It is widely believed that mathematics carries a substantial part of the explanatory burden in science. However, mathematics can also play important heuristic roles of a different kind, being a source of new ideas and approaches, allowing us to build toy models, enhancing expressive power and providing fruitful conceptualizations. In this paper, we focus on the application of dynamical systems theory (DST) within the extended cognition (EC) field of cognitive science, considering this case study to be a good illustration of (...) a general phenomenon. In the paper, we justify both a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that dynamical systems theory hardly plays any explanatory role in EC research. We justify our claim by analyzing several accounts of the explanatory role of mathematics and stressing the way mathematical arguments are used in explanations. Our positive claim is that even though, for now, DST has no explanatory power in many of the EC approaches, it still plays an important heuristic role there. In particular, using mathematical notions improves the expressive power of the language and gives a sense of understanding of the phenomena under investigation. The case study of EC allows us to identify and analyze this important role of mathematics, which seems to be neglected in contemporary discussions. (shrink)

Comparative study of Sankhya philosophy of Hinduism and the Ayurvedic system of Indic medicine.

The contributions gathered here demonstrate how categorical ontology can provide a basis for linking three important basic sciences: mathematics, physics, and philosophy. Category theory is a new formal ontology that shifts the main focus from objects to processes. The book approaches formal ontology in the original sense put forward by the philosopher Edmund Husserl, namely as a science that deals with entities that can be exemplified in all spheres and domains of reality. It is a dynamic, processual, and non-substantial ontology (...) in which all entities can be treated as transformations, and in which objects are merely the sources and aims of these transformations. Thus, in a rather surprising way, when employed as a formal ontology, category theory can unite seemingly disparate disciplines in contemporary science and the humanities, such as physics, mathematics and philosophy, but also computer and complex systems science. (shrink)

According to the expertise defense, practitioners of the method of cases need not worry about findings that ordinary people’s philosophical intuitions depend on epistemically irrelevant factors. This is because, honed by years of training, the intuitions of professional philosophers likely surpass those of the folk. To investigate this, we conducted a controlled longitudinal study of a broad range of intuitions in undergraduate students of philosophy (n = 226), whose case judgments we sampled after each semester throughout their studies. Under the (...) assumption, made by proponents of the expertise defense, that formal training in philosophy gives rise to the kind of expertise that accounts for changes in the students’ responses to philosophically puzzling cases, our data suggest that the acquired cognitive skills only affect single case judgments at a time. There does not seem to exist either a general expertise that informs case judgments in all areas of philosophy, or an expertise specific to particular subfields. In fact, we argue that available evidence, including the results of cross-sectional research, is best explained in terms of differences in adopted beliefs about specific cases, rather than acquired cognitive skills. We also investigated whether individuals who choose to study philosophy have atypical intuitions compared to the general population and whether students whose intuitions are at odds with textbook consensus are more likely than others to drop out of the philosophy program. (shrink)

Beebe and Buckwalter made the surprising discovery that people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when norms are violated than when they are conformed to. The epistemic side-effect effect is the analogue of the Knobe effect. ESEE was replicated in a number of experiments. It was also studied under various conditions. We have carried out a meta-analysis of research on ESEE. The results suggest that ESEE is a robust finding but its magnitude is highly variable. Two study-level covariates influence its (...) size: the subject of the knowledge attribution and the type of norm that is violated or complied with. The effect size is not influenced, however, by the manipulation of chances, by whether the story is about a side effect or not, by language or by question phrasing. The impact of the Gettierization of the story is marginally significant. (shrink)

I show how classical and quantum physics approach the problem of randomness and probability. Contrary to popular opinions, neither we can prove that classical mechanics is a deterministic theory, nor that quantum mechanics is a nondeterministic one. In other words it is not possible to show that randomness in classical mechanics has a purely epistemic character and that of quantum mechanics an ontic one. Nevertheless, recent developments of quantum theory and increasing experimental possibilities to check its predictions call for returning (...) to the problem of comparing possibilities given by classical and quantum physics to accommodate and prove the existence of a `genuine randomness'. Recent results concerning `amplification of randomness' show that, in certain sense, quantum physics is in fact ‘more random’ that classical and outperforms it in producing a `truly random process'. (shrink)

