This book examines the theories of meaning or artha in different schools of philosophical thought highlighting the significant relationship between 'word' and 'meaning'. It demonstrates that classical Indian theory of language can inform and be informed by contemporary philosophy.

Artha-shastra is about generating food, i.e. wealth, by creating goods and services; Kama-shastra is about indulging our hungers with this food. Dharma-shastra insists we consider the hunger of others, while Moksha-shastra is about outgrowing our hungers, in order to be detached and generous. Together, these four Hindu shastras provide a framework within which human action, its purposes and consequences, can be defined; together, they validate human existence and give it meaning. In Dharma Artha Kama Moksha, Devdutt Pattanaik uses (...) his unique understanding of mythology to provide an accessible and lucid guide to the Hindu way of thinking, with short essays that are crisp expositions of important concepts.". (shrink)

The Arthaśāstra: Selections from the Classic Indian Work on Statecraft. Edited and Translated, with an Introduction, by Mark McClish and Patrick Olivelle. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2012. Pp. lxvi + 169. $52, £37.95 ; $16.95, £12.95.

This second volume in the Foundations of Philosophy in India series is an important contribution to the philosophy of language. Here Jonardon Ganeri highlights the significant relationship between semantic power and epistemic power to understand the important philosophical category of meaning.

Classical work on Jaina philosophy of action.

Classical work on Jaina doctrines and philosophy; includes commentary and Hindi translation.

This paper explores the contrast between words and meaning as it emerges from those Mah?y?na s?tras that discuss the issue most extensively. For these texts artha is out of the reach of language. Some declare it inexpressible, some view words and meaning as mutually exclusive, while still others warn of verbalization as a danger to the realization of artha. Their concerns do not spring from semantics, but derive from their conception of reality as sameness.

Treatise of the Vedanta philosophy ; based on discourses.

This article aims to introduce some features of the literary output of Gling-ras-pa Padma rdo-rje, who was the teacher of the ‘Brug-pa bKa’-brgyud-pa school’s founder, gTsan-pa rGya-ras Ye-shes rdo-rje in Tibet. The work that I draw upon here is titled A Torch of Crucial Points. A Condensation and Presentation of all Dharmas that are to be Practiced, a presentation of the entire outline of Buddhist practice that resembles the doctrinal stages literary genre. Based on an edition and translation of the (...) fifth chapter of the 17 that comprise the work, here I focus on several concepts, such as the three natures and the allground consciousness, that pertain to the system of Yogācāra and the terminology related to it. These are shown as they appear in the framework of the work, which is heavily influenced by the tradition of Mahāmudrā and the background of its author’s life as a wandering yogin in the lineage of Mi-la ras-pa. (shrink)

Prakrit verse work on philosophical interpretation of Jaina worship.

The notion of dharma is one of the most important concepts of Hinduism. This paper deals with the semantics diversity of the term of dharma, which is a Sanskrit word derived from the root of dhṛ that means to support, hold, maintain. In addition, the concept of purushārtha, consisting of the words purusha and artha, is examined by focusing on the different usages of that term. It is criticized why purusarthas are defined as trivarga or çaturvarga and the historical (...) and philosophical significance of the purusarthas is discussed. Besides, the connection of purushārthas with varna and ashramas has been investigated as well as it is mentioned which purushārtha orders should be observed by caste members and which purushārtha should be considered by individuals in the ashrama system.Purushārtha is a key concept in Hinduism and refers to the three/ four proper goals or aims of a human life. The word purushārtha literally means purpose of human being or object of human pursuit. All four purushārthas are important, but in cases of conflict, dharma is considered more important than artha or kama in Hindu philosophy. Moksha is considered the ultimate ideal of human life. It is also criticized that purushārthas are defined as trivarga or çaturvarga; its historical and philosophical significance was discussed. In addition, the connection of purushārthas with varna (brahman, kshatriya, vaisya, sudra) and ashramas (brahmacharya, grihastha, vanaprastha, sanyasa) has been investigated. In the caste system, the knowledge of which purushārtha element that caste members should observe has been mentioned. It was emphasized which purushārtha should highlight in the stages. (shrink)

