Contains essays by different authors on Arius Didymus. Also contains parallel text in Greek and English of fragments attributed to Arius Didymus, preserved in Stobaeus's Eclogues. Translation of Arius Didymus by Georgia Tsouni.

This edition of volume 1 in the series Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities concerns Hellenistic ethics.

Starting from an abstract sketch of scenarios for philosophical reception stimulated by disagreement and school rivalry, part one of this chapter highlights the case of an older, marginalized position that tries to reinsert itself into the debate through radical modernization of its terminology and argumentative strategies and thereby triggers various forms of orthodox response. Part two discusses examples for this scenario extracted from some of the remains of the Peripatetic ethical literature of the late Hellenistic era (Critolaus, Arius (...) class='Hi'>Didymus). Challenging the traditional picture of contamination and decline in the development of the Peripatetic school, the chapter demonstrates how the reception of Stoic concepts and strategies by Peripatetic modernizers and the subsequent more orthodox approaches created an intellectually fruitful dynamic exemplifying different styles of reception. (shrink)

This paper is a first publication on my ongoing research on the sources of the extant doxographies on Stoic ethics. It argues that there are identifiable traces of a copy-and-paste strategy in the “Outline of Stoic Ethics” generally attributed to Arius Didymus and transmitted in Johannes Stobaeus’ Anthology. The author of the Outline took extant doxographic texts and supplemented it by inserting additional material. The editing process also resulted in transpositions, omissions, and rewriting to connect the original material (...) with the accretions to it. This kind of source criticism is important because sometimes there is still an identifiable train of thought that can be restored, and the relation of parallel accounts, their sources, and the choices of individual source authors can be spelled out more precisely. (shrink)

This book provides a collection of sources, many of them fragmentary and previously scattered and hard to access, for the development of Peripatetic philosophy in the later Hellenistic period and the early Roman Empire. It also supplies the background against which the first commentator on Aristotle from whom extensive material survives, Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. AD 200), developed his interpretations which continue to be influential even today. Many of the passages are here translated into English for the first time, (...) including the whole of the summary of Peripatetic ethics attributed to 'Arius Didymus'. (shrink)

From the Hellenistic period we have two extensive texts of great interest which draw on Aristotle’s ethical works. One is Antiochus’ system of ethics in Cicero’s De Finibus V; the other is the long account of “the ethics of Aristotle and the other Peripatetics” in Stobaeus’ Eclogae II, 116-152, plausibly ascribed to Arius Didymus. Antiochus’ ethics is consciously “eclectic” in the sense that he is using a variety of ethical material and approaches, Aristotelian and other, to create something (...) of his own. Arius, however, professes to be telling us what Aristotelian ethics is, and scholars have been disconcerted to find something so different from any idea we have of Aristotelian ethics. We find a text in which material clearly taken from the ethical works and the Politics has been not just summarized but recast in terms that are clearly Stoic. Most strikingly, before we get to what we recognize as Aristotelian material we find a long section developing in an Aristotelian context what seems clearly to be the Stoic notion of oikeiōsis. Either Arius, or more likely the Peripatetic source he is following, has presented Aristotle’s ethics in a very changed form. Since we have no hope of pinpointing a particular Peripatetic source for the passage, I shall for convenience refer to “Arius” or “the Arius passage,” but the person or people with whom we are concerned are more likely to be, in fact, Arius’ source or sources. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Platonic Ethics: Old and NewEve Browning ColeJulia Annas. Platonic Ethics: Old and New. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pp. vii + 196. Cloth, $35.00Readers of Plato's dialogues in our time are almost unanimously affected by what Annas here calls "the developmental thesis." We bring to Plato's texts as a dogma the [End Page 114] view that his doctrines evolved over time, that later dialogues return to problems (...) unsuccessfully addressed in earlier dialogues, and in short that the Platonic corpus as a whole should be arranged as a kind of intellectual "Bildungsroman." The early and inconclusive explorations of Socrates give way to mature and expansive metaphysical doctrines, which in turn are tested and revised in subsequent works.This developmentalist dogma has dominated interpretations of Plato, with few exceptions (notably Paul Shorey), for a century and more. Yet this makes it a rather young dogma after all. Annas argues that it is a product of Victorian scholars, and especially targets the highly influential work of Benjamin Jowett (95 n.56). Jowett placed the Republic at the center of Plato's works and interpreted others backward and forward from it. The influence of this developmental thesis has been sweeping and, Annas argues, unfortunate. Armed with it, we are reluctant to consider the doctrines of the dialogues on their own terms; we make problems for one dialogue with concerns expressed in quite another; we tend to force our readings to fit the progressive picture and distort the works in the process.To achieve some distance from developmentalism and other modern preconceptions and dogma, Annas proposes listening with an open mind to ancient readings of Plato, especially those of the so-called Middle Platonists. Most modern students of ancient philosophy have been accustomed to discount these ancients as either too marginal to deserve a hearing or too biased to be fair readers. (In addition, access to their works in reliable texts and translations has been impossible until quite recently.)But such ancient readers as Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus, Philo, and Numenius have (Annas argues) much to offer.First, they are active participants in an ongoing intellectual conversation about "eudaimonism," or the sufficiency of virtue for happiness. They comfortably engage Plato in this conversation as a proponent of eudaimonism. This is as true for the Plato of Republic and Laws as for the earlier dialogues. These older readers of Platonic ethics demonstrate that it is indeed possible to discern a unified view of the relation between goodness and happiness, without violence to the texts. While Plato may speak with "many voices," as Arius Didymus averred, this does not entail that he held "many doctrines" (9).Another modern shibboleth which the older readers can help us dislodge concerns the proper understanding of the Republic. We have tended to classify it as political theory (and in this are supported by the Library of Congress, as Annas points out). While recognizing the hefty core of more individual ethical thinking which goes into the definition of justice in the soul, we have insisted that the "Fairest City" is a serious utopian project description and should shape and contain the Republic's ethical teachings. Here too the ancients were much less inhibited than we; most of them cheerfully ignore the city-building and attend mainly to the implications for moral life. Annas finds this not only salubrious and unity-supporting but more faithful to the text, whose political content she finds "brief and underdeveloped" (82).Many readers will find the treatment of Republic's political significance (or lack thereof) objectionable. Many readers will also find the idea of relinquishing developmentalism to be unappealing or even frightening. But Annas makes a strong case for [End Page 115] seriously consulting the ancient readers if only for their medicinal value; they can "... wake us from our developmental slumbers" (165). Moreover, she provides a friendly and accessible entree to their world, one which will be of value to many modern readers who have been mystified by them heretofore.All texts quoted are in translation, and the occasional bits of original texts are transliterated. An extremely helpful "cast of characters" (which everyone will be tempted to xerox and... (shrink)

