RÉSUMÉBeaucoup ont soutenu qu'il n'y a pas de place pour des expériences scientifiques dans les sciences naturelles d'Aristote : les expériences interviennent dans la nature, mais Aristote soutient que nous devons simplement observer la nature; si nous intervenions, le résultat serait quelque chose d'artificiel ou contraire à la nature. Contre cela, je soutiens qu'Aristote a non seulement effectué des expériences scientifiques, mais a également maintenu qu'il y a beaucoup de connaissances sur la nature qui peuvent être découvertes expérimentalement.

Many philosophers adopt methods that emulate those of the natural sciences. For them, this position, which they call naturalism, defines the indispensable set of starting points for fruitful debate in various areas. In spite of this consensus, however, little is ever said about the way naturalism depends on the primary idea of nature. If we understand this dependency of naturalism on underlying accounts of nature, we would be in a better position to recognize and evaluate different kinds of naturalism. (...) In this research monograph, I undertake a sustained study of the concept of nature to answer this need. I examine in detail how conceptual, historical, and scientific constraints affect, and are in turn affected by, the concept of nature in various domains of philosophy, and I relate the conceptual framework of scientific inquiry back to the lived experience that is proper to everyday self-understanding. The method I use is conceptual analysis. I begin with an evaluation and justification of this method, and then present the fundamental idea that forms the backbone of the entire book, namely the idea of complexification of concepts in the course of history. I present the four main views on nature that have dominated Western thought: the dynamic view, related primarily to Aristotle’s approach, the mechanistic view, the Romantic view, and the evolutionary view. From here, I engage in a detailed inquiry into the fundamental ideas of explanation and causation, defending a pluralist account for both. I then examine carefully the intricate relation between things and the meaning of the words we use to describe them. I show how we can acknowledge the emergence of complex properties from simpler ones within an overall evolutionary view of nature. I also explore how concepts concerning the nature of things are related to values. The final chapter deals with an objection that arises from those who claim that the empirical method is the only one available for our knowledge of nature. I show that the value of conceptual analysis, as used in this book, remains unharmed by this objection. We need to accept that, in the course of history, the concept of nature has become complexified, multilayered, and increasingly loaded with internal tension because of its many relations to different areas of our conceptual scheme. (shrink)

Although Aristotle's contribution to biology has long been recognized, there are many philosophers and historians of science who still hold that he was the great delayer of natural science, calling him the man who held up the Scientific Revolution by two thousand years. They argue that Aristotle never considered the nature of matter as such or the changes that perceptible objects undergo simply as physical objects; he only thought about the many different, specific natures found in perceptible objects. (...) Against this view, this book argues that Aristotle offers a systematic account of matter, motion, and the basic causal powers found in all physical objects. It argues that Aristotle not only sees all perceptible objects as sharing certain basic physical properties, but he also holds that perceptible objects have these physical properties because they are ultimately made from physical matter of one kind or another. Finally, it argues that for Aristotle the basic properties of matter, including the basic properties of the material elements, cannot be understood teleologically. (shrink)

The paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s view on scientific inquiry as problem solving. It tackles passages where Aristotle emphasises the role that the problem-solving activity has in science, and where he describes the history of humans’ problem-solving activity and the historical development of natural science as a problem-solving activity. Further, the paper examines Aristotle’s practice of raising, assessing and solving problems as well as the heuristic procedures he employs to move from ignorance to scientific knowledge. Finally, (...) it raises a question about Aristotle’s view on the epistemic status of scientific definitions: does Aristotle conceive of the definitions, which are the results of scientific inquiries, as truths or rather as plausible hypotheses that may or may not be true? (shrink)

An overview is provided of how the concept of the thought experiment has developed and changed for the natural sciences in the course of the 20th century. First, we discuss the existing definitions of the term 'thought experiment' and the origin of the thought experimentation method, identifying it in Greek Presocratics epoch. Second, only in the end of the 19th century showed up the first systematic enquiry on thought experiments by Ernst Mach's work. After the Mach's work, a (...) negative attitude towards thought experiments came in the beginning of the 20th century, which went on until the Thomas Kuhn's and Karl Popper's work on thought experiments. Only from the mid-1980s did thought experiments begin to be considered relevant to scientific enterprise. Finally, we show the existing empirical and 'functional' theories which have developed about the nature and purpose of thought experiments. (shrink)

