Many scholars in religious ethics and political theory read Augustine's emphasis on pride as tied to a pessimism about politics and human nature as well as a neutralist vision of politics. Against these views, this essay argues that Augustine's vision of political humility is at once tied to a thick, non‐neutralist vision of the good and a limited view of politics' role in achieving this good on its own. To make this argument, I compare Augustine's largely neglected commentary on Genesis (...) with that of Hobbes, a political pessimist with whom Augustine is often compared. While Hobbes's political combatting of pride adheres to a vision of mere “preservation,” Augustine's instead entails a vision of “re‐creation.” Political re‐creation is aspirational, participating in a re‐instantiation of creation's order, but it is also limited, since (re‐)creation is ultimately the work of God. (shrink)

The following article examines Augustine’s efforts in De gestis Pelagii, the bishop of Hippo’s commentary on the acts of the Synod of Diospolis at which Pelagius was acquitted of heresy in December 415 CE. Gest. Pel. is far from an attempt to offer an impartial account of the synod’s events. Rather, it forms a key part of Augustine’s efforts in the aftermath of Diospolis to re-interpret what appeared to be a disaster for the anti-Pelagian cause. In this sense, gest. Pel. (...) is a work with a clear rhetorical purpose. The question at the heart of this article is whether, as two scholars have recently suggested, Augustine’s rhetorical aims in this work led him to consciously misrepresent the facts—about the synod’s decision, Pelagius’s views, and his own history with Pelagius. I will argue that we can plausibly take Augustine at his word in gest. Pel. (shrink)

The Augustinian text is being radically rewritten by contemporary theologians to render it compatible with various proposals for a postmodern Christianity. The proximate stimulus is Derrida's deconstruction of the argument of the Confessions. What is positive and what is wanting in his appropriation of the Augustinian dialectic is reviewed, as also what can and cannot be seen of the historical Augustine from within the purview of a postmodern theology.

The Augustinian text is being radically rewritten by contemporary theologians to render it compatible with various proposals for a postmodern Christianity. The proximate stimulus is Derrida's deconstruction of the argument of the Confessions. What is positive and what is wanting in his appropriation of the Augustinian dialectic is reviewed, as also what can and cannot be seen of the historical Augustine from within the purview of a postmodern theology.

This dissertation is a detailed exploration of Augustine's discussion of the origin of the human soul in the De Genesi ad Litteram. The two central problems addressed are: Why does Augustine abruptly and without explanation abandon his two-phase view of creation and reduce his three hypotheses of the soul's origin to two?, and Why, in spite of what seems to be a preponderance of evidence in favor of the traducianist hypothesis, does Augustine resist it? It is argued that the solution (...) to both of these puzzles is to be found in Augustine's unstated yet persistent commitment to an unmediated account of the soul's origin. It is further argued that if one is sufficiently attentive to the details of Augustine's discussion, it can be seen that Augustine in fact mounts a concerted effort to argue in favor of the creationist hypothesis while simultaneously attempting to block the traducianist hypothesis. (shrink)

This present volume is the twenty-ninth in the Re-Reading the Canon series, the title of each of which volumes begins Feminist Interpretations of . . . . Surprisingly, the volume on Augustine has appeared relatively late in the series. The editor has collected eleven essays plus a poem on feminist interpretations of the bishop of Hippo, who has certainly exerted a powerful influence on the view of women in the Western Christian churches of all major denominations. Besides the essays, Stark (...) has provided a substantial introduction to the volume in which she touches upon the principal events of Augustine's life and briefly sketches the main points of each essay.The feminist interpretations of Augustine included in the volume represent a broad spectrum running from quite radical to fairly moderate or even tame approaches. In "Augustine, Sexuality, Gender, and Women," Rosemary Radford Ruether presents a call to critique the views of Augustine from which women and men have suffered for over 1500 years in Western Christianity. Anne-Marie Bowery argues in "Monica: The Feminine Face of Christ" that Augustine's portrait of Monica allows us to "reframe the masculine image of the divinity" that is. (shrink)

"La dimension philosophique de la pensée et de l'œuvre de Novalis constitue le cœour de cet ouvrage bilingue. Des philosophes examinent sous toutes les coutures, en allemand et en français, les écrits scientifiques, littéraires et philosophiques du penseur romantique, non sans s'appuyer sur - et majorer - la dimension proprement réflexive de cette œuvre."--Page 4 de la la couverture.