The present study partly supports, partly corrects, and partly complements recent discussions of Arius Didymus fr. 23 and fr. 25 Diels, Aetius I, 20, 1 and Sextus Empiricus AM X, 3-4 = PH III, 124. It proposes a comprehensive interpretation of the first text (A.I), defends the attribution of its content to Zeno of Citium (A.II), interprets the Stoic definitions of space, place and void to be found in the other sources (B.I) and again vindicates the attribution of (...) the core definitions to Zeno (B.II). The central methodological principle is the presumption of innocence for sources.The main conclusions of (A) are: 1. Arius Didymus' fr. 23 deals only with the coherence and the structure of the cosmos, not with its immobility; 2. The coherence of the cosmos, as that of any object, is determined by its hexis which pushes its parts towards its centre; 3. The structure of the cosmos, its stratification into the four concentric spheres of the elements, is determined by the combined effect of (a) the thrust downwards they all undergo from the cosmos' hexis; (b) their own natural weight or lightness and (c) the relative quantitative values of these weights or lightnesses; 4. The reasons adduced against Zeno's authorship are not based on the evidence but on the now prevalent disparaging sceptical approach towards Stobaeus' way of excerpting from Arius.The main conclusions of (B) are: 1. There is no deep contradiction between the various de finitions of space ascribed by our sources to Zeno, Chrysippus and the Stoics in general: what Chrysippus denied was the form of the de finition attributed to Zeno by Aetius, not the concept de fined, even though this form seems to have prevailed later in the school; 2. There is no good reason therefore to question its ascription to Zeno as some modern researchers have done; 3. Here again the error is due to a predominantly sceptical approach towards the reliability of our sources. (shrink)

My ultimate purpose here is to examine, discuss, and interpret a difficult excerpt in Stobaeus’ 5th c. AD anthology, alleging to report—uniquely, it appears—a distinction Chrysippus drew between three different applications of the term stoixe›on or element (i.e., physical element).1 Stobaeus lists this passage as giving opinions specifically of Chrysippus “about the elements out of substance” (per‹ t«n §k t∞w oÈs€aw stoixe€vn), though in holding them he says Chrysippus was following Zeno, the leader of his sect. Hermann Diels (1879) identified (...) this selection as an excerpt (his fr. 21) from Arius Didymus’ late first century BC Epitome of Physical Doctrines.2 I print a translation below, with the text in an Appendix, as it is given in von Arnim (1903). The text is not without its problems, and I indicate in footnotes to the text which of the principal editors’ textual interventions I accept and follow in my translation. Whether this text presents a single, continuous excerpt from Arius Didymus, or instead some compilation of Stobaeus (or an earlier anthologist whose work Stobaeus employed) from dispersed passages of.. (shrink)