The Article is concerned with the investigation of interpretation of the concept "pratyakṣa" in the first chapter of the first part of "Nyāya Sūtras", which became the determining ground for the entire subsequent history of the development of this concept in the teachings of the adherents of this philosophical school and their polemics with opponents. The methods of etymological and contextual analysis are applied, the key meaningful connotations of "pratyakṣa" are outlined, and the main issues of its interpretation and translation (...) are revealed. The first chapter of the first part of "Nyāya Sūtras" is the systemic core of the work as a whole, therefore its thorough study is of primary importance, both for the reconstruction of the teachings of Nyāya darshan, and for clarifying the specifics of the actualization of the lexemes presented in this part of the text and in the philosophical discourse of India as a whole. However, the brevity of the text chosen for analysis in this article opens a rather comprehensive perspective of different interpretations and creates a number of open questions. The duration of the tradition of comments dedicated to "Nyāya Sūtras" is an evidence of the importance of this work and the difficulty of reconstructing its content. The open questions actualized in the process of this study should not only become the basis for further investigations, but also reveal the specifics of the problematization of "pratyakṣa" in the philosophical discourse of India. The article reveals that the study of the concept of "pratyakṣa" in the teaching of Nyaya darshan, first of all, requires the analysis of the following concepts: prama̅ṇa, indriya, manas, artha, jñāna, buddhi. The article also suggests that "pramana pratyakṣa" is rather a "situation" of acquiring knowledge that meets the criteria of truth, rather than a simple "tool of knowledge" or "ability to know", so its simple translation as "perception" seems insufficiently substantiated. The article declares that the issue whether every contact between indriya and artha necessarily leads to the formation of a jñāna that meets the criteria of avyapadeśyam ("that which precedes definition and expression"), avyatirekavyabhicārin ("that which is clear, distinct, uncontroversial and steady'), vyavasāyātmaka ('that which is intense, bright and full of energy') is open and urgent for further research. It also states that the issues whether it is possible to talk about the contact of indriya, in the sense of a simple list of empirical senses (sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell), with artha without the mediation of manas; and how to interpret the possible role of the Western concept of "consciousness" in this process are also important. (shrink)

Indeterminacy in dating and elusive modes of intertextuality often confound attempts to establish reliable relative chronologies for classical South Asian texts. Occasionally, however, the relationship between two texts clearly reveals the dependence of one upon the other. Such is the case for the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya and the Mānava Dharmaśāstra, arguably the two most important classical treaties on law and statecraft. Close reading of the two reveals a direct relationship wherein the seventh adhyāya of the Mānava Dharmaśāstra took its general (...) structure and most of its material from the Arthaśāstra.The clarification of this general relationship makes possible an appreciation of the manner in which Manu appropriated material from Kauṭilya’s treatise and allows us to draw new conclusions and raise new questions about the intellectual and cultural history of the period. (shrink)

If a quiz‐master were to ask the question, “Is there anything common among the philosophies of the world?” the answer that should come from the participants with perfect aplomb is, “Yes, the concern for truth.” The presumed unanimity of this response, however, does not imply that philosophers possess a uniform understanding of the notion of truth. There are, indeed, many similarities in the way great minds think on this topic, yet divergences among them are also too significant to be ignored. (...) In this article, therefore, I propose to expound the various aspects of truth from a typically Indian perspective (although, of course, in the contemporary philosophical idiom) before making a comparative assessment of different philosophical theories of truth. (shrink)

The authors make an attempt to comparatively analyse some stances of the Old Indian philosophy of language, exemplified by the Medieval Indian author Jayanta, along with the Western tradition of the analytical philosophy of language, and to highlight the differences as well as the similarities. The main focus is on Jayanta's discussion of the meaning vs. reference problem.

This book is a scholarly treatise on the subject of Indian philosophy and is also written by one of its foremost and most well-known proponents. Chaturvedi Badrinath shows that the Mahabharata is the most systematic inquiry into the human condition. Badrinath shows that the concerns of the Mahabharata are the concerns of everyday life––of dharma, artha, kama and moksha. This book dispels several false claims about what is today known as ‘Hinduism’ to show us how individual liberty and knowledge, (...) freedom, equality, and the celebration of love, friendship and relationships are integral to the philosophy of the Mahabharata, because they are integral to human life. What sets this book apart from others is that Badrinath has used more than 500 Sanskrit shlokas, which he has translated himself to illustrate his arguments. Secondly, his approach to Hindu philosophy is one based in humanism, rather than in divisive politics. (shrink)

