Arthur Madigan presents a clear, accurate new translation of the third book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, together with two related chapters from the eleventh book. Madigan's accompanying introduction and commentary give detailed guidance to these texts, in which Aristotle sets out the main questions of metaphysics and assesses the main answers to them, and which serve as a useful introduction not just to Aristotle's own work on metaphysics but to classical metaphysics in general.
Arthur Madigan presents a clear, accurate new translation of the third book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, together with two related chapters from the eleventh book. Madigan's accompanying introduction and commentary give detailed guidance to these texts, in which Aristotle sets out the main questions of metaphysics and assesses the main answers to them, and which serve as a useful introduction not just to Aristotle's own work on metaphysics but to classical metaphysics in general.
This review presents the principal themes of Robert Spaemann's Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something.’ To be a person is not to be identical with one's teleological nature, but rather, to have that nature. Personal consciousness is necessarily temporal consciousness. Persons have a range of distinctively personal acts, such as recognizing and respecting one another, understanding their lives as wholes, making judgments of conscience, promising, and forgiving. All members of the human species, whatever their stage of development or limitations, (...) are persons. The present review also briefly considers certain objections that have been raised against Spaemann's position. (shrink)
Arthur Madigan presents a clear, accurate new translation of the third book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, together with two related chapters from the eleventh book. Madigan's accompanying introduction and commentary give detailed guidance to these texts, in which Aristotle sets out what he takes to be the main problems of metaphysics or 'first philosophy' and assesses possible solutions to them; he takes his starting-point from the work of earlier philosophers, especially Plato and some of the Presocratics. These texts serve as a (...) useful introduction both to Aristotle's own work on metaphysics and to classical metaphysics in general; they are also a good example of Aristotle's dialectical method, which reasons not from known truths but from reputable opinions. (shrink)
This is the second volume of a three-volume study of one and many in Aristotle's Metaphysics. It covers Metaphysics 6, 7, 8, and 9. Chapter 4 summarizes the results of the textual analysis. Halper argues against three interpretations of form. Against the view that form is individual, he presents texts showing the universality and knowability of form. Form is universal because it is one in formula. Against the view that form is a kind of universal, he presents texts which insist (...) on the numerical unity of form. Form is individual because it is numerically one. The view that form is neither universal nor individual does not square with the requirement that form be the cause of unity in a thing. (shrink)
This commentary welcomes Prof. Vasiliou’s adoption of an “objects first” method for the analysis of nous in Aristotle as well as his suggestion that there are three distinct levels of nous for the essences of material things, mathematical things, and immaterial things. It queries his claim that nous is not to be understood as a faculty, citing texts in which Aristotle uses “that by which” language to describe nous. It suggests that ordinary human beings have what may be called a (...) functional grasp of essences, and that, while some of Aristotle’s uses of nous and noein may be highly technical, his aim in De Anima III 4 is to explain an operation that is widely shared among human beings. The commentary concludes by expressing the wish that Prof. Vasiliou had said more about the case in which nous is its own object. (shrink)