RESUMO: Tradução dos passos 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B da Epitome de Etica Estoica, do filósofo estoico e doxógrafo alexandrino Ário Dídimo. Não há traduções em língua moderna das obras completas de Ário Dídimo. Assim, para esta tradução, usamos a fixação da exposição sobre a ética estoica presente em Estobeu, realizada por Pomeroy. A seção que traduzimos versa sobre o conceito estoico de excelência, explicando o que ela é, quais as virtudes que dela participam, e como. Por antítese, Ário Dídimo também elucida o (...) conceito estoico de vício, o que ele é e qual a sua taxonomia. ABSTRACT: Translation of 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B of the Epitome of Stoic Ethics by the Stoic philosopher and Alexandrian doxographer Arius Didymus. There are no translations of Arius Didymus' complete works into modern languages. Thus for this translation we utilized Pomeroy's fixation of the exposition of Stoic ethics found in Stobaeus' Florilegium. Parts 2.7.5A- 2.7.5B deal with the Stoic concept of excellence, explaining what excellence is, what virtues participate in it, and how. Arius Didymus also explains the Stoic concept of vice, what it is, and its taxonomy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Platonic Ethics: Old and NewEve Browning ColeJulia Annas. Platonic Ethics: Old and New. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pp. vii + 196. Cloth, $35.00Readers of Plato's dialogues in our time are almost unanimously affected by what Annas here calls "the developmental thesis." We bring to Plato's texts as a dogma the [End Page 114] view that his doctrines evolved over time, that later dialogues return to problems (...) unsuccessfully addressed in earlier dialogues, and in short that the Platonic corpus as a whole should be arranged as a kind of intellectual "Bildungsroman." The early and inconclusive explorations of Socrates give way to mature and expansive metaphysical doctrines, which in turn are tested and revised in subsequent works.This developmentalist dogma has dominated interpretations of Plato, with few exceptions (notably Paul Shorey), for a century and more. Yet this makes it a rather young dogma after all. Annas argues that it is a product of Victorian scholars, and especially targets the highly influential work of Benjamin Jowett (95 n.56). Jowett placed the Republic at the center of Plato's works and interpreted others backward and forward from it. The influence of this developmental thesis has been sweeping and, Annas argues, unfortunate. Armed with it, we are reluctant to consider the doctrines of the dialogues on their own terms; we make problems for one dialogue with concerns expressed in quite another; we tend to force our readings to fit the progressive picture and distort the works in the process.To achieve some distance from developmentalism and other modern preconceptions and dogma, Annas proposes listening with an open mind to ancient readings of Plato, especially those of the so-called Middle Platonists. Most modern students of ancient philosophy have been accustomed to discount these ancients as either too marginal to deserve a hearing or too biased to be fair readers. (In addition, access to their works in reliable texts and translations has been impossible until quite recently.)But such ancient readers as Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus, Philo, and Numenius have (Annas argues) much to offer.First, they are active participants in an ongoing intellectual conversation about "eudaimonism," or the sufficiency of virtue for happiness. They comfortably engage Plato in this conversation as a proponent of eudaimonism. This is as true for the Plato of Republic and Laws as for the earlier dialogues. These older readers of Platonic ethics demonstrate that it is indeed possible to discern a unified view of the relation between goodness and happiness, without violence to the texts. While Plato may speak with "many voices," as Arius Didymus averred, this does not entail that he held "many doctrines" (9).Another modern shibboleth which the older readers can help us dislodge concerns the proper understanding of the Republic. We have tended to classify it as political theory (and in this are supported by the Library of Congress, as Annas points out). While recognizing the hefty core of more individual ethical thinking which goes into the definition of justice in the soul, we have insisted that the "Fairest City" is a serious utopian project description and should shape and contain the Republic's ethical teachings. Here too the ancients were much less inhibited than we; most of them cheerfully ignore the city-building and attend mainly to the implications for moral life. Annas finds this not only salubrious and unity-supporting but more faithful to the text, whose political content she finds "brief and underdeveloped" (82).Many readers will find the treatment of Republic's political significance (or lack thereof) objectionable. Many readers will also find the idea of relinquishing developmentalism to be unappealing or even frightening. But Annas makes a strong case for [End Page 115] seriously consulting the ancient readers if only for their medicinal value; they can "... wake us from our developmental slumbers" (165). Moreover, she provides a friendly and accessible entree to their world, one which will be of value to many modern readers who have been mystified by them heretofore.All texts quoted are in translation, and the occasional bits of original texts are transliterated. An extremely helpful "cast of characters" (which everyone will be tempted to xerox and... (shrink)

