In the article, I discuss some ideas of the type theoretical grammar of Aarne Ranta and the analysis of the problem of Quine (Ralph and Ortcutt), which Oleg Domanov implemented by means of this theory. There are more similarities than differences in TT grammar with well-known ideas, including “fine grinding” of meanings, counterparts, procedural understanding of – intensions. The main problem, which, in my opinion, exists in the TT grammar, consists in understanding how another agent’s epistemic attitudes can be justified (...) for me. Ranta proceeds from the metaphor of the agent as a calculator, which for the general case is unacceptable. I believe that the interpretation of the epistemic attitudes of another agent must be externalistic, that is, referring not to the agent’s worlds, but to his actions in the actual world: “agent X believes that A” is true when the interpreter sees the behavior of the agent in situations that the interpreter would consider adequate for himself if he believed A and would be “in place” of X. To formalize here, it would take complicated tools which are used for describing actions. I’ve come to the conclusion that an understanding of the type in TT grammar makes it intensional in some extended sense, since the working with the naming relation is already an element of a specific pragmatics. (shrink)

Zubiri was especially keen on unde rstanding what mathematics is, and what literature is,not in the operational terms often employed to describe them, but as knowledge about reality. Through his philosophy of sentient intelligence, he came to understand that in bothcases, a new reality is created which is then explored, and the essential ingredient ispostulation. This insight was only possible because Zubiri recognized that reality is not azone of things, but formality. Zubiri’s notion of postulated reality can be extended (...) to a thirdarea, political theory, where analysis reveals that key realities are postulated by the action of politically empowered entities, usually states. However, postulated reality in thisarea differs in some important ways from mathematics and literature. Zubiri tuvo gran interés en entender qué es la matemática, y qué es la literatura, no ensentido funcional, sino en sentido de saber acerca de la realidad. Por su filosofía de inteligencia sentiente, llegó a entender que en ambos casos, se crea una realidad nueva que seexplora después, y el ingrediente esencial es la postulación. Tal percepción solo fue posibleya que Zubiri se dio cuenta de la realidad no es una zona de cosas, sino formalidad. Su noción de realidad por postulación se puede extender a un campo tercero, la teoría de la polí-tica, donde el análisis revela que las realidades claves son postulados por acción de entidades autorizadas políticamente, en general, estados nacionales. Pero, la realidad postuladaen este campo difiere de la matemática y de la literatura en sentidos importantes. (shrink)

The many difficulties the book contains are not due to its translator; Miss Freeman's well-marshalled English seldom leaves us in search of the intended sense. They are due rather to the complex character of the author's mind and to the exigencies of the thesis he is defending. One encounters flights of imagination in which lyrical transports alternate or combine with bold dialectical constructions offered as sober interpretations, and multiple quotations from ancient thinkers and modern critics, confusingly blended with our author's (...) own comments. Signor Untersteiner displays an ability like that of the anatomist Cuvier, and can reassemble the entire structure of a lost sophistic writing from a single bone. He exhumes from the works of many other writers--Thucydides, Plato, Theophrastus, Demosthenes, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero--major conceptions, chapters, or whole treatises, mistakenly incorporated there by later editors, or borrowed without acknowledgment; these and sundry anonymous writings on relevant themes he confidently assigns to this or that beneficiary among the sophists. As the inevitable consequence of this process other thinkers, notably Socrates and Plato, are sadly diminished. Socrates becomes, indeed, almost a superfluity, in whose absence the history of Greek thought would have remained unimpaired. Plato's works serve as happy hunting-grounds for supposed incorporations of sophistic insights; for the rest, he is shown as stone-and-gravel blind to the merits of these rival thinkers. Now, some discounting of Plato's satirical portrayal of the sophists may be admitted as legitimate and necessary. Untersteiner, however, has so far exceeded his allowance here as to reach the counter-absurdity, of which his interpretation of Thrasymachus in the ne plus ultra: to a proper reading, we are told, Thrasymachus is far from being a cynical denier of the claims of moral obligation. On the contrary, he is a broken-hearted idealist, and in calling justice "the advantage of the stronger" he is offering not his own conception of justice but, out of his bitter disillusion, describing what men in their tragic folly have made of that noble virtue. (shrink)

