Introductory survey -- Atomic theory and mechanics -- The quantum postulate and the recent development of atomic theory -- The quantum of action and the description of nature -- The atomic theory and the fundamental principles underlying the description of nature.

These articles and speeches by the Nobel Prize-winning physicist date from 1934 to 1958. Rather than expositions on quantum physics, the papers are philosophical in nature, exploring the relevance of atomic physics to many areas of human endeavor. Includes an essay in which Bohr and Einstein discuss quantum and_wave equation theories. 1961 edition.

"Atom," "byte" and "gene" are metonymies for techno-scientific developments of the 20th century: nuclear power, computing and genetic engineering. Resistance continues to challenge these developments in public opinion. This book traces historical debates over atoms, bytes and genes which raised controversy with consequences, and argues that public opinion is a factor of the development of modern techno-science. The level and scope of public controversy is an index of resistance, examined here with a "pain analogy" which shows that just as (...) pain impacts movement, resistance impacts techno-scientific mobilization: it signals that something is wrong, and this requires attention, elaboration and a response to the challenge. This analysis shows how different fields of enquiry deal with the resistance of social-psychological mentalities in the face of industrial, scientific and political activities inspired by projected futures. (shrink)

Although continued investments in nanotechnology are made, atomically precise manufacturing (APM) to date is still regarded as speculative technology. APM, also known as molecular manufacturing, is a token example of a converging technology, has great potential to impact and be affected by other emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and ICT. The development of APM thus can have drastic global impacts depending on how it is designed and used. This paper argues that the ethical issues that arise from APM (...) - as both a standalone technology or as a converging one - affects the roles of stakeholders in such a way as to warrant an alternate means furthering responsible innovation in APM research. This paper introduces a value-based design methodology called Value Sensitive Design (VSD) that may serve as a suitable framework to adequately cater to the values of stakeholders. Ultimately, it is concluded that VSD is a strong candidate framework for addressing the moral concerns of stakeholders during the preliminary stages of technological development. (shrink)

This paper argues that the field of chemistry underwent a significant change of theory in the early twentieth century, when atomic number replaced atomic weight as the principle for ordering and identifying the chemical elements. It is a classic case of a Kuhnian revolution. In the process of addressing anomalies, chemists who were trained to see elements as defined by their atomic weight discovered that their theoretical assumptions were impediments to understanding the chemical world. The only way to normalize the (...) anomalies was to introduce new concepts, and a new conceptual understanding of what it is to be an element. In the process of making these changes, a new scientific lexicon emerged, one that took atomic number to be the defining feature of a chemical element. (shrink)

Philosophers routinely invoke self‐control in their theorizing, but major questions remain about what exactly self‐control is. I propose a componential account in which an exercise of self‐control is built out of something more fundamental: basic intrapsychic actions called cognitive control actions. Cognitive control regulates simple, brief states called response pulses that operate across diverse psychological systems (think of one's attention being grabbed by a salient object or one's mind being pulled to think about a certain topic). Self‐control ostensibly seems quite (...) different because it regulates complex, temporally extended states such as emotions and cravings. But critically, these complex states also exhibit important componential structure: They rely on response pulses as a key means by which they bring about action. The overall picture is that self‐control consists of skilled sequences of cognitive control directed against extended streams of response pulses that arise from states such as emotions and cravings, thus preventing these states from being effective in action. The account clarifies the “atoms” of self‐control—the elemental units that get combined in complex ways to produce different kinds of self‐control actions. Surprisingly, the account, which is derived from research in cognitive science, aligns nicely with the commonsense conception of self‐control. (shrink)

We provide a detailed history of the concepts of atomic number and isotopy before the discovery of protons and neutrons that draws attention to the role of evolving interplays of multiple aims and criteria in chemical and physical research. Focusing on research by Frederick Soddy and Ernest Rutherford, we show that, in the context of differentiating disciplinary projects, the adoption of a complex and shifting concept of elemental identity and the ordering role of the periodic table led to a relatively (...) coherent notion of atomic number. Subsequent attention to valency, still neglected in the secondary literature, and to nuclear charge led to a decoupling of the concepts of elemental identity and weight and allowed for a coherent concept of isotopy. This concept received motivation from empirical investigations on the decomposition series of radioelements and their unstable chemical identity. A new model of chemical order was the result of an ongoing collaboration between chemical and physical research projects with evolving aims and standards. After key concepts were considered resolved and their territories were clarified, chemistry and physics resumed autonomous projects, yet remained bound by newly accepted explanatory relations. It is an episode of scientific collaboration and partial integration without simple, wholesale gestalt switches or chemical revolutions. (shrink)