Phillip Cary argues that Augustine invented or created the concept of self as an inner space--as space into which one can enter and in which one can find God. This concept of inwardness, says Cary, has worked its way deeply into the intellectual heritage of the West and many Western individuals have experienced themselves as inner selves. After surveying the idea of inwardness in Augustine's predecessors, Cary offers a re-examination of Augustine's own writings, making the controversial point that in his (...) early writings Augustine appears to hold that the human soul is quite literally divine. Cary goes on to contend that the crucial Book 7 of the Confessions is not a historical report of Augustine's "conversion" experience, but rather an explanation of his intellectual development over time. (shrink)

Idipsum est une locution qu'Augustin utilise pour désigner Dieu. Elle signifie littéralement "cela même". Ce minimalisme sémantique ne laisse pas de la rendre mystérieuse. Faut-il y voir un emprunt à certains textes bibliques qui déjà en font usage? Dans ce cas, idipsum, tel un nom propre vide de toute signification, se bornerait à indiquer Dieu en tant qu'il échappe à toute définition rationnelle. Ou bien faut-il rattacher idipsum à la tradition platonicienne qui recourt à des locutions grecques similaires pour (...) désigner la réalité intelligible qui est " elle-même en elle-même "? Idipsum serait alors la trace d'un héritage philosophique conduisant Augustin à une définition métaphysique de Dieu comme Etre absolu. Cependant, cette alternative entre origine biblique et tradition platonicienne néglige la diversité des usages philosophiques des locutions formées sur auto puis ipsum: elles expriment d'abord l'identité et le fait d'être soi, puis la réflexivité, au croisement des champs dialectique, pratique et ontologique. Cet ouvrage explore la façon dont ces aspects de l'identité se sont construits, du autos grec à l'idipsum latin, à travers des études portant sur Homère, Platon, Aristote, le stoïcisme, le néoplatonisme grec puis latin, Augustin. (shrink)

Augustine of Hippo is a giant in the history of Christian thought, commended by St Jerome for having virtually 're-founded the old faith'.

For Augustin Thierry, rewriting the story of the past was, until 1830, explicitly a way of making the future, and after 1830, implicitly a way of justifying the present. In subverting traditional historiography perceived as a legitimation of royal authority Thierry did not follow the Enlightenment strategy of opposing history and reason. Writing after 1789, he discovered reason in history. Constant and the Saint-Simonians had already distinguished two ages of history an age of conquest or violence, and an age, (...) just beginning, of commerce and reason but these appeared as discontinuous. Thierry's aim, especially after 1830, was to reveal history as a continuous, providential unfolding of reason, culminating in the bourgeois nation state. The violence of history was thus to be subsumed by reason. Historiographically, narrative and commentary were not to be discontinuous, as in Enlightenment historiography; meaning was to emerge instead from the narrative itself. Correspondingly, the historian's role was to be construed as a mediating, not a constructive one. The historian is the mouthpiece of history, as the bourgeois, the true hero of history, uniting in himself conquered and conqueror, re-presents what in history was divided the nation. In neither case is control to be viewed as a mark of division or violence; historian and hero are alike agents or representatives of totality . Violence reasserts itself thematically, however, in the stark, unresolved opposition of conquered and conqueror, subject and lord, female and male, victim and executioner, which structures Thierry's most successful historical narratives. (shrink)

Augustine’s doctrine of Jewish witness maintains that, although Christianity has superseded Judaism as the one true religion, it is God’s will that the Jews continue to exist because they preserve and authenticate the Old Testament, divinely-inspired texts which foretold the coming of Jesus. Thus, Christian rulers are obligated to protect the religious liberties of the Jewish people, and the church should focus its missionary efforts on pagans rather than Jews. Current scholarly consensus holds that Augustine adhered consistently to this doctrine (...) from its first iteration in Contra Faustum in 398 until his death in 430. However, this essay argues that, when Augustine spoke his last words on the subject in the Tractatus Aduersus Iudaeos, the doctrine was no longer his primary guide in thinking about how Christians should interact with Jews. In marked contrast to his earlier views, here, Augustine passionately urges Jews to accept Christ and encourages his congregation to try to convert them. This reading of the Tractatus Aduersus Iudaeos calls for a re-examination of the development of Augustine’s teaching, particularly in the context of dramatic changes in imperial policy toward Jews in the 420s. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews St. Auc~stine and Being: A Me$aphyM,cal Essay. By James F. Anderson. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.Pp. viii [i] + 76. Guilders 9.90.) Contemporary students of medieval philosophy, especially those influenced by the writings of Gilson, usually view Augustine as primarily an essentialist in metaphysics, while Aquinas is viewed as some sort of existentialist. This is taken to mean that, whereas Augustine seems to identify being with essence (...) or wha~ a thing is, Aquinas distinguishes between what a thing is and its act of existence. The major contribution of Aquinas to later philosophy is often depicted as this distinction between essence and existence. Perhaps the major interest and value of Professor Anderson's essay is that it contests this currently predominant opinion of the essentialist character of Augustinian metaphysics and calls for a re-evaluation of the supposedly revohi~ionary character of the Thomistic concentration upon the act of existence. It is quite evident that Augustine broke with Plotinus when he asserted that the first principle of all things was God, being itself (ipsum esse), rather than the One, which transcends being. The controversy arises over Augustine's view of the nature of being (esse). For Gilson the notion of being remained for Augustine Neoplatonic, while for Anderson Augustine introduced an existential aspect to the notion of being lacking in Neoplatonic thought. Citing the same texts for support Gilson maintains that Augustine interprets the name of God given in Exodus as "I am he who never changes," while Anderson maintains that Augustine interprets Exodus as asserting that God is being, in the sense of existence, itself. The major point of disagreement between Gilson and Anderson is not whether Augustine regarded being as pre~ dominant, but how Augustine interpreted the notion of being. In some texts Augustine maintsSns that being and immutability mean the same thing, in others he argues that a thing truly is 'because it is immutable, and in yet others he argues that a thing is immutable because it truly is. The first opinion seems to be the one frequently favored as an interpretation of Augustine by Gilson. The second is usually regarded as Neoplatonic. The third is the opinion which Professor Anderson argues was most accurately Augustine's. According to Professor Anderson the first two opinions reflect for Augustine a merely factual connection between being and immutability, whereas the third reflects a metaphysical entailment. I should like to mention three points in Professor Anderson's discussion which seem to me weak. Firstly, as Augustine remarks that being is the name for unchangeableness we cannot take this as asserting a merely factual relationship. Secondly, to say that 'being' and 'immutability ~mean the same thing to Augustine or that being and immutability are identical to him does not necessitate, as Professor Andersen claims, denying the primacy of being. If 'being' and 'immutability' mean the same thing, then it is very peculiar to ask which is primary. If it is remarked that 'triangleI means the same thing as 'three sided figure', what sense does it make to ask which notion is primary? I suspect that Professor Anderson's contention makes sense only if one believes that there is a difference in the meanings of 'being' and 'immutability ', but whether or not there was such a difference for Augustine is precisely the point at issue. Professor Anderson asserts that it would be a "metaphysical inconsistency" to claim that God is both being and immutability, but it is not clear why such a claim would be inconsistent if the two terms in fact mean the same thing (p. 30). Thirdly, if, as is in fact the case, Augustine's remarks on the relationship between immutability and being are inconsistent perhaps we should accept the possibility that Augustine himself never came to a clear view on this matter rather than attempt to surmise what Augustine "must have meant." Of course, such inconsistency in Augustine's writings would tend to support the thesis of Gilson that Augustine has difficulties reconciling his theology and metaphysics. Moreover, the analogy Professor Anderson suggests between the Augustinian mutability-immutability contrast and the Thomistic potency-act contrast could only be a very rough one... (shrink)

