The ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has quickly swept the globe leaving a devastating trail of lost human lives and leading to a public health and economic crisis. With this in mind, prosociality has been heralded as a potential important factor to overcome the negative effects of the pandemic. As such, in this study, we examined the effectiveness of a brief reflexive writing exercise about recent experiences of gratitude on individuals’ intentions to engage in prosocial behaviors using a sample (...) of 253 participants living in Portugal and 280 participants living in Brazil. Participants were randomly assigned to either a condition in which they were asked to write about recent experiences of gratitude or a control group in which they were asked to write about daily tasks. We predicted that the gratitude intervention would increase state gratitude and, consequently, increase positive affect and empathic concern, and decrease negative affect, leading to increased intentions to engage in prosocial behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic. A moderated serial–parallel mediation analysis, in which we controlled for gender, age, and level of religiosity, indicated that our manipulation led to increases in state gratitude, which in turn increased positive emotions and empathic concern, leading to increased prosocial intentions in both countries. A content analysis of participants’ responses in the gratitude group revealed that relationships with others and health and well-being were the central themes of their gratitude experiences during the COVID-19 global pandemic. (shrink)

Se aborda el estudio del film a partir del concepto de género cinematográfico, después la forma narrativa, la puesta en escena y el plano, interrelacionando los tres aspectos, para intentar a través del cómo capturar el qué o significado fílmico, y comentar la imagen depresiva ofrecida por la directora de una congénere que simboliza el modo diferente de ser mujer en la historia de Colombia.

Accurate and reliable prediction of Perfobond Rib Shear Strength Connector is considered as a major issue in the structural engineering sector. Besides, selecting the most significant variables that have a major influence on PRSC in every important step for attaining economic and more accurate predictive models, this study investigates the capacity of deep learning neural network for shear strength prediction of PRSC. The proposed DLNN model is validated against support vector regression, artificial neural network, and M5 tree model. In the (...) second scenario, a comparable AI model hybridized with genetic algorithm as a robust bioinspired optimization approach for optimizing the related predictors for the PRSC is proposed. Hybridizing AI models with GA as a selector tool is an attempt to acquire the best accuracy of predictions with the fewest possible related parameters. In accordance with quantitative analysis, it can be observed that the GA-DLNN models required only 7 input parameters and yielded the best prediction accuracy with highest correlation coefficient and lowest value root mean square error. However, the other comparable models such as GA-M5Tree, GA-ANN, and GA-SVR required 10 input parameters to obtain a relatively acceptable level of accuracy. Employing GA as a feature parameter selection technique improves the precision of almost all hybrid models by optimally removing redundant variables which decrease the efficiency of the model. (shrink)

We explore the value of the subjunctive mood as a template for understanding ethical action and the theological ontology that undergirds it. We do this by examining the use of a strange but very precisely used word in the writing of a theologian and minister and poet, Samuel Taylor Coleridge: "silly." We do so in the name of exploring the value of contingency, accidentality and abjection to a general theory of ecological thought.

Complex‐trait genetics has advanced dramatically through methods to estimate the heritability tagged by SNPs, both genome‐wide and in genomic regions of interest such as those defined by functional annotations. The models underlying many of these analyses are inadequate, and consequently many SNP‐heritability results published to date are inaccurate. Here, we review the modelling issues, both for analyses based on individual genotype data and association test statistics, highlighting the role of a low‐dimensional model for the heritability of each SNP. We use (...) state‐of‐art models to present updated results about how heritability is distributed with respect to functional annotations in the human genome, and how it varies with allele frequency, which can reflect purifying selection. Our results give finer detail to the picture that has emerged in recent years of complex trait heritability widely dispersed across the genome. Confounding due to population structure remains a problem that summary statistic analyses cannot reliably overcome. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/WC2u03V65MQ. (shrink)

We present a mathematical model of a fishery on several sites with a variable price. The model takes into account the evolution during the time of the resource, fish and boat movement between the different sites, fishing effort and price that varies with respect to supply and demand. We suppose that the movements of the boats and resource as well as the variation of the price go on at a fast time scale. We use methods of aggregation of variables in (...) order to reduce the number of variables and we derive a reduced model governing two global variables, respectively the biomass of the resource and the fishing effort of the whole fishery. We look for the existence of equilibria of the aggregated model and perform local stability analysis. Two main cases can occur. The first one corresponds to over-exploitation leading to fish extinction. At extinction, the fishing effort tends to a positive value. The second case corresponds to a durable fishery equilibrium which is globally asymptotically stable. In the later case, we show that there exists a number of fishing sites that optimizes the total catch of the fishery. (shrink)