In this paper, we present two experimental studies on reference of complex demonstratives. The results of our experiments challenge the dominant view in philosophy of language, according to which demonstrative reference is determined by the speaker's intentions. The first experiment shows that in a context where there are two candidates for the referent—one determined by the speaker’s intention, the other by some “external” factors—people prefer to identify the referent of a demonstrative with the latter object. The external factors for which (...) this prediction has been confirmed include the speaker’s demonstration and the descriptive content of a demonstrative. The second experiment shows that while this preference can be explained in terms of the speakers’ having different sorts of referential intentions, the relevant kind of intentions are fully opaque to the subjects. At the end of our paper, we point to some alternative accounts of demonstrative reference, including a pluralistic and hybrid approach, which can accommodate our experimental results. (shrink)

Diffusion of responsibility is a well-known effect widely studied in a real-life setting. It can occur in a situation in which the more people observe a crisis event, the less likely it is that someone will react and provide real assistance. These days of a galloping digital revolution a question is to be raised as to whether the same effect can be observed in the online space of communication. In order to investigate this phenomenon we designed a study aimed at (...) testing whether people exposed to a situation of cyberbullying will decide to take action against it depending on how many other Internet users are also aware of that crisis. Results obtained by us confirmed the existence of the diffusion of responsibility in the Internet similar to that observed in our daily lives. We also confirmed that a well-known influence technique “Even a penny will help” (in our study “every reaction will help”) can be effectively used to model behaviour online. In our times of digital revolution, those outcomes can be a step both toward understanding human behaviour in the online setting, showing us that it is not that different from the one presented in real live face-to-face communication and toward helping deal with antisocial behaviour people face online on a daily basis. (shrink)

Truth conditions of sentences ascribing non-doxastic propositional attitudes seem to depend on the information structure of the embedded clause. In this paper, we argue that this kind of sensitivity is a semantic phenomenon rather than a pragmatic one. We report four questionnaire studies which explore the impact of the information structure on the truth conditions of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions from different perspectives. The results of the first two studies show that the acceptability of those ascriptions can be affected by some (...) structural modifications of the embedded clause, in particular, when we replace a simple form by an equivalent complex _conjunctional_ form (‘_p_ and _q_’). However, it is possible that different evaluations of such ascriptions have a pragmatic source, namely, the ascriptions with embedded conjunction _imply_ that the agent’s attitude transfers to both conjuncts. In the second pair of studies, we further investigate the nature of this implication which can be classified as ‘Conjunction Elimination’ (CE) in the scope of an attitude verb. The results show that CE-inferences in the context of non-factive non-doxastic attitude ascriptions are not easily cancellable and hence of a semantic rather than pragmatic nature. The results are not conclusive when it comes to the factive non-doxastic attitudes. We conclude our findings by some considerations about a potential source of the observed difference between non-factive and factive attitude verbs and the significance of our general findings to the semantic theory of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions. (shrink)

Author's ideas on the end of the world and afterlife.

Starting from logical structures of classical and quantum mechanics we reconstruct the logic of so-called no-signaling theories, where the correlations among subsystems of a composite system are restricted only by a simplest form of causality forbidding an instantaneous communication. Although such theories are, as it seems, irrelevant for the description of physical reality, they are helpful in understanding the relevance of quantum mechanics. The logical structure of each theory has an epistemological flavor, as it is based on analysis of possible (...) results of experiments. In this note we emphasize that not only logical structures of classical, quantum and no-signaling theory may be treated on the same ground but it is also possible to give to all of them a common ontological basis by constructing a “phase space” in all cases. In non-classical cases the phase space is not a set, as in classical theory, but a more general object obtained by means of category theory, but conceptually it plays the same role as the phase space in classical physics. (shrink)

The author presents a uniform formulation of the Paradox of an Unexpected Ex-amination and classifies proposed solutions of the antinomy. The analysis of the so-lutions and counterarguments found in the literature of the problem allows to point possible further developments and criticism.