Parmi les 'but de l'homme' (puruṣārtha) qui orientent la vie humaine dans le monde indien, le dharma occupe une position très élevée, au-dessus de 'l'intérêt' (artha) et du 'désir' (kāma), respectivement la sphère du pouvoir (politique, économique, social) et celle de l'amour (y compris les passions et les plaisirs de la vie). Enfin, le dharma englobe le quatrième et ultime but de l'homme, la 'délivrance' (moksa). Le caractère normatif du dharma fixe la place de chacun dans la société, par (...) l'exercice de son devoir spécifique. Mais il ne se décline pas moins selon les dispositions individuelles de chacun, et l'action de l'homme en est la véritable mesure. Par-delà la littérature du dharma, le volume réunit des enquêtes sur cette notion 'en contexte,' de la poésie védique à la grammaire, de l'épopée au théâtre, des traditions religieuses et philosophiques--les premières Écoles bouddhiques, la Mīmāmsā, le tantrisme--à la médecine classique (Āyurveda) et jusqu'à la jurisprudence indienne moderne (du XVIIe au XIXe siècle) avec deux éclairages inédits sur le dharma des femmes. Une telle approche tend à restituer la complexité de quelques visages du dharma ainsi recomposés, non pas 'tel ou tel' aspect mais pour chaque cas le 'tout' d'un système à plusieurs facettes, à l'appui d'une histoire singulière dont les auteurs s'attachent à montrer points forts et limites, situations ambiguës, paradoxes et contradictions."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

An esteemed scholar of Hinduism presents a groundbreaking interpretation of ancient Indian texts and their historic influence on subversive resistance. Ancient Hindu texts speak of the three aims of human life: dharma, artha, and kama. Translated, these might be called religion, politics, and pleasure, and each is held to be an essential requirement of a full life. Balance among the three is a goal not always met, however, and dharma has historically taken precedence over the other two qualities in (...) Hindu life. Here, historian of religions Wendy Doniger offers a spirited and close reading of ancient Indian writings, unpacking a long but unrecognized history of opposition against dharma. Doniger argues that scientific disciplines (shastras) have offered lively and continuous criticism of dharma, or religion, over many centuries. She chronicles the tradition of veiled subversion, uncovers connections to key moments of resistance and voices of dissent throughout Indian history, and offers insights into the Indian theocracy's subversion of science by religion today. (shrink)

The well-known classification of legal procedure into “four feet” presents certain conceptual problems for the Indian legal tradition that various Smṛtikāras and commentators have attempted to resolve in different and sometimes contradictory ways. These difficulties arise because the four feet originally referred in Indian legal theory to four distinct, hierarchical legal domains rather than procedural means for reaching a verdict. The earliest attested discussion of the four feet, found in Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra, indicates that early legal theorists understood the greater legal (...) order as being comprised of four hierarchical domains and that these domains were ordered by the state as expressed in the original formulation of the four feet. Among the four legal domains, that of vyavahāra was developed by the state itself as a realm of public, transactional law meant to address disputes that could not be resolved in other legal forums. From this we can conclude that the origin of Indian jurisprudence lies with state efforts to formalize and enforce the laws of public transactions. The reinterpretation of the four feet by later jurists was motivated perhaps by resistance to one of the fundamental relationships expressed in the four feet, namely that royal authority possessed the greatest legal authority, independent of Brāhmaṇical law. (shrink)

This volume of essays offers direct comparisons of historic Western and Buddhist perspectives on ethics and metaphysics, tracing parallels and contrasts all the way from Plato to the Stoics, Spinoza to Hume, and Schopenhauer through to contemporary ethicists such as Arne Naess, Charles Taylor and Derek Parfit. It compares and contrasts each Western philosopher with a particular strand in the Buddhist tradition, in some chapters represented by individual writers such as Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Santideva or Tsong Khapa. It does so in (...) light of both analytic concerns and themes from the existentialist and phenomenological traditions, and often in an ecumenical spirit that bridges both analytic and continentalist approaches. Some of the deepest questions in ethics, dealing with the scope of agency, value-laden notions of personhood and the nature of value in general, are intertwined with questions in metaphysics. One set of questions addresses how varying conceptions of selfhood relate to moral values ; another set of questions addresses how a conception of oneself or one’s selves should or should not affect how one thinks of happiness, or eudaimonia, or – in classical Indian terms – artha, sukha or nirvana. Western philosophy has featured discussion of both, but some would argue that certain traditions of Asian philosophy have offered a more sustained and even treatment of both sets of questions. The Buddhist tradition in particular has not only featured much discussion on both fronts, but has attracted many contemporary philosophers to its distinctive spectrum of approaches, and to what is – from many ‘Western’ points of view – a seemingly subversive analysis of ego, selfhood and personhood, whether in metaphysical, phenomenological or other incarnations. (shrink)