This article seeks to illustrate the relevance of social theory for the study and practice of law. As social theory reports on changes that influence societal structures, the question for lawyers is how these changes affect law and what this means for its role and function. To this end, the article draws on Ulrich Beck's theory of the risk society and reflexive modernization to provide the relevant perspective. This theory reports upon and explains the so-called side effects of modernization that (...) take the shape of environmental, industrial and political risks. It is these side effects that constitute the problem in risk society and dealing with them demands a reflexive approach towards modernization. The article seeks to highlight the relevance of this theory for law by placing it in the tradition of social contacts theory. It does so by reformulating the central problem of the risk society and by identifying the main social actors who would be party to a "new" social contract. The article then identifies and formulates the instruments of negotiation, at which point it becomes clear what the role of law may be. It concludes with a tentative indication of what the main terms of the social contract could look like. (shrink)

_Youth in Education_ explores the multiple, interrelated social contexts that young people inhabit and navigate, and how educational institutions cope with increasing ethnic, cultural and ideological diversity. Schools, families and communities represent important settings in which young people must make successful transitions to adulthood, and the classroom often becomes a battleground in which these contexts and values interact. With contributions from the UK, Belgium, Germany and Canada, the chapters in this book explore rich examples from Europe and North America to (...) suggest strategies that can help to counter negative perceptions, processes of stigmatization and disengagement, instead prioritising peer support and cooperative learning to give pupils a renewed sense of worth. This book takes the growing ethno-cultural diversity in education systems to heart and studies the various related educational processes from a multidisciplinary and multi-method approach. It aims to offer more insight into underlying mechanisms that are often implicit, but can be important factors that positively or negatively influence educational trajectories and outcomes. It is essential reading for researchers, academics and postgraduate students in the fields of education, sociology, higher education, policy and politics, and social and cultural geography. (shrink)

We present a mathematical bioeconomic model of a fishery with a variable price. The model describes the time evolution of the resource, the fishing effort and the price which is assumed to vary with respect to supply and demand. The supply is the instantaneous catch while the demand function is assumed to be a monotone decreasing function of price. We show that a generic market price equation (MPE) can be derived and has to be solved to calculate non trivial equilibria (...) of the model. This MPE can have 1, 2 or 3 equilibria. We perform the analysis of local and global stability of equilibria. The MPE is extended to two cases: an age-structured fish population and a fishery with storage of the resource. (shrink)

According to the naïve, pre-theoretic conception, lying seems to be characterized by the intent to deceive. However, certain kinds of bald-faced lies appear to be counterexamples to this view, and many philosophers have abandoned it as a result. I argue that this criticism of the naïve view is misplaced; bald-faced lies are not genuine instances of lying because they are not genuine instances of assertion. I present an additional consideration in favor of the naïve view, which is that abandoning it (...) comes at an extremely high price; alternative accounts which eschew the intent-to-deceive condition on lying have difficulty distinguishing lies from non-literal speech. (shrink)

According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you say something that you believe to be false and you intend to deceive someone into believing what you say. However, philosophers have recently noted the existence of bald-faced lies, lies which are not intended to deceive anyone into believing what is said. As a result, many philosophers have removed deception from their definitions of lying. According to Jennifer Lackey, this is ‘an unhappy divorce’ because it precludes an (...) obvious explanation of the prima facie wrongness of lying. Moreover, Lackey claims that there is a sense of deception in which all lies are deceptive. In this paper, I argue that bald-faced lies are not deceptive on any plausible notion of deception. In addition, I argue that divorcing deception from lying may not be as unhappy a result as Lackey suggests. (shrink)

Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved. Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion : lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of (...) our disapproval of non-deceptive lies is a rhetorical illusion. (shrink)

In Lying and Insincerity, Andreas Stokke argues that bald-faced lies are genuine lies, and that lies are always assertions. Since bald-faced lies seem not to be aimed at convincing addressees of their contents, Stokke concludes that assertions needn’t have this aim. This conflicts with a traditional version of intentionalism, originally due to Grice, on which asserting something is a matter of communicatively intending for one’s addressee to believe it. I argue that Stokke’s own account of bald-faced lies faces serious problems (...) and give several responses on behalf of intentionalism. Some bald-faced lies are best understood as irrational attempts to deceive. Others are best understood as indirect speech acts of various kinds. Still, others are best understood as conventional speech acts, which differ from communicative acts like assertion in the ways that they must be embedded in social institutions or practices. An overarching theme of this essay is that we should not make theoretical decisions about how to classify speech acts by consulting ordinary usage. (shrink)

We conducted two experiments to determine whether common folk think that so-called _tell-tale sign_ bald-faced lies are intended to deceive—since they have not been tested before. These lies involve tell-tale signs (e.g. blushing) that show that the speaker is lying. Our study was designed to avoid problems earlier studies raise (these studies focus on a kind of bald-faced lie in which supposedly everyone knows that what the speaker says is false). Our main hypothesis was that the participants will think that (...) the protagonists from our examples lied without intending to deceive, and the results of our surveys confirmed this hypothesis: most of our participants rated tell-tale sign lies as lies not intended to deceive. Therefore, our analysis suggests that common folk think that some lies are not intended to deceive. (shrink)