Marshall's asset equilibrium model provides a way of explaining the identity of entrepreneurs. Keynes adopted this model but transformed it when he emphasized the short-period and volatile character of long-term expectations. This entails a view of entrepreneur identity in which radical uncertainty plays a central role. This in turn deepens the post Keynesian view of uncertainty as ontological in that entrepreneurs' survival plays into their behavior. This paper explores this role-based view of individual identity and uses the analysis to comment (...) on Keynes’s ideas for the socialization of investment and euthanasia of the rentier in the last chapter of The general theory. (shrink)

In this article, I want to show that the concept “rationality”, which is important for the French school of epistemology of science, has a dual content and is not very successful. This is the main point of my polemic with Tatyana Sokolova. On the one hand, there seems to be general rationality in it, understood as a preference (in the broad sense) for benefits over costs. Benefits include true knowledge. On the other hand, there is a historical socio-cultural context (...) in which scientific knowledge arises and in which the parameters of practice are determined, which serves as the final instance for testing knowledge. At the same time, there are many such contexts in society, which I call human interfaces. The world, for its part, offers many of its interfaces as collections of interaction tools. When some interface of a person and some interface of the world assimilate each other, knowledge arises, that is confirmed by practice. It can be considered rational. But with a change in the sociocultural context, the human interface also changes, so that a search for new assimilation takes place. It is carried out by science. I agree with Tatyana Sokolova’s characterization of the progress of science, but I suggest at least differentiating the levels of rationality. One operates in the historical sociocultural locus, the other ensures the change of such loci and the adaptation of knowledge to them. I consider the progress of science to be an evaluative characteristic; no objectively recorded phenomenon corresponds to it. The disciplinary distinction of science is derived from the concepts of “object” and “method”, which have a performative content. (shrink)

This essay presents a brief summary of the Sen/Nussbaum conception of liberalism, offers some main points of criticism, and contrasts their conception of human flourishing and politics with an alternative one. The ultimate aim will be to show that they do not advance the cause of liberalism properly understood but actually retreat from it. The “human capabilities argument,” “public reasoning,” “internalist essentialism,” and other key concepts are discussed. The paper concludes that Sen and Nussbaum fail to adequately defend the premises (...) of the human capabilities argument and that their argument invites a retreat from liberalism. Moreover, on their theory individuals have no basis upon which to erect borders for their resources or themselves and to say to any and all that some areas are off limits no matter who may benefit. Rather, there is only the relentless and enforced pursuit of capabilities. (shrink)

In recent decades, many researchers set out to draw links between Western anarchism and ancient Chinese Daoism. The present work aims at adding to this ongoing debate by answering the question of whether the Guodian _Laozi_’s 郭店老子 sayings can be labelled as “anarchism.” It defends the claim that the text endorses a unique kind of anarchist theory based on a distinctive theory of political authority grounded in Daoist moral commitments. To do so, this essay first offers an overview of the (...) scholarly debate surrounding this topic. Second, it provides an account of the necessary and sufficient feature any theory must secure in order to be argued to be anarchist, as well as a framework that underlines potential differences between various anarchist theories. Third, a rigorous textual analysis of the Guodian Laozi is conducted to extrapolate its political advice, before analyzing it in light of the anarchist framework mentioned above. This essay concludes with an assessment of several objections that may be raised against its claims. (shrink)

Accession Number: ATLA0001712103; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 24-40.; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 38-40.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.