Aristotle argued that in theory one could acquire knowledge of the natural world. But he did not stop there; he put his theories into practice. This volume of new essays shows how Aristotle's natural science and philosophical theories shed light on one another. The contributors engage with both biological and non-biological scientific works and with a wide variety of theoretical works, including Physics, Generation and Corruption, On the Soul, and Posterior Analytics. The essays focus on a number (...) of themes, including the sort of explanation provided by matter; the relationship between matter, teleology, and necessity; cosmic teleology; how an organism's soul and faculties relate to its end; how to define things such as sleep, void, and soul; and the proper way to make scientific judgments. The resulting volume offers a rich and integrated view of Aristotle's science and shows how it fits with his larger philosophical theories. (shrink)

Some experimental results in science are productively surprising or beautiful. Such results are disruptive in their epistemic nature: by violating epistemic expectations they mark the phenomenon at hand as worthy of further investigation. Could it be that there are emotions beyond these two which are also useful for the epistemic evaluation of scientific experiments? Here, I conduct a structured sociological survey to explore affective experiences in scientific experimental research. I identify that learning the results of an experiment (...) is the high emotional point in the experimenting process. Thus, experimental results can be challenging, beautiful, or boring, and they can worry, amuse, make one sad, and so on. They can also drive meta-cognitive evaluations as well as motivate specific research-related actions. From this, I advance two claims: that emotions beyond surprise and disruptive beauty are epistemically useful in empirical research, and that emotions help to overcome specific challenges of reasoning about new experimental results. (shrink)

This dissertation is a collection of essays exploring the role of metaphor in Aristotle’s scientific method. Aristotle often appeals to metaphors in his scientific practice; but in the Posterior Analytics, he suggests that their use is inimical to science. Why, then, does he use them in natural science? And what does his use of metaphor in science reveal about the nature of his scientific investigations? I approach these questions by investigating the epistemic status of metaphor in (...) Aristotelian science. In the first essay, I defend an interpretation of metaphor as a type of heuristic reasoning: I claim that Aristotle uses metaphor to express conditions an explanation in natural science must meet if it is to explain regular, ordered change. These conditions specify the kinds of causes—particularly unmoved efficient causes—which the inquirer into nature is seeking. In the second essay, I look to Aristotle’s use of certain endoxa or common beliefs as explanatory principles in science, and show that his use of these principles is similar to his use of metaphor. In the final essay, I present a historical study of the analogy of art and nature, and I suggest that by looking to how the Greeks understood the role of inquiry in the arts, we can shed some light on Aristotle’s views concerning the method of inquiry he thinks the natural scientist should adopt. (shrink)

“Beauty is truth, truth beauty, –that is allYe know on earth, and all ye need to know”.Hippias of Elis travels throughout the Greek world practicing and teaching the art of making beautiful speeches. On a rare visit to Athens, he meets Socrates who questions him about the nature of his art. Socrates is especially curious about how Hippias would define beauty. They agree that "beauty makes all beautiful things beautiful," but when Socrates presses him to say precisely what he means, (...) Hippias is unable to deliver such a definition. The more Socrates probes, the more absurd the responses from Hippias become. This is one of Plato's best comedies and one of his finest efforts at posing the difference between particular things and universals.Aristotle's Poetics is best known for its definition and analysis of tragedy, but it also applies to truth and beauty as they are manifested in the other arts. In our age when the natural and social sciences have dominated the quest for truth, it is helpful to consider why Aristotle claimed "poetry is more philosophical and more significant than history." In this postmodern era when the arts have been separated from ethics, it is worthwhile to consider Aristotle's way of connecting goodness and beauty. (shrink)

Contributors; Preface; Introduction; Part I. Instruments in Experiments: 1. Scientific instruments: models of brass and aids to discovery; 2. Glass works: Newton’s prisms and the uses of experiment; 3. A viol of water or a wedge of glass; Part II. Experiment and Argument: 4. Galileo’s experimental discourse; 5. Fresnel, Poisson and the white spot: the role of successful predictions in the acceptance of scientific theories; 6. The rhetoric of experiment; Part III. Representing and Realising: 7. ’Magnetic curves’ (...) and the magnetic field: experimentation and representation in the history of a theory; 8. Artificial clouds, real particles; 9. Living in the material world; 10. Justification and experimentation; Part IV. The Constituency of Experiment: 11. Extraordinary experiment: electricity and the creation of life in Victorian England; 12. Why did Britain join CERN?; Part V. Hallmarks of Experiment: 13. From Kwajalein to Armageddon? Testing and the social construction of missile accuracy; 14. The epistemology of experiment; Select bibliography; Name index; Subject index. (shrink)

An English language translation accompanies the original Greek text of Aristotle's book about the nature of the state, constitutions, revolutions, democracy, and oligarchy.