À partir d’une lecture intégrale de l’oeuvre d’Augustin d’Hippone (354-430), Vincent Giraud met au jour les aspects de ce qu’il appelle, dès l’introduction, une « condition herméneutique ». Il s’agit de démontrer que le « il y a », le « es gibt » propre à toute « donation » phénoménale, se situe, pour Augustin, entièrement sous condition du signe : la compréhension de l’existence humaine peut alors faire l’objet d’une reprise radicale à partir du concept de signe. (...) Être au monde, à soi, à autrui, à Dieu, c’est donc d’abord faire face à des signes. Car c’est le signe (signum) qui prévaut dès lors que la chose même (res ipsa) fait défaut. Cette tension fondamentale entre signification et manifestation peut alors être considérée comme la trame profonde qui régit toute la pensée augustinienne de l’humain. L’étude s’ordonne en deux grandes parties, qui permettent de déployer l’ensemble du spectre couvert par l’existence herméneutique telle que l’a conçue Augustin. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews St. Auc~stine and Being: A Me$aphyM,cal Essay. By James F. Anderson. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.Pp. viii [i] + 76. Guilders 9.90.) Contemporary students of medieval philosophy, especially those influenced by the writings of Gilson, usually view Augustine as primarily an essentialist in metaphysics, while Aquinas is viewed as some sort of existentialist. This is taken to mean that, whereas Augustine seems to identify being with essence (...) or wha~ a thing is, Aquinas distinguishes between what a thing is and its act of existence. The major contribution of Aquinas to later philosophy is often depicted as this distinction between essence and existence. Perhaps the major interest and value of Professor Anderson's essay is that it contests this currently predominant opinion of the essentialist character of Augustinian metaphysics and calls for a re-evaluation of the supposedly revohi~ionary character of the Thomistic concentration upon the act of existence. It is quite evident that Augustine broke with Plotinus when he asserted that the first principle of all things was God, being itself (ipsum esse), rather than the One, which transcends being. The controversy arises over Augustine's view of the nature of being (esse). For Gilson the notion of being remained for Augustine Neoplatonic, while for Anderson Augustine introduced an existential aspect to the notion of being lacking in Neoplatonic thought. Citing the same texts for support Gilson maintains that Augustine interprets the name of God given in Exodus as "I am he who never changes," while Anderson maintains that Augustine interprets Exodus as asserting that God is being, in the sense of existence, itself. The major point of disagreement between Gilson and Anderson is not whether Augustine regarded being as pre~ dominant, but how Augustine interpreted the notion of being. In some texts Augustine maintsSns that being and immutability mean the same thing, in others he argues that a thing truly is 'because it is immutable, and in yet others he argues that a thing is immutable because it truly is. The first opinion seems to be the one frequently favored as an interpretation of Augustine by Gilson. The second is usually regarded as Neoplatonic. The third is the opinion which Professor Anderson argues was most accurately Augustine's. According to Professor Anderson the first two opinions reflect for Augustine a merely factual connection between being and immutability, whereas the third reflects a metaphysical entailment. I should like to mention three points in Professor Anderson's discussion which seem to me weak. Firstly, as Augustine remarks that being is the name for unchangeableness we cannot take this as asserting a merely factual relationship. Secondly, to say that 'being' and 'immutability ~mean the same thing to Augustine or that being and immutability are identical to him does not necessitate, as Professor Andersen claims, denying the primacy of being. If 'being' and 'immutability' mean the same thing, then it is very peculiar to ask which is primary. If it is remarked that 'triangleI means the same thing as 'three sided figure', what sense does it make to ask which notion is primary? I suspect that Professor Anderson's contention makes sense only if one believes that there is a difference in the meanings of 'being' and 'immutability ', but whether or not there was such a difference for Augustine is precisely the point at issue. Professor Anderson asserts that it would be a "metaphysical inconsistency" to claim that God is both being and immutability, but it is not clear why such a claim would be inconsistent if the two terms in fact mean the same thing (p. 30). Thirdly, if, as is in fact the case, Augustine's remarks on the relationship between immutability and being are inconsistent perhaps we should accept the possibility that Augustine himself never came to a clear view on this matter rather than attempt to surmise what Augustine "must have meant." Of course, such inconsistency in Augustine's writings would tend to support the thesis of Gilson that Augustine has difficulties reconciling his theology and metaphysics. Moreover, the analogy Professor Anderson suggests between the Augustinian mutability-immutability contrast and the Thomistic potency-act contrast could only be a very rough one... (shrink)

