I argue that animals have rights in the sense of having valid claims, which might turn out to be actual rights as society advances and new scientific-technological developments facilitate finding alternative ways of satisfying our vital interests without using animals. Animals have a right to life, to liberty in the sense of freedom of movement and communication, to subsistence, to relief from suffering, and to security against attacks on their physical existence. Animals’ interest in living, freedom, subsistence, and security are (...) of vital importance to them, and they do not belong to us; they are not the things we have already possessed by virtue of our own nature. (shrink)

Philosophy; philosophers, Turkish; Hacıkadiroğlu, Vehbi.

Rawls's view that the right is prior to the good has been criticized by various scholars from divergent points of view. Some contend that Rawls's teleological/deontological distinction based on the priority of the right is misleading while others claim that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right prior to the good. There is no consensus on how to interpret the priority of right to the good; nor is there an agreement on the criteria of teleological/deontological distinction. In this (...) article, I argue that the critics' interpretations of the principle of the priority of right to the good as well as their conceptions of the teleological/deontological distinction have serious shortcomings to the extent that they ignore rich theoretical resources we find in Kant's moral and political philosophy. Kant's conception of human dignity and his division of the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right supply powerful arguments to clarify and sustain the idea of the priority of right to the good and the teleological/deontological division. (shrink)

Everything is a sign. We can consider the words we use, the texts we write, the movies or TV series we watch, photos or any content used in social media as a 'sign'. These signs are constantly telling us something as a representation. When considered from this point of view, it is inevitable that cartoons prepared for children will also be an sign. Based on this, it has been thought that the cartoon called 'Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles', which has been (...) broadcast all over the world for more than thirty years, both on television and in cinemas without losing its currency, may also be signs. For this reason, the aim of the study is to analyze the narrative of the cartoons and animations called 'Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles' through the representations in this narrative, the characters and their names in the cartoons and animations, the weapons used by the characters, the food they eat, their clothes, the colors and places they use. In addition, what the subject discussed in Mutant Ninja Turtles in general represents was analyzed through the relevant characters. In the study, it has been seen that each sign examined semiotically is produced with a certain cultural meaning. The cultural heritage from the Renaissance to the present reflects the culture of a particular society. Therefore, the culture spread by mass media can influence different cultures from itself. (shrink)

Bringing together an international collection of experts, this work explores various philosophical issues surrounding modern music recordings. With perspectives from practicing musicians, musicologists, sound artists, and recordings engineers, this reference asks how theoretical issues related to their work relate to the context of making and using recordings. Additional questions asked by this study include What kind of “spatiality” is generated through recordings, and by what means? What is the nature of “recorded space”? Do recordings reflect musical reality or create one? (...) and What are the philosophical bases of an “ethics” of recording? (shrink)

Rawls's view that the right is prior to the good has been criticized by various scholars from divergent points of view. Some contend that Rawls's teleological/deontological distinction based on the priority of the right is misleading while others claim that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right prior to the good. There is no consensus on how to interpret the priority of right to the good; nor is there an agreement on the criteria of teleological/deontological distinction. In this (...) article, I argue that the critics' interpretations of the principle of the priority of right to the good as well as their conceptions of the teleological/deontological distinction have serious shortcomings to the extent that they ignore rich theoretical resources we find in Kant's moral and political philosophy. Kant's conception of human dignity and his division of the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right supply powerful arguments to clarify and sustain the idea of the priority of right to the good and the teleological/deontological division. (shrink)

