This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

If citizens are to make enlightened collective decisions, they need to rely on true factual beliefs, but misinformation impairs their ability to do so. Although some cases of misinformation are deliberate and amount to propaganda, cases of inadvertent misinformation are just as problematic in affecting the beliefs and behavior of democratic citizens. A review of empirical evidence suggests that this is a serious problem that cannot entirely be corrected by means of deliberation.

We consider a two-patch epidemiological system where individuals can move from one patch to another, and local interactions between the individuals within a patch are governed by the classical SIRS model. When the time-scale associated with migration is much smaller than the time-scale associated with infection, aggregation methods can be used to simplify the initial complete model formulated as a system of ordinary differential equations. Analysis of the aggregated model then shows that the two-patch basic reproduction rate is smaller than (...) the 1 patch one. We extend this result to a linear chain of P patches . These results are illustrated by some examples for which numerical integration of the system of ordinary differential equations is performed. Simulations of an individual based model implemented with a multi-agent system are also carried out. (shrink)

Kant’s discussion of the highest good is subject to continuous disagreement between the proponents of two interpretations of this concept. According to the secular interpretation, Kant conceived of the highest good as a political ideal which can be realized through human agency alone, albeit only from the Critique of the Power of Judgement onwards. By way of contrast, proponents of the theological interpretation find Kant’s treatment of the highest good in his later works to be wholly coherent with the discussions (...) of this concept found in the second Critique. In their view, however, Kant never conceived of the highest good as a political ideal, and some go as far as to argue that it is the work of God alone. In this article, I defend a theologico-political account of the highest good that avoids the pitfalls of both readings. (shrink)

A biological function is supposed to be performed adequately, and hence may fail to do so: this is dysfunction. This raises two questions. One is how to make explicit the way in which function can be discriminated from dysfunction without confusing dysfunction with non-function. The second question is how what is “right” and “wrong” can be legitimated by natural regulatory norms. A function can be viewed as a quality to which at least one variable with a definite set of values (...) is associated. Accordingly, function and dysfunction are the same quality of the same trait, but differ in the values associated to this variable. Dysfunction occurs when the associated set of values does not match this normal state. Biological systems have the epistemic singularity that their existence is the consequence of two distinct causal regimes, the so-called “proximate” and “ultimate” causes, whose convergence defines a system’s prescriptive normality. Each cause imposes restrictive rules that limit the possible ways these systems can putatively exist. When a system is insensitive to ultimate cause, it is determined by proximate causation alone, and hence escapes its own prescriptive norms. In conclusion: The normality of a biological system is defined by the convergence of proximate and ultimate causes. A function is a variable-associated quality whose values are defined relative to the norms of the system. Dysfunction occurs when the set of values of the same variable does not match the normality of the system, which can occur when the system is insensitive to ultimate causation. (shrink)

The article explores the inter-relations between episteme, ideology and knowledge in biblical translations and the underlying historical and intellectual questions that emerge. Through four narratives, drawn across differing timelines, this article maps the implications of theological and temporal power. Besides, it is also argued for how translations are sites of transgressions that eventually shape knowledge and impact epistemology. In conclusion, the article argues that Jerome and Wycliffe represent the role of public intellectuals and the dissident lessons of history.

Theology and the Cartesian Doctrine of Freedom, now for the first time available in English,was Étienne Gilson's doctoral thesis and part of a larger project to show the medieval roots of Descartes at a time when the very existence of medieval philosophy was often ignored. Young Descartes was sent to La Flèche, one of the Jesuits schools that offered a complete philosophical program, and Descartes would have had the same philosophical training as a Jesuit. There is some controversy about the (...) exact dates of Descartes's stay at La Flèche and consequently about his philosophy instructor. By Gilson's calculations François Véron taught Descartes for three years. Véron eventually left the Jesuits to be free to engage in extraordinarily aggressive anti-Calvinist polemics. If anything, Véron's overbearing manner may have contributed to Descartes antipathy toward Scholastic philosophy. (Whatever Descartes's objections to its philosophy curriculum, later in life he recommended la Flèche as the best school in France.) Descartes,s great intellectual mission in life was not his mathematics but his physics, which was understood as a part of philosophy. We see him navigate the shoals of heated theological and religious strife in his attempt to articulate the metaphysical foundations(and in particular a philosophical vision of God) for his physics or theory of nature. As a layman, he always pleaded ignorance in technically theological matters. He presented himself as a loyal Catholic, quite sincerely in the portrait Gilson paints. (shrink)

Étienne Kola | : L’Afrique est riche de son patrimoine culturel. Cependant peut-elle se réjouir de l’apport de ses filles et de ses fils sur le double plan de la démocratie et de la rationalité moderne? Le relatif retard de ce continent dans certains domaines semble s’enraciner dans des écueils d’ordre éducatif. La plupart des systèmes éducatifs africains sont en effet perçus comme des structures inadaptées aux réalités socioculturelles des peuples. Le paradigme de la philosophie pour enfants consacre la culture (...) du débat sensé, de l’esprit critique, des valeurs éthiques et démocratiques à travers l’institution des communautés de recherche philosophique. Un usage judicieux du substrat culturel africain comme support heuristique dans les communautés de recherche peut s’avérer bénéfique pour l’éveil de la jeunesse. Cette expérience de la philosophie pour enfants vaut la peine d’être menée en Afrique. | : Africa enjoys a rich cultural heritage. Can it, however, rejoice over the contribution of its daughters and sons to both democracy and modern rationality? The relative delay of that continent in some domains seems to be rooted in failures in education. Most African systems of education are indeed perceived as unadapted to the sociocultural realities of the people. The paradigm of philosophy for children gives precedence to the culture of sensible debate, critical thinking, ethical and democratic values through the institution of philosophical research communities. Judicious recourse to the African cultural substrate as a heuristic support in the research communities may prove beneficial for the awakening of youth. This experience of philosophy for children is worth carrying out in Africa. (shrink)