I must begin by confessing that I owe to the deficiencies of voice-mail a valuable occasion to re-think the purpose of this lecture. For I left on the voice-mail of Professor Martin the title of the lecture: “Augustine and a Crisis of Wealth in Late Antiquity.” I received—again by voice-mail—a delighted reply. He fully approved of my title: “Augustine and a Crisis of Wills in Late Antiquity.” I realized, to my shame, that I had awoken false expectations in the heart (...) of a great Augustinian scholar. Of course, “Wills” is what a St Augustine Lecture should be about. It was on the Will that Augustine wrote with greatest passion and tenacity, and with the gravest long-term consequences. And I had offered, for the occasion of a St. Augustine Lecture, not “Will” but merely “Wealth.”. (shrink)

This article argues that within the context of settler colonialism, the goal of transitional justice must be decolonisation. Settler colonialism operates according to a logic of elimination that aims to affect the disappearance of Indigenous populations in order to build new societies on expropriated land. This eliminatory logic renders the death of Indigenous peoples “ungrievable”. Therefore, this article proposes a decolonising transitional justice premised on a politics of grief that re-conceptualises Indigenous death as grievable, posing a challenge to the logic (...) of elimination and advancing a “decolonisation of the mind”, and resists a purely affective concept of grief in order to mobilise grief as a political resource to demand transformative structural justice. This article consider deaths at Canada’s Indian Residential Schools as a case study of ungrievability under settler colonialism and the Project of Heart as an illustration of a decolonising form of informal transitional justice. (shrink)

This article provides arguments to show that there is a form of syntax specific to the bodily movements of certain martial arts. This syntax of bodily mouvements is different from that usually identified in multimodal conversational analysis which consists of the addition of bodily extensions to speech turns Keevallik (Res Lang Soc Interact 46(1):1–21, 2013) and (Res Lang Soc Interact 51(1):1–21, 2018). Based on an analysis of video extracts from two martial arts (Aikido and Kenpo), the article shows that martial (...) arts movements, accomplished within a martial intercorporeality, acquire syntactic characteristics that make it possible to anticipate trajectories accomplished simultaneously, before and during body contact. The article presents the four movement-units common to these two martial arts and the way participants combine them, in a sequentiality of simultaneity. (shrink)

I first became interested in De dialectica in 1966, while I was doing re search on Augustine's knowledge of logic. At the time I made a transla tion of the Maurist text and included it as an appendix to my doctoral dissertation (Yale, 1967). In 1971 I thoroughly revised the translation on the basis of the critical text of Wilhelm Crecelius (1857) and I have re cently revised it again to conform to Professor Jan Pinborg's new edition. The only previously (...) published translation of the whole of De dialectica. is N. H. Barreau's French translation in the Oeuvres completes de Saint Augustin (1873). Thomas Stanley translated parts of Chapters Six and Nine into English as part of the account of Stoic logic in his History of Philosophy (Pt. VIII, 1656). I offer De dialectica in English in the hope that it will be of some interest to historians of logic and of the liberal arts tradition and to students of the thought of Augustine. In translating I have for the most part been as literal as is consistent with English usage. Although inclusion of the Latin text might have justified a freer translation, for example, the use of modern technical terms, it seemed better to stay close to the Latin. One of the. values in studying a work such as De dialectica is to see familiar topics discussed in a terminology not so familiar. In the translation I follow these conventions. (shrink)