Expressivists distinguish between two languages: the descriptive and the normative. The moral sentences belonging to the latter do not state facts, therefore have no truth conditions and only express moral approval or disapproval towards the evaluated object. This proposition faced the charge that it is possible to find unasserted semantic contexts in which moral sentences appear to be true (Frege-Geach objection). The paper shows how Blackburn (1988) dealt with this problem. We go on to argue that in order to accept (...) Blackburn's solution one needs to have a clear concept of what it is 'to express'. We show which conditions this relation has to fulfill so as to make the theory of expressivism coherent. Using as examples two popular notions of expression relation - expression as a symptom (Husserl, Ajdukiewicz, Ossow­ska) and expression as a causal relation (Ayer) - we demonstrate that neither of these notions is adequate for the expressivists' purposes, which leads to the conclusion that expression relation remains mysterious and there is a serious gap in the theory. (shrink)

Leibniz’s _principium identitatis indiscernibilium _excludes the existence of two different objects possessing all properties identical. Although perfectly acceptable for macroscopic systems, it becomes questionable in quantum mechanics, where the concept of identical particles is quite natural and has measurable consequences. On the other hand, Leibniz’s principle seems to be indispensable when we want to individuate an item and ascribe to it particular property (e.g. value of the projection of spin on a chosen axis). We may thus abandon the principle on (...) the quantum level, claiming it falsity here, or (better) try to find other ways of individuation of objects, possibly by adopting appropriately the very concept of it. All these problems, and many other connected with identity and indiscernibility of quantum objects, are thoroughly discussed in the book of Tomasz Bigaj, unique in the world literature due to its comprehensiveness. (shrink)

Barcz and Zaręba (2021) argue that depending on the shape and the size of the asymmetry in attributions of intentional actions one can distinguish various interpretations of the Knobe effect. Their classification of these interpretations can be used to compare judgments of intentional action across different languages and cultures. Our study in three languages (Polish, English and Italian) indicates that there is some cross-cultural variation both in the ascription of intentionality to an action and in the ascription of actions to (...) the agent. (shrink)

In the digital world of today, multitasking with media is inevitable. Research shows, for instance, that American youths spend on average 7.5 h every day with media, and 29% of that time is spent processing different forms of media simultaneously. Despite numerous studies, however, there is no consensus on whether media multitasking is effective or not. In the current paper, we review existing literature and propose that in order to ascertain whether media multitasking is effective, it is important to determine (...) which goal/s are used as a reference point ; whether a person's intentions and subjective feelings or objective performance are considered ; and finally whether the short- or long-term consequences of media multitasking are considered. Depending on these differentiations, media multitasking can be seen as both a strategic behavior undertaken to accomplish one's goals and as a self-regulatory failure. The article integrates various findings from the areas of cognitive psychology, psychology of motivation, and human-computer interaction. (shrink)

The spectral fluctuations of quantum (or wave) systems with a chaotic classical (or ray) limit are mostly universal and faithful to random-matrix theory. Taking up ideas of Pechukas and Yukawa we show that equilibrium statistical mechanics for the fictitious gas of particles associated with the parametric motion of levels yields spectral fluctuations of the random-matrix type. Previously known clues to that goal are an appropriate equilibrium ensemble and a certain ergodicity of level dynamics. We here complete the reasoning by establishing (...) a power law for the ħ dependence of the mean parametric separation of avoided level crossings. Due to that law universal spectral fluctuations emerge as average behavior of a family of quantum dynamics drawn from a control parameter interval which becomes vanishingly small in the classical limit; the family thus corresponds to a single classical system. We also argue that classically integrable dynamics cannot produce universal spectral fluctuations since their level dynamics resembles a nearly ideal Pechukas–Yukawa gas. (shrink)

We discuss two philosophical explanations of the epistemic side-effect effect: the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. The Monist 95 (2): 264–289, 2012) and the consequence account (Paprzycka-Hausman Synthese 197: 5457–5490, 2020). We argue that the doxastic heuristic account has problems with explaining knowledge attributions in cases where the probability that the side effect will occur is low and where the side effect does not ultimately occur. It can explain why there is a difference between the harm and the help (...) cases but it cannot explain why people are willing to attribute knowledge in the harm cases. Such attributions can be explained on the consequence account, which takes knowledge attributions in norm-violation cases to be due to the increased salience of a consequence-awareness claim (knowledge that a possible consequence of the chairman’s action is that the environment would be harmed). We report the results of a new study that tests the predictions of both accounts. In some conditions, people attribute knowledge of the side effect even in cases where the chairman does not have the relevant belief. This result directly contradicts the central tenet of the doxastic heuristic account. Linear regression models of knowledge attribution that correspond to the two accounts were compared. The addition of different justification options significantly contributes to the predictive power of the statistical model. The consequence account can explain the pattern of justifications better than the doxastic heuristic account. Our findings support the consequence account and pose a challenge to the proponents of the doxastic heuristic account. (shrink)

A Riposte to Stanislav Sousedík’s View of Historical Facts.

