We address the impingement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on logic, by examining the requirements posed on logic by knowledge representation and reasoning issues which A I has addressed. We then outline some of AI's contributions, via Logic Programming, to more dynamic forms of logic, in order to deal with knowledge in flux, namely: incomplete and contradictory information; hypotheses making through abduction; argumentation; diagnosis and debugging; updating; and learning. Along the way we delve into implications for the philosophy of knowledge.

We address the impingement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on logic, by examining the requirements posed on logic by knowledge representation and reasoning issues which A I has addressed. We then outline some of AI's contributions, via Logic Programming, to more dynamic forms of logic, in order to deal with knowledge in flux, namely: incomplete and contradictory information; hypotheses making through abduction; argumentation; diagnosis and debugging; updating; and learning. Along the way we delve into implications for the philosophy of knowledge.

This book provides a framework for thinking about foundational philosophical questions surrounding machine learning as an approach to artificial intelligence. Specifically, it links recent breakthroughs in deep learning to classical empiricist philosophy of mind. In recent assessments of deep learning's current capabilities and future potential, prominent scientists have cited historical figures from the perennial philosophical debate between nativism and empiricism, which primarily concerns the origins of abstract knowledge. These empiricists were generally faculty psychologists; that is, they argued that the (...) active engagement of general psychological faculties-such as perception, memory, imagination, attention, and empathy-enables rational agents to extract abstract knowledge from sensory experience. This book explains a number of recent attempts to model roles attributed to these faculties in deep neural network based artificial agents by appeal to the faculty psychology of philosophers such as Aristotle, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), John Locke David Hume, William James, and Sophie de Grouchy. It illustrates the utility of this interdisciplinary connection by showing how it can provide benefits to both philosophy and computer science: computer scientists can continue to mine the history of philosophy for ideas and aspirational targets to hit on the way to more robustly rational artificial agents, and philosophers can see how some of the historical empiricists' most ambitious speculations can be realized in specific computational systems. (shrink)

À propos de : Susan Schneider, Artificial You : AI and the Future of your Mind, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2019. Susan Schneider est professeure associée au département de philosophie de l’Université du Connecticut (États-Unis). Dans cet ouvrage destiné à une large audience, Schneider affirme la nécessité de clarifier la nature des états mentaux, de la conscience et de l’identité, pour garantir le développement de formes d’intelligence artificielle et d’amélioration cognitive dési...

Clark Glymour, Richard Scheines, Peter Spirtes and Kevin Kelly. Discovering Causal Structure: Artifical Intelligence, Philosophy of Science and Statistical Modeling.

O debate entre J. Searle e D. Dennett acerca da possibilidade técnica de uma Inteligência artificial gira em torno de uma única questão: estados mentais expressam algo intrínseco, privado e subjetivo, experimentado em primeira-pessoa ou não passam de entidades obscurantistas, frutos da ignorância e, em princípio, reduzíveis à objetividade científica da neurociência? Searle defende a primeira tese, enquanto Dennett argumenta pela segunda. O texto expõe a posição de Dennett, a crítica de Searle e se direciona para uma nova solução, que (...) defende um monismo integral, no qual mente e cérebro podem ser vistos como duas dimensões de uma mesma realidade. Nesse sentido, o projeto de Inteligência artifical precisará revisar o conceito de “físico” se quiser avançar em suas pretenções, incluindo nele conceitos hoje antagônicos como intencionalidade, liberdade e subjetividade.: The debate between J. Searle and D. Dennett about the technical possibility of an artificial intelligence revolves around a single issue: mental states express something intrinsic, private and subjective, experienced in first-person or are merely obscurantist entities, results from ignorance and, in principle, reducible to scientific objectivity of neuroscience? Searle argues for the first position, while Dennett argues for the second. The text exposes the position of Dennett, the criticism of Searle and is directed to a new solution, which advocates an integral monism, in which mind and brain can be seen as two dimensions of the same reality. In this sense, the project of artificial intelligence need to review the concept of "physical" if it wants to advance its claims, including today antagonistic concepts such as intentionality, freedom and subjectivity. Keywords: physicalism, technique, artificial intelligence, John Searle, Daniel Dennett. (shrink)

_Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of AI_ is a valuable contribution to the study of Wittgenstein's theories and his controversial attack on artifical intelligence, which successfully crosses a number of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, logic, artificial intelligence and cognitive science, to provide a stimulating and searching analysis.

_Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of AI_ is a valuable contribution to the study of Wittgenstein's theories and his controversial attack on artifical intelligence, which successfully crosses a number of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, logic, artificial intelligence and cognitive science, to provide a stimulating and searching analysis.

This scholarly inquiry examines the interplay between artificial intelligence (AI) and academic integrity within higher education. Through a comprehensive synthesis of academic literature, the study delves into the multifaceted implications of AI tools on academic practices, pedagogical approaches, and the evolving landscape of academic integrity within higher education. The findings, derived from an extensive analysis of scholarly works, offer profound insights into the challenges posed by the integration of AI in higher education. The impact on academic dishonesty, the nuances (...) of pedagogical shifts, and the dynamic relationship between students and AI are scrutinized, contributing to a nuanced comprehension of the intricate dynamics within the academy. (shrink)

It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered (...) odds. And even apart from this consideration, assigning probabilities to the options among which one is choosing is futile since such probabilities could be of no possible use in choice. The paper subjects these arguments to critical examination and suggests that, appearances notwithstanding, practical deliberation need not crowd outself-prediction. (shrink)

El presente artículo propone un modelo de análisis para orientar el discernimiento y posicionamiento en torno al uso de la IA en educación superior. Analizaremos los cuatro posibles usos de la IA que más incidencia tendrán en esta si se considera el actual desarrollo de esta tecnología. Ellos son: la co-construcción de conocimiento, el uso de IA para tutoría o mentoreo, el auge de las plataformas adaptativas y la capacidad predictiva. Propondremos un ejercicio de análisis para cada uso apelando a (...) algunas de las dimensiones del modelo propuesto para orientar sobre su utilización. El resultado es fecundo, en tanto advierte sobre el riesgo de parcializar el análisis perdiendo de vista las implicancias y los compromisos más profundos que exige el discernimiento sobre el uso de la IA. (shrink)

Over three decades ago, in a brief but provocative essay, Paul Ziff argued for the thesis that robots cannot have feelings because they are "mechanisms, not organisms, not living creatures. There could be a broken-down robot but not a dead one. Only living creatures can literally have feelings."[i] Since machines are not living things they cannot have feelings. In the first half of my paper I review Ziff's arguments against the idea that robots could be conscious, especially his appeal to (...) our linguistic usage. In the second half of the essay I try to provide a deeper ontological understanding of why we ought not attribute minds to nonliving artifacts. I argue that inanimate mechanisms are incapable of genuinely active and purposive behavior. They are importantly different in kind from living human beings and animals. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents:IntroductionAntónio ZILHÃO: Folk-Psychology, Rationality and Human ActionJoão BRANQUINHO: The Problem of Cognitive DynamicsJ.P. MONTEIRO: Hume, Induction and Single ExperimentsMarco RUFFINO: The Primacy of Concepts and the Priority of Judgments in Frege's LogicJoão Vergílio Gallerani CUTER: Die unanwendbare Arithmetik des TractatusSílvio PINTO: Wittgenstein's Anti-PlatonismFernando FERREIRA: A Substitutional Framework for Arithmetical ValidityJ.R. CROCA & R.N. MOREIRA: Indeterminism Versus CausalismLuíz MONIZ PEREIRA: The Logical Impingement of Artifical Intelligence.

The opposition between creation and evolution is invalid because humans are creators of new life, such as synthetic life or artifical intelligence. Thus the problem ofhow it is possible that reality arises at all needs a new answer. The phenomenological framework of this volume combines scientific and theological knowledge to offer a new theory of reality.

The discipline of ontology has enjoyed a checkered history since 1606, with a significant expansion in recent years. We focus here on those developments in the recent history of philosophy which are most relevant to the understanding of the increased acceptance of ontology, and especially of realist ontology, as a valuable method also outside the discipline of philosophy.