I first became interested in De dialectica in 1966, while I was doing re search on Augustine's knowledge of logic. At the time I made a transla tion of the Maurist text and included it as an appendix to my doctoral dissertation (Yale, 1967). In 1971 I thoroughly revised the translation on the basis of the critical text of Wilhelm Crecelius (1857) and I have re cently revised it again to conform to Professor Jan Pinborg's new edition. The only previously (...) published translation of the whole of De dialectica. is N. H. Barreau's French translation in the Oeuvres completes de Saint Augustin (1873). Thomas Stanley translated parts of Chapters Six and Nine into English as part of the account of Stoic logic in his History of Philosophy (Pt. VIII, 1656). I offer De dialectica in English in the hope that it will be of some interest to historians of logic and of the liberal arts tradition and to students of the thought of Augustine. In translating I have for the most part been as literal as is consistent with English usage. Although inclusion of the Latin text might have justified a freer translation, for example, the use of modern technical terms, it seemed better to stay close to the Latin. One of the. values in studying a work such as De dialectica is to see familiar topics discussed in a terminology not so familiar. In the translation I follow these conventions. (shrink)

Cloning, gene therapy, stem-cell harvesting—are we on the path to a Huxley-like Brave New World? Not really, argues political philosopher and Kass Commission member Peter Augustine Lawler in Stuck with Virtue: The American Individual and Our Biotechnological Future, even as he admits that we will likely become more obsessive and anxious and will be subjected to new forms of tyranny. Rather, he contends, human nature is such that the biotechnological world to come, despite the best efforts of its proponents, will (...) still fail to make it possible to feel good without being good. It will be harder, Lawler warns, to be virtuous in the future, because we will be more detached than ever from the natural sources of happiness. But we may take some solace in the fact that virtue will still be the best way to live well with what we really know. With irony and wit, Lawler delivers the good news about the future of the American individual: We’re going to remain free, because the modern effort to make increasingly individualistic human beings at home with themselves and their environments through technological progress cannot succeed. That is the truth and promise, concludes Lawler, of a genuinely postmodern conservatism. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I will examine the problem of theological fatalism in St. Augustine and, specifically, whether or not Augustine was philosophically justified in his belief that his views on divine grace and human freedom could be harmonized. As is well-known, beginning with his second response To Simplician (ca. 396) and continuing through his works against the semi-Pelagians (ca. 426-429), Augustine espoused the Pauline doctrine of all-inclusive grace: that the fallen will’s ability to accomplish the good is totally a function (...) of God’s elective grace. What, then, does the fallen will do to work out its own salvation? There is the further issue of how to reconcile Augustine’s rather extreme emphasis on grace in his later works with the more balanced picture we receive in his sermones ad populum, written throughout his forty-year preaching career. In many of these sermons, even those written during the Pelagian controversy, Augustine is careful to leave space for both divine and human initiative in the process of our justification within the totus Christus, or ‘whole Christ.’ How we can understand Augustine in his role as doctor gratiae and as preacher of human freedom will be a major inquiry of this dissertation.The most serious obstacle to moving forward on these problems has been and remains the essentialist interpretation of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology by most commentators. On their interpretation, Augustine thought that there were no real distinctions within the Trinity, with each of the three divine persons and their actions sharing in the absolute unity of the divine essence. Holding this interpretation not only does away with the distinctness of each of the persons, but also requires all of God’s different powers and attributes, including willing and foreknowing, to be coalesced into one another without distinction in the divine essence. God’s foreknowledge is thereby identified with God’s will, which necessarily leads to theological fatalism: God would have to will everything that He foreknows, and God would have to foreknow everything that He wills. Since God is omniscient, He wills everything that will happen, including the future willings of the fallen human will.It cannot be denied that there are texts in the Augustinian corpus that seem to point to a reading of the Trinity as absolutely simple. But this study will endeavor to show that there are also other largely overlooked texts in On the Trinity, the Confessions, and his Commentaries on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis (among others) that argue for various distinctions within the Trinity to make sense of the relation between Creator and creature, and the differences between the divine processions of generation/spiration, and the act of creation. These texts will be shown to parallel very closely the position of the Eastern Orthodox Christian tradition, which consistently uses the real distinction between God’s essential being and energetic activities (also known as the essence-energy distinction) to avoid the problem of theological fatalism. This rich theological and philosophical tradition, from the time of the fourth-century Greek Fathers to the Byzantine tradition that followed, differs less with Augustine concerning the essentials of Trinitarian theology and its practical implications for solving the problem of making human freedom and divine grace compatible than has been hitherto thought. (shrink)

Arendt and others have regarded Augustine as “the first philosopher of the Will,” considered in a broadly naturalistic sense. However, the Stoicism that influenced the young Augustine has a better claim to have “invented” such a will. His own thinking about will was profoundly affected by the Neoplatonism that facilitated his reconversion to Christianity. On the one hand, Augustine envisaged the near negation of will through the irrationality of sin and the fall. On the other, he came to believe that (...) through grace will could be re-identified with charity and with reason, human and divine. From a philosophical point of view, he thus rationalized, and in effect nullified, the concept of will with which he began. (shrink)