Through an exploration of theoretical physics, this paper suggests the need for regrounding natural science in phenomenological philosophy. To begin, the philosophical roots of the prevailing scientific paradigm are traced to the thinking of Plato, Descartes, and Newton. The crisis in modern science is then investigated, tracking developments in physics, science's premier discipline. Einsteinian special relativity is interpreted as a response to the threat of discontinuity implied by the Michelson-Morley experiment, a challenge to classical objectivism that Einstein sought (...) to counteract. We see that Einstein's efforts to banish discontinuity ultimately fall into the “black hole” predicted in his general theory of relativity. The unavoidable discontinuity that haunts Einstein's theory is also central to quantum mechanics. Here too the attempt has been made to manage discontinuity, only to have this strategy thwarted in the end by the intractable problem of quantum gravity. The irrepressible discontinuity manifested in the phenomena of modern physics proves to be linked to a merging of subject and object that flies in the face of Cartesian philosophy. To accommodate these radically non-classical phenomena, a new philosophical foundation is called for: phenomenology. Phenomenological philosophy is elaborated through Merleau-Ponty's concept of depth and is then brought into focus for use in theoretical physics via qualitative work with topology and hypercomplex numbers. In the final part of this paper, a detailed summary is offered of the specific application of topological phenomenology to quantum gravity that was systematically articulated in The Self-Evolving Cosmos (Rosen 2008a). (shrink)

"Von Natur aus ist der Mensch ein politisches Wesen". Diese Einsicht sprach Aristoteles als erster aus. Die begriffliche Fassung der unterschiedlichen Formen staatlicher Organisation und seine Untersuchungen darüber, welche von ihnen der Bestimmung des Menschen am besten entspräche, begründen die Wissenschaft von der Politik und bilden noch heute ihr Fundament.

Discusses the experiments of Aristotle, William Beaumont, Robert Norman, Stephen Hales, Konrad Lorenz, Galileo, Robert Boyle, Theodoric of Freibourg, Louis Pasteur, Ernest Rutherford, A.A. Michelson, E.W. Morley, F. Jacob, E. Wollman, J.J. Gibson, A.L. Lavoisier, Humphrey Davy, J.J. Thomson, Isaac Newton, Michael Faraday, J.J. Berzelius, and Otto Stern.

Practical realism is focused on the problem of how science really works. In the case of physics and chemistry, experiment is the centrepiece of scientific practice. The rapid development of contemporary natural science does not leave the experiment unaffected. The classical experiment is normally applied only to systems that can be considered structurally stable, repeatability being the key feature. After the introduction of the theoretical basis of irreversibility by Ilya Prigogine the essence of the experiment changed. The strict (...) requirement of repeatability has to be dropped. It will be discussed, whether the change is big enough for calling it revolutionary. There are means to update the understanding of the experiment by applying the experimental settings. The material experiment will probably be with us forever but its position on the scientific landscape will be shifted. (shrink)

An English language translation accompanies the original Greek text of Aristotle's book about the nature of the state, constitutions, revolutions, democracy, and oligarchy.

This chapter is an examination of the way aporiai are employed in Aristotle’s scientific account of animal reproduction, and how they are resolved. I argue that – surprising as it may be, given what Aristotle says in Metaphysics B about the importance of going through aporiai – there seems to be nothing of much significance about his use of them, at least if we assume that genuine cases of aporiai are being tracked by use of aporia-language. I demonstrate this (...) negative thesis by systematically going through the examples. There seems to be no common purpose for which they are raised, they have no single type of structure, and they are not caused by any one sort of difficulty. (shrink)