NGOs have taken a dominant position in setting the agendas of Corporate Responsibility and Socially Responsible Investment matters, thereby skewing the efforts of corporates to limit negative externalities towards their own agendas. As the latter remain to a certain extent unpredictable, corporates must deal with an information asymmetry. This situation can be explained by the historically defensive nature of Corporate Responsibility codes established by companies under pressure of the NGOs. In this paper, I contend that only a new approach to (...) Corporate Responsibility could reverse this asymmetry: one where the social responsibility matters are articulated in a political debate between all stakeholders of a company and where conflicting interests are addressed in a deliberative process. To this end, the corporate world and the NGOs need to understand the need for a larger debate that includes all relevant stakeholders defined as the Public in the sense of Dewey. Latour and the Actor-Network theory provide us with a workable framework to structure such a dialogue, where participants have the authority and legitimacy to speak for the Public. (shrink)

In chemistry one observes different relationships [rapports] between different bodies, which act such that they unite easily with one another. These relationships have their degrees and their laws. One observes their different insofar as, among several materials are confounded and that have some disposition to unite together, one perceives that one of these substances always unites constantly with a certain other [substance] preferably to all others.

Stimulation of airway myocytes by contractile agents such as acetylcholine (ACh) activates a Ca2+-activated Cl– current (IClCa) which may play a key role in calcium homeostasis of airway myocytes and hence in airway reactivity. The aim of the present study was to model IClCa in airway smooth muscle cells using a computerised model previously designed for simulation of cardiac myocyte functioning. Modelling was based on a simple resistor-battery permeation model combined with multiple binding site activation by calcium. In order to (...) validate the model, a combination of equations, used to mimic [Ca2+]i response to ACh stimulation, were incorporated into the model. The results indicate that the model developed in this article accounts for experimental recordings and electrophysiological characteristics of this current in airway smooth muscle cells, with parameter values consistent with those calculated from experimental data. Such a model may thus be used to predict IClCa functioning, though additional experimental data from airway myocytes would be useful to more accurately determine some parameter values of the model. (shrink)

To what extent could Max Weber's ethic of responsibility serve as a model for us today? An adequate answer to this question could only be given on the basis of a satisfactory interpretation and thorough assessment of his ethic of responsibility. In this monograph Etienne de Villiers sets himself the task of doing just that. He establishes that, in spite of serious shortcomings, Weber's ethic points to the contemporary need for an ethic of responsibility as a second-level normative ethical (...) approach that would address the undermining effect of modernisation on ethical living. Such a contemporary ethic of responsibility would provide guidelines on how ethical living could be responsibly enhanced in our time. The author also presents a brief proposal on how a contemporary ethic of responsibility might be designed. (shrink)

Prokaryotes growing at high temperatures have a high proportion of charged residues in their proteins to stabilize their 3D structure. By mining 175 disparate bacterial and archaeal proteomes we found that, against the general trend for charged residues, the frequency of aspartic acid residues decreases strongly as natural growth temperature increases. In search of the explanation, we hypothesized that the reason for such unusual correlation is the deleterious consequences of spontaneous chemical transformations of aspartate at high temperatures. Our subsequent statistical (...) analysis supported this hypothesis. This finding reveals that organisms have likely adapted to high temperatures by minimizing the harmful consequences of spontaneous chemical transformations. (shrink)

Condillac's Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, first published in French in 1746 and offered here in a new translation, represented in its time a radical departure from the dominant conception of the mind as a reservoir of innately given ideas. Descartes had held that knowledge must rest on ideas; Condillac turned this upside down by arguing that speech and words are the origin of mental life and knowledge. He argued, further, that language has its origin in human interaction (...) and in our natural capacity to react spontaneously and instinctively to the expression of emotions and states of mind in others. The importance of this pointedly anti-Cartesian view, and its relevance to both aesthetics and epistemology, were quickly understood, and Condillac's work influenced many later philosophers including Herder, Rousseau, and Adam Smith. His conception also anticipated Wittgenstein's view of language, its usage, and its relation to mind and thought. (shrink)

"As one of Louis Althusser's most brilliant students in the 1960s, Etienne Balibar contributed to the theoretical collective masterpiece of Reading Capital. Since then he has established himself amongst the most subtle philosophical and political thinkers in France. In Politics and the Other Scene Balibar deepens and extends the work he first developed with Immanuel Wallerstein in Race, Nation, Class. Exploring the theme of universalism and difference, he addresses questions such as "European racism, " the notion of the border, (...) whether a European citizenship is possible or desirable, violence and politics, identity and emancipation"--provided by publisher. (shrink)

In this contribution, Balibar follows his seminal 1993 work applying the notion of the transindividual to Spinoza’s work, to produce a broader history of thinking the transindividual that brings both Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud into relation with Spinoza, devoting a section to each of these thinkers. Balibar positions the notion of the transindividual, here, as a solution to the opposing ontological errors of philosophical individualism that fails to attend to the social constitution of the individual, and the social organicism (...) that reduces the individual to the effect of larger forces. For Balibar, following Gilbert Simondon, the individual is to be understood as always already extending beyond themselves. (shrink)