The quantum theory of atoms in molecules (QTAIM) uses physics to define an atom and its contribution to observable properties in a given system. It does so using the electron density and its flow in a magnetic field, the current density. These are the two fields that Schrödinger said should be used to explain and understand the properties of matter. It is the purpose of this paper to show how QTAIM bridges the conceptual gulf that separates the observations of (...) chemistry from the realm of physics and do so in a manner that is both rigorous and conceptually simple. Since QTAIM employs real measurable fields, it enables one to present the findings of complex quantum mechanical calculations in a pictorial manner that isolates the essential physics. The time has arrived for a sea change in our attempts to predict and classify the observations of chemistry, time to replace the use of simplified and arbitrary models with the full predictive power of physics, as applied to an atom in a molecule. (shrink)

The present book takes the discovery that quantum-like behaviour is not solely reserved to atomic particles one step further. If electrons are modelled as vibrating droplets instead of the usually assumed point objects, and if the classical laws of nature are applied, then exactly the same behaviour as in quantum theory is found, quantitatively correct! The world of atoms is strange and quantum mechanics, the theory of this world, is almost magic. Or is it? Tiny droplets of oil bouncing round (...) on a fluid surface can also mimic the world of quantum mechanics. For the layman - for whom the main part of this book is written - this is good news. If the everyday laws of nature can conspire to show up quantum-like phenomena, there is hope to form mental pictures how the atomic world works. The book is almost formula-free, and explains everything by using many sketches and diagrams. The mathematical derivations underlying the main text are kept separate in a -peer reviewed - appendix. The author, a retired professor of Flight Mechanics and Propulsion at the Delft University of Technology, chose to publish his findings in this mixed popular and scientific form, because he found that interested laymen more often than professional physicists feel the need to form visualisations of quantum phenomena. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss some consequences and manifestations of a mereology of structured wholes in chemistry, with particular reference to the concept of atoms in molecules.

Research into learners' ideas aboutscience suggests that school and collegestudents often hold alternative conceptionsabout `the atom'. This paper discusses whylearners acquire ideas about atoms which areincompatible with the modern scientificunderstanding. It is suggested that learners'alternative ideas derive – at least in part –from the way ideas about atoms are presented inthe school and college curriculum. Inparticular, it is argued that the atomicconcept met in science education is anincoherent hybrid of historical models, andthat this explains why learners commonlyattribute to atoms (...) properties (such as beingthe constituent particles of all substances, orof being indivisible and conserved inreactions) that more correctly belong to otherentities (such as molecules or sub-atomicparticles). Bachelard suggested that archaicscientific ideas act as `epistemologicalobstacles', and here it is argued thatanachronistic notions of the atom survive inthe chemistry curriculum. These conceptualfossils encourage learners to develop an`atomic ontology' (granting atoms `ontologicalpriority' in the molecular model of matter); tomake the `assumption of initial atomicity' whenconsidering chemical reactions; and to developan explanatory framework to rationalisechemical reactions which is based on thedesirability of full electron shells. Theseideas then act as impediments to thedevelopment of a modern chemical perspective onthe structure of matter, and an appreciation ofthe nature of chemical changes at the molecularlevel. (shrink)

This paper suggests that the cases made for atoms and the aether in nineteenth-century physical science were analogous, with the implication that the case for the atom was less than compelling, since there is no aether. It is argued that atoms did not play a productive role in nineteenth-century chemistry any more than the aether did in physics. Atoms and molecules did eventually find an indispensable home in chemistry but by the time that they did so they were different (...) kinds of entities to those figuring in the speculations of those natural philosophers who were atomists. Advances in nineteenth-century chemistry were a precondition for rather than the result of the productive introduction of atoms into chemistry. (shrink)

In this paper I shall explore a novel alternative to these familiar views. In his recent book Sub ects of Ex erience, E. J. Lowe argues, as many others have done before, that you and I are not animals. It follows from this, he says, that we must be simple substances without parts. That may sound like Cartesian dualism. But Lowe is no Cartesian. He argues from premises that many present-day materialists accept. And he claims that our being mereologically simple (...) is consistent with our having such paradigmatically physical properties as being six feet tall and weighing 160 pounds. You and I, he claims, are mereological atoms shaped like human beings. (shrink)