The Sense of I: Conceptualizing Subjectivity: In Indian Philosophy (Sāṃkhya-Yoga) This book discusses the sense of I as it is captured in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition – one of the oldest currents of Indian philosophy, dating back to as early as the 7th c. BCE. The author offers her reinterpretation of the Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā complemented with several commentaries, including the writings of Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya – a charismatic scholar-monk believed to have re-established the Sāṃkhya-Yoga lineage in the early 20th century. The (...) textual analysis of the classical Sanskrit sources and their constructive interpretation is enhanced by some crucial questions and points of dispute commonly picked up in the contemporary philosophy of mind, such as the challenge of ontological and categorical reductionism, the criteria of personal identity, the limits of agency and free will, the ineluctability of self-deception, etc. However, defining the sense of ego (ahaṃkāra) and ‘I-am-ness’ (asmitā) is the main focus of this research. Four chapters composing the study are subsequently devoted to: (1) the methodological assumptions of the present author and the basic historical distinctions relevant to the subject matter, (2) linguistic preconditioning of I-consciousness as well as metaphysical coherency and ambiguity of the concept of subjectivity presented by Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers, (3) cognitive and ontological issues concerning the embodied ego being opposed to inactive and contentless consciousness, or the pure self (puruṣa), (4) axiological evaluation of self-discipline and significance of liberation from ego. 1. The method, scope, and problem. In the first chapter, the method of comparative philosophy adopted in this book is introduced by a phenomenological analysis of ‘otherness’ and ‘alienness’ inspired by the considerations of Bernhard Waldenfels and his understanding of xenology. This section is followed by a critical reflection on the incommensurability of the alternative conceptual frameworks, supported by some arguments provided by Ludwik Fleck and Richard E. Nisbett. When explaining the term ‘comparative philosophy’, the author pays special attention to those proponents of the aforementioned current who contributed to the rapprochement of Western and Indian philosophical traditions by tracing both their similarities and divergences. The author makes references to numerous prominent researchers, such as Paul Masson-Oursel, Paul Deussen, Stanisław Schayer, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Bimal K. Matilal, Raimundo Panikkar, Daya Krishna, Wilhelm Halbfass, and many others representing a younger generation. The historical introduction presents a concise survey of the evolution of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga textual tradition, and distinguishes five phases of its development: proto-Sāṃkhya (7th c. BCA – 1st c. CE), pre-classical phase (1st – 5th c. CE), classical Sāṃkhya (3rd – 9th c. CE), post-classical phase (till 14th c.), and neo-classical phase (since 1927). Here, the author also evaluates the primary sources, including Sanskrit commentaries, and the secondary sources in the light of their relevance and usefulness to the constructive interpretation of Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā. Then, she makes some methodological remarks concerning the specificity of their reading. This section is concluded with highlighting three main strategies usually applied when interpreting Patañjali’s sūtras: (1) anti-philosophical approach – treating the text as a merely mystical report or the yogic vademecum, (2) anti-mystical perspective – which reads the text as a highly speculative divagation of no much use to a practitioner, (3) mystic-and- philosophical approach – emphasizing the fact that the theory of consciousness presented in Yogasūtra is both philosophically coherent and empirically (or mystically) verified. The author argues for the third, heuristic, perspective mentioned above. The last section of the first chapter aims to problematize the I-concept (aham) and the paradoxical situation of the ego searching for self-knowledge. This part starts with the acknowledgement of the deliberation on non-self (anātman) by Śāntideva, a Buddhist philosopher claiming that one’s own ego ought to be identified with the ego of any other. Then, the author unfolds the fundamental assumptions and scope of the constructive interpretation she wants to develop following K.C. Bhattacharyya’s clues. When explaining her reasons, she stresses both the need to reveal the philosophical meaning of the source materials and, at the same time, the need to make them meaningful on the ground of our contemporary philosophical enquiry. Thus, among the main purposes there is a reliable, scrupulous and careful reconstruction of the historical conception of the self as elaborated on in the classical period of Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition, as well as reinterpretation of the sense of I as it was grasped by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga thinkers in terms of modern comparative and ‘polylogical’ discourse. 2. Naming I. In the second chapter, a variety of linguistic categories capturing different aspects of subjectivity is discussed in detail. A textual examination is preceded by clarification of the semantic distinctions made by Patañjali, such as a verbal convention (saṃketa) which stands for uniting or overlapping a word (śabda), its meaning (artha) and a mental state of comprehension (pratyaya) that ascribes the word to a particular object. Among the key concepts there is also explained a spontaneous mental activity referring to pseudo-objects posited only by words (vikalpa), which is unwittingly involved in every process of conceptualizing, designating, and naming objects. Such mental states can neither be ‘valid’ nor ‘invalid’, and are believed to unavoidably accompany one’s use of language. These presuppositions testify to Patañjali’s severe criticism towards all verbal conventions that not only affect the way we formulate and construct our views, but also determine the very process of perception. A major section of the