One central objection to philosophical defences of liberal neutrality is that many neutrally justified laws and policies are nonetheless discriminatory as they unilaterally impose costs or confer unearned privileges on the bearers of a particular conception of the good. Call this the false neutrality objection. While liberal neutralists seldom consider this objection to be a serious allegation, and often claim that it rests on a misunderstanding, I argue that it is a serious challenge for proponents of justificatory neutrality. Indeed, a (...) careful examination of recent French and Canadian laws which impede the members of cultural minorities from freely practising their religion reveals that the state can hide its discriminatory aims by cloaking the policies it enacts in neutral language. In order to avoid the problem of false neutrality, I contend, liberal neutralists should defend a combination of neutrality of justification and neutrality of aim and operationalize neutrality of aim through a practical test that has been a defining feature of American jurisprudence on religious freedom in the last thirty years: the general applicability requirement. (shrink)

Etienne Balibar, one of the foremost living French philosophers, builds on his landmark work 'Spinoza and Politics' with this exploration of Spinoza's ontology. Balibar situates Spinoza in relation to the major figures of Marx and Freud as a precursor to the more recent French thinker Gilbert Simondon's concept of the transindividual. Presenting a crucial development in his thought, Balibar takes the concept of transindividuality beyond Spinoza to show it at work at both the individual and the collective level.

La mesure d'audience joue un rôle très important dans les décisions prises dans une chaîne comme TF1, qui ne vit que de la publicité. Nous faisons une télévision de la demande et le résultat d'audience exprime une forme de satisfaction du public. Toutefois, c'est un chiffre relatif, qui mesure l'état de la concurrence à un moment donné; un chiffre abstrait, qui moyenne des départs et des arrivées; et un chiffre rétrospectif, qui montre ce qui s'est passé mais ne dit pas (...) ce qu'il faudrait faire pour que cela marche. C'est pourquoi l'audience est d'une faible utilité pour concevoir les programmes. Il n'y a pas de renouvellement de la grille sans prise de risque. Les études peuvent nous aider à saisir des tendances, à confirmer des hypothèses. Mais l'intuition et l'expérience sont essentielles pour prendre la décision d'arrêter une émission ou d'essayer de l'améliorer, et pour créer de nouveaux programmes.Audience research plays a very important role in the decision making process at a channel like TFl whose only source revenue is advertising. The television we construct is based on demand and audience ratings express the levels of a kind of a public satisfaction. However, the ratings are relative since they also measure the state of the competition at any given time; they are abstract because they give an average of people switching on or off; and they are retrospective figures because they show what happened but give no suggestions as to how to make things work better. Therefore, audience ratings are of little use when it comes to new programme ideas. It is impossible to renew the schedule without taking risks. Surveys can help us to apprehend trends and corroborate existing hypotheses. But intuition and experience are essential factors in the decision making process when it comes to stopping a programme, attempting to improve a programme or coming up with new programme ideas. (shrink)

Two essays, one by Althusser, the other by Balibar which were presented as papers at a seminar on Marx's "Capital" at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1965, and included al.

Étienne Pouliot | Résumé : On convient aisément que tout témoignage peut renvoyer à une expérience, passée ou du moins présupposée, ou encore qu’il peut véhiculer en quelque sorte un message. Il ne se réduit pas pour autant à n’être qu’une fenêtre sur autre chose, voire sur lui-même. En vérité, parce qu’il est avant tout parole, le témoignage constitue toujours et se constitue précisément en un certain ratage de l’expérience là représentée, du message là livré, du vécu là offert. Un (...) examen de certaines conditions épistémologiques de cet enjeu de la représentation au coeur du témoignage, en écho à la philosophie de Paul Ricoeur mais pour en signaler le point aveugle, permet d’élucider que cet enjeu y est second — ce qui ne signifie en rien : secondaire — par rapport à un enjeu herméneutique bien plus originaire, bien plus radical et fondamental que la représentation elle-même : celui de la parole. Au travers du témoignage, une parole atteste autant qu’elle efface. |: We all agree that witnessing may refer back to experience — to something from the past or at least to something that is presupposed — or that it may be the vehicle for some message. This does not mean that witnessing is merely a window onto something else, or onto itself. Indeed, because it is first and foremost “word”, it always stands as a reminder of its inability to represent what it purports to represent and as a failure to deliver the message it intends to deliver. This examination of some of the epistemological underpinnings of representation — which echoes the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur even as it points to a blind spot in his position — intends to show that the issue of representation comes second in witnessing and that a far more radical and fundamental issue — a hermeneutical one — also comes into play here. Thus witnessing, and more precisely the word that is witnessing, both attests to and obliterates itself. (shrink)

At a time when bioethical issues are at the top of public and political agendas, there is a renewed interest in representations of the embryo in various religious traditions. One of the major traditions that have contributed to Western representations of the embryo is the Jewish tradition. This tradition poses some difficulties that may deter scholars, but also presents some invaluable advantages. These derive from two components, the search for limits and narrativity, both of which are directly connected with the (...) manner in which Jewish tradition was constructed in Antiquity. The article accomplishes three goals: • To introduce some central elements in ancient Rabbinic literature on the subject of the embryo and its representation; • To present this body of literature as clearly as possible, noting some of the difficulties encountered by scholars who engage in its study; • To explain how the literature’s textuality came about, examining the particular sociopolitical circumstances of Judaism at that time, including the reasons for the delay in the production of scientific texts, transmitted as such, as compared to other philosophical or religious traditions. The claim is that these circumstances engendered a tradition peculiarly relevant for the study and teaching of medical ethics today. (shrink)