In this paper I address two important objections to the theory called ‘ Composition as Identity’ : the ‘wall-bricks-and-atoms problem’, and the claim that CAI entails mereological nihilism. I aim to argue that the best version of CAI capable of addressing both problems is the theory I will call ‘Atomic Composition as Identity’ which consists in taking the plural quantifier to range only over proper pluralities of mereological atoms and every non-atomic entity to be identical to the plurality of atoms (...) it fuses. I will proceed in three main steps. First, I will defend Sider’s Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 211–221, 2014) idea of weakening the comprehension principle for pluralities and I will show that :219–235, 2016a) it can ward off both the WaBrA problem and the threat of mereological nihilism. Second, I will argue that CAI-theorists should uphold an ‘atomic comprehension principle’ which, jointly with CAI, entails that there are only proper pluralities of mereological atoms. Finally, I will present a novel reading of the ‘one of’ relation that not only avoids the problems presented by Yi Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 169–191, 2014) and Calosi :429–443, 2016b, Am Philos Q 55:281–292, 2018) but can also help ACAI-theorists to make sense of the idea that a composite entity is both one and many. (shrink)

Event concepts are unstructured atomic concepts that apply to event types. A paradigm example of such an event type would be that of diaper changing, and so a putative example of an atomic event concept would be DADDY'S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER.1 I will defend two claims about such concepts. First, the conceptual claim that it is in principle possible to possess a concept such as DADDY'S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER without possessing the concept DIAPER. Second, the empirical claim that we actually possess such concepts and that they (...) play an important role in our cognitive lives. The argument for the empirical claim has the form of an inference to the best explanation and is aimed at those who are already willing to attribute concepts and beliefs to infants and nonhuman animals. Many animals and prelinguistic infants seem capable of re-identifying event-types in the world, and they seem to store information about things happening at particular times and places. My account offers a plausible model of how such organisms are able to do this without attributing linguistically structured mental states to them. And although language allows adults to form linguistically structured mental representations of the world, there is no good reason to think that such structured representations necessarily replace the unstructured ones. There is also no good reason for a philosopher who is willing to explain the behavior of an organism by appealing to atomic concepts of individuals or kinds to not use a similar form of explanation when explaining the organism's capacity to recognize events. -/- We can form empirical concepts of individuals, kinds, properties, event-types, and states of affairs, among other things, and I assume that such concepts function like what François Recanati calls ‘mental files’ or what Ruth Millikan calls ‘substance concepts’ (Recanati 2012; Millikan 1999, 2000, 2017). To possess such a concept one must have a reliable capacity to re-identify the object in question, but this capacity of re-identification does not fix the reference of the concept. Such concepts allow us to collect and utilize useful information about things that we re-encounter in our environment. We can distinguish between a perception-action system and a perception-belief system, and I will argue that empirical concepts, including atomic event concepts, can play a role in both systems. The perception-action system involves the application of concepts in the service of (often skilled) action. We can think of the concept as a mental file containing motor-plans that can be activated once the individual recognizes that they are in a certain situation. In this way, recognizing something (whether an object or an event) as a token of a type, plays a role in guiding immediate action. The perception-belief system, in contrast, allows for the formation of beliefs that can play a role in deliberation and planning and in the formation of expectations. I distinguish between two particular types of belief which I call where-beliefs and when-beliefs, and I argue that we can model the formation of such perceptual beliefs in nonlinguistic animals and human infants in terms of the formation of a link between an empirical concept and a position on a cognitive map. According to the account offered, seemingly complex beliefs, such as a baby's belief that Daddy changed her diaper in the kitchen earlier, will not be linguistically structured. If we think that prelinguistic infants possess such concepts and are able to form such beliefs, it is likely that adults do too. The ability to form such beliefs does not require the capacity for public language, and we can model them in nonlinguistic terms; thus, we have no good reason to think of such beliefs as propositional attitudes. Of course, we can use sentences to refer to such beliefs, and thus it is possible to think of such beliefs as somehow relations to propositions. But it is not clear to me what is gained by this as we have a perfectly good way to think about the structure of such beliefs that does not involve any appeal to language. (shrink)

For any finite n 3 there are two atomic n-dimensional cylindric algebras with the same atom structure, with one representable, the other, not.Hence, the complex algebra of the atom structure of a representable atomic cylindric algebra is not always representable, so that the class RCAn of representable n-dimensional cylindric algebras is not closed under completions. Further, it follows by an argument of Venema that RCAn is not axiomatisable by Sahlqvist equations, and hence nor by equations where negation can (...) only occur in constant terms.Similar results hold for relation algebras. (shrink)

It has been known for six years that the restriction of Girard's polymorphic system $\text{\bfseries\upshape F}$ to atomic universal instantiations interprets the full fragment of the intuitionistic propositional calculus. We firstly observe that Tait's method of “convertibility” applies quite naturally to the proof of strong normalization of the restricted Girard system. We then show that each $\beta$-reduction step of the full intuitionistic propositional calculus translates into one or more $\beta\eta$-reduction steps in the restricted Girard system. As a consequence, we obtain (...) a novel and perspicuous proof of the strong normalization property for the full intuitionistic propositional calculus. It is noticed that this novel proof bestows a crucial role to $\eta$-conversions. (shrink)