On Advaita Vedanta philosophy of self-control; Sanskrit text with commentaries and English translation.

This article examines the use of the kus ‘where’-interrogative clause in the second position of a question–answer adjacency pair in Estonian informal interaction. Applying an interactional linguistic approach, I will demonstrate how speakers use the kus-interrogative to point out the inappositeness of their interlocutor’s question. The use of the kus-interrogative in the second position implies that the questioner should already know the answer before asking. Essentially, the kus-interrogative is a response that negates the presumption posed by the polar question. Nonetheless, (...) the negation is not sufficient to close this question–answer sequence. Instead, the interlocutors treat the kus-interrogative response as a challenge by subsequently justifying their question. (shrink)

The paper is a first attempt to analyse Greimas’ theory of the figurative from a “philological” perspective and discuss some hitherto unresolved issues. In particular, the paper will focus on four main topics: (1) the relation with Hjelmslev’s conception of the figure, showing that while Greimas’ conception of the figure is closely related to that of Hjelmslev’s – mainly in the fact that the figure is placed below the sign – it does, however, possess quite different and peculiar features; (2) (...) the problem of the significant nature of figures, that emerges in many writings of Greimas’ and those of his followers, in which figures are not considered elements of the content that are smaller than a sign, with no autonomous meaning, but as already significant entities; (3) the problematic distinction between the thematic and the figurative; (4) the nature and limits of a semiotics of the sensible, and the (im)possibility of redefining and studying figurativity, not as given in a text, but when first grasped at the moment of perception.Данная статья является первой попыткой проанализировать теорию фигуративности Греймаса с ≪филологической≫ точки зрения и обсудить некоторые нерешенные до настоящего времени проблемы. Работа сосредоточивается на четырех главных темах: (1) связь с концепцией фигуры у Ельмслева, где автор демонстрирует, что хотя концепт фигуры у Греймаса тесно связан с ельмслевским (главным образом тем, что фигура размещается ниже знака), концепция Греймаса, тем не менее, обладает своими специфическими особенностями; (2) проблема значимой природы фигуры, которая появляется во многих работах Греймаса и его последователей, где фигуры считаются значимыми сущностями (а не элементами плана содержания, не обладающими автономным значением); (3) проблематичное различение тематического и фигуративного; (4) природа и пределы семиотики чувственного, а также возможность пересмотра и изучения фигуративности не так, как она была представлена в тексте, но как она была впервые осознана в момент восприятия.Kaesolevas artiklis tehakse esimene katse analuusida Greimase fi guratiivsusteooriat “fi loloogilisest” perspektiivist ja arutleda monede varem lahenduseta jaanud kusimuste ule. Eelkoige keskendub artikkel neljale pohipunktile: (1) suhtele Hjelmslev’ fi guuri moistega, naidates, et kuigi Greimase arusaam fi guurist on tihedasti seotud Hjelmslev’ omaga – peamiselt toiga tottu, et fi guur on margist madalama staatusega – on neil samas mitmeid olulisi erinevusi; (2) probleem fi guuride tahendusliku loomusega, mis tuleb ilmsiks mitmetes Greimase ning tema jargijate kirjutistes, kus fi guure ei peeta mitte margi autonoomse tahenduseta sisuelementideks, vaid tahenduslikeks entiteetideks; (3) temaatilise ja fi guratiivse problemaatiline eristamine; (4) meelte semiootika olemus ja piirid ning fi guratiivsuse umbedefi neerimise ja uurimise voimalikkus mitte nii, nagu seda esitletakse tekstis, vaid nii, nagu seda algselt moistetakse tajumismomendil. (shrink)