The ArgumentLittle has been written about religion vis à vis eugenics and, even less on Roman Catholicism and eugenics. A 1930 papal encyclical,Casti connubii, is usually held by historians to have been the official condemnatory view of the Catholic Church on eugenics, and the document is further supposed to have induced the only organized opposition to eugenic legislative efforts in several countries (especially France). In fact, the encyclical was not directly about eugenics but a general statement of the Catholic doctrine (...) on marriage.This article attempts to clarify the issue of a Catholic position on eugenics by re-examining the encyclical itself as well as its contemporaneous reception in Germany and France, where there was a strong Catholic presence.Casti connubiiintroduced a change in the prescribed hierarchy of the aims of marriage when, for the first time, relations between spouses took precedence over procreation. While condemning the means (abortion, sterilization, etc.), the encyclical did not condemn positive eugenics. In the broader context of the history of eugenics, the reception of the encyclical emphasizes the family as the third entity between the individual and society. Eugenics, as a “religious Utopia” of modernity, developed a hegemonic discourse over the family realm. As such it entered into competition with more traditional religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church. (shrink)

The Kyoto Protocol became law in February 2005—eight years after its conception as a framework for reducing emissions and a full four years after the United States abandoned it. But while President George W. Bush embarrassed much of the scientific community by challenging the veracity of the greenhouse effect, and thus the impetus for Kyoto, officials elsewhere expressed far different concerns. _Reading the Kyoto Protocol_ explores their qualms and objections to everything from Kyoto's controversial policies on emissions trading to the (...) question of a "post-Kyoto era." Contributors include internationally known philosophers, researchers, and environmentalists. (shrink)

What place can women have in Plato’s just city? In opposition to the two main antagonistic positions on this topic - some consider Plato a promoter of gender equality as he allows women to have political office, while others put the stress on the fact that Plato keeps them in a subordinate status - this article makes a new claim: these two positions must be held together because of the nature of the rationality at work in Plato’s political philosophy, as (...) a combination of emancipatory theoretical elements, and the taking into account of the constraints of history. (shrink)

The academic debate on institutional slavery in Plato’s has been limited so far to the question of whether or not it is present in his paradigmatic just cities. The answer is clearly affirmative for the city of Magnesia in the Laws, but things are not so clear with respect to the Kallipolis of the Republic: some believe that it contains slaves, while others deny it or at least report that it cannot be assessed with certainty. As legitimate as it may (...) be, this debate remains very limited. My claim is that a close scrutiny of a specific passage from the Laws reveals that slavery is not present in Plato’s political thought as a mere cultural element of economic origin: it rather fulfills the function of what I call an “inner political border” on which the civic space must be built if it is to have a true theoretical and practical autonomy, that the citizens embody and enforce. (shrink)

The paper argues that a specific "concept of the political" can be reconstructed in Arendt by bringing together elements coming from Origins of Totalitarianism, Part II , from The Human Condition and On Revolution , and from On Disobedience . These propositions produce a singular variety of "institutionalism", which involves a "groundless" politics of Human Rights , and also helps clarifying the thesis on the "banality of evil" in Eichmann in Jerusalem: the sovereign tautology "law is law" is the root (...) of voluntary servitude. To say that we have a choice between becoming Eichmanns or taking the risk of civil disobedience is too quick; and to suppose that a state where civil disobedience becomes recognized would be immune of the danger of totalitarian transformation is an illusion, but as an ideal type, these formulations may encapsulate what Arendt's "concept of the political" hints at. (shrink)

This paper concerns periodic solutions of a class of equations that model gene regulatory networks. Unlike the vast majority of previous studies, it is not assumed that all decay rates are identical. To handle this more general situation, we rely on monotonicity properties of these systems. Under an alternative assumption, it is shown that a classical fixed point theorem for monotone, concave operators can be applied to these systems. The required assumption is expressed in geometrical terms as an alignment condition (...) on so-called focal points . As an application, we show the existence and uniqueness of a stable periodic orbit for negative feedback loop systems in dimension 3 or more, and of a unique stable equilibrium point in dimension 2. This extends a theorem of Snoussi, which showed the existence of these orbits only. (shrink)

In this final edition of his classic study of St. Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson presents the sweeping range and organic unity of Thomistic philosophical thought. The philosophical thinking of Aquinas is the result of reason being challenged to relate to many theological conceptions of the Christian tradition. Gilson carefully reviews how Aquinas grapples with the relation itself of faith and reason and continuing through the existence and nature of God and His creation, the world and its creatures, especially human (...) beings with their power of intellect, will, and moral life. He concludes this study by discussing the life of people in society, along with their purpose and final destiny. Gilson demonstrates that Aquinas drew from a wide spectrum of sources in the development of his thought-from the speculations of the ancient Greeks such as Aristotle, to the Arabic and Jewish philosophers of his time, as well as from Christian writers and scripture. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas offers students of philosophy and medieval studies an insightful introduction to the thought of Aquinas and the Scholastic philosophy of the Middles Ages, insights that are still revelant for today. (shrink)