chapter contains the analysis of the ambiguous sense of subjectivity and its basic aspects distinguished by the author in the result of a contextual and comparative study of the Sanskrit terms used in Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā for naming I-consciousness. The six basic aspects of the self comprise: essentializing oneself, perceiving (something), getting conscious (of something), mastering or owning (something), and being capable of self-identifying as well as disidentifying oneself. A majority of the enumerated predicates ascribed to the self refer to different functions and activities of the empirical ego and the embodied mind. Yet, apart from this intentional, active, reactive, sensing, and objectifiable self Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers distinguish a sense of subjectivity going beyond all these psycho-physical characteristics: the self that remains unmanifest, non-active, free from experiencing any joy or pain, said to be the principle of consciousness. The plausibility of its existence as the final cause of the world is to be determined by the embodied ego by virtue of abductive reasoning based on the analysis of all material and psycho-physical phenomena preconditioned by three guṇas that compose the domain of nature (prakṛti). In the subsequent section, three Sanskrit notions – ahaṃkāra, asmitā, and puruṣa, most significant for the Sāṃkhya and Yoga understanding of subjectivity, are discussed closely one after another to expose their semantic, epistemic and metaphysical connotations. The chapter is completed by some pivotal remarks bringing out the problem of discrepancy between the metaphysical position implied by Patañjali and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and the grammatical instruments applied by them to express it. 3. Cognizing I. The third chapter addresses two important issues in the phenomenology of self-perception, namely the question of psycho-physical dualism explained on the grounds of the considered darśanas, and the spiritual quest for the ideal embodiment of consciousness. While emphasizing the unity of human psycho-physical nature the author refers to several contemporary Western thinkers, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Thomas Nagel, John R. Searle, David Chalmers and others, by making some comparative remarks on the idea of the embodied mind. Furthermore, three arguments for the plurality of selves (puruṣa-bahutva) are reconstructed and critically considered. The arguments given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (SK 18) include the diversity of ways in which one experiences one’s life and death, the spatio-temporal distinctness of particular embodied egos, and the variations of features manifested by individual selves. The second section of this chapter presents a thorough inquiry into a non-theistic devotion and spiritual pragmatism defended by the adherents of Sāṃkhya- Yoga. God (īśvara) is defined here primarily as an object of meditative practice and a special tool convenient for yogic pedagogy. In the concluding part of this section four functions of devotional practice (īśvara-pranidhāna) are recognized and explained; they embrace: (1) prevention from mental scattering and dispersion, (2) therapy allowing to form some positive perceptual habits and the right cognitive approach, (3) enhancement of morally and spiritually required qualities, and (4) reinforcement of the sense of subjective identity being a complementary method of self-development. 4. Liberating oneself from I. The final chapter consists of three sections. The first one introduces the concept of liberation through action (pravṛtti-dharma), commonly opposed in Indian tradition to the path of renunciation (nivṛtti- dharma). According to Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya’s interpretation, both Sāṃkhya- Yoga and Buddhism follow the latter one, which in terms of spiritual practice dynamics makes them much closer to each other than it is usually believed. In the subsequent section the idea of liberating oneself from one’s attachment to ego is explained in detail, along with the significance of gradual self-negation. Then the author raises the interpretation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga perspective on liberation as self-distinction-through-renunciation. The main focus in this section is placed on the sense of agency (kartṛ), the problem of free will, and the criteria of moral and soteriological evaluation of one’s deeds. Some crucial questions on karmic conditioning of self-knowledge in the form of kleśas are also the subject of careful analysis. The next section undertakes the issue of ownership (mamakāra) of one’s activity and self-esteem (abhimāna) involved in spiritual growth. Again, some comparative remarks are made by referring to the Buddhist philosophers’ positions, such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. Among others, the Buddhist refutation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga concept of eternal, inactive, indifferent, irresponsible, and exclusively conscious self (puruṣa) is quoted and partly rejected in favour of the classical Hindu darśanas. In summary, the author emphasized the significance-generating or sense-creating function of I, its engagement in the search for its own raison d’être, its role in self-identification as well as subverting it, and the expediency of liberation from ego. The philosophers of classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga indicate a twofold sense of the self; on the one hand, the only appropriate designation: ‘I’ is true self (puruṣa), a passive and unknowable principle of consciousness whose existence makes the empirical phenomena meaningful. On the other hand, the ‘I’ clearly designates the current sense of the self, expressed as “I think”, “I doubt”, “I suffer”, etc. This second meaning of ‘I’, the specific sense of ‘mineness’, is recognized as a secondary and relative one – thus illusive and troublesome. However, its delusiveness does not mean that the empirical ego is an unreal or non-existent entity. What it implies is that the empirical self-identity is fundamentally inadequate and – according to the Indian thinkers – ought to be unveiled and, ultimately, given up. (shrink)