Cosmopolitans hold that our duties of distributive justice to others do not stop at borders. Darrel Moellendorf is among those who defend the view that principles of distributive justice are applicable beyond borders. He suggests as a principle of international justice the global difference principle, which allows inequalities in the distribution of wealth and resources only if they are to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged individuals. In this paper, I try to indicate that Moellendorf’s argument for the global (...) difference principle is far from sustaining it. Instead, I argue for a minimum floor principle of distributive justice on the basis of the idea that each person ought to have an equal standard of living with respect to the fulfillment of their basic interests. I also propose the principle of contribution backed up by the principle of fair equality of opportunity, aiming to equalize background conditions of a competition for socially favored positions, as the basic principles of a complete account of global distributive justice.Kozmopolitanisti drže da se naše dužnosti distributivne pravednosti prema drugima ne zaustavljaju na granicama. Darrel Moellendorf je među onima koji brane gledište da su načela distributivne pravednosti primjenjiva s onu stranu granica. Kao načelo međunarodne pravednosti on predlaže globalno načelo razlike, koje nejednakosti u raspodjeli bogatstva i resursâ dopušta samo ako su one u najveću korist najlošije stojećih individua. U ovome članku pokušavam pokazati da Moellendorfov argument u prilog globalnog načela razlike to načelo nimalo ne potkrepljuje. Umjesto toga argumentiram u prilog načela distributivne pravednosti minimalne razine na osnovi zamisli da bi svaka osoba trebala imati jednaki standard življenja s obzirom na ispunjenje njezinih osnovnih interesa. Ujedno kao osnovna načela potpunog opisa globalne distributivne pravednosti predlažem načelo doprinosa poduprto načelom pravične jednakosti mogućnosti, koje stremi izjednačavanju pozadinskih uvjeta natjecanja za društveno favorizirane pozicije. (shrink)

In spite of several attempts to explicate the relationship between a scientific hypothesis and evidence, the issue still cries for a satisfactory solution. Logical approaches to confirmation, such as the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive instance account of confirmation, are problematic because of their neglect of the semantic dimension of hypothesis confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of confirmation are no better than logical approaches in this regard. An outstanding probabilistic account of confirmation, the Bayesian approach, for instance, is found to be defective (...) in that it treats evidence as a formal entity and this creates the problem of relevance of evidence to the hypothesis at issue, in addition to the difficulties arising from the subjective interpretation of probabilities. This essay purports to satisfy the need for a successful account of hypothesis confirmation by offering an original formulation based on the notion of instantiation of the relation urged by an hypothesis. (shrink)

In spite of several attempts to explicate the relationship between a scientific hypothesis and evidence, the issue still cries for a satisfactory solution. Logical approaches to confirmation, such as the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive instance account of confirmation, are problematic because of their neglect of the semantic dimension of hypothesis confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of confirmation are no better than logical approaches in this regard. An outstanding probabilistic account of confirmation, the Bayesian approach, for instance, is found to be defective (...) in that it treats evidence as a formal entity and this creates the problem of relevance of evidence to the hypothesis at issue, in addition to the difficulties arising from the subjective interpretation of probabilities. This essay purports to satisfy the need for a successful account of hypothesis confirmation by offering an original formulation based on the notion of instantiation of the relation urged by an hypothesis. (shrink)

Rawls's view that the right is prior to the good has been criticized by various scholars from divergent points of view. Some contend that Rawls's teleological/deontological distinction based on the priority of the right is misleading while others claim that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right prior to the good. There is no consensus on how to interpret the priority of right to the good; nor is there an agreement on the criteria of teleological/deontological distinction. In this (...) article, I argue that the critics' interpretations of the principle of the priority of right to the good as well as their conceptions of the teleological/deontological distinction have serious shortcomings to the extent that they ignore rich theoretical resources we find in Kant's moral and political philosophy. Kant's conception of human dignity and his division of the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right supply powerful arguments to clarify and sustain the idea of the priority of right to the good and the teleological/deontological division. (shrink)

The conditions of life of many companion animals and the rate at which they are surrendered to shelters raise many ethical issues. What duties do we have towards the dogs that live in our society? To suggest answers to these questions, I first give four possible ways of looking at the relationship between man and dog: master–slave, employer–worker, parent–child, and friend–friend. I argue that the morally acceptable relationships are of a different kind but bears family resemblances to the latter three. (...) As dogs are beings with an interest in their wellbeing, society has certain duties towards the dogs, which can be translated in legislation. But human beings also have special responsibilities towards the dogs they take into their care. Such responsibilities entail caring for their emotional and physical welfare, but also ensuring a bond of trust, which should not easily be broken. (shrink)

Özlem, Doğan; philosophy; biography; Turkey.