English summary: Condillacs 1746 Essai sur lorigine des connaissance humaines represents a pioneering approach to the philosophy of knowledge. Working through a semiotic method, Condillac is able to radically revisit the theory of ideas developed by predecessors such as Malebranche and Locke. This critical edition allows readers to better understand Condillacs essential contributions to Enlightenment philosophy. French description: L'Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines que Condillac publie en 1746 est un texte surprenant a plusieurs points de vue. Il l'est tout (...) d'abord du fait qu'on ne sait pas exactement dans quelles conditions il a ete compose, et que, faute de manuscrits, il reste impossible a ce jour d'en connaitre la redaction initiale. Dans ses ouvrages ulterieurs, Condillac en a par ailleurs critique plusieurs elements, mais rien ne nous permet de savoir s'il a touche a l'Essai quand il a entrepris de reviser ses ecrits en vue de leur publication dans ses oeuvres completes qu'il n'aura pas eu le temps de mener a bonne fin. Il l'est aussi dans son contenu qui s'efforce d'articuler une philosophie de la connaissance avec ce que nous considererions comme une semiotique generale. Dans cet effort, le genie de Condillac prend appui sur toute la culture de son temps pour ouvrir avec alacrite une voie de recherche dans laquelle il fait oeuvre de pionnier. Ayant en effet arrime l'idee au signe, il entreprend l'inventaire des modalites de fonctionnement de toutes les especes de signes d'institution. Il lui devient alors possible de bousculer de l'interieur la theorie des idees sous les formes qu'elle a prises chez ses predecesseurs, en particulier Malebranche et Locke, et de reconduire sans reste l'idee jusqu'a la sensation. Au cours de ce travail, il met en place non seulement les bases, mais jusqu'au projet, destine a alimenter pour longtemps les discussions, d'une theorie de l'esprit. (shrink)

Summary This paper examines the entomological investigations carried out by the French naturalist Henri-Louis Duhamel du Monceau during a series of insect epidemics that ravaged France in the second half of the eighteenth century.1 This article began as a paper for Pamela H. Smith's ?Knowledge in Transit? graduate seminar. I would like to thank the participants of that seminar for comments and feedback. I would also like to thank Pamela Smith, Carl Wennerlind, Anya Zilberstein, Christopher L. Brown, Charly Coleman, Matthew (...) Jones, Peter Walker and Melissa Morris for their suggestions and comments on this paper. Finally, thanks to Vanessa Copeland for invaluable assistance in the archives in Paris. The author acknowledges support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University. It shows how a particularly fierce invasion of caterpillars in the Angoumois region in the 1760s sparked theoretical debates about the nature of animal generation between academic naturalists, farmers, provincial officials and amateur naturalists. As part of a wider effort to reform agricultural production in France, Duhamel du Monceau sought to eliminate vernacular understandings of insect generation and to reform local pest control techniques. In his attempt to develop a body of pest-control knowledge grounded in the systematic observation of insect generation, however, Duhamel du Monceau relied heavily on the efforts of amateur naturalists. The paper shows how he mobilized a nation-wide network of entomological observers, and collected specimens and observational reports from farmers, improving landlords and local officials throughout France. Some informants did not only act as ?mere? observers, but formulated their own causal claims about insect generation that sometimes contradicted those of their metropolitan counterpart. Finally, it demonstrates that a ?patriotic? discourse that joined agricultural improvement and civic virtue provided a powerful impetus for the formation of collaborative relationships between academic naturalists, state officials and enlightened agricultural improvers. (shrink)

ArgumentIn recent decades, through the work of Jane Goodall and other ethologists, the practice of giving personal names to nonhuman animals who are the subjects of scientific research has become associated with claims about animal personhood and scientific objectivity. While critics argue that such naming practices predispose the researcher toward anthropomorphism, supporters suggest that it sensitizes the researcher to individual differences and social relations. Both critics and supporters agree that naming tends to be associated with the recognition of individual animal (...) rights. The history of the naming of research animals since the late nineteenth century shows, however, that the practice has served a variety of purposes, most of which have raised few ethical or epistemological concerns. Names have been used to identify research animals who play dual roles as pets, workers, or patients, to enhance their market value, and to facilitate their identification in the field. The multifaceted history of naming suggests both that the use of personal names by Goodall and others is less of a radical break with previous practices than it might first appear to be and that the use of personal names to recognize the individuality, sentience, or rights of nonhuman animals faces inherent limits and contradictions. (shrink)

The monumental altar on the esplanade of the Delos theatre belongs to the series of pi-shaped table altars, well represented in the Cyclades since the Archaic period. It had a foundation with a frieze, of which nothing remains, but which is mentioned in an inscription. The inscription makes it possible to identify the altar as that of Dionysus and to date its construction to 179-178 B.C.

The study of being was one of the main preoccupations of Gilson's scholarly and intellectual life. Being and Some Philosophers is at once a testament to the persistence of these concerns and an important landmark in the history of the question of being. The book charts the ways in which being is translated across history, from unity in Plato and substance in Aristotle to essence in Avicenna and the act of existence in Aquinas. It examines the vicissitudes of essence and (...) existence in Suarez and Christian Wolff, in Hegel and Kierkegaard, in order to uncover the metaphysical and existential foundations of modern thought. And yet Being and Some Philosophers remains not so much an historical investigation (although it could only have been written by a scholar steeped in the history of philosophy) but, in the words of its author, "a philosophical book, and a dogmatically philosophical one at that." Its passionate vigour has proven, over many years, at once fresh and provocative. Indeed, the appendix to this revised edition contains critiques of the book by two Thomists as well as Gilson's replies to their objections. (shrink)

**** A reprint of Gilson's estimable book of 1936 (Sheed and Ward) (endorsed by BCL3). These 20 lectures were delivered as Gifford Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

La publication, dans la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle, de la version grecque des Lettres ignatiennes, à partir de deux manuscrits différents, a été l’occasion d’une compétition entre leurs éditeurs respectifs, Valentin Hartung, dit Paceus, converti de la Réforme, et l’imprimeur zurichois André Gesner, figure marquante de l’Église zwinglienne. Elle pose un problème non encore résolu : pourquoi André Gesner laisse-t-il entendre qu’il est l’auteur de l’édition princeps tandis que Paceus l’affirme hautement de son côté ? In the second half (...) of the 16th century the publication of the Greek version of the Letters of Ignatius, on the basis of two different manuscripts, gave rise to a competition between their two respective editors, Valentin Hartung, called Paceus, who had converted from the Reformation to Roman Catholicism, and the Zürich printer André Gesner, who was a remarkable figure of the Church of Zwingli. As yet, the following problem is unresolved : Why does André Gesner give us to understand that he is the author of the first edition, whereas Paceus resolutely claims the same thing for himself ? (shrink)