The Quest After Perfection, first published in 1952, is a collection of eight remarkable essays on Indian philosophy by Prof. M. Hiriyanna. The learned professor discusses at great length the topic of values, a subject that has received much attention the world over. In his own words, "Indian philosophy is essentially a philosophy of values." With great clarity, he cogitates upon Truth, Goodness, and Beauty-often called the 'eternal values' in the Western tradition. He also expounds the traditional Indian idea of (...) the purusharthas, or the goals of human life-dharma (sustainability), artha (wealth), kama (desire), moksha (release)-by sharing thoughtful insights on them. (shrink)

This paper aims to recover the ideas about semantics that are contained in Yāska’s _Nirukta_ (c. 6–3 century BCE), the seminal work of the Indian tradition of _nirvacana_ or etymology. It argues that, within the framework of his etymological project, Yāska developed consistent and sophisticated ideas relating to semantics—what I call his theory of meaning. It shows that this theory assumes the form of explicit and implicit reflections pertaining to the relation between three categories: denoting names (_nāman_/_nāmadheya_), denoted objects (_sattva_/_artha_), (...) and name-giving action expressed by verbal roots (_ākhyāta_). A typology of Yāska’s etymologies for what they reveal about semantics will be proposed and investigated. In doing so, attention will be paid to how Yāska’s ideas resemble and anticipate ideas concerning the difference between polysemy and homonymity, metaphoric transfer, and synecdoche. It is hoped that attending to Yāska’s thus-far largely overlooked ideas will help us better appreciate the _Nirukta_’s role in the history of early Indian engagements with semantics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT -/- Ayurveda is science of living being with an aim to live healthy life and curing of ailments. Arogyata (healthy life) is root to achieve the purushartha chatushtaya which are dharma(religious rituals), artha, kama and moksha. Kama in society is taken in sexual lust but Vatsayan has described kama as the enjoyment of appropriate objects by the five senses of hear- ing, feeling, seeing, tasting, and smelling, assisted by the mind together with the soul. The ingre- dient in (...) this is a peculiar contact between the organ of sense and its object, and the consciousness of pleasure which arises from that contact is called Kama. A well organised, controlled form of kama comes under brahmacharya. Acharya Charaka has specified brahmacharya among three subpillars which assists in healthy living being. Brahmacharya leads to conservation of shukra dhatu which is essence of ahara. This shukra dhatu is responsible for bala, virya, yash, dhairya, preeti. Development of these qualities assists higher faculty buddhi or pragya not to indulge in pragyaparadh leading to correct decisionary power and patience. Healthy state of mind is achieved with this brahmacharya. Through this paper a review over various parameters of brah- macharya have been discussed and concluded. -/- Keywords: Kama, dhairya, pragyaparadh, health, shukra dhatu. (shrink)