Martha Nussbaum argues that animals are entitled to a flourishing life according to the norm for their species. Nussbaum furthermore suggests that in the case of dogs, breed norms as well as species norms are relevant. Her theses capture both common intuitions among laypeople according to which there is something wrong with the breeding of “unnatural” animals, or animals that are too different from their wild ancestors, and the dog enthusiast’s belief that dogs departing from the norms for their breed (...) are tragic. I argue that the high diversity of the dog species and the ultimate arbitrariness of breed norms support the thesis that a conception of welfare must be tied to what the individual requires in order to flourish. In the second part of the paper, I discuss the implications that an individualized welfare conception has for the breeding of dogs for conformation shows, for the pet market and for the performance of various tasks for which we need working dogs. (shrink)

We present experimental evidence that an interpretation was accurate. Current wisdom notwithstanding, we could interpret from the text alone because its information is redundant: repetition provides internal checks. Knowing neither dreamer nor their associations we made falsifiable predictions that we tested by subsequently gathering information about the dreamer. Predictions were supported. Results were repeated with seven additional dreams. Each dream was tightly crafted, used humor, drama or hyperbole to penetrate the dreamer’s defenses, and furthered the emergence of personality. Our experiment (...) compliments fMRI and statistics because it studies a whole text as a unique narrative: one iteration identified healing steps during therapy; another confirmed the psychological meaning of a myth. Our experiment might generate a body of objective knowledge about interpretation and make interpretation itself more accurate. In the US 20% live with mental illness. Our experiment supports talk therapy against pressure from the drug and insurance industries. (shrink)

Tool use is a central topic in research on cognitive evolution and behavioral ecology in non-human animals. Originally thought to be a uniquely human phenomenon, many other species have been observed making and using tools for a variety of purposes, starting with Goodall’s groundbreaking work with chimpanzees in Gombe. Despite the frequent attention and great research interest in animal tool use, and ubiquity of the behavior, we argue here that chewing sticks by dogs should be included as a case of (...) tool use. We discuss alternate possible explanations and then propose several testable predictions regarding this hypothesis. We suggest that tool use may be more common than is often assumed and that many cases of animal tool use may be overlooked. (shrink)

This article analyzes the sculptural depiction of two nonhuman animals, Greyfriars Bobby in Edinburgh, Scotland and the Brown Dog in Battersea, South London, England. It explores the ways in which both these cultural depictions transgress the norm of nineteenth century dog sculpture. It also raises questions about the nature of these constructions and the way in which the memorials became incorporated within particular human political spaces. The article concludes by analyzing the modern "replacement" of the destroyed early twentieth century statue (...) of the Brown Dog and suggests that the original meaning of the statue has been significantly altered. (shrink)

According to one highly influential approach to moral responsibility, human beings are responsible (eligible to be praised or blamed) for what they do because they are _responsive to reasons _(Fischer & Ravizza 1998). However, this amounts to a descriptive assumption about human beings that may not be borne out by the empirical research. According to a recent trend in moral psychology (Haidt 2001), most human judgment is caused by fast, nonconscious, and intuitive processes, rather than explicit, conscious deliberation about one’s (...) reasons. And when humans do engage in explicit deliberation, it primarily serves to provide post hoc rationalization of their intuitive judgments (confabulation). If this is correct, it is tempting to conclude that most of our judgments—and the actions we perform on their basis—are not genuine responses to reasons. The reasons-responsiveness approach would thus appear to be committed to the implausible conclusion that we are not responsible for very much after all, including, most problematically, our implicit biases. I argue that the reasons-responsiveness approach can avoid this conclusion by showing three things: (1) that affective and intuitive processes can be reasons-responsive; (2) that the responsiveness of those processes can be bolstered by the agent’s environment; and (3) that practices like blame are one of the key ways in which human beings are attuned to reasons over time. I argue that the first and second of these items, despite their initial plausibility, are insufficient on their own to explain why humans can be held accountable for things like implicit biases, and that the way forward is to appreciate what holding each other accountable _does—_i.e., its effects. (shrink)