Perguntaremos aqui "como seria ver como um ser humano". Tal questão é difícil, pois recuando um passo em relação à percepção e considerando que ela pode não ser o que é, essa questão vai de encontro àquilo que é comumente considerado como a "atitude natural". Merleau-Ponty articulou esta relativização da visão humana e seu realismo espontâneo de duas maneiras diferentes. Em primeiro lugar, há o que poderia ser chamado a "via da finitude". Ela consiste em assumir o ponto de vista (...) de parte alguma para a percepção, o ponto de vista de um espírito sem ligações mundanas. Poder-se-ia dizer então, como Merleau-Ponty não pára de dizer, que perceber não é ver de parte alguma, eque sempre percebemos a partir de algum lugar, em um corpo finito, e não do ponto de vista de deus. Nossa origem animal, contudo, oferece uma segunda maneira completamente diferente de frustar o dogmatismo da fé perceptiva. Essa é a via adotada por Merleau-Ponty em A estrutura do comportamento, onde muito naturalmente ele é levado a interrogar o que distingue a percepção animal da percepção humana. Sua resposta é valiosa: ver como um ser humano significa ser capaz de "multiplicidade perspectiva". Apreender tal conceito e encarar a visão humana como plural e como excesso, apenas é possível para quem abandonou o ponto de vista de parte alguma e decidiu filosofar começando pelo animal.Percepção. Origem animal. Ser humano. Atitude natural. Multiplicidade.We will ask here “what is it like to see as a human”. Such a question is difficult, for in taking a step back from perception and in considering that it might not be what it is, this question goes against what is commonly called the “natural attitude”. Merleau-Ponty will have orchestrated this relativization of human seeing and its spontaneous realism in two different ways. First, there is what might be called the “way of finitude.” This consists in taking the point of view from nowhere on perception, the point of view of a mind without worldly attachments. We would then say, as Merleau-Ponty never stopped saying, that perceiving is not seeing from nowhere, and that we always perceive from somewhere, in a finite body, and not from the point of view of god. Our animal origin, however, offers a second, quite different way of frustrating the dogmatism of the perceptual faith. This is the way that Merleau-Ponty adopts in The Structure of Behavior, where he is, in a very natural manner, brought to interrogate that which distinguishes animal perception from human perception. His answer here is valuable: to see as a human is to be capable of “perspectival multiplicity.” To catch sight of such a concept, to see human seeing as plural and excessive, is only possible for someone who has abandoned the point of view of nowhere and who has decided to philosophize starting from the animal.Perception. Animal Origin. Human being. Natural attitude. Perspectival multiplicity. (shrink)

Today, two forces combine to produce a systematic transformation in all that is given. First, the economic force of the global market is propelled by a series of techno-scientific advances that continually reinvent that market. Second, the political force of modern democracies, in spite of their different actualizations, centers individual autonomy as the ultimate norm that would create each individual’s future. The human body, in virtue of its intrinsic plasticity and because it is always the body of a particular individual, (...) lends itself to this process of unlimited transformation in a privileged way. As such, the human body is the promise of enhancement without end. The following questions thus arise: Does the human body possess normative aspects that would bound or enclose its future transformations when considered from the modern frame of the autonomous individual? Could Merleau-Ponty’s notion of le corps propre point us in the direction of an answer? Is there a bodily given that authorizes self-experience, apart from any external or theological frame? Or, is the bodily given only a myth that obscures the human body’s actual capacity for unlimited transformation?Aujourd’hui, deux forces se combinent pour produire une transformation systématique sur tout ce qui est donné. Premièrement, la force économique du marché mondial est mue par une série de progrès techno-scientifiques qui le réinvente continuellement. Deuxièmement, la force politique des démocraties modernes, en dépit de leurs différentes actualisations, centre l’autonomie individuelle en tant que norme ultime qui pourrait créer le futur de chaque individu. Le corps humain, en vertu de sa plasticité intrinsèque et parce qu’il est toujours le corps d’un individu particulier, se prête lui-même à ce processus de transformation illimitée d’une manière privilégiée. Ainsi, le corps humain est la promesse d’une amélioration sans fin. Émergent alors les questions suivantes : le corps humain possède-t-il des aspects normatifs qui lieraient ou enfermeraient ses transformations futures lorsqu’il est considéré à partir du cadre moderne de l’autonomie individuelle? La notion merleau-pontienne de corps propre peut-elle nous donner une réponse? Y a-t-il un corporellement donné qui autorise une expérience de soi, en dehors de tout cadre extérieur ou théologique? Ou bien, le corporellement donné n’est-il qu’un mythe qui obscurcit la capacité actuelle de transformation illimitée du corps humain?Oggi, due forze contribuiscono a produrre una trasformazione sistematica di tutto ciò che è dato. In primo luogo, la forza economica del mercato globale, alimentata da una serie di progressi tecnologici che continuano a reinventare il mercato. In secondo luogo, la forza politica delle moderne democrazie, che, nonostante le loro differenti attualizzazioni, indicano l’autonomia individuale come norma ultima, in grado di garantire il futuro del singolo. Il corpo umano, in virtù della sua plasticità intrinseca e dal momento in cui esso è sempre il corpo di uno specifico individuo, si presta in modo privilegiato a questo processo di continua trasformazione. In quanto tale, il corpo umano è la promessa di un potenziamento illimitato. Il chè suscita le seguenti domande: vi sono degli aspetti normativi che verrebbero a limitare o vincolare le future trasformazioni del corpo umano, considerato nella prospettiva moderna dell’individuo autonomo? La nozione di corpo proprio elaborata da Merleau-Ponty può metterci sulle tracce di una risposta? Esiste un “corpo dato” che autorizzi un’esperienza di sé, a prescindere da ogni orizzonte esterno o teleologico? Oppure il “corpo dato” è puramente un mito che verrebbe a oscurare le illimitate capacità di trasformazione del corpo umano? (shrink)