The essay deals with the formation of the Greimassian thought from its earliest origins in his young years at Kaunas University, i.e. his connections with Wilhelm Sesemann, Lev Karsavin and Russian formalism, to the rise of structuralism in Paris. The Paris School approach stems from Semantique structurale (1967) leading to the ‘third semiotic revolution’, as Greimas called it, by the invention of the modalities. This made his method close to even analytic philosophy and modal logics. In both, a linguistic turn (...) and use of formal logics took place. Yet Greimas’ semiotics grew out of a purely linguistic framework into a broader philosophical approach. Nowadays, considered one of the classics of the semiotic scene, his method still has not lost anything of its analytic acuity and epistemic temptation. Even such new paradigms as existential semiotics grow organically from some Greimas’ ideas which have kept their relevance.В статье исследуется формирование научных взглядов Греймаса: юность в Каунасском университете, знакомство с Василием Сеземаном, Львом Карсавиным и идеями русского формализма, рождение структурализма в Париже. Основой парижской школы семиотики стала книга Греймаса Semantique structurale (1967), которая, по его словам, привела к ≪третьей семиотической революции≫ благодаря изобретению модальностей. Это сблизило метод Греймаса с аналитической философией и модальной логикой. В обеих науках произошел лингвистический поворот и стали пользоваться формальной логикой. Семиотика Греймаса преодолела рамки чистой лингвистики, став более широким философским подходом. Сейчас его метод считается классикой семиотики. Однако метод Греймаса не потерял своей аналитической остроты и эпистемологической привлекательности. Даже такие новые парадигмы, как экзистенциальная семиотика, органически вырастают из идей Греймаса, сохранивших свою актуальность.Artikkel kasitleb Greimase mottemaailma valjakujunemist alates selle varaseimatest allikatest, mis parinesid noorusaastatest Kaunase Ulikoolis, s.t tema sidemetest Wilhelm Sesemanni, Lev Karsavini ja vene vormikoolkonnaga, kuni strukturalismi tekkimiseni Pariisis. Pariisi koolkonna lahenemise aluseks on Semantique structurale (1967), mis toob kaasa “kolmanda semiootilise revolutsiooni”, nagu Greimas seda nimetas, leiutades modaalsused. See muutis tema meetodi sarnaseks ingliskeelse analuutilise fi losoofi a ja modaalloogikaga, kus molemas toimus lingvistiline poore ning hakati kasutama formaalloogikat. Ent Greimase semiootika kasvas puhtlingvistilisest raamistikust valja avaramaks fi losoofi liseks lahenemiseks. Tanapaeval, mil tema meetodit peetakse semiootikavaldkonna klassikasse kuuluvaks, ei ole see kaotanud midagi oma analuutilisest teravusest ja episteemilisest koitvusest. Isegi sellised uued paradigmad nagu eksistentsiaalne semiootika kasvavad orgaaniliselt valja monedest Greimase ideedest, mis on sailitanud oma relevantsuse. (shrink)

Socialinio darbo teoretikai sutinka, kad Pierre’o Bourdieu sociologijos įtaka sociali­ niam darbui plečiasi ir gilėja. Kita vertus, kai kalbama apie socialinio darbo profesiją, tie patys teoretikai ignoruoja P. Bourdieu nuostatą nuo profesijos tyrimų pereiti prie profesinio lauko analizės. P. Bourdieu profesijos fenomeną laikė biurokratinės pri­ gimties konceptualizacija, kuri įtvirtina mokslinio mąstymo logikai prieštaraujančias heteronomijos apraiškas. Straipsnyje siekiama įgyvendinti P. Bourdieu reikalavimą ir, pritaikius jį socialiniam darbui, nuo socialinio darbo profesijos analizės pereiti prie socialinio darbo profesinio lauko tyrimų. Straipsnyje ieškome atsakymo (...) į klausimą, kaip keičiasi su socialiniu darbu siejamų veiklos formų arba praktikų traktavimas, kai socialinio darbo profesijos analizę keičia socialinio darbo lauko tyrimas. Palyginę trijų skirtingų šalių – JAV, Japonijos ir Lietuvos – socialinio darbo profesinės veiklos lau­ kus, priėjome prie išvados, kad profesinio lauko, kitaip nei profesijos, požiūris sudaro prielaidas įtraukti į socialinio darbo lauką tas socialinio įgalinimo praktikas, kurios, socialinio darbo profesijos požiūriu, lieka anapus biurokratinio socialinio darbo reg­ lamento. (shrink)