Deceptionism about lying is the view that all lies are intended to deceive. This view sits uneasily with some cases that seem to involve lies not intended to deceive. We call these lies bald-faced because the liar lies while believing that the hearer knows that they are lying. The most recent deceptionist argument put forward by Rudnicki and Odrowąż-Sypniewska (this journal) defends the view that all genuine bald-faced lies are intended to deceive some of their hearers. I argue that this (...) argument is interesting but problematic: its premises do not support the view that all bald-faced lies are intended to deceive but rather only that some people who bald-faced lie to institutions or large audiences intend to deceive someone. Also, genuine bald-faced lies addressed at institutions are intended to (non-deceptively) manipulate institutions rather than deceive anyone. (shrink)

Bald-faced lies are on the uptick by political leaders in democracies worldwide. In the United States, for example, we are becoming numb not only to outrageous falsehoods, but to the bizarre self-assurance with which they are pronounced. We were told crowds were bigger than they were, that the sun shined when it didn’t, that Trump won in a landslide—and that was just in the first few days after his election. What has shocked so many is the fearlessness in the face (...) of the facts, the willingness to simply deny reality outright, and the apparent toleration—even joy—with which Trump’s followers greet the practice. Bald-faced lying by political leaders is an important phenomenon, but it is easy to misunderstand in ways that undermine our ability to combat its strange effectiveness. In this paper, I aim to first analyze political bald-faced lies and then examine the threat they pose to the norms of democratic discourse. My goal is not to answer the empirical question of how frequently denials of obvious facts occur in politics; it is the normative question of understanding what harms they cause — particularly when they are made by those — in political power. Nonetheless, I think it is important to resist the temptation to think that what we are talking about here are a few isolated and extreme examples. As Hannah Arendt noted, there are times in political life when truth, “if it happens to oppose a given group’s profit or pleasure, is greeted with greater hostility.” Arguably we are living in one of those times. (shrink)

Donald Trump and Boris Johnson are notoriously uninterested in truth-telling. They also often appear uninterested even in constructing plausible falsehoods. What stands out above all is the brazenness and frequency with which they repeat known falsehoods. In spite of this, they are not always greeted with incredulity. Indeed, Republicans continue to express trust Donald Trump in remarkable numbers. The only way to properly make sense of what Trump and Johnson are doing, we argue, is to give a greater role to (...) audience relativity – and in some cases, audience participation – in notions like bullshitting and bald-faced lying. In this paper, we develop a new understanding of bullshitting, one that includes bald-faced lying, and recognizes that different communicative acts may be directed at different audiences with a single utterance. In addition, we argue for recognition of the category of bald-faced bullshitting, a particular speciality of both Trump and Johnson, and one especially useful to authoritarian leaders. (shrink)

Donald Trump and Boris Johnson are notoriously uninterested in truthtelling. They also often appear uninterested even in constructing plausible falsehoods. What stands out above all is the brazenness and frequency with which they repeat known falsehoods. In spite of this, they are not always greeted with incredulity. Indeed, Republicans continue to express trust in Donald Trump in remarkable numbers. The only way to properly make sense of what Trump and Johnson are doing, we argue, is to give a greater role (...) to audience relativity - and in some cases, audience participation - in notions like bullshitting and bald-faced lying. In this paper, we develop a new understanding of bullshitting, one that includes bald-faced lying, and recognizes that different communicative acts may be directed at different audiences with a single utterance. In addition, we argue for recognition of the category of bald-faced bullshitting, a particular speciality of both Trump and Johnson, and one especially useful to authoritarian leaders. (shrink)

How can we disagree with a bald-faced liar? Can we actively disagree if it is common ground that the speaker has no intent to deceive? And why do we disapprove of bald-faced liars so strongly? Bald-faced lies pose problems for accounts of lying and of assertion. Recent proposals try to defuse those problems by arguing that bald-faced lies are not really assertions, but rather performances of fiction-like scripts, or different types of language games. In this paper, I raise two objections (...) to the fictionalist view, and then offer an analysis of how we disagree with bald-faced liars. I conclude that bald-faced lies are assertions, and that in pronouncing a bald-faced lie, the speaker tries to make it common ground that the assertion was in good standing qua assertion. (shrink)

I present a short, informal vignette that poses the question of whether altering one's appearance by wearing a wig counts as deception, since in both cases one (apparently) tries to bring about false beliefs in others. The bald-headed wig-wearer tries to get others to believe falsely that he has a thick head of hair. If deception is generally wrong, why isn't wig-wearing wrong also?