Like the other volumes in this excellent series, so auspiciously inaugurated by Reale’s Metaphysics, this contains a long introduction, a translation, and copious notes. Unlike those in the Clarendon Aristotle series, these translations are designed to be readable rather than to provide an unbiased key to Aristotle’s meaning and admit an element of conscious interpretation.

This volume "contains eight articles dealing with the intellectual and institutional developments in physics from the mid-1840’s to the mid-1920’s. The primary focus is on the quantum and relativity theories and Einstein’s contributions to these theories. The secondary focus is on thermodynamics and its kinetic theory basis in the nineteenth century." Slightly more than one third of the book is devoted to various aspects of Einstein’s work: M. J. Klein analyzes his difference with Bohr in 1923-1925; R. McCormmach traces the (...) problem area which he extracted from Lorentz’ electron theory in about the first decade of this century; and S. Goldberg considers the British response to his special theory of relativity in 1905-1911. In the editor’s foreword, McCormmach illustrates from the current investigation of Einstein a general thesis about "the limitations of contemporary writing in the history of science." Thus, this anthology may well become a standard secondary source for Einstein scholarship. A fourth of the book has to do with thermodynamics: Y. Elkana follows Helmholtz’ formulation of its first law ; E. E. Daub looks at the evolution of concepts essential to its second law ; and E. W. Garber delineates Clausius’ contribution to its underpinnings. Just two articles are unrelated to these two foci: P. Forman, in the longest paper in the volume, considers Lande’s search for a theory of the anomalous Zooman effect in 1919-1921; and R. Sviedrys, in an exchange with A. Thackray, examines the rise of physical science at Cambridge University during the Victorian era. (shrink)

In this remarkably ambitious book, Robert Pasnau has sought to trace out the story of medieval epistemology during its formative years, 1250 to 1350, and to draw conclusions both regarding the tenability of views advanced during the High Middle Ages and regarding the relation of medieval epistemology to early modern epistemology. In the history of cognitive theories, Pasnau discusses mainly the figures of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, and William of Ockham, although brief treatments are also included (...) of Roger Bacon and William Crathorn. The conclusions that Pasnau draws are that none of the epistemological theories advanced by the principal authors treated is altogether satisfactory and that medieval epistemology provides a direct antecedent to early modern epistemology since, on Pasnau’s reading, even the cognitive theory of a figure such as Aquinas relies on a kind of representationalism. (shrink)

We tend to think of the French Revolution as a good idea gone awry--idealism consumed by its antithesis in an orgy of Freudian Oedipal violence. It's difficult for us to credit the theorists of the French Revolution with genius. And yet they did possess genius. They recognized the root tension that exists between the ideals of human liberty and human equality. Individual liberty, freely exercized results in social inequality. Enforced social equality of necessity curtails individual liberty. The genius of their (...) solution to this dilemma was, of course, proudly proclaimed in the battle cry of the Revolution: Libèrté! Ègalité! Fraternité! The two inconsistent ideals of liberty and equality are reconcilable and realizable, but only in the resolving agent of fraternity. The trouble was that, as emotively effective as the word 'fraternity' may be as part of a battle cry, it is not effective as the organizing principle for a state. A less emotive, more nuanced understanding of the complex and often conflicting natures of the components that go into the making of a state was needed. It was not there, and the Revolution itself betrayed its own ideals. (shrink)

The primary purpose of this book "is to analyze and clarify certain fundamental concepts, principles, and procedures in both classical and relativistic mechanics." At the same time, it attempts to provide a grounding in the theory for the philosopher of science who must deal with the sometimes technical literature on the philosophical implications of relativistic mechanics. "This book, then, is an attempt at fundamental philosophic clarification embedded in the format of an introductory work." Its first six chapters deal with the (...) methodological foundations of classical mechanics and electrodynamics, as conceived prior to Einstein. Thus, the next six chapters introduce special relativity in such a way that it is connected with the tradition from which it arose. Although the book is not primarily a historical treatment of the theory, this added perspective is welcome because almost invariably philosophers of relativity portray the theory as if it arose without the intermediary of electrodynamics. (shrink)