According to one highly influential approach to moral responsibility, human beings are responsible (eligible to be praised or blamed) for what they do because they are _responsive to reasons _(Fischer & Ravizza 1998). However, this amounts to a descriptive assumption about human beings that may not be borne out by the empirical research. According to a recent trend in moral psychology (Haidt 2001), most human judgment is caused by fast, nonconscious, and intuitive processes, rather than explicit, conscious deliberation about one’s (...) reasons. And when humans do engage in explicit deliberation, it primarily serves to provide post hoc rationalization of their intuitive judgments (confabulation). If this is correct, it is tempting to conclude that most of our judgments—and the actions we perform on their basis—are not genuine responses to reasons. The reasons-responsiveness approach would thus appear to be committed to the implausible conclusion that we are not responsible for very much after all, including, most problematically, our implicit biases. I argue that the reasons-responsiveness approach can avoid this conclusion by showing three things: (1) that affective and intuitive processes can be reasons-responsive; (2) that the responsiveness of those processes can be bolstered by the agent’s environment; and (3) that practices like blame are one of the key ways in which human beings are attuned to reasons over time. I argue that the first and second of these items, despite their initial plausibility, are insufficient on their own to explain why humans can be held accountable for things like implicit biases, and that the way forward is to appreciate what holding each other accountable _does—_i.e., its effects. (shrink)

Dogs are known for their incredible ability to detect odours, extracting them from a “complex” environment and recognising them. This makes sniffer dogs precious assets in a broad variety of security applications. However, their use is subject to some intrinsic restrictions. Dogs can only be trained to a limited set of applications, get tired after a relatively short period, and thus require a high turnover. This has sparked a drive over the past decade to develop artificial sniffer devices—generally known as (...) “chemical sniffers” or “electronic noses”—able to complement and possibly replace dogs for some security applications. Such devices have been already deployed, or are intended to be deployed, at borders, airports and other critical installation security checkpoints. Similarly to dogs, they are adopted for detecting residual traces that indicate either the presence of, or recent contact with, substances like drugs and explosives. It goes without saying that, as with sniffer dogs, the use of artificial sniffer devices raises many sensitive issues. Adopting an ethical and legal perspective, the present paper discusses the privacy and data protection implications of the possible deployment of a hand-held body scanning sniffer for screening passengers at EU airport security checkpoints. (shrink)

Purebred dog rescuers are doing their part to reduce the problems of homeless pets and pet overpopulation. The volunteers studied are doing the daily and invisible work of saving dogs. Because of their perception of the animal rights movement, however, they do not consider themselves part of the animal welfare or animal rights movement, nor do they care to be. Dog rescue organizations agree with academics and activist organizations on the cause of the problem of homeless pets and pet overpopulation, (...) but they differ on the theoretical, political, and ideological solutions to the problem. This paper focuses on the disagreements between rescue workers, activists, and academics and asks whether there is a place for rescue workers within the larger animal protection movement. (shrink)

Although company narratives frequently emphasize impressive sales numbers and market leadership, such an organizational “top dog” narrative can backfire when companies are accused of engaging in unethical conduct. This research demonstrates, through a series of nine (_N_ = 3872) experimental studies, that an organizational top dog (vs. underdog) narrative increases the intended punishment of company moral transgressions but not non-moral transgressions. Such differences in intended punishment emerge because observers infer that organizations with a top dog narrative use predominantly dominance-based strategies (...) to achieve their status, whereas companies with an underdog narrative are less likely perceived as employing such strategies. We provide preliminary evidence that a debiasing intervention decreases the harsher punishment of organizations with a top dog narrative but does not affect the punishment of organizations with an underdog narrative. (shrink)

With its minimalist narrative and long durational recordings of a family living on the margins of modern society and drifting around deserted urban spaces in Taiwan, Stray Dogs ( Jiaoyou, Tsai Ming-liang, 2013) provides a productive reading of cinematic slowness and a critique of the globalising domination of capitalism and neoliberalism in a locally and culturally specific context. This article examines how the representation of cinematic slowness in Stray Dogs encompasses both a narrative that requires the audience’s sympathetic and intellectual (...) understanding and a durational perception of time that calls for empathy and intuition. Moreover, this article aims to reveal how the film’s temporal illegibility, resulting from its radical use of long takes and unresolved differentiation between the past and the present, transforms a prolonged hesitant moment into an act of resistance against the ongoing capitalist and neoliberal standardisation, rationalisation and homogenisation of time’s, or more specifically duration’s, heterogenous nature. By exploring the potential of ethical hesitation and political resistance, underscored by slow aesthetics such as the use of long takes, this article aims to make the case for a specific and unique understanding of slowness as a philosophical signifier of empathy. (shrink)