On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus. by William W. Fortenbaugh Theophrastus of Eresus on his Life and Work. by William W. Fortenbaugh; Pamela M. Huby; Anthony A. Long Theophrastean Studies on Natural Science, Physics and Metaphysics, Ethics, Religion and Rhetoric. by William W. Fortenbaugh; Robert W. Sharples Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos. by William W. Fortenbaugh; Peter Steinmetz Theopharastus His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings. by William W. Fortenbaugh; Dimitri Gutas Theophrastus of Eresus Sources (...) for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. by William W. Fortenbaugh; Pamela M. Huby; Robert W. Sharples; Dimitri Gutas. (shrink)

This article examines the citation of Didymus’ ‘first’ commentary on Pindar's Paeans in Ammon. Diff. 231 Nickau. It argues that the commentary on the Paeans was the first volume in Didymus’ commentary to all of Pindar.

Arius maintains that the Father must produce the Son without any pre-existing ingredients (ex nihilo) because no such ingredients are available to the Father. Athanasius denies this, insisting not only that the Father himself becomes an ingredient in the Son, but also that the Son inherits his divine properties from that ingredient. I argue, however, that it is difficult to explain exactly how the Son could inherit certain properties but not others from something he is not identical to, just (...) as it is difficult to explain the precise way that a statue inherits certain properties but not others from the lump of bronze it is made from. (shrink)

In this article I argue for a change to the text of Stobaeus’ doxography of Stoic ethics. I propose we emend it by reference to a parallel text in the Scholia in Lucianum. In order to make that argument, I offer a new assessment of the value of the scholiast's report of Stoic doxography – a report that, at least in virtue of its length ought to be better known to scholars of Stoicism than it currently is.

Cui bono? Cherchez la femme! These ancient maxims offer counsel to the investigator of an unsolved murder or some inexplicable pattern of behaviour. They advise the pursuit of what has come more recently to be known as a form of lateral thinking. The puzzle may not best be solved by an intensification of the examination of the immediate data. The primary clue may lie out of sight somewhere further back. Financial advantage or sexual attraction, which does not show up as (...) a feature of the immediate situation, may be the hidden motive of the traditionally male agent's actions. When that is recognized, the otherwise inexplicable phenomena may become intelligible. (shrink)

As is well known, the work of Aristarchus on Homer is not preserved by direct tradition. We have instead many fragments preserved mainly in the Homeric scholia, the Byzantine Etymologica and the Homeric commentaries by Eustathius of Thessalonica. These fragments go back to the so-called Viermännerkommentar, the ‘commentary of the four men’, a commentary that is dated to the fifth-sixth century c.e. and collects the works of Aristonicus, Didymus, Nicanor and Herodian. In the first century b.c.e. Aristonicus explained the (...) meaning of Aristarchus’ critical signs in a treatise called Περὶ τῶν σημείων τῶν τῆς ᾿Ιλιάδος καὶ ᾿Οδυσσείας, while in the Περὶ τῆς ᾿Αρισταρχείου διορθώσεως Didymus studied Aristarchus’ Homeric recension. In the second century c.e. two more scholars, Herodian and Nicanor, dealt with Aristarchus while analysing questions of prosody in the Homeric language or the punctuation of the Homeric text. Not all of these four ‘men’ are equally important, however, as sources for Aristarchus. In fact, Herodian and Nicanor had aims that were quite independent of Aristarchus’ enterprise: the former was concerned with problems of prosody, accentuation and aspiration in Homer, whereas the latter had developed a new system of punctuation to elucidate the Homeric text from a syntactic point of view. Although both Herodian and Nicanor did take an interest in Aristarchus, their focus was thus different from that of their Alexandrian predecessor. The goal of Aristonicus and Didymus, on the other hand, was specifically to reconstruct Aristarchus’ work on Homer; it is for this reason that they are considered the most trustworthy witnesses for Aristarchus’ fragments. (shrink)

Didymus, in modern works of reference, gets rather a good press. It is conceded on all sides that he was not an original researcher and that his remarks often betray a certain want of common sense. But the general estimate is favourable: more recent works do not substantially dissent from Sandys’ verdict : ‘The age of creative and original scholars was past and the best service that remained to be rendered was the careful preservation of the varied stores of (...) ancient learning; and this service was faithfully and industriously rendered by Didymus.’ His industry is, of course, beyond question. But it is perhaps surprising that his reputation for accuracy did not drop sharply with the publication of the Berlin papyrus of the,the defects of which cast grave doubt on his reliability and general competence. (shrink)

