With increasing awareness of environmental issues, there has been rising demand for environmental-friendly business practices. Prior research has shown that the implementation of environmental management practices is influenced by existing and potential stakeholder groups in the form of external pressures from legislators, environmental groups, financial institutions and suppliers, as well as internally by employees and owner/manager attitudes and knowledge. However, it has been reported that despite business owner/managers having strong “green” attitudes, the level of implementation of environmental-friendly practices is (...) low. In order to explore the connection between pressures for improved practices and the management actions taken, this article examines how influence from various stakeholders is related to awareness of environmental issues, and how this awareness relates to actions taken within the businesses to reduce the environmental impact of their operations. The results indicate that legislation does result in general environmental awareness, and that organizations are then willing to␣change their business processes and environmental strategies. However, despite their actions they have little awareness of the benefits that might arise from cost reductions from their environmental-friendly practices. Those influenced by their suppliers act to reduce waste, but do not put into place formal environmental management systems, or use environmental messages to market their goods or services. Nevertheless, it can be argued that they have a real commitment to environmental issues, as evidenced by a willingness to voluntarily contribute to environmental organizations. (shrink)

The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of the “Visual Awareness Education Programme” developed to support the visual literacy skills of preschool children. The study group comprised 40 children (20 children in the experimental group and 20 children in the control group) attending preschool in the 2014–2015 school year. The pre-test post-test experimental model was used in the study. The “Visual Literacy Inventory for Preschool Children” and the “Children’s Visual Literacy Rating Inventory for Parents” were (...) used to determine visual literacy level of children. Study results revealed significant differences in favour of the experimental group children in the sub-dimensions and the post-test scores of the “Visual Literacy Inventory for Preschool Children” and the post-test scores of the “Children’s Visual Literacy Rating Inventory for Parents”. (shrink)

This review considers a number of recent theories on the neural basis of consciousness, with particular attention to the theories of Bogen, Crick, Llinás, Newman, and Changeux. These theories allot different roles to various key brain areas, in particular the reticular and intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus and the cortex. Crick's hypothesis is that awareness is a function of reverberating corticothalamic loops and that the spotlight ofintramodalattention is controlled by the reticular nucleus of the thalamus. He also proposed different (...) mechanisms for attention and intention . The current review presents a new hypothesis, based on elements from these hypotheses, includingintermodalattention and olfaction and pain, which may pose problems for Crick's original theory. This work reviews the possible role in awareness and intermodal attention and intention of the cholinergic system in the basal forebrain and the tegmentum; the reticular, the intralaminar, and the dorsomedial thalamic nuclei; the raphe and locus coeruleus; the reticular formation; the ventral striatum and extended amygdala; insula cortex, and other selected cortical areas. Both clinical and basic research data are covered. The conclusion is reached that the brain may work by largely nonlinear parallel processing and much intramodal shifts of attention may be effected by intracortical, or multiple corticothalamic mechanisms . But this is constrained by the functional anatomy of the circuits concerned and waking “awareness” is modulated by the many “nonspecific” systems . But the principal agents for intermodal attention shifts, the “searchlight,” may be two key nuclei of the cholinergic system in the mesencephalon. Clinical loss of consciousness results from damage to these nuclei but not from damage to the cholinergic nucleus basalis of the basal forebrain. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore nuances within the field of bodily self-awareness. My starting-point is phenomenological. I focus on how the subject experiences her or his body, i.e. how the body stands forth to the subject. I build on the phenomenologist Drew Leder’s distinction between bodily dis-appearance and dys-appearance. In bodily dis-appearance, I am only prereflectively aware of my body. My body is not a thematic object of my experience. Bodily dys-appearance takes place when the body (...) appears to me as “ill” or “bad.” This is often the case when I experience pain or illness. Here, I will examine three versions of bodily dys-appearance. Whereas many phenomenological studies have explored cases of bodily dys-appearance, few studies have focused on the opposite of bodily dys-appearance, i.e. on bodily modes of being where the body appears to the subject as something good, easy or well. This is done in this article. When the body stands forth as good, easy or well to the subject, I suggest that the body eu-appears to this person. The analysis of eu-appearance shows that the subject can attend to her or his body as something positive and that this attention need not result in discomfort or alienation. Eu-appearance can take place in physical exercise, in sexual pleasure and in some cases of wanted pregnancies. I also discuss, briefly, the case of masochism. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty suggests that to perceive is to be “geared into” the world. In perceiving, we are related to a temporally structured modal space of bodily possibilities that is co-constituted by the body and the world. When we perceive, we are “geared into” this structure and responsive to it; when we misperceive, we are not. In misperceiving, we are unaware of our failure to be geared into the world, and in this respect, we lack awareness of what we are doing. (...) In explaining misperception via this lack of self-awareness, Merleau-Ponty anticipates a key feature of M. G. F. Martin's epistemic disjunctivism: the idea that perceptions and misperceptions can be indiscriminable because of a self-awareness we lack, rather than a set of positive phenomenal features that two experiences share. However, because Merleau-Ponty's account of self-awareness imposes relatively few cognitive demands, he is able to explain how adults, infants, and dogs can be self-aware in the same sense, and how they can fail to discriminate between their experiences in the same way. This provides Merleau-Ponty with the resources to answer Susanna Siegel's objection to epistemic disjunctivism on the basis of “cognitively unsophisticated hallucinators.”. (shrink)