Through a detailed analysis of the various modes of argumentation employed by Aristotle throughout his natural scientific works, I aim to contribute to the growing scholarship on the relation between Aristotle’s theory of science and his actual scientific practice. I challenge the standard reading of Aristotle as a methodological empiricist and show that he permits a variety of non-empirical arguments to support controversial theses in properly scientific contexts. Specifically, I examine his use of logical (logikôs) argumentation (...) in the discussion of mule sterility in Generation of Animals II 8, rational (kata ton logon) argumentation in his discussion of cardiocentrism throughout the biological works, and the method of division in Posterior Analytics II 13. (shrink)

The eighth book of Aristotle's Physics is the culmination of his theory of nature. He discusses not just physics, but the origins of the universe and the metaphysical foundations of cosmology and physical science. He moves from the discussion of motion in the cosmos to the identification of a single source and regulating principle of all motion, and so argues for the existence of a first `unmoved mover'. Daniel Graham offers a clear, accurate new translation of this key text in (...) the history of Western thought, and accompanies the translation with a careful philosophical commentary to guide the reader towards an understanding of the wealth of important and influential arguments and ideas that Aristotle puts forward. (shrink)

A new translation of Aristotle's classic work on the natural sciences.

This 1983 book is a lively and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of natural science, organized around the central theme of scientific realism. It has two parts. 'Representing' deals with the different philosophical accounts of scientific objectivity and the reality of scientific entities. The views of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Putnam, van Fraassen, and others, are all considered. 'Intervening' presents the first sustained treatment of experimental science for many years and uses it to give a new (...) direction to debates about realism. Hacking illustrates how experimentation often has a life independent of theory. He argues that although the philosophical problems of scientific realism can not be resolved when put in terms of theory alone, a sound philosophy of experiment provides compelling grounds for a realistic attitude. A great many scientific examples are described in both parts of the book, which also includes lucid expositions of recent high energy physics and a remarkable chapter on the microscope in cell biology. (shrink)

In the first two books of the Physics Aristotle discusses philosophical issues involved in the investigation of the physical universe. He introduces his distinction between form and matter and his fourfold classification of causes or explanatory factors, and defends teleological explanation. These books therefore form a natural entry into Aristotle's system as a whole, and also occupy an important place in the history of scientific thought. The present volume provides a close literal translation, which can be used by (...) serious students without Greek. The introduction and commentary deal with the interpretation and assessment, from a philosophical standpoint, of what Aristotle says. This translation was first published in 1970. (shrink)

Part I deals with language and knowledge. Chapter 1: Plato’s Cratylus presents two opposing views of meaning—naturalism and conventionalism—and finds both wanting. Aristotle’s De Interpretatione offers a compromise between these views: the relations between written and spoken words and between spoken words and mental states are conventional, but that between mental states and the objects they represent is natural. Chapter 2: Aristotle holds a correspondence theory of truth, and he treats necessity as a property that a statement has in (...) relation to what it asserts. These are important for his claim that scientific knowledge must be derived from necessarily true first principles. Chapter 3: Posterior Analytics argues that the human mind is so related to the world that it is able to grasp the basic categories and kinds existing in reality. Modrak rejects as overly Cartesian the intuitionist interpretation of nondemonstrative knowledge of first principles and universal concepts; instead, she argues, Aristotle is an empiricist and moderate realist: really existing kinds cause humans to know them through sense-experience and induction. But it remains mysterious how they are able to do this. Chapter 4: Aristotle’s three types of demonstrative science—mathematics, natural science, and first philosophy—are all empirically based. The method of dialectic employing endoxa complements this empirical approach. (shrink)

How was the hypothetical character of theories of experience thought about throughout the history of science? The essays cover periods from the middle ages to the 19th and 20th centuries. It is fascinating to see how natural scientists and philosophers were increasingly forced to realize that a natural science without hypotheses is not possible.

Since the 19th century many philosophers have argued, that metaphysics will have no more function at all. But the concept of metaphysics has many aspects. It must not only be understood as a system, based on everlasting principles. In the following article it is used in the sense of a philosophical cosmology. The startingpoint are the sciences, which exclude by their method the observer in his subjectivity; their view of the world must remain incomplete. Philosophical cosmology therefore has the task (...) to complete the scientific interpretation of reality by other perspectives and to connect them with one another. The unity of reality as well as that of human experience forbids a side by side of different “Sprachspiele”. A philosophical cosmology therefore develops an interpretation of reality which embraces the scientific view of the world as well as the observer in his subjectivity and those relations, which are determined by it. Already Leibniz has tried to integrate both perspectives; in the 20th century, under new conditions, especially Whitehead has developed a philosopical cosmology. For a modern concept of metaphysics it is characteristic, that it is not a system, but a permanent process, in which all relevant experiences of man in a certain epoch are synthesized. (shrink)