Didymus, in modern works of reference, gets rather a good press. It is conceded on all sides that he was not an original researcher and that his remarks often betray a certain want of common sense. But the general estimate is favourable: more recent works do not substantially dissent from Sandys’ verdict : ‘The age of creative and original scholars was past and the best service that remained to be rendered was the careful preservation of the varied stores of (...) ancient learning; and this service was faithfully and industriously rendered by Didymus.’ His industry is, of course, beyond question. But it is perhaps surprising that his reputation for accuracy did not drop sharply with the publication of the Berlin papyrus of the,the defects of which cast grave doubt on his reliability and general competence. (shrink)

The letter from Arius to Alexander of Alexandria, also known as «Arius’ profession of faith», has been transmitted in its original language, Greek, by Athanasius (De Synodis) and Epiphanius (Panarion). Also, Hilary of Poitiers quotes a Latin translation of the letter twice (De Trinitate IV and VI). The comparative study of the two Greek versions and the Latin translation reveals small textual variants, which points to the independence of the three testimonies. The textual variant (κτιστὴν, instead of κριτὴν) (...) is the most interesting; it comes from a Greek version that has not been preserved. However, our work has been able to reconstruct this lost textual variant using an ancient and forgotten conjecture of Erich Klostermann. (shrink)

Traditionally attributed to Didymus the Blind, this anonymous work on the Trinity found in the Cod. Rom. Angel. gr. 116, has no certain authorship. The article throws light on the numerous parallels among the so-called De Trinitate and passages from Basil, the two Gregorys, Athanasius, the pseudo-Basilian books IV and V of the Adversus Eunomium, as well as from some writings of Cyril of Alexandria. Even though the question of the paternity of De Trinitate is still destined to remain (...) clouded, the parallels pointed out by the Author tend definitely to exclude Didymus as the author of this anonymous theological tract. (shrink)

This groundbreaking monograph on Bardaisan, his relation to Origen, and his Middle Platonic framework has argued, through a painstaking analysis of all evidence, that Bardaisan was a Christian Middle Platonist, a philosophical theologian who built a Logos Christology, possibly the first supporter of apokatastasis, and there is a close relation between Origen, Bardaisan, their thought, and their traditions [further proofs in an edition with essays: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming]. This monograph (and a related HTR essay) was received far beyond the field (...) of patristics, among others by P. Crone (Princeton IAS). * Dedication Page (page 5) * Table of Contents (page 7) * Preface (page 11) * 1 By way of Introductory Essay: Methodological Guidelines (page 17) * 2 Critical and Comparative Analysis of the Sources (page 45) o 1 The Very First Possible Witness: Clement (page 45) o 2 Two Early Witnesses Close to Origen and Very Appreciative of Bardaisan: Africanus and Didymus (page 46) + 2.1 Julius Africanus’ Acquaintance with both Bardaisan and Origen (page 46) + 2.2 The Origenian Didymus the Blind: The Most Appreciative Source on Bardaisan (page 56) o 3 Hippolytus (page 62) o 4 The Liber Legum Regionum (page 70) o 5 Porphyry and the Utmost Importance of His Fragments from Bardaisan: The Cosmic Christ, Middle Platonism, and a Christian Reading of the Timaeus (page 107) + 5.1 The Fragments from Bardaisan’s De India in Porphyry’s De Styge (page 107) + 5.2 Bardaisan’s Work in Porphyry’s De Abstinentia (page 124) o 6 Achilles Tatius and the Knowledge of Bardaisan in Late-Second-Century Alexandria (page 126) o 7 The Acts of Thomas (page 127) o 8 A Very Positive Witness: the Origenian Eusebius (page 131) o 9 The Origenian Gregory of Nyssa and His Own Work Against Fate (page 138) o 10 Diodore of Tarsus and His Closeness to Origens Eschatology and Refutation of Fate (page 142) o 11 Bardaisan’s Fight Against Marcionism (page 161) o 12 Jerome’s Parallel Turn: From Admirer to Criticizer of both Origen and Bardaisan (page 164) o 13 The Dialogue of Adamantius and the Portrait of a Bardaisanite (page 168) o 14 Ephrem between Documentation and Misunderstandings (page 172) o 15 Transition: The Transformation and Worsening of Bardaisan’s Image (page 254) o 16 Epiphanius’ Information: A ‘Mixed Bag’ (page 255) o 17 Two Heresiological Accounts Deriving from Epiphanius’ (page 261) o 18 Sozomen (page 262) o 19 Theodoret’s Account (page 266) o 20 Interesting Clues in a Very Appreciative Armenian Witness: Moses of Chorene (page 269) o 21 Philoxenus of Mabbug, an Anonymous, Isho’dad, and the Assimilation of Bardaisan to Valentinus or Mani (page 303) o 22 Rabbula and Theodoret (page 307) o 23 Appreciation of Bardaisan in a Local Source: the Chronicon of Edessa (page 312) o 24 The So-Called Cosmological Traditions: Importance and Methodological Guidelines. Barhadbshabba ‘Arbaya, Plus Comparisons with (Ps.) Maruta and Jacob of Edessa (page 314) o 25 Theodore Bar Konai (page 328) o 26 Theodore Abû Qurra (page 338) o 27 Moses Bar Kepha (page 339) o 28 (Ps.) John of Dara (page 347) o 29 Agapius and the So-Called Third Cosmological Tradition (page 352) o 30 Michael the Syrian’s Cosmological Testimony (page 353) o 31 Barhebraeus’ Cosmological Account (page 354) o 32 Mutaman ad-Dawla (page 355) o 33 From the “Cosmological Traditions'' to Other Doxographies and the Biographical Accounts. Masudi’s Biographical Information (page 355) o 34 The Fihrist and Arabic Sources on Bardaisan’s Anti-Dualism (page 358) o 35 Michael the Syrian’s Biographical Account (page 366) o 36 Barhebraeus (page 374) o 3 Conclusions and Contribution to Research (page 379) o Essential Bibliographical References on Bardaisan (page 381) o Index (page 389) . (shrink)