The traditional conception of lying, according to which to lie is to make an assertion with an intention to deceive the hearer, has recently been put under pressure by the phenomenon of bald-faced lies i.e. utterances that _prima facie_ look like lies but because of their blatancy allegedly lack the accompanying intention to deceive. In this paper we propose an intuitive way of reconciling the phenomenon of bald-faced lies with the traditional conception by suggesting that the existing analyses of the (...) phenomenon overlook a non-obvious category of hearers whom the speakers of bald-faced lies intend to deceive. Those hearers are institutions represented by the people involved, such as courts or secret police. We also criticize two recent rival accounts (Jessica Keiser’s and Daniel Harris’s) that attempt to save the traditional conception by saying that some bald-faced lies are not assertions, because they are conventional—rather than illocutionary—speech acts. (shrink)

This paper investigates the gendered and racialized discourse on Polycystic Ovary Syndrome in India. A complex metabolic, endocrinal and reproductive disorder, PCOS is one of the most common endocrinopathies in women of reproductive age today. Due to an unclear etiology, there is no single clinical definition for PCOS, contributing to a sense of confusion around the syndrome. India has one of the highest rates of PCOS in the world. Medical and social discourses on PCOS suggest the high rates are due (...) to the failures of Westernized lifestyle and diet in women from developing countries. Taking the example of India, I argue that the lack of a clear etiology creates a discursive vacuum and that PCOS in itself is not a gendered and racialized syndrome, but the discourse on it is. Through the figure of the “new Indian woman,” I address the socio-political anxieties of nationalism projected onto the female body and suggest that the discourse on PCOS in India is in reaction to a rising nationalist rhetoric. As a syndrome that presents through “masculine” symptoms, PCOS acts a unique entryway into the intersectional issues of gender, race, sexuality, class and national identities. An analysis of the Indian setting might shed light on PCOS discourses that are increasingly relevant globally. (shrink)

In the context of classical (crisp, precise) sets, there is a familiar connection between the notions of counting, ordering and cardinality. When it comes to vague collections, the connection has not been kept in central focus: there have been numerous proposals regarding the cardinality of vague collections, but these proposals have tended to be discussed in isolation from issues of counting and ordering. My main concern in this paper is to draw focus back onto the connection between these notions. I (...) propose a natural generalisation to the vague case of the familiar process of counting precise collections. I then discuss the relationships between this process of counting and various notions of ordering and cardinality for vague sets. Some existing views concerning the cardinality of vague collections fit better than others with my proposal about how to count the members of such a collection. In particular, the idea that we should approach cardinality via certain formulas of a logical language -- which has been prominent in the recent literature -- is less attractive than other existing proposals. (shrink)

It is wrong to deceive people, to get them to believe falsehoods. At least some times, when I wear a wig, I attempt to deceive people about how much hair I have. Why is this not deception? Why is this not wrong? These are the questions I explore.

_"A genial exercise in public philosophy" (_Kirkus_, starred review) from one of the world's best-known popular philosophers__ "Simon Critchley is an international treasure—that rare and real philosopher who embraces Rousseau’s ‘feeling of existence,’ David Bowie’s vision of love, and Philip K. Dick’s genius with genuine wrestling and a soulful smile!’’—Cornel West, Harvard University_ The moderator of the _New York Times_’ Stone column and the author of numerous books on everything from Greek tragedy to David Bowie, Simon Critchley has been a (...) strong voice in popular philosophy for more than a decade. This volume brings together thirty-five essays, originally published in the _Times,_ on a wide range of topics, from the dimensions of Plato’s academy and the mysteries of Eleusis to Philip K. Dick, Mormonism, money, and the joy and pain of Liverpool Football Club fans. In an engaging and jargon‑free style, Critchley writes with honesty about the state of world as he offers philosophically informed and insightful considerations of happiness, violence, and faith. Stripped of inaccessible academic armatures, these short pieces bring philosophy out of the ivory tower and demonstrate an exciting new way to think in public. (shrink)

By speaking of the bald man, I am of course referring to the most clear-cut of the paradoxes of vagueness, the sorites paradox. Or, strictly speaking, I am referring to one of the dramatizations of this paradox. This case is nevertheless fully representative of the general issues involved. (For the sorites paradox in general, see e.g. Keefe and Smith 1987 or Sainsbury 1995, ch.2.) The allegedly paradoxical argument is well known. It might be formulated as follows.

According to a traditional view, one lies if and only if one asserts what one believes is false and with the intent to deceive one’s audience. Recently, many theorists have challenged the requirement of intent to deceive. The principal reason offered appeals to so-called bald-faced lies wherein one asserts what one believes is false without intent to deceive. I argue that, assuming a reasonable model of assertion, two of the most prominent examples of bald-faced lies fail to be genuinely assertoric. (...) As such, they fail as counter-examples to the view that intent to deceive is a necessary condition on lying. (shrink)