In the first book of Physics, Aristotle is concerned with the question “What is Being?” Ti to on? The determinations of Being are obtained from our experience of things in movement: on kinoumenon. His discussion on Being and One, on matter and form, on subject and privation, etc. does not differ from metaphysics. Contents of the translated chapters: 1. Method, 2-3. Theories of the Presocratic physicists on the principles of nature; the essent exists not as one the way Parmenides and (...) Melissus supposed; the multiplicity of Being, 7. Analysis of becoming: the pair of contraries presupposes something third – a substratum, 9. Not-Being as the condition of becoming: Aristotle’s notion of matter. (shrink)

A presentation showing how the statements which relate to microphysical objects as they are different from the statements of classical mechanics is made. The determinism of classical and of quantum-mechanical theories is qualified. A (crucial) distinction between causality and determinism is given. Detailed analyses of diffraction as a result of single and double-slit demonstrations point to paradoxes arising from the use of particle or wave models, respectively, for photons and electrons. The compromising wave-packet model is underscored. The meanings for the (...) Psi-function and for |ψ|2 are presented, with an explanation of the limitations that arise from giving an interpretation of |ψ|2 as a probability. The meaning of ψ -waves is analyzed. A case is made for the ψ -function's describing a well-ordered list of betting odds, based on previous statistical experiences, for the different results of specific experiments of a microscopic object of study with macroscopic apparatus. The Schrödinger wave equation is evaluated for meaning and judged as a deterministic expression. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this article we will explain and defend the proposition: “A statement which prescribes the conditions for its verification is a scientific statement.” We will confine our consideration to factual statements alone, although it may be true that our proposed proposition refers to formal, analytic statements also.If prescribing the conditions for its verification is the only necessary qualification for a statement to be scientific then obviously the means of arriving at such a statement is irrelevant. It does not (...) matter whether we have performed many experiments or none before making a scientific statement. There are, of course, reasons for having a systematic method of arriving at the formulation of scientific statements, but this does not make them more, or less, scientific. (shrink)

Bringing together the latest scientific advances and some of the most enduring subtle philosophical puzzles and problems, this book collects original historical and contemporary sources to explore the wide range of issues surrounding the nature of life. Selections ranging from Aristotle and Descartes to Sagan and Dawkins are organised around four broad themes covering classical discussions of life, the origins and extent of natural life, contemporary artificial life creations and the definition and meaning of 'life' in its most (...) general form. Each section is preceded by an extensive introduction connecting the various ideas discussed in individual chapters and providing helpful background material for understanding them. With its interdisciplinary perspective, this fascinating collection is essential reading for scientists and philosophers interested in astrobiology, synthetic biology and the philosophy of life. (shrink)

This book addresses central issues in the philosophy and metaphysics of science, namely the nature of scientific theories, their partial truth, and the necessity of scientific laws within a moderate realist and empiricist perspective. Accordingly, good arguments in favour of the existence of unobservable entities postulated by our best theories, such as electrons, must be inductively grounded on perceptual experience and not their explanatory power as most defenders of scientific realism claim. Similarly, belief in the reality of (...) dispositions such as causal powers which ground the natural necessity of scientific laws must be based on experience. Hence, this book offers a synthetic presentation of an original metaphysics of science, namely a metaphysics of properties, both categorical and dispositional, while at the same time opposing strong versions of necessitarism according to which laws are true in all possible worlds. The main theses and arguments are clearly presented in a non-technical way. Thus, on top of being of interest to the specialists of the topics discussed, it is also useful as a textbook in courses for third year and more advanced university students. (shrink)