In this follow up to The Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle, Peter L. P. Simpson centers his attention on the basics of Aristotelian moral doctrine as found in the Great Ethics: the definition of happiness, the nature and kind of the virtues, pleasure, and friendship. This work's authenticity is disputed, but Simpson argues that all the evidence favors it. Unlike the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle wrote the Great Ethics for a popular audience. It gives us insight less into Aristotle the (...) theoretician than into Aristotle the pedagogue. For this reason, the Great Ethics has distinct advantages as an introduction to Aristotelian ethical thinking: it is simpler and clearer in its argumentation, matters such as the intellectual virtues are made suitably secondary to the practical focus, the moral virtues come through with a pleasing directness, and the work's syllogistic formalism gives it a transparency and accessibility that the other Ethics typically lack. Arius' Epitome, which relies heavily on this work, helps confirm its value and authenticity. Because the Great Ethics is generally neglected by scholars, less has been done to clear up its obscurities or to expose its structure. But to ignore it is to lose another and more instructive way of approaching and appreciating Aristotle's teaching. The translation is prefaced by an analytic outline of the whole, and the several sections of it are prefaced by brief summaries. The commentary supplies fuller descriptions and analyses, sorting out puzzles, removing misunderstandings, and resolving doubts of meaning and intention. This book is a fresh rendition of the work of the preeminent philosopher of all time. (shrink)

The concept of πρoπαειαι or "pre-emotions" is known not only to the Roman Stoics and Christian exegetes but also to Philo of Alexandria. Philo also supplies the term πρoπαεια at QGen 1.79. As Philo cannot have derived what he knows from Seneca, nor from Cicero, who also mentions the point, he must have found it in older Stoic writings. The πρoπαεια concept, rich in implications for the voluntariness and phenomenology of the passions proper, is thus confirmed for the Hellenistic period. (...) It is not to be expected that Philo's handling of this or any concept will necessarily conform to the usage of his Stoic sources. His evidence is nonetheless of great value where it coincides with that of other witnesses. In QGen 4.73 the emphasis falls upon involuntariness and the mechanisms of impression and assent as in Epictetus fr. 9. The πρoπαεια saves the virtuous person's insusceptibility to emotion exactly as it does for the Stoic spokesman in Gellius NA 19.1; this point is of some interest in view of the Christological use of this concept in Origen and Didymus. QGen 1.55 and 3.56 indicate that the occurrence of the πρoπαειαι is dependent upon uncertainty, and further, that for Philo, as for Seneca in Ira 2.3.4, a thought not acted upon can count as a πρoπαεια. In QGen 4.15-17 and 1.79, Philo indicates that hope and perhaps laughter may be related to joy as πρoπαεια to παoς; these assertions are not paralleled in extant Stoic texts. Further, in QGen 2.57, he names "biting and contraction" as the ευπαεια corresponding to grief, supplying a helpful parallel for Cic. Tusc. 3.83 and Plut. Virt. Mor. 449a. The topic may well have been discussed by Posidonius, as suggested by Cooper and others, but Posidonius' attested innovations are rather different in character from the points which have caught the attention of Philo. Taking together the indirect evidence of Philo, Seneca, and Cicero, we may reasonably infer that the πρoπαεια concept belonged already to an earlier period of Stoicism. (shrink)