The British bestseller Straw Dogs is an exciting, radical work of philosophy, which sets out to challenge our most cherished assumptions about what it means to be human. From Plato to Christianity, from the Enlightenment to Nietzsche and Marx, the Western tradition has been based on arrogant and erroneous beliefs about human beings and their place in the world. Philosophies such as liberalism and Marxism think of humankind as a species whose destiny is to transcend natural limits and conquer the (...) Earth. John Gray argues that this belief in human difference is a dangerous illusion and explores how the world and human life look once humanism has been finally abandoned. The result is an exhilarating, sometimes disturbing book that leads the reader to question our deepest-held beliefs. Will Self, in the New Statesman , called Straw Dogs his book of the year: “I read it once, I read it twice and took notes . . . I thought it that good.” “Nothing will get you thinking as much as this brilliant book” ( Sunday Telegraph ). (shrink)

I critique an ancient argument for the possibility of non-linguistic deductive inference. The argument, attributed to Chrysippus, describes a dog whose behavior supposedly reflects disjunctive syllogistic reasoning. Drawing on contemporary robotics, I urge that we can equally well explain the dog's behavior by citing probabilistic reasoning over cognitive maps. I then critique various experimentally-based arguments from scientific psychology that echo Chrysippus's anecdotal presentation.

Building on the framework of learned helplessness, and applying a behavioural perspective, Boddez et al. theorise that consecutive failures in various life domains might be generalised and cause a general sense of helplessness, which leads to, and can be conceptualised as, human suffering. We argue that this perspective fails to address the complexities of human suffering and the motivational sources of feelings of helplessness. We provide an existential-social psychological perspective on helplessness, highlighting the need for psychological protection and the mechanisms (...) by which it is achieved. We draw upon attachment, terror management, and motivated helplessness theories in order to demonstrate the anxiety-buffering function of goal attainment in major life domains (e.g. self-esteem and close relationships) and its influence on helplessness and suffering. (shrink)

To the best of our current understanding, quantum mechanics is part of the most fundamental picture of the universe. It is natural to ask how pure and minimal this fundamental quantum description can be. The simplest quantum ontology is that of the Everett or Many-Worlds interpretation, based on a vector in Hilbert space and a Hamiltonian. Typically one also relies on some classical structure, such as space and local configuration variables within it, which then gets promoted to an algebra of (...) preferred observables. We argue that even such an algebra is unnecessary, and the most basic description of the world is given by the spectrum of the Hamiltonian and the components of some particular vector in Hilbert space. Everything else—including space and fields propagating on it—is emergent from these minimal elements. (shrink)

Transcription‐coupled repair (TCR) is a phenomenon that exists in a wide variety of organisms from bacteria to humans. This mechanism allows cells to repair the actively transcribed DNA strand much faster than the non‐transcribed one. At the sites of bulky DNA damage RNA polymerase stalls, initiating recruitment of the repair machinery. It is a commonly accepted paradigm that bacterial cells utilize a sole coupling factor, called Mfd to initiate TCR. According to that model, Mfd removes transcription complexes stalled at the (...) lesion site and simultaneously recruits repair machinery. However, this model was recently put in doubt by various discrepancies between the proposed universal role of Mfd in the TCR and its biochemical and phenotypical properties. Here, I present a second pathway of bacterial TCR recently discovered in my laboratory, which does not involve Mfd but implicates a common repair factor, UvrD, in a central position in the process. (shrink)

"... chronicles the story of U.G. Krishnamurti, the Cosmic Naxalite, from his troubled childhood to his disillusionment with many of the leading spiritual teachers of the twentieth century and his catastrophic personal life. In 1967, UG underwent a series of biological mutations that left him in the 'natural state'--functioning without the interference of thought. With no fixed address, no followers and no organization, UG spent the next thirty years travelling the world with an uncompromising message: that 'mind is a myth' (...) and dthe human condition should be demystified and de-psyhologized and viewed in purely physiological terms."--Cover. (shrink)

