ABSTRACTIn this article we investigate structural differences between “literary” metaphors created by renowned poets and “nonliterary” ones imagined by non-professional authors from Katz et al.’s 1988 corpus. We provide data from quantitative narrative analyses of the altogether 464 metaphors on over 70 variables, including surface features like metaphor length, phonological features like sonority score, or syntactic-semantic features like sentence similarity. In a first computational study using machine learning tools we show that Katz et al.’s literary metaphors can be successfully discriminated (...) from their nonliterary ones on the basis of response measures, in particular the ratings for familiarity, ease of interpretation, semantic relatedness, and comprehensibility. A second computational study then shows that the classifier can reliably detect and predict between-group differences on the basis of five QNA features generalizing from a... (shrink)
In his review, Walter (2012) links conceptual perspectives on empathy with crucial results of neurocognitive and genetic studies and presents a descriptive neurocognitive model that identifies neuronal key structures and links them with both cognitive and affective empathy via a high and a low road. After discussion of this model, the remainder of this comment deals more generally with the possibilities and limitations of current neurocognitive models, considering ways to develop process models allowing specific quantitative predictions.
Levelt et al. attempt to “model their theory” with WEAVER ++. Modeling theories requires a model theory. The time is ripe for a methodology for building, testing, and evaluating computational models. We propose a tentative, five-step framework for tackling this problem, within which we discuss the potential strengths and weaknesses of Levelt et al.'s modeling approach.
Glenberg's conception of “meaning from and for action” is too narrow. For example, it provides no satisfactory account of the “logic of Elfland,” a metaphor used by Chesterton to refer to meaning acquired by being told something. All that we call spirit and art and ecstasy only means that for one awful instant we remember that we forget. G. K. Chesterton.