What is it Like to See as a Human Being ?We will ask here “what is it like to see as a human being?” Such a question is difficult, for taking a step back from perception and considering that it might not be what it is, this question goes against what is commonly called the “natural attitude”. Merleau-Ponty orchestrates this relativization of human seeing and itsspontaneous realism in two different ways. First, there is what might be called the “way of (...) finitude.” This consists in taking the point of view from nowhere on perception, the point of view of a mind without worldly attachments. We would then say, as Merleau-Ponty never stopped saying, that perceiving is not seeing from nowhere, and that we always perceive from somewhere, in a finite body, and not from the point of view of god. Our animal origin, however, offers a second, quite different way of frustrating the dogmatism of the perceptual faith. This is the way that Merleau-Ponty adopts in The Structure of Behavior, where he is, in a very natural manner, brought to interrogate that which distinguishes animal perception from human perception. His answer here is valuable: to see as a human is to be capable of “perspectival multiplicity.” To catch sight of such a concept, to see human seeing as plural and excessive, is only possible for someone who has abandoned the point of view of nowhere and who has decided to philosophize starting from the animal.Che effetto fa vedere come un essere umano?Noi ci chiederemo qui che cosa significa «vedere come un essere umano». La questione è difficile, poiché, nell’assumere un distacco rispetto alla percezione e nel supporre che questa possa non essere ciò che è, va contro ciò che comunemente si definisce «atteggiamento naturale». Merleau-Ponty orchestrerà in due modi diversi questa relativizzazione del vedere umano, e del suo realismo spontaneo. Vi è prima di tutto ciò che si potrebbe chiamare la « via della finitezza ». Questa consiste nel prendere nei confronti della percezione il punto di vista assoluto, il punto di vista di uno spirito privo di legami mondani; diremo allora, come Merleau-Ponty non cessa di ripetere, che percepire non è vedere da nessun luogo, che percepiamo sempre da qualche luogo, in un corpo finito, e non dal punto di vista di dio. La nostra origine animale si offre tuttavia come una seconda modalità, ben diversa, di svelare il dogmatismo della fede percettiva. È la via che Merleau-Ponty fa propria ne La Struttura del comportamento, in cui egli è naturalmente portato ad interrogarsi su ciò che distingue le percezioni animali ed umane. Da qui questa risposta, per noi preziosa: vedere come un essere umano significa essere capaci di una « molteplicità prospettica ». Intravedere un tale concetto, vedere il vedere umano come plurale ed eccessivo, è ciò di cui è capace solamente chi ha abbandonato un punto di vista assoluto ed ha deciso difilosofare a partire dall’animale. (shrink)

What is it Like to See as a Human Being?We will ask here “what is it like to see as a human being?” Such a question is difficult, for taking a step back from perception and considering that it might not be what it is, this question goes against what is commonly called the “natural attitude”. Merleau-Ponty orchestrates this relativization of human seeing and itsspontaneous realism in two different ways. First, there is what might be called the “way of finitude.” (...) This consists in taking the point of view from nowhere on perception, the point of view of a mind without worldly attachments. We would then say, as Merleau-Ponty never stopped saying, that perceiving is not seeing from nowhere, and that we always perceive from somewhere, in a finite body, and not from the point of view of god. Our animal origin, however, offers a second, quite different way of frustrating the dogmatism of the perceptual faith. This is the way that Merleau-Ponty adopts in The Structure of Behavior, where he is, in a very natural manner, brought to interrogate that which distinguishes animal perception from human perception. His answer here is valuable: to see as a human is to be capable of “perspectival multiplicity.” To catch sight of such a concept, to see human seeing as plural and excessive, is only possible for someone who has abandoned the point of view of nowhere and who has decided to philosophize starting from the animal.Che effetto fa vedere come un essere umano?Noi ci chiederemo qui che cosa significa «vedere come un essere umano». La questione è difficile, poiché, nell’assumere un distacco rispetto alla percezione e nel supporre che questa possa non essere ciò che è, va contro ciò che comunemente si definisce «atteggiamento naturale». Merleau-Ponty orchestrerà in due modi diversi questa relativizzazione del vedere umano, e del suo realismo spontaneo. Vi è prima di tutto ciò che si potrebbe chiamare la « via della finitezza ». Questa consiste nel prendere nei confronti della percezione il punto di vista assoluto, il punto di vista di uno spirito privo di legami mondani; diremo allora, come Merleau-Ponty non cessa di ripetere, che percepire non è vedere da nessun luogo, che percepiamo sempre da qualche luogo, in un corpo finito, e non dal punto di vista di dio. La nostra origine animale si offre tuttavia come una seconda modalità, ben diversa, di svelare il dogmatismo della fede percettiva. È la via che Merleau-Ponty fa propria ne La Struttura del comportamento, in cui egli è naturalmente portato ad interrogarsi su ciò che distingue le percezioni animali ed umane. Da qui questa risposta, per noi preziosa: vedere come un essere umano significa essere capaci di una « molteplicità prospettica ». Intravedere un tale concetto, vedere il vedere umano come plurale ed eccessivo, è ciò di cui è capace solamente chi ha abbandonato un punto di vista assoluto ed ha deciso difilosofare a partire dall’animale. (shrink)