Ayurveda is science of living being. Aim of Ayurveda is mantainance of healthy life and pacification of diseases of diseased ones. Dharma, artha, kama and moksha these four are together called chaturvidha purushartha which is achieved by arogya (health).Ayurveda holds view of its independent darshanika viewthough it has shades of nearly all six astika darshanas. Mimamsa’s first verse implies its motto to explore Dharma. Ayurveda considers dharma as one of basic component to health. Dharma has been described under trieshana (...) by acharya Bhela. Various conducts are described under sadavritta, achararasayana, moksha marga, naishtikichikitsa. Ayurveda describes three types of treatment which are yuktivyapshraya, daivavyapashraya and sattvavajaya. This daivyapashraya includes mantra, ausadhi, mani, mangal, bali, upahaar, homa, niyama,prayashchita, upawaas, swastyayana, pranipata, gamana etc. These type of methods are widely described in karma kanda of mimamsa darshana. This treatment method has been used in curing of diseases like unmada,graharoga. Methods of yagya has been described as well as used in putreshti and punsawansamskara described in charakasamhita. With this paper karma kanda widely used in treatment has been described in Ayurveda. (shrink)

This paper explores the history of two central categories of ancient Indian moral philosophy: trivarga and puruṣārtha. After an exhaustive analysis of the textual evidence from the earliest times until the middle of the first millennium CE, the paper concludes that the classificatory term trivarga requires an implicit referent and that its reference is artha in the sense of things that are beneficial. The term puruṣārtha, furthermore, is an elaboration of artha as the referent of trivarga: something that (...) is beneficial to a human being. The term artha in the compound puruṣārtha does not mean aim or goal, even though that meaning may occasionally seep into it in actual usage especially in later texts. Within this compound artha has the same meaning it has in Mīmāṃsā and Kauṭilya: something that is beneficial, as opposed to anartha: something that is detrimental. The expression puruṣārtha is rare with reference to the trivarga in the early literature until at least the middle of the first millennium CE. Its absence in the comprehensive lexicon, the Amarakośa, which records the trivarga and caturvarga, shows its marginal status in the Sanskrit vocabulary relating to trivarga. For the authors of the ancient Indian texts, the three concepts—dharma,artha,kāma—comprehended by trivarga do not constitute goals or aims of human life, as they are so often depicted in modern scholarship. They represent three major domains of human activities and pursuits that are beneficial to persons who perform them. (shrink)

The compound “Hindu philosophy” is ambiguous. Minimally it stands for a tradition of Indian philosophical thinking. However, it could be interpreted as designating one comprehensive philosophical doctrine, shared by all Hindu thinkers. The term “Hindu philosophy” is often used loosely in this philosophical or doctrinal sense, but this usage is misleading. There is no single, comprehensive philosophical doctrine shared by all Hindus that distinguishes their view from contrary philosophical views associated with other Indian religious movements such as Buddhism or Jainism (...) on issues of epistemology, metaphysics, logic, ethics or cosmology. Hence, historians of Indian philosophy typically understand the term “Hindu philosophy” as standing for the collection of philosophical views that share a textual connection to certain core Hindu religious texts (such as the Vedas), and they do not identify “Hindu philosophy” with a particular comprehensive philosophical doctrine. -/- Hindu philosophy, thus understood, not only includes the philosophical doctrines present in Hindu texts of primary and secondary religious importance, but also the systematic philosophies of the Hindu schools: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta. In total, Hindu philosophy has made a sizable contribution to the history of Indian philosophy and its role has been far from static: Hindu philosophy was influenced by Buddhist and Jain philosophies, and in turn Hindu philosophy influenced Buddhist philosophy in India in its later stages. In recent times, Hindu philosophy evolved into what some scholars call “Neo-Hinduism,” which can be understood as an Indian response to the perceived sectarianism and scientism of the West. Hindu philosophy thus has a long history, stretching back from the second millennia B.C.E. to the present. (shrink)

Epicurus was a Greek philosopher interested in pleasure or pursuit of it more than other ideals. He said, "No pleasure in itself is a bad thing, but the things that produce certain pleasures involve disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves." Epicurus tells us that the knowledge of which pleasures are good for us is wisdom. While this sometimes led to a negative view of his philosophy, in many regions of the world today the reality is that his thinking (...) has been very advanced and developed, leading to his ideas becoming highly influential in modern thought. His simple philosophies of avoiding pain, living a simple life, and learning has made much of his philosophy appealing and influential. An important Indian philosophy called "Charvaka" is that this world is the only reality. Out of the four human values — Dharma, Artha, Kama, and Moksha — they advocate the pursuit of karma only, and Artha merely as a means of facilitating the purpose. For Charvaka, the goal of human life is to achieve the maximum amount of pleasure in this life and to avoid as much pain as possible. Good life is the most enjoyable life. Good action is one that leads to a balance of pleasure, and bad action is one that causes more pain than pleasure. Today, consumerism is pervasive, the real spirit for any developing economy is to develop consumerism-driven products and marketing practices, and it is inevitable that the interests of consumers in general will be safeguarded. Consumerism believes that personal well-being and happiness depends to a very large extent on the level of personal consumption, in particular on the purchase of material goods. The idea is not simply that well-being depends on a standard of living above a certain threshold, but that consumption and material possessions are at the center of happiness. It is an attempt of this paper to see the relationship between these philosophies and to try to find common characteristics that lead man to live a happy and satisfying life. (shrink)

