly in recent writing in the philosophy of mind.

In a bold new argument, Ulrika Carlsson grasps hold of the figure of Eros that haunts Søren Kierkegaard's The Concept of Irony, and for the first time, uses it as key to interpret that text and his second book, Either/Or. According to Carlsson, Kierkegaard adopts Plato's idea of Eros as the fundamental force that drives humans in all their pursuits. For him, every existential stance-every way of living and relating to the outside world-is at heart a way of (...) loving. By intensely examining Kierkegaard's erotic language, she also challenges the theory that the philosopher's first two books have little common ground and reveals that they are in fact intimately connected by the central and explicit topic of love. In this text suitable for both students and the Kierkegaard specialist, Carlsson claims that despite long-held beliefs about the disparity of his early work, his first two books both relate to love and Part I of Either/Or should be treated as the sequel to The Concept of Irony. (shrink)

For several decades, there have been increased requests to allow euthanasia in Sweden. The issue is a hot topic of debate among medical people, theologians, philosophers and parliamentarians. The authors in this book argue against the legalization of euthanasia.

Judge Wilhelm’s ethical critique of the aesthetic life, in Either/Or, is usually thought to be devastating. But it is rare for interpreters to consider whether the Judge’s characterization of the aesthetic life-view does justice to Aesthete A’s writings, let alone whether A could give a retort to the ethicist. This paper argues that much of the Judge’s criticism misses its mark. Part of the criticism is better directed at Johannes the Seducer, who cannot necessarily be identified with A. Furthermore, A (...) portrays in his essay on tragedy a life centred on unselfish love and attachment to family, albeit without what the Judge calls ‘repentance’. It is not ethics but the Judge’s distinctly Protestant religiosity that is missing from A’s view. The Judge accuses A of lacking faith, as though this were a character flaw in A, or something he could correct through an act of will. But in fact, I argue, faith is based on an immediate feeling, and cannot be acquired. Without religious faith, A tries to find other sources of meaning in life. The question whether life is worth living is what guides A in his inquiries into aesthetic value, yet that question itself is not aesthetic but ethical. (shrink)

Artikeln är en översikt av den tysk-judiska invandringen till Sverige från 1770-talet och framåt. Till en början skedde invandringen till stor del i form av kedjemigration från Mecklenburg. Många i pionjären Aaron Isaacs släktkrets invandrade, likaså i släktkretsen kring hans kompanjon Abraham Aaron. Under 1800-talet fortsatte frivilliginvandringen men nu i mindre form av kedjemigration och med mer differentierad geografisk bakgrund än tidigare. Så småningom kom invandringen från Tyskland numerärt att överflygas av den så kallade östjudiska invandringen; av de judar som (...) bodde i Sverige 1880 var bara åtta procent födda i Tyskland och 1920 mindre än fem procent. Många tysk-judiska invandrare vid denna tid, såsom bankmannen Louis Frænckel, gjorde betydelsefulla insatser i det svenska industriundret. Trots den restriktiva invandringspolitiken på 1930-talet kom ett antal tysk-judiska flyktingar till Sverige, såväl individuellt som genom särskilda kvoter. Många blev betydande aktörer i olika sektorer av samhället, och några blev internationellt kända namn som författaren och Nobelpristagaren Nelly Sachs och kärnfysikern Lise Meitner. Många flyktingar fick dock inte arbete som motsvarade deras utbildningar. Bland ”1945 års räddade” fanns tämligen få från Tyskland. (shrink)

In this article it is suggested that the discourse entailing the realization of a dystopia of totalitarian surveillance, far from being a grounded fact, on the contrary, works as a screen sheltering us from the fact that we are reaching a point where we are nothing more than depersonalized, emptied forms of interest neither to corporations nor to each other; instead, we are moving towards the liquification of subjectivity as such. When our user data is “taken hostage” we are emptied (...) of personal features, submitted to a process of dissolution rather than prying surveillance. It is tempting to suggest that the various repetitions of the Orwellian theme is a basic fantasy protecting us from the ever increasing gaps in the global virtual order; working to cover up the real of digital capitalism following a desperate logic by which only nightmares suffice. What if the furthering of the digital paradigm, with its potential to add yet another layer of virtuality to experience leads, not to an increase of (Orwellian) control, but on the contrary overturns the house of cards of (symbolic) reality, exposing the core of the illusions of the self and the subject? (shrink)

Background To characterize patients dying in a community hospital with or without attempting cardiopulmonary resuscitation and to describe patient involvement in, documentation of, and compliance with decisions on resuscitation. Methods All patients who died in Kalmar County Hospital during January 1, 2016 until December 31, 2016 were included. All information from the patients’ electronic chart was analysed. Results Of 660 patients female), 30 were pronounced dead in the emergency department after out-of-hospital CPR. Of the remaining 630 patients a DNAR order (...) had been documented in 558 patients. Seventy had no DNAR order and 2 an explicit order to do CPR. In 43 of these 70 patients CPR was unsuccessfully attempted while the remaining 27 patients died without attempting CPR. In 2 of 558 patients CPR was attempted despite a DNAR order in place. In 412 patients the DNAR order had not been discussed with neither patient nor family/friends. Moreover, in 75 cases neither patient nor family/friends were even informed about the decision on code status. Conclusions In general, a large percentage of patients in our study had a DNAR order in place. However, 27 patients died without CPR attempt or DNAR order. DNAR orders had not been discussed with the patient/surrogate in almost three fourths of the patients. Further work has to be done to elucidate the barriers to discussions of CPR decisions with the patient. (shrink)

В книге собраны статьи по актуальным вопросам политической теории, которые находятся в центре дискуссий отечественных и зарубежных философов и обществоведов. Книга имеет полемический характер и предназначена всем.