Canid and human barks and growls were examined in videotapes of 24 humans (Homo sapiens) and 24 dogs (Canis familiaris) playing with familiar and unfamiliar cross-species play partners. Barks and growls were exhibited by 9 humans and 9 dogs. Dogs barked and (less often) growled most frequently when being frustrated by humans and/or engaged in competitive games, and less often when being chased or inviting chase, and being instigated or captured. Dogs never growled when playing with an unfamiliar human, and (...) humans did so rarely when playing with an unfamiliar dog. Humans growled and (less often) barked most frequently when chasing and capturing the dog, less often when engaging in competitive games, being frustrated by the dog, and/or instigating the dog, and rarely when showing or throwing an object. Dog barks were most often requests for the human to make an object available to the dog. Dog growls were often pretend threats when competing for an object or being frustrated by the human’s actions. Human barks and growls were typically pretend threats, and were sometimes used to emphasize simultaneous behaviors. Human barks and growls allow humans to connect with their canid partner. (shrink)

The live-action comedies Hotel for Dogs and Marley and Me illustrate the prominent American stereotypes of canines as surrogate children and models of human behavior. Both adopt a human perspective on nonhuman animals, particularly dogs. An ethic of caring goes awry, to become pampering and permissiveness, and precludes empathetic training that would help dogs to prosper as canines in a human world.

Bred to provide human companionship, dogs eclipse all other species when it comes to reading the body language of people. Dog owners hunger for a complete rapport with their pets; in the dog the fantasy of empathetic resonance finds its ideal. But cross-species communication is never easy. Dog love can be a precious but melancholy thing. An attempt to understand human attachment to the _canis familiaris_ in terms of reciprocity and empathy, _Melancholia’s_ _Dog_ tackles such difficult concepts as intimacy and (...) kinship with dogs, the shame associated with identification with their suffering, and the reasons for the profound mourning over their deaths. In addition to philosophy and psychoanalysis, Alice A. Kuzniar turns to the insights and images offered by the literary and visual arts—the short stories of Ivan Turgenev and Franz Kafka, the novels of J. M. Coetzee and Rebecca Brown, the photography of Sally Mann and William Wegman, and the artwork of David Hockney and Sue Coe. Without falling into sentimentality or anthropomorphization, Kuzniar honors and learns from our canine companions, above all attending to the silences and sadness brought on by the effort to represent the dog as perfectly and faithfully as it is said to love. (shrink)

Humans interact with animals in numerous ways and on numerous levels. We are indeed living in an “animal”s world,’ in the sense that our lives are very much intertwined with the lives of animals. This also means that animals, like those dogs we commonly refer to as our pets, are living in a “human’s world” in the sense that it is us, not them, who, to a large degree, define and manage the interactions we have with them. In this sense, (...) the human-animal relationship is nothing we should romanticize: it comes with clear power relations and thus with a set of responsibilities on the side of those who exercise this power. This holds, despite the fact that we like to think about our dogs as human’s best friend. Dogs have been part of human societies for longer than any other domestic species. Like no other species they exemplify the role of companion animals. Relationships with pet dogs are both very widespread and very intense, often leading to strong attachments between owners or caregivers and animals and to a treatment of these dogs as family members or even children. But how does this relationship look from the dogs’ perspective? How do they perceive the humans they engage with? What responsibilities and duties arise from the kind of mutual understanding, attachment, and the supposedly “special” bonds we form with them? Are there ethical implications, maybe even ethical implications beyond animal welfare? The past decades have seen an upsurge of research from comparative cognition on pet dogs’ cognitive and social skills, especially in comparison with and reference to humans. We will therefore set our discussion about the nature and ethical dimensions of the human–dog relationship against the background of the current empirical knowledge on dog (social) cognition. This allows us to analyze the human–dog relationship by applying an interdisciplinary approach that starts from the perspective of the dog to ultimately inform the perspective of humans. It is our aim to thereby identify ethical dimensions of the human–dog relationship that have been overlooked so far. (shrink)