Until the 1970s, models of early infancy tended to depict the young child as internally preoccupied and incapable of processing visual-tactile data from the external world. Meltzoff and Moore's groundbreaking studies of neonatal imitation disprove this characterization of early life: They suggest that the infant is cognizant of its external environment and is able to control its own body. Taking up these experiments, theorists argue that neonatal imitation provides an empirical justification for the existence of an innate ability to engage (...) in social communication. Since later imitation is taken as a benchmark for self- and other-awareness, theorists claim that a proto- or primitive self must exist in the infant. This paper takes up the issue of whether or not neonatal imitation does provide us with a ground to argue against developmental accounts that consider self-awareness to be a later acquisition. I argue that the enthusiasm over neonatal imitation is premature. Psychological studies that claim to prove neonatal imitation do not provide sufficient grounds for dismissing alternate philosophical and psychological theories about the self as being a post-birth "event" rather than an intrinsic condition. Therefore, I argue that there is no compelling reason to suppose that we come to the world with a primitive sense of self- or other-awareness. (shrink)

This article traces the philosophical idea of self-perception from the times of ancient Stoicism to the thirteenth century by analyzing the views of Seneca, Augustine, and Olivi. The central argument is that they defend the same idea according to which self-preservation and the appropriate use of one’s body requires awareness thereof, despite the obvious contextual differences and the uncertainty of direct historical connections between the authors. They think that this kind of self-awareness does not belong only to human (...) beings, because irrational animals need to perceive their bodies, the functions of their bodily parts, and to perceive themselves as living beings in order to act appropriately and survive. The attribution of self-perception to animals is based on a distinction between the experiential awareness of the soul and the intellectual understanding of its essence, a distinction postulated by all three authors. The philosophical affinities between their views show that ideas that originate in Stoic thought were transmitted, directly or indirectly, to medieval philosophical psychology. (shrink)

The mortality and morbidity resulting from noncommunicable diseases including cancer in sub- Saharan Africa are predicted to overtake that of infectious diseases by the year 2030. Esophageal cancer is on the increase in Tanzania. This study estimates risk factors for esophageal cancer, ethical issues and the level of awareness of cancer related services among adults in rural Kilimanjaro. A cross sectional descriptive study was conducted of adults aged 18 years and above in three wards, namely, Kahe, mabogini and Arusha (...) Chini, Moshi Rural District, Kilimanjaro region. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with a total of 419 individuals. The mean age was 36.47 =13.49) years. Of those who participated, 211 were male and 60% reported to have completed primary education. A majority of participants were knowledgeable about esophageal cancer risk factors. Overall, 15% and 23% of the participants reported to have been smoking and drinking alcohol, respectively. Male respondents were almost three times more likely to be smokers as compared to female respondents. Moreover, people who were self-employed were about five times more likely to be smokers as compared to those who were unemployed.. Male respondents were almost two times more likely to be drinkers as compared to female respondents. Overall, the level of awareness of cancer related health services was about 70%. The study findings confirm that despite a good level of knowledge about risk factors for esophageal cancer, the practice of exposure to risk factors is alarmingly high. Awareness of where to seek cancer related health services was high with hospitals been mentioned by the majority though there was low understanding on modalities of treatment among adults in Rural Kilimanjaro. Intervention measures should aim at further increasing knowledge of cancer risk factors and reduce the practice of such risks. Ethical matters including truth telling, ageism and autonomy need to be addressed to improve the perception of cancer related health issues and health seeking behaviour. (shrink)