In this article I reconsider the question of anthropological difference. I demonstrate that at least three motives prevent us from facing up to the originality of human behavior: science, morals, and also philosophy want us to believe that this question is a thing of the past. I come back to these three motives so as to criticize them and to reveal their flimsiness. And I try to show that one may advocate, in a naturalistic way and without metaphysics, the idea (...) that there remains something that is “proper to humankind.”. (shrink)

One cannot consider the future of continental philosophy without accounting for its specific “hermeneutic situation.” It seems to us that the state of continental philosophy today returns us to metaphysics and to the possibility of truly having done with it. Continental philosophy, in reality, does not cease to live metaphysically, because by asserting the end of metaphysics, it still continues to think according to the topos of the here-and-now and the beyond: that which seeks the ruin of the heavens continues (...) to obsess over the heavens; the cult of immanence can only understand itself in opposition to the other world, therefore in constant reference to it; insufficiently radical, the critique, in the words of Karl-Otto Apel, is but an “inverted metaphysics.” Our inversions of the for and against (the sensible vs. the intelligible, the body vs. the soul, the empirical vs. the transcendental, and more recently, the multiple vs. the one) still belong to the landscape of metaphysics.How do we imagine what comes after metaphysics? Can philosophy think according to a topos other than the one of the world above and the world below? Can it respatialize itself in a new way? Put more precisely, can we accept what science tells us about the world and about humanity in any other way than as the deposing of the other world? Can science provide us with anything other than weapons against metaphysics; in other words, can science give us anything other than metaphysics? As a response to these questions, we imagine an alternative scenario tied to the (scientifically attested) fact of our animal origin. Our animal origin can be, for philosophy and more specifically for phenomenology, the chance for a new beginning. But it can do so only on the condition that it does not follow the current method of evolutionary psychology. If it is true that we can be metaphysicians while being reductionistic, because we thus preserve the “old schema,” then evolutionary psychology is today, in virtue of its very reductionism, one of the more metaphysical currents of thought. Conversely, if phenomenology decides to face the fact of evolution and to confront its estrangement, we think that it possesses all the resources to invent a new intellectual landscape. (shrink)

The paper argues that a specific "concept of the political" can be reconstructed in Arendt by bringing together elements coming from Origins of Totalitarianism, Part II, from The Human Condition and On Revolution, and from On Disobedience. These propositions produce a singular variety of "institutionalism", which involves a "groundless" politics of Human Rights, and also helps clarifying the thesis on the "banality of evil" in Eichmann in Jerusalem: the sovereign tautology "law is law" is the root of voluntary servitude. To (...) say that we have a choice between becoming Eichmanns or taking the risk of civil disobedience is too quick; and to suppose that a state where civil disobedience becomes recognized would be immune of the danger of totalitarian transformation is an illusion, but as an ideal type, these formulations may encapsulate what Arendt's "concept of the political" hints at. (shrink)

Discussions around the meaning and validity of Freud’s notion of Todestrieb, as it was introduced in the essay from 1920 Beyond the Pleasure Principle, later...

Dioramas are multimedia installations used in museums and popular culture since the 19th century. I study two sets of anthropological dioramas: the ones made for the Museum of Natural History in New York by Franz Boas; and the ones fabricated at the New York State Museum in Albany by Arthur C. Parker. As I will show, dioramas are not only visual dis- plays but also installations with a proper materiality and temporality: they are the stage of multiple performances and work (...) as contact zones between objects, models, makers, and beholders. (shrink)

We are witnessing and participating in a new “Querelle of Universals” which has indissoluble political and philosophical characters. It ranges from the incorporation of anthropological differences into the very definition of the “human” to the contemporary attempts at rethinking the diversity of histories within mankind as a multiverse of translations rather than a failed unity. The essay discusses a series of typical aporias that are relevant to this querelle and proposes a concept of subjectivity which elaborates their productivity.

We observe many signs of the fact that the category « racism » not only has profoundly changed its meaning, but could also have reached the limits of its historical validity, both as an instrument of theoretical analysis, and as an instrument of progressive politics. The failed World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and related Intolerance in Durban (2002) was a striking indication in this respect. As a consequence, we can no longer proceed in our struggle against extreme discriminations (...) and violence without critically revisiting the origins and meaning of our notion of « racism ». The term was coined in the 30’s in its current use, but it was not before the 1950 and 1951 Declarations on race and racism, issued under the aegis of UNESCO and the UN, that it named a scientific paradigm. The article examines its logical function (to give a unitary description of the phenomena of anti-Semitism, colonialist subjection, and colour segregation), its ethical prerequisites (the « humanist » principle of the indivisibility of the Human Species), its epistemological consequences (a Copernican Revolution in the field of anthropology, and finally the alternative conceptualizations that – right from the beginning – confronted its research program with a different problematic of the community, notably in Antelme, Primo Levi, Fanon and Arendt. (shrink)

Dioramas are multimedia installations used in museums and popular culture since the 19th century. I study two sets of anthropological dioramas: the ones made for the Museum of Natural History in New York by Franz Boas; and the ones fabricated at the New York State Museum in Albany by Arthur C. Parker. As I will show, dioramas are not only visual dis- plays but also installations with a proper materiality and temporality: they are the stage of multiple performances and work (...) as contact zones between objects, models, makers, and beholders. (shrink)