The question about the scientific nature of computing has been widely debated with no universal consensus reached about its disciplinary status. Positions vary from acknowledging computing as the science of computers to defining it as a synthetic engineering discipline. In this paper, we aim at discussing the nature of computing from a methodological perspective. We consider, in particular, the nature and role of experiments in this field, whether they can be considered close to the traditional experimental scientific (...) method or, instead, they possess peculiar and unique features. We argue that this experimental perspective should be taken into account when discussing the status of computing. We critically survey how the experimental method has been conceived and applied in computing, and some open issues that could be tackled with the aid of the history of science, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Prior to the nineteenth century, those who are now regarded as scientists were referred to as natural philosophers. With empiricism, science was claimed to be a superior form of knowledge to philosophy, and natural philosophy was marginalized. This claim for science was challenged by defenders of natural philosophy, and this debate has continued up to the present. The vast majority of mainstream scientists are comfortable in the belief that through applying the scientific method, knowledge will continue (...) to accumulate, and that claims to knowledge outside science apart from practical affairs should not be taken seriously. This is referred to as scientism. It is incumbent on those who defend natural philosophy against scientism not only to expose the illusions and incoherence of scientism, but to show that natural philosophers can make justifiable claims to advancing knowledge. By focusing on a recent characterization and defense of natural philosophy along with a reconstruction of the history of natural philosophy, showing the nature and role of Schelling’s conception of dialectical thinking, I will attempt to identify natural philosophy as a coherent tradition of thought and defend it as something different from science and as essential to it, and essential to the broader culture and to civilization. (shrink)

First published in 1997, this volume expands the analytical philosophical tradition in the face of parochial Anglo-American philosophical interests. The essays making up the section on 'Antiquity' share one concern: to show that there are largely unrecognised but radical differences between the way in which certain fundamental questions - concerning the nature of number, sense perception, and scepticism - were thought of in antiquity and the way in which they were thought of from the 17th century onwards. Part 2, on (...) early modern thought, explores the theoretical characterisation of the role of experiment in early modern physical theory through Galileo's embracing of experiments, along with Descartes' automata and issues in a relatively neglected but especially intractable part of Descartes' philosophy: how he conceives of what a successful inference consists in and what it is that makes it successful. The final section deals with the philosophical foundations of physical theory, the distinction between the human and the natural sciences, the philosophical-cum-scientific foundations of Marx's idea of socialism, and Nietzche's criticisms of the very notion of science, concluding that Nietzsche's probing questions cannot be dismissed, as he has opened up some genuinely challenging issues which we ignore at our peril. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the pattern of conceptual change during scientific revolutions by using methods from cognitive psychology. We show that the changes characteristic of scientific revolutions, especially taxonomic changes, can occur in a continuous manner. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts and the direct links between concept and taxonomy, we develop an account of conceptual change in science that more adequately reflects the current understanding that episodes like the Copernican (...) revolution are not always abrupt. When concepts are represented by frames, the transformation from one taxonomy to another can be achieved in a piecemeal fashion not preconditioned by a crisis stage, and a new taxonomy can arise naturally out of the old frame instead of emerging separately from the existing conceptual system. This cognitive mechanism of continuous change demonstrates the constructive roles of anomaly and incommensurability in promoting the progress of science. (shrink)

Homeopathy is one of the most widely practiced alternative systems of medicine in the world. Current scientific understanding is unable to explain its mode of action, and the therapy is often dismissed by detractors who claim—despite growing evidence to the contrary— that it is ineffective. While homeopathy’s philosophical foundations and the nature of its medicines differ markedly from those of its mainstream counterpart, biomedical researchers are nevertheless employing conventional methods to study it—including lab-based animal experimentation. This article considers the (...) implications of using violent methodology to investigate a gentle system of medicine founded on treating the individual and on doing no harm. (shrink)

Both science and philosophy are interested in questions of ontology- questions about what exists and what these things are like. Science and philosophy, however, seem like very different ways of investigating the world, so how should one proceed? Some defer to the sciences, conceived as something apart from philosophy, and others to metaphysics, conceived as something apart from science, for certain kinds of answers. This book contends that these sorts of deference are misconceived. A compelling account of ontology must appreciate (...) the ways in which the sciences incorporate metaphysical assumptions and arguments. At the same time, it must pay careful attention to how observation, experience, and the empirical dimensions of science are related to what may be viewed as defensible philosophical theorizing about ontology. The promise of an effectively naturalized metaphysics is to encourage beliefs that are formed in ways that do justice to scientific theorizing, modeling, and experimentation. But even armed with such a view, there is no one, uniquely rational way to draw lines between domains of ontology that are suitable for belief, and ones in which it would be better to suspend belief instead. In crucial respects, ontology is in the eye of the beholder: it is Informed by underlying commitments with implications for the limits of inquiry, which inevitably vary across rational inquirers. As a result, the