The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self-awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) when it was appropriated by Śaiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition ( ahampratyaya ). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmakaṇṭha (‘reflexive awareness’) and a kind elaborated (...) by Dharmakīrti (‘intentional self-awareness’). It is then pointed out that Dharmakīrti avails himself not only of intentional self-awareness but also of reflexive awareness. Some remarks on the relationship between these two strands of Dharmakīrtian Buddhism are offered. The conclusion points out that although self-awareness occurs in Buddhism as inextricably linked with anātmavāda , the doctrine of no-self, and sākāravāda , the view that the forms we perceive belong not to external objects but to consciousness, it is used by Rāmakaṇṭha to refute both of these views. An appendix addresses the problem of how precisely to interpret Dharmakīrti’s contention that conceptual cognition is non-conceptual in its reflexive awareness of itself. (shrink)

I. The Paradox of “Judgment” and Pre-reflective Self-AwarenessIn “Fichte’s Original Insight” (1982), Dieter Henrich, the founder of the Heidelberg School, delivered a diagnosis of why three hundred years of Western explication of the internal structure of subjectivity proved to be fruitless. As Manfred Frank noted, “Seldom has so much food for thought been put in a nutshell.”1 Fichte had the “insight” that his predecessors, in their totality (and “nearly all his successors”2), including Kant, misconceived the reality of our self-consciousness as (...) reflection, and thus fell prey to circular reasoning. A subject’s reflection on its own identity is impossible, since it can gain awareness of this identity only if it previously possessed some immediate knowledge of itself. Therefore, (self-)consciousness should not be conceived within the framework of the “reflection model,” which possesses an inherent contradiction, but rather as pre-reflective in nature, and as such it must be postulated by our thought. This is not to say that reflective consciousness—“egological” consciousness, the “reflection model of consciousness,” the “higher-order” theory of consciousness—i.e., the cogito, is impossible, but merely to highlight that its logical foundation cannot be justified by itself and that it essentially depends on the pre-reflective sphere of our psychic lives.3. (shrink)

The 2015 UK Supreme Court judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire reinforces the importance of informed consent to medical treatment. This paper suggests that Montgomery recognises the challenge faced by vulnerable individuals in choosing between treatment options and making decisions with appreciation of information about material risks. The judgment endorses a form of weak paternalism to safeguard such persons, which is not disrespectful of the aggregate principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. But ethical practice requires professionals to tread carefully between (...) weak and hard paternalism in the context of therapeutic interactions with vulnerable patients, while ensuring their awareness of material risks. (shrink)

The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume's comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist accounts. Hume's theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.

Based on theoretical considerations of Aurell (1979) and Block (1995), we argue that object recognition awareness is distinct from purely sensory awareness and that the former is mediated by neuronal activities in areas that are separate and distinct from cortical sensory areas. We propose that two of the principal functions of neuronal activities in sensory cortex, which are to provide sensory awareness and to effect the computations that are necessary for object recognition, are dissociated. We provide examples (...) of how this dissociation might be achieved and argue that the components of the neuronal activities which carry the computations do not directly enter the awareness of the subject. The results of these computations are sparse representations (i.e., vector or distributed codes) which are activated by the presentation of particular sensory objects and are essentially engrams for the recognition of objects. These final representations occur in the highest order areas of sensory cortex; in the visual analyzer, the areas include the anterior part of the inferior temporal cortex and the perirhinal cortex. We propose, based on lesion and connectional data, that the two areas in which activities provide recognition awareness are the temporopolar cortex and the medial orbitofrontal cortex. Activities in the temporopolar cortex provide the recognition awareness of objects learned in the remote past (consolidated object recognition), and those in the medial orbitofrontal cortex provide the recognition awareness of objects learned in the recent past. The activation of the sparse representation for a particular sensory object in turn activates neurons in one or both of these regions of cortex, and it is the activities of these neurons that provide the awareness of recognition of the object in question. The neural circuitry involved in the activation of these representations is discussed. (shrink)