The development of AI appears to be not only rendering humans obsolete, but in being empowered could decide that humans should be eliminated for the benefit of life and the conditions for its own future. Given the behaviour of humans, this could be seen as a relief to the rest of terrestrial life, as Günter Grass suggested in his novel, The Rat. While there are many reasons to support this contention, in this paper I argue that humans do have the (...) potential to augment rather than undermine terrestrial life, a potential celebrated by the subordinated tradition of the Radical Enlightenment. Rather than accepting the demise of humanity, it is now time to put the Radical Enlightenment into practice. (shrink)

The question of whether new rules or regulations are required to govern, restrict, or even prohibit the use of autonomous weapon systems has been the subject of debate for the better part of a decade. Despite the claims of advocacy groups, the way ahead remains unclear since the international community has yet to agree on a specific definition of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems and the great powers have largely refused to support an effective ban. In this vacuum, the public has (...) been presented with a heavily one-sided view of Killer Robots. This interdisciplinary volume presents a more nuanced approach to autonomous weapon systems that recognizes the need to progress beyond a discourse framed by the Terminator and HAL 9000. Re-shaping the discussion around this emerging military innovation requires a new line of thought and a willingness to challenge the orthodoxy. Lethal Autonomous Weapons focuses on exploring the moral and legal issues associated with the design, development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapons. The volume brings together some of the most prominent academics and academic-practitioners in the lethal autonomous weapons space and seeks to return some balance to the debate. As part of this effort, it recognizes that society needs to invest in hard conversations that tackle the ethics, morality, and law of these new digital technologies and understand the human role in their creation and operation. (shrink)

This article discusses the concept of Biomimicry, which has been applying in many fields, from nanotechnology to robotics. It is appearing in smart materials and machinic intelligence, for diverse purposes, being inspired by natural processes and organisms. The main application of Biomimicry has been to produce artifacts and ideas from what we can know about what nature has already done. While the mimesis has been removed from the vocabulary of Art, the works of some artists are still full of (...) possibilities to discuss under the concept of Biomimetics. Many artists have dedicated themselves to the development of works using the poiesis of hybridization and mimicry. How close they approach of Biomimetics? As examples, are brought Walmor Corrêa, Patrícia Piccinini, Liu Xue, Berlinde De Bruyckere, Alessandro Boezio, Joan Fontcoberta and Pere Formiguera. This discussion is the starting point for introduce my project “VIRIDIUM”, in which I´m developing some semiautonomous and translucent robots, printed in 3D. The poetic basis is the possibility that nature has in hybridizing and evolving, spontaneously, as well as being hybridized by genetic manipulation. I propose the development of objects / beings that do not exist in the nature but refer and simulate behaviors of those who inhabit the world, in different kingdoms of Nature. I describe the first stage of the project, which focuses the Plantae kingdom. Afterwards of the Biomimicry and darwinian evolution concepts I bring the concept of Artification, as a possible model of understanding the poetic process, both in “VIRIDIUM” and in the works of the artists chosen. (shrink)

The development of increasingly intelligent and autonomous technologies will eventually lead to these systems having to face morally problematic situations. This gave rise to the development of artificial morality, an emerging field in artificial intelligence which explores whether and how artificial systems can be furnished with moral capacities. This will have a deep impact on our lives. Yet, the methodological foundations of artificial morality are still sketchy and often far off from possible applications. One important area of application of (...) artificial systems with moral capacities is geriatric care. The goal of this article is to afford the methodological foundations for artificial morality, i.e., for implementing moral capacities in artificial systems in general, and to discuss them with respect to an assistive system in geriatric care which is capable of moral learning. (shrink)

Worum geht es in den aktuellen Vorwürfen, die Postmoderne hätte den aktuellen populistischen Diskurs um alternative Fakten vorbereitet? Ausgehend von Latours Elend der Kritik diskutiert der Artikel die Genealogie von Wahrheits- und Evidenzkritik vor und nach den Anfängen des Computers. Dabei lässt sich zeigen, dass vor aller Wahrheits- und Evidenzkritik zunächst ein Misstrauen in den menschlichen Intellekt steht, welches in den frühen Entwürfen künstlicher Intelligenz und der Auslagerung des Intellekts in lernende Maschinensysteme ein vermeintliches Ende findet. Nicht zufällig ruft Herbert (...) A. Simon 1969 in seinem Standardwerk The Sciences of the Artifical Arthur Schopenhauers Welt als Wille und Vorstellung auf, wenn er schreibt, dass die Welt viel mehr eine künstliche, vorgestellte als eine natürliche sei. Anders als im 19. Jahrhundert verspricht jedoch nun die Computersimulation Einsichten in bisher unzureichend verstandene Komplexitäten menschlichen Verhaltens. Das Resultat dieser maschinellen Kritik ist ein ökonomisch-technologischer Komplex, in dem Rationalität nicht mehr als Funktion des Subjektes, sondern als Funktion der Maschine interpretiert und das Politische auf die Ebene des Affektiven reduziert wird. What is really behind the recent accusations of postmodernism being responsible for preparing the current populistic argument about alternative facts? Based on Bruno Latour’s »Why has Critique Run out of Steak? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern«, this article discusses the genealogy of truth- and evidentness critique before and after the beginnings of the computer. This will lead to the realization that before all critique concerning truth and evidentness there is already a distrust in the human intellect which comes to an alleged end in the early drafts of artificial intelligence as well as in the outsourcing of intellect into adaptive machine-systems. It is not by accident that Herbert A. Simon refers to Arthur Schopenhauer’s Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in his standard reference work The Sciences of the Artificial from 1969 when he states that the world resembles more of an artificial, imagined one than a natural. Different from the 19th century, the computer simulation these days promises insight into the complexities of human behaviour that have until now been understood only incompletely and insufficiently. The result of machine-based critique is an economic-technological complex in which rationality is no longer interpreted as the function of the subject but as the function of the machine, while politics is reduced to the level of affect. (shrink)