From the beginning, Augustine's "Confessions" presents itself as a dialogue with God. Taking a cue from Ludwig Feuerbach’s "The Essence of Christianity [Das Wesen des Christentums]," this dialogue can easily be dismissed as a projection of the self. This would imply that the divine otherness is nothing more than a mirror of one’s own fears and preferences. “Does this critique,” I asked myself in this piece, “really do justice to a position like that of Augustine?” For a long time, I (...) did not know how to approach what I had — provisionally — called Augustine’s dialogue with God. It appeared to me that Augustine, in an accidental and indirect way, had re-invented the Platonic dialogue and had turned it into a new Christian genre. “It is true,” I told myself, “that the genre of the Confessions shows family resemblances with the hagiography and the autobiography. But most certainly it cannot be reduced to these genres.” The Greek words ‘hagios’ (holy) and ‘autos’ (self) are in flagrant contradiction with the intention of the Confessions. Augustine tries to stay clear of any claim of holiness and only highlights his own ‘self’ to immediately question it. “Is the Platonic dialogue,” I asked myself, “not a far more appropriate predecessor for Augustine’s dialogue with God?” Both types of dialogues can be seen as true dia logoi in which at least two different voices emerge. However, contrary to what one would expect, it is not the dialogue form itself that frames these two voices. Instead the two voices emerge within the discourse of a single speaker, incorporating true otherness within the discourse of the self. Building on these reflections, I explore how Augustine's dialogue with God succeeds in eluding Feuerbach's charge of self-projection. (shrink)

This essay attempts to provide more evidence for the notions that there actually is a Latin (as opposed to a Greek) Neoplatonic tradition in late antiquity, that this tradition includes a systematic theory of first principles, and that this tradition and theory are influential in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. The method of the essay is intended to be novel in that, instead of examining authors or works in a chronological sequence and attempting to isolate doctrines in the traditional (...) manner, it proceeds by identifying certain philosophemes (a concept borrowed from structuralist and post-structuralist thought and here signifying certain minimal units from which philosophical “systems“ can be constructed), and then studying the combination and re-combination of these philosophemes consciously and unconsciously by a selection of important medieval writers. These philosophemes occur in Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram ; Augustine, De Trinitate ; Augustine, De Vera Religione ; Augustine, De Musica ; Macrobius, Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis ; and Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae . The sampling of medieval authors who use these philosophemes includes Eriugena, William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, and Nicholas of Cusa. (shrink)

Les philosophes anciens ont ecrit sur le rapport de la cite et du monde et c'est a eux que l'on doit les premieres theses cosmopolitiques. L'objet de l'essai de Jean-Francois Pradeau est d'exposer ces theses, en les rendant accessibles a des lecteurs qui ne les connaissent pas. Ainsi l'essai presente-t-il ce que des auteurs comme Diogene le cynique, Platon, les stoiciens ou encore le Pere de l'Eglise Saint Augustin ont pu dire de la citoyennete mondiale et du reve d'une (...) cite mondiale unique qui reunirait enfin tous les peuples. Les questions qu'agite cette histoire ancienne du cosmopolitisme sont pour beaucoup celles de notre epoque, qui a fait l'eloge pendant quelques decennies d'une forme d'emancipation cosmopolitique, qui a invente une Europe supranationale, mais qui parait aujourd'hui figee autour de ses frontieres. Les grecs anciens qui ont invente la formule citoyen du monde ont quelque chose a nous dire de la mondialisation. Ils nous rappellent avec une certaine simplicite que la vie humaine, qui est une vie politique, c'est-a-dire une vie qui n'est possible que dans les limites instituees d'une communaute civique, ne peut atteindre la tranquillite ou le bonheur sans apprecier a sa juste mesure la place qui lui convient dans le monde. Il est nefaste et finalement impossible de vivre sans se faire une certaine idee de ce monde et de son ordre, sans se representer, ne serait-ce que de maniere vraisemblable, ce qu'est l'univers et la place qui nous revient en son sein. (shrink)

This book probes beneath modern scientific and sentimental concepts of the heart to discover its past mysteries. Historical hearts evidenced essential aspects of human existence that still endure in modern thought and experience of political community, psychological mentality, and physical vitality. Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle revises ordinary assumptions about the heart with original interdisciplinary research on religious beliefs and theological and philosophical ideas. Her book uncovers the thought of Aristotle, William Harvey, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Calvinas it relates to the (...) heart. It analyzes Augustine’s outlaw heart in cultural deviance from biblical law; Aquinas’s problematic argument for the permanence of the natural law in the heart; and Calvin’s advocacy for an affective heart re-created by the Spirit from its fallen nature. This book of cultural anatomies is the climax of her dozen years of publications on the heart. (shrink)