The doctrine of creation out of nothing was conceptually sharpened as the Church Fathers engaged the cosmological views of their opponents. This article discusses the emergence of this doctrine in the second century, focusing on the polemic of Irenaeus against the Gnostics. For Irenaeus, creatio ex nihilo was already a part of the “rule of truth,” which provided a hermeneutical key to the scriptures. Irenaeus also used rational arguments to show that Gnostic cosmologies obscured, rather than explained the origins of (...) the world. A different challenge arose in the fourth century, when Arius began to teach that the Son was created out of nothing, thereby treating the divine act of the generation of the Son analogously to the creating of the world. Athanasius of Alexandria introduced an important distinction by correlating the eternal generation of the Son with the divine essence and the creation of the world with the will of the Father. (shrink)

This article further examines the literary relationship between the De Trinitate falsely attributed to Didymus the Blind and the works of Cyril of Alexandria, aside from their common philosophical citations. The highlighted similarities of these two authors cannot be explained by a common source; on the contrary, they indicate a direct dependence of one author upon the other. Their analysis shows that words, turns of phrase and ideas which are typical of Cyril and often occur in his writings are (...) each used only once by Pseudo-Didymus. This evidence weighs heavily in favour of Cyril’s antecedence. In fact, the anonymous author of the De Trinitate has been influenced, in addition to fourth-century doctrinal treatises, by Cyril’s De sancta Trinitate dialogi, an anti-Arian work dating from the 420s. He also assimilated several other Cyrillian features, and was even inspired by Cyril’s anti-Arian Christology in his doctrine on the Holy Spirit. Cyril of Alexandria, therefore, has priority over Pseudo-Didymus, both chronologically and theologically. (shrink)

Interest in νομαστìκωμδєȋν began early. Even before the compilation of prosopo-graphical κωμδούμєνο in the second century B.C., Hellenistic study of Aristophanes had devoted attention to the interpretation of personal satire. The surviving scholia contain references to Alexandrian scholars such as Euphronius, Eratosthenes and Callistratus which show that in their commentaries and monographs these men had dealt with issues of νομαστì κωμδєȋν Much material from Hellenistic work on Old Comedy was transmitted by later scholars, particularly by Didymus and Symmachus in (...) their variorum editions, and was eventually embodied in the scholia, though of course in an abridged and sometimes distorted form. Many of our fragments of Old Comedy, preserved in the scholia or in medieval works of reference as parallels to passages in Aristophanes, are direct evidence of the long ancient tradition of interest in the genre's large element of personal satire. What we find in the scholia should not therefore be treated as representative only of the latest and most derivative stages of ancient scholarship. It is the purpose of this article to argue that the scholia on Aristophanes allow us to see that in matters of νομαστì κωμδєȋν certain assumptions about the nature of this type of comic material were persistently made by ancient scholars, and that certain interpretative habits were consequently developed from them. It is my further aim to suggest that this pattern of interpretation has been widely but unjustifiably perpetuated in later work on Aristophanes. (shrink)

The concept of o or "pre-emotions" is known not only to the Roman Stoics and Christian exegetes but also to Philo of Alexandria. Philo also supplies the term o at QGen 1.79. As Philo cannot have derived what he knows from Seneca (despite his visit to Rome in 39), nor from Cicero, who also mentions the point, he must have found it in older Stoic writings. The o concept, rich in implications for the voluntariness and phenomenology of the passions proper, (...) is thus confirmed for the Hellenistic period. It is not to be expected that Philo's handling of this or any concept will necessarily conform to the usage of his Stoic sources. His evidence is nonetheless of great value where it coincides with that of other witnesses. In QGen 4.73 the emphasis falls upon involuntariness and the mechanisms of impression and assent as in Epictetus fr. 9. The o saves the virtuous person's insusceptibility to emotion exactly as it does for the Stoic spokesman in Gellius NA 19.1; this point is of some interest in view of the Christological use of this concept in Origen and Didymus. QGen 1.55 and 3.56 indicate that the occurrence of the o is dependent upon uncertainty, and further, that for Philo, as for Seneca in Ira 2.3.4, a thought not acted upon can count as a o. In QGen 4.15-17 and 1.79, Philo indicates that hope and perhaps laughter may be related to joy as o to o; these assertions are not paralleled in extant Stoic texts. Further, in QGen 2.57, he names "biting and contraction" as the shrink)

Professor Christopher Stead was Ely Professor of Divinity from 1971 until his retirement in 1980 and one of the great contributors to the Oxford Patristic Conferences for many years. In this paper I reflect on his work in Patristics, and I attempt to understand how his interests diverged from the other major contributors in the same period, and how they were formed by his philosophical milieu and the spirit of the age. As a case study to illustrate and diagnose his (...) approach, I shall focus on a debate between Stead and Rowan Williams about the significance of the word idios in Arius's theology (in the course of which I also make some suggestions of my own about the issue). (shrink)