In this article the argumentation structure of the court’s decision in the Popov v. Hayashi case is formalised in Prakken’s (Argument Comput 1:93–124; 2010) abstract framework for argument-based inference with structured arguments. In this framework, arguments are inference trees formed by applying two kinds of inference rules, strict and defeasible rules. Arguments can be attacked in three ways: attacking a premise, attacking a conclusion and attacking an inference. To resolve such conflicts, preferences may be used, which leads to three corresponding (...) kinds of defeat, after which Dung’s (Artif Intell 77:321–357; 1995) abstract acceptability semantics can be used to evaluate the arguments. In the present paper the abstract framework is instantiated with strict inference rules corresponding to first-order logic and with defeasible inference rules for defeasible modus ponens and various argument schemes. The main techniques used in the formal reconstruction of the case are rule-exception structures and arguments about rule validity. Arguments about socio-legal values and the use of precedent cases are reduced to arguments about rule validity. The tree structure of arguments, with explicit subargument relations between arguments, is used to capture the dependency relations between the elements of the court’s decision. (shrink)

L’article retrace l’historique des recherches menées en sociologie sur l’artification, et identifie les principaux obstacles qu’il a fallu surmonter pour les mener à bien : la confusion avec la notion d’artialisation, la réduction à un usage simplement métaphorique, et le rabattement sur le concept de légitimation. Soulignant la connexion étroite entre la problématique de l’artification et le nominalisme en philosophie, il argumente en faveur d’une conception foncièrement nominaliste de la sociologie, à travers ses trois déclinaisons contemporaines que sont le constructivisme, (...) le pragmatisme et l’individualisme méthodologique. Il plaide pour finir en faveur d’une prise au sérieux des représentations mentales dans le programme sociologique, congruente avec l’approche nominaliste. (shrink)

The article seeks to explain what it means to say that an object has the status of being made art-like. I have reconstructed and analysed Ossi Naukkarinen and Yuriko Saito’s definition of artification and flagged up its methodological limitations. My conclusions serve as a starting point for describing the nature of artified objects, the way they are individuated, and how they persist. I consider the question of what can and what cannot be artified. Finally, I propose that artification be redefined (...) in such a way as to render it informative on the grounds of the largest number of existing aesthetic theories of art. (shrink)

L’artification au sens fort est un phénomène qui remonte à Duchamp et à ses ready-mades. Je propose de comprendre ces processus comme des processus de « cognification », consistant à transformer en dispositifs de réflexion tout objet ou action non cognitif. Un exemple classique est la découverte d’une boîte à chaussures de Gabriel Orozco à la Biennale de Venise en 1993. L’artification récente de la recherche montre que les projets de recherche artistique, en plus d’être des outils de réflexion, peuvent (...) transmettre une véritable connaissance des faits. Deux exemples sont proposés, l’un de l’artiste allemand Hito Steyerl et l’autre du groupe international Forensic Architecture. (shrink)

Cette étude vise à mettre en lumière les motifs et les modalités des procédures d’artification, de désartification et de réartification dont le champ contemporain de l’architecture a été et continue d’être le théâtre. Elle prend en considération trois courants majeurs qui l’ont marqué de leur empreinte : le modernisme, le postmodernisme et le déconstructivisme. Il en ressort que la pratique architecturale, bien que dotée d’une dimension technique, n’est pas moins sujette que les autres activités créatrices aux diverses opérations par lesquelles (...) les limites entre ce qui est considéré comme de l’art et ce qui ne l’est pas sont soumises à fluctuations. (shrink)