Though al-Ghazalı is often superficially compared to Descartes, Ghazalı’s epistemological project echoes—in consonance or dissonance—Augustine’s, warranting a clear exploration of the depths of these echoes. For both Augustine and Ghazalı the epistemological and theological quest starts with an interior turn, and divine illumination provides the tools for and content of knowledge. Both recount skeptical leanings resolved by divine illumination; both employ philosophy as a tool in theological disputes; both see knowledge as dynamic and transformative; and both assert that God’s direct (...) illumination is a necessary precursor to and a final capstone upon knowledge. Ghazalı’s use of illumination is more circumscribed and specified than Augustine’s. I argue that Ghazalı and Augustine take similar approaches to the role of divine illumination and the importance of interiority or the subjective grasp on knowledge, but despite these differences, Ghazalı and Augustine deal distinctly with the question of authority and certitude of knowledge. (shrink)

Lam, Joseph In an audience for journalists shortly after his election in 2013 Pope Francis revealed not only the reason for his choice of name, but also his vision of the church: 'Francis of Assisi. For me he is the man of poverty, the man of peace, the man who loves and safeguards creation... He is the man who gives us this spirit of peace, the poor man... Oh, how I wish for a Church that is poor and for the (...) poor!' The Pontiff in his 2014 Lenten message re-emphasised the church's commitment to the poor. The responsibility of the church is 'to bear witness to all those who live in material, moral and spiritual destitution the Gospel message of the merciful love of God our Father, who is ready to embrace everyone in Christ. We can do this to the extent that we imitate Christ who became poor and enriched us by his poverty'. Pope Francis' concern for the poor is again reechoed in his latest encyclical, Laudato Si, in which he re-emphasises the church's commitment to the poor by calling Catholics especially to be stewards God's creation. A poor church for the poor, as Pope Francis envisages, has its foundation in the poverty of Jesus Christ: 'For you know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sake he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich'. (shrink)

Disputing the Unity of the World: The Importance of Res and the Influence of Averroes in Giles of Rome's Critique of T homas Aquinas concerning the Unity of the World G. j. MCALEER 1. INTRODUCTION tILES OF ROME earned, after a decidedly difficult start, the most complete honors open to an academic religious in the Middle Ages. Joining the Hermits of St. Augustine at age 14, he became the first regent master of his order at the University of Paris ; (...) his works were made compul- sory in the education of students entering the Hermits in 1287; finally, in 1292 he became the general of the order itself.' Giles is significant, as Mandonnet puts it, because he "est incontestablement au premier rang des th~ologiens de la fin du XIII e si~cle. "2 But this is not all. Giles is also important to the period because his writings were censured by the same commission that composed the famous Parisian condemnation of 1277. As a result of this I would like to thank Robert Wielockx, Jos Decorte, Jennifer DeRose, and especially two anonymous referees of theJHP, for their extremely useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. P. Nash, "Giles of Rome," New Catholic Eneydopedia, vol. 6 , 485 9 "P. Mandonnet, O. P., "La carri6re scolaire de Gilles de Rome," Revue des sciences philosophiques et thlologiques 4 09t~ 497. [~9] 3 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 36: I JANUARY 1998 censure, Giles had to leave.. (shrink)

L'état de crise générale qui règne aujourd'hui dans la société française, comme l'a révélé, entre autres, l'ampleur sans précédent de la "manif pour tous", menace aujourd'hui l'universalité même de notre modèle sociopolitique national. Depuis que les trois notions qui fondent nos "valeurs républicaines" - liberté, égalité, fraternité - ont été détournées de leur sens véritable. La "liberté", devenue illimitée, consacre un sujet dominé par son seul ego, l'"égalité" est désormais synonyme d'une abolition de toute différence, fût-elle biologique, et la "fraternité" (...) se réduit à des promiscuités imposées. D'une promesse d'élévation citoyenne passant par l'accession de tous à l'autonomie, les principes des Lumières semblent bien conduire aujourd'hui à la négation même de ce qui définit notre humanité. Comment pareille grandeur humaniste a-t-elle pu dégénérer, en moins de trois siècles, en humanitarisme hygiénique de base? Ne faut-il pas chercher dans l'échec métapolitique du libéralisme mondialisé la réponse à cette question, qui dépasse de loin la banale scission gauche/droite? Paul-François Paoli passe au crible les mensonges et les contradictions criantes de la "religion laïque" en convoquant tour à tour dans le débat saint Augustin, Nietzsche, Raymond Boudon ou encore Pierre Manent. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qui fonde la souveraineté? De quand date-t-elle? Quelle était sa place dans les régimes politiques antérieurs à la Révolution française? Pour répondre à ces questions, un économiste laïque, Jacques Sapir, et un philosophe dominicain, Bernard Bourdin, se confrontent. Quand le premier évoque les fondements du pouvoir à Athènes, dans la Rome impériale et au Moyen Age, l'autre revient aux origines de la notion de peuple dans l'Ancien Testament, sur l'essence de l'autorité papale et la doctrine de La Trinité. C'est (...) aussi l'occasion pour eux de dialoguer avec d'illustres penseurs : Platon, saint Augustin, Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke ou encore Marx. Cette réflexion d'ordre historique et philosophique montre qu'il n'y a pas d'humanité sans racines, sans origines, sans legs, que ce soit pour celui qui croit au ciel comme pour celui qui n'y croit pas. Un ouvrage indispensable pour comprendre les enjeux de la souveraineté nationale dans son rapport au phénomène religieux en Occident. (shrink)

Réflexions sur la controverse saint Thomas - saint Augustin -- La vertu de patience selon saint Thomas et saint Augustin -- Note sur un texte de saint Thomas -- Prolégomènes à la prima via -- Sur la problématique thomiste de la vision béatifique -- L'esse du verbe incarné selon saint Thomas -- Eléments d'une métaphysique thomis-te de l'être.