Little is known about the harmonic theorist Archestratus (probably early 3rd century BC). Our only substantial information comes from Porphyry, who quotes a brief comment by a certain Didymus on his epistemological stance, and seeks to justify it through reflection on a rather startling technical doctrine which Archestratus propounded; and from Philodemus, who comments scathingly on his view of the relation between harmonic theory and philosophy. Neither passage is easy to interpret; this paper tries to make sense of them, (...) and to set them in an intelligible relation to one another. It argues that the doctrine recorded by Porphyry becomes comprehensible when it is placed against the background of Aristoxenus' work in harmonics, and it discusses Porphyry's inferences about the way in which his epistemological position diverged from that of Aristoxenus. It argues that Philodemus' report gives evidence of Archestratus' interest in issues of central concern to philosophy and in particular of an engagement with Aristotelian thought; it tries to identify some specific questions which attracted his attention, and to explain how he seems to have answered them, and why. It suggests that the two reports can be brought together as elements in a single, though fragmentary picture, and finally that Archestratus can be assigned an interesting though minor role in the history of Peripatetic philosophy and science. (shrink)

This article first deals with Pantaenus’s mission to India, which began in Alexandria through the private initiative of Pantaenus, the teacher of Clement who was also well known to Origen. In the age of Athanasius (fourth century), another mission to India was organised in Alexandria, and this time the bishop himself took the initiative to send missionaries. Meanwhile in Alexandria the episcopacy had gained strength, and the head of the Didaskaleion – Didymus, a follower of Origen – was then (...) appointed by the bishop, whereas neither Pantaenus nor Clement were so appointed. The article also discusses to which “India” the mission was directed. Generally, it is considered to have been Ethiopia, but in fact it might have been India. (shrink)

This book is primarily a study of what we can learn about Didymus the Blind from a careful analysis of the Tura Papyri. The story of these Papyri, their origin, their being hidden,...

As the apparent variant is in the text, Ludvvich alters the scholion into S0009838800018516_inline1, which has not been found in any MS. so far. The only noticeable point prima facie about S0009838800018516_inline2 is that it is an S0009838800018516_inline3 . Therefore I would read S0009838800018516_inline6. Ludwich's index to his A.H.T. gives cases of the omission of ov or OVK in the scholia. We need not restrict S0009838800018516_inline7 There is too much tendency to restrict usage in matters of language. At one time (...) it was believed that μxs22EFποτε was the property of Didymus! S0009838800018516_inline8 ‘passage’ does not occur in the scholia we possess, τόπος however does . Compare the note on H 96S0009838800018516_eqnU1xs22EFν xs1F04λλxs1FF3 xs1F51βριταxs22EF. We must supply in sense χωρxs22EFxs1FF3, for the reference is to Callim. Del. 69, where this is the meaning of xs22EFπειλητxs22EFρες. (shrink)

As the apparent variant is in the text, Ludvvich alters the scholion into, which has not been found in any MS. so far. The only noticeable point prima facie about is that it is an. Therefore I would read. Ludwich's index to his A.H.T. gives cases of the omission of ov or OVK in the scholia. We need not restrict There is too much tendency to restrict usage in matters of language. At one time it was believed that μ⋯ποτε was (...) the property of Didymus! ‘passage’ does not occur in the scholia we possess, τόπος however does. Compare the note on H 96⋯ν ἄλλῳ ὑβριτα⋯. We must supply in sense χωρ⋯ῳ, for the reference is to Callim. Del. 69, where this is the meaning of ⋯πειλητ⋯ρες. (shrink)

This article will attempt to show that from the beginning of the letter of Eusebius of Nicodemia to Paulinus of Tyre, the meaning of ὁμοούσιος should be sought in the opposition on the part of the Council of Nicea to the divisive doctrine of hypostases by Arius and his followers. The assertion of the similarity or identity of nature or ousia between the Father and the Son that ὁμοούσιος suggests is traceable to the teaching of Alexander of Alexandria, but (...) also of Eusthatius of Antioch, so that it could be thought that in Nicea a convergence between the two major opponents of Arius could have taken place, in the same way in which it had occurred over the Antiochene formula of 325. Analysis of the doctrine of ὁμοούσιος by Athanasius confirms that the term was opposed to the divisive interpretation of the hypostases within Arianism. The second part of the article, takes into consideration the study on the interpretation of the Nicene ὁμοούσιος proposed by P. F. Beatrice. The Author argues that Beatrice’s thesis, which attempts to trace the introduction of the term in the Nicene Creed back exclusively to Constantine, with the agreement of Eusebius of Caesarea, is not backed by the documentation at our disposal. (shrink)