It is customary practice to define ‘x is composed of the ys’ as ‘x is a sum of the ys and the ys are pairwise disjoint ’. This predicate has played a central role in the debate on the special composition question and on related metaphysical issues concerning the mereological structure of objects. In this note we show that the customary characterization is nonetheless inadequate. We do so by constructing a mereological model where everything qualifies as composed of atoms even (...) though some elements in the domain are gunky, i.e., can be divided indefinitely into smaller and smaller proper parts. (shrink)

: This paper examines the debate in the late 19th and early 20th centuries over the acceptability of atomic and molecular physics. It focuses on three prominent figures: Maxwell, who defended atomic physics, Ostwald, who initially rejected it but changed his mind as a result of experiments by Thomson and Perrin, and Duhem, who never accepted it. Each scientist defended the position he did in the light of strongly held methodological views concerning empirical evidence. The paper critically evaluates each of (...) these methodological positions. (shrink)

We give an account of some relationships between the principles of Constant and Atom Exchangeability and various generalizations of the Principle of Instantial Relevance within the framework of Inductive Logic. In particular we demonstrate some surprising and somewhat counterintuitive dependencies of these relationships on ostensibly unimportant parameters, such as the number of predicates in the overlying language.

The role of measure theoretic atomicity in common cause closedness of general probability theories with non-distributive event structures is raised and investigated. It is shown that if a general probability space is non-atomic then it is common cause closed. Conditions are found that entail that a general probability space containing two atoms is not common cause closed but it is common cause closed if it contains only one atom. The results are discussed from the perspective of the Common Cause (...) Principle. (shrink)

The intention of Atomic Order is to encourage and contribute to the dialogue between philosophers and scientists by discussing a concrete example of scientific discovery according to a method acceptable and understandable to both sides. This discussion takes simultaneously into account the scientific and philosophical methodologies and mentalities. By regarding "pure" science or "pure" philosophy as limiting cases, it becomes evident that basic questions are best posed and answered by emphasiz ing the deeply embedded complementary relationship between the two. The (...) example chosen is atomic physics, and a systematic method is developed to illuminate the philosophical structure of this science--and science generally--from within.The book consists of two parts. The first part is devoted to the problem of atomic order as discovered and verified by physics, from the speculations of Dalton to the consequences of modern quantum mechanics. These chapters will afford a telescopic, historical review to the scientific reader and a reliable, understandable account of the physical discoveries and theories to the nonscientist. The second part analyzes the presuppositions, guiding principles, and implications that made possible the development of atomic physics and that impart a humanistic meaning to it. In separate chapters are discussed the epistemological structure of atomic physics, the new conception of matter implicit in the quantum theory, and the ontological implications of atomic order. It is seen that, in this area, science and philosophy are inextricably interpenetrated. A philosophic problematic is immanent in creative atomic science, as is evidenced by the numerous reflections and speculations of scientists that are quoted in the book. Conversely, an interest in scientific research is indispensable for a modern philosopher, and the philosopher may well be surprised and encouraged on recognizing the role already being played by philosophy in the supposedly pragmatic world of science.Dr. Cantore brings an ecumenical cast Lof mind to the healing of the bjcultural split between the humanists and the scientists. The recipient of a doctorate in physics and another in philosophy, he has drawn from both fields in a book dedicated to "making the educated public more aware of the need and method for a new synthesis between the two cultures.". (shrink)

In the future, magic, prophecy, and faith, as well as the usual thought patterns of classical philosophy, but also revelations, will no longer serve to convey to people the meaning of existence. The book shows how they are superseded by the modern physical theory of matter. This has far-reaching implications since there is no possibility for the existence of a (creating) God and the cosmos has to be regarded as a "split zero". In addition the book presents an outline for (...) a cosmic ethic, which calls for mutual respect and mutual assistance between all people. (shrink)

It is shown that the Kapitza-Dirac effect with atoms, which has been considered to be evidence for their wavelike character, can be interpreted as a scattering of pointlike objects by the periodic laser field.

Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts, i.e., parts without proper parts. Typically, this thesis is characterized by an axiom stating that everything has atomic parts. The present paper argues that the success of this standard characterization depends on how the notions of sum and composition are defined. In particular, we put forward a novel definition of mereological sum that: (i) is not equivalent to existing definitions in the literature, if no strong decomposition principle (...) is assumed; (ii) can be used to argue that the standard characterization of atomism fails, because having atomic parts is not sufficient to be a sum of atoms; and (iii) provides a purely mereological distinction between structured and unstructured wholes, contributing to the ongoing debate on this crucial topic. (shrink)

although mostly known to specialists nowadays, Kenelm Digby was a remarkable figure on the intellectual scene of the early seventeenth century. He has been described as “one of the most influential natural philosophers” of his time,1 and corresponded with many of the great scholars of his days, including Descartes, and the French pioneer of atomism, Pierre Gassendi. In the later years of his life, Digby, alongside men like Robert Boyle, became one of the founding members of the Royal Society.2Digby authored (...) one major work of philosophy: the Two Treatises of 1644. This work consisted of a long First Treatise on bodies, and a shorter, Second Treatise on the human soul. In the First Treatise, Digby argued... (shrink)

There are four main theories concerning the ultimate constitution of matter: atomism version 1, atomism version 2, the theory of gunk, and the theory of extended simples. These four theories are usually seen as diametrically opposed. Here I take a stab at ecumenism, and argue that atomism version 1 and the theory of extended simples can be reconciled and rendered compatible by reference to the reality of dispositions.

After his father passed away, James Nolan's mother gave him a box of materials that his dad had kept private. To Nolan's complete surprise, the contents revealed the role his grandfather had played as a doctor in the Manhattan Project. Dr. Nolan, it turned out, had been a significant figure. A talented radiologist, he cared for the scientists on the Project, helped organize the safety and evacuation plans for the Trinity Test at Alamogordo, escorted the "Little Boy" bomb from Los (...) Alamos to Japan, and was one of the first Americans to enter the irradiated ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The documents set Nolan on a hunt for more information about his grandfather and more generally about the conflicted role that medical personnel played in the early years of atomic testing. The result is a compelling history of the dawn of the atomic age as seen through the eyes of men and women torn between their duty and desire to win the war and their oath to protect life. Nolan follows his grandfather and medical colleagues as they seek to maximize safety while serving leaders determined to minimize delays, and as they consider the ethics of ending the deadliest of all wars with the most lethal of all weapons. The result, Nolan shows, was a very human pattern of caution, co-optation, and complicity. A vital and vivid account of a largely unknown chapter in atomic history, Delivering Little Boy is also a profound meditation on the professional and moral dilemmas that ordinary people face in extraordinary times. (shrink)

Our aim was to try to generalize some theorems about the saturation of ultrapowers to reduced powers. Naturally, we deal with saturation for types consisting of atomic formulas. We succeed to generalize “the theory of dense linear order (or T with the strict order property) is maximal and so is any which is SOP3”, (where Δ consists of atomic or conjunction of atomic formulas). However, the theorem on “it is enough to deal with symmetric pre‐cuts” (so the theorem) cannot be (...) generalized in this case. Similarly the uniqueness of the dual cofinality fails in this context. (shrink)

The concepts of atoms and bonds in molecules which appeared in chemistry during the nineteenth century are unavoidable to explain the structure and the reactivity of the matter at a chemical level of understanding. Although they can be criticized from a strict reductionist point of view, because neither atoms nor bonds are observable in the sense of quantum mechanics, the topological and statistical interpretative approaches of quantum chemistry (quantum theory of atoms in molecules, electron localization function and maximum probability domain) (...) provide consistent definitions which accommodate chemistry and quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The story of a triumphant idea from Democritus to the Higgs boson, one of the most successful scientific hypotheses ever devised is chronicled in this history of atomism. Stenger makes the case that in the final analysis atoms and the void are all that exists.

There exists a countable structure of Scott rank where and where the -theory of is not ω-categorical. The Scott rank of a model is the least ordinal β where the model is prime in its -theory. Most well-known models with unbounded atoms below also realize a non-principal -type; such a model that preserves the Σ1-admissibility of will have Scott rank . Makkai [M. Makkai, An example concerning Scott heights, J. Symbolic Logic 46 301–318. [4]] produces a hyperarithmetical model of Scott (...) rank whose -theory is ω-categorical. A computable variant of Makkai’s example is produced in [W. Calvert, S.S. Goncharov, J.F. Knight, J. Millar, Categoricity of computable infinitary theories, Arch. Math. Logic . [1]; J. Knight, J. Millar, Computable structures of rank J. Math. Logic . [2]]. (shrink)

In this paper we show that the one-generated free three dimensional polyadic and substitutional algebras Fr1PA3 and Fr1SCA3 are not atomic. What is more, their corresponding logics have the Gödel’s incompleteness property. This provides a partial solution to a longstanding open problem of Németi and Maddux going back to Alfred Tarski via the book [12].