The themes and topics of these eight essays are various. Two common threads run through them, though, and provide a tenuous unity. One thread, the basis for their claim to unpopularity, is their emphasis upon negative aspects of technological progress. The other is their philosophical character which, as described by the author, is not so much to resolve problems as "to raise questions, to sharpen our focus on the issues, and to indicate considerations that must be taken into account". Both (...) threads stand out in the first essay. (shrink)

Peter of Bergomo, one of the first to attempt to compile an index and concordance of Aquinas's works, often noted apparent discrepancies between diverse texts. His entry for "accidens" is no exception since approximately ten percent of its divisions are prefaced by the familiar "oppositum videtur dicere." The reader is left with the task of determining whether Bergomo's notations concern only apparent contradictions or whether St. Thomas indeed made significant alterations in his understanding of the topic. Brown's portrayal of Aquinas's (...) texts in their specific contexts permits a nuanced interpretation of St. Thomas's diverse considerations of the being of accidents which avoids both of the aforementioned alternatives. (shrink)

The sixteen essays contained in this book were all written independently of each other and date back over a considerable period of time to 1956. Most of the essays have been previously published and are reprinted here with little or no change or additions. Only two were specially written for this volume. All but two deal with the theoretical as distinct from the practical dimensions of science. The two exceptions are a set of reflections on the morality of the atomic (...) bombing of Japan in World War II and an essay which sketches a framework for the consideration of issues in nursing as a practical discipline. (shrink)

The present work is an excellent translation of Walter Burkert’s Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaus, und Platon, first published in 1962. It is very probably the most illuminating and comprehensive study of Pythagoreanism yet produced by a modern scholar. Obviously Pythagoreanism is a protean historical phenomenon, equally mysterious both in its origin and development, and in all epochs its interpretation has indicated as much about the winds of cultural doctrine as about the nature of Pythagoreanism itself. Burkert’s study (...) is the product of an astonishingly thorough penetration of all the relevant ancient evidence and all the critically significant modern literature, and it evinces the author’s remarkable ability to weave the diverse threads of Pythagoreanism into a comprehensible historical picture. (shrink)

This book is an important attempt to make explicit the moral and political implications and presuppositions of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. To many readers of Wittgenstein it will come as a surprise that there should be any significant political implications at all, for Wittgenstein’s work more than that of most other philosophers seems to be concerned exclusively with technical philosophical problems. Nevertheless, even before the appearance of Moran’s study, several commentators have suggested that the Tractatus is at least something more (...) than a treatise for philosophers; and Wittgenstein himself, in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker, stated flatly: "The point of the book is an ethical one." Moran, to the reviewer’s knowledge, is the first philosopher to take Wittgenstein’s own appraisal seriously enough to work out systematically the "wisdom" expressed, if muted, by the Tractatus. (shrink)

The author has written a noteworthy book on Hegel's ethical theory which will certainly make its mark in Hegelian scholarship. Not, properly speaking, an introductory work, Hegel's Ethical Theory is tightly written and thoroughly researched. The author's command of the Hegelian corpus is imposing. The work has been painstakingly organized, even though it is not entirely free of redundancies. The author is creditable when he states that the book was seventeen years in the making.

Price’s chief interest in this study of the Investigations is the origin of speaking. A review of Wittgenstein’s examinations of logic, pictures, rules of use, and mental processes as proposed standards of meaning shows that no determinate standard such as these can explain the origin of speaking. Wittgenstein’s discussions of custom, usage, pain statements, and recognition serve to elucidate the context and origin of speaking. However, the result raises difficulties for comprehending the originative moment of speaking anew. Although these are (...) partially resolved by Wittgenstein’s discussions of imagination and negation, the origin of any speaking must finally remain opaque because of the way ordinary usage contributes to meaning. (shrink)