The present joint contribution offers a tentative comprehensive re-interpretation of Pāṇini’s rule A 2.3.46, and shows how that rule teaches the application of the nominative ending without making use of the notion of “subject,” a notion that belongs to other grammatical systems, but not to Pāṇini’s. We discuss the controversial domain of some segments of its wording by attempting to adhere to Pāṇini’s framework and his usus scribendi. In particular, we read the first constituent of the compound prātipadikārtha­ liṅgaparimāṇavacana­ as (...) a genitive depending on a dvandva made up of three constituents, i.e., artha­, liṅga­, and parimāṇavacana­, and we take parimāṇa­ as denoting a quantity that, combining with vacana­, is substantially equivalent to the concept of grammatical number in modern linguistics. We finally show that our reading of A 2.3.46 is able to generate the nominative endings affixed to the subject and predicate of a nominal sentence: as a consequence, nominal sentences might actually not have been neglected by Pāṇini. (shrink)

If the good is what people desire or strive after, the Indian thinkers very early on developed a theory of hierarchy of goods: these are artha (material wealth), kāma (pleasure), dharma (righteousness), and mokṣa (spiritual freedom). Leaving aside the question about precisely how the first two in this list have to be ranked, one might suggest that the first two are what human beings do strive after, while the last two are what they ought to strive after. Such a (...) distinction between what human beings in fact strive after and what they ought to strive after is indicated in a distinction between the śreya (morally good) and the preya (pleasant) found in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, although it may have to be conceded that the is – ought distinction did not come to the forefront of Hindu moral thinking. One may as a matter of fact construct an argument to prove that even mokṣa, the supreme value, is not a mere ought – to‐be. The argument would run as follows: we do want to get rid of pain and enjoy a state of happiness. This natural desire, by implication, may be extended to a complete freedom from pain and enjoyment of an uninterrupted state of bliss (even if no one ordinarily posits this as his or her goal). It is only on reflection, and after reaching the first two goals and finding oneself dissatisfied with them, that one self‐consciously posits the last two goals – the third to begin with and, as a result of experiencing a similar dissatisfaction once it has been reached, subsequently the fourth and highest good, which is not a mere ought‐to‐be but an ideal state of being. If the English phrase “the highest good” translates into niḥśreyasaḥ in Sanskrit, then mokṣa is that state of excellence than which there is nothing greater and which leaves, upon attainment, nothing else to be desired. (shrink)

Since time immemorial Indian culture has been upholding a symbiotic relationship between man and environment. It has led to the all round evolution of Indian culture as an integral whole. This assimilation has been possible due to the spiritual vision of Indian seers. Every Culture is based upon certain values. In India values are usually discussed in the context of the principal ends of human life (chatuspurusartha): dharma (moral value), artha (political and economic values), kama (sensual value) and moksha (...) (spiritual value). Indian cultural tradition shaped human behaviour in accordance with these values, which impinged ecological issues as well. Again, Indian classification of value is based on two percepts. These are (1) the essential infinitude and divinity of all souls and (2) the essential oneness and solidarity of universe and all life. Supreme being resides in all; hence no area of life is alien to spiritual influence. It emphasizes the presence of an infinite knowledge, power, purity and bliss behind the body-mind complex of human beings, which is called Atman. Upanisads express this truth as Aham Brahmasmi (I am Brahman) or Ayam Atma Brahma (the individual soul is Brahman) or Tat Twam Asi (thou art that). Acceptance of the presence of God in everything led Indian culture to maintain and protect the natural harmonious relationship between human beings and nature. Moreover, Indians discovered the essential unity of all existence. The universe is holistic. Here at the deeper level of all pervading consciousness everything in the world is interconnected. Oneness of the entire reality is the basic presupposition and the guiding principle of the spiritualistic approach of Indian culture. The paper is an attempt to show that the holistic view of Indian culture is mirrored in the philosophy of ecology. (shrink)