This article concerns the distinction between memory-time and information-time, which appeared in Wittgenstein’s middle-period lectures and writings, and its relation to Wittgenstein’s career-long reflection about musical understanding. While the idea of “information-time” entails a public frame of reference typically pertaining to objects which persist in physical time, the idea of pure “memory-time” involves the totality of one’s present memories and expectations that do now provide any way of measuring time-spans. I argue that Wittgenstein’s critique of Augustine notion of pure memory-time (...) entails ipso facto a critique of an influential idea of musical motion, which has been recurring in the work of some major philosophers of music up until the present day. The article connects Wittgenstein’s critical remarks on the confused foundations of such “Augustinian Picture of Music” with his emphasis on the notion of phrasing or characterization in language and music. Wittgenstein’s reversal of Augustinian priorities regarding musical time brings to surface the particularity of expression and the aesthetically “right” in music, evoked by Wittgenstein’s remarks on simultaneity and tempo in music and language. Wittgenstein renders musical simultaneity as enabled by a “protocol” which inheres in musizieren, in the aptly collaborative quest for drawing in significance by means of the phrasing and re-phrasing of a passage in order to characterize it, enabling by means of such comparative investigation meaningful distinctions between right and wrong. (shrink)

With Augustine and especially with Wittgenstein, we see that when we use language we negotiate a meaning since language is something we acquire in a community. On the other hand, Chomsky argues that language is something that happens to us, rather than something we learn. We attempt to bring these two positions in a balance by following Davidson's ideas on meaning and radical interpretation, which gives us a way to keep meaning (what someone thinks) and belief (what someone holds true (...) about the world) together and thus we manage to bring and keep the individual and the community in a balance. Moreover, through language, with the help of narrative, we get in touch with ourselves, as selves, and with the others, which leads us to considerations on personal identity. To illustrate this, we bring in a few examples ranging from Apache stories in Arizona to narrative accounts about lives lived while changing linguistic environments. In guise of conclusion, we will attempt to move the discussion on the field of multiculturalism, pointing out a possible line of research which would inquire into an alternative approach to understanding other cultures by emphasizing the concept of dialogue and a re-defined concept of identity. (shrink)

Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) a marqué l'histoire de la pensée économique en introduisant la modélisation des phénomènes économiques, et non leur seule quantification. Ce constat appelle une double question : 1° Comment la rupture opérée par Cournot s'inscrit-elle dans l'histoire et l'évolution des méthodes de l'économie? La question se pose d'autant plus que les Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses passèrent d'abord presque inaperçues. 2° Que reste-t-il aujourd'hui de ce tournant effectué par le «philosophe-géomètre»? Autrement dit, (...) comment penser l'actualité de l'œuvre économique de Cournot? Or, avant d'être un économiste, Cournot est d'abord mathématicien et philosophe. Comment son œuvre économique s'accorde-t-elle alors avec son activité de mathématicien, et comment prend-elle place dans sa réflexion philosophique, c'est-à-dire à la fois dans sa théorie de la connaissance et dans sa philosophie de l'action et de la décision? Comprendre la portée de l'œuvre économique de Cournot et sa place dans son œuvre multiforme, tel est le projet qui anime le présent ouvrage où économistes, philosophes, historiens des sciences et sociologue entrecroisent leurs approches de celui qui demeure l'un des économistes et des philosophes majeurs du XIXe siècle."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

En skumrand (poem) av A. Larsen.--Platons øyeblikks-filosofi eller Dialogen Parmenides' 3. hypotese, av E.A. Wyller.--Gresk og israelittisk historiesyn, av T. Boman.--Lukrets, dikter og filosof, av E. Skard.--Amor og Psyche, elskoven og sjelen, av H.P. L'Orange.--Augustins liv og lære, av P. Dietrichson.--Thomas Aquinas' syn på naturvitenskapene, av D. Føllesdal.--Mester Eckehart, av A. Brynildsen.--Renessanse-humanistene og "humanitas," av P. Svendsen.--Striden mellom de gamle og de nye, av A. Aarnes.--Harmonitanken i Schillers filosofiske avhandlinger, av O. Koppang.--Grunntrekk i Wilhelm von Humboldts sprogfilosofi, av I. Dal.--Noen (...) bemerkninger til Dostojevskijs Storinkvisitoren, av E. Krag.--Speculum og analogi i Peer Gynt, av B. Blekastad.--Om pakt-begrepet i "Kristin Lavrandsdatter," av D. Haakonsen.--Subjektivitet og sanning, av H. Skjervheim.--Refleksjoner om helhetssyn, sannhet og kunnskap, av A. Næss.--I tid og rum (poem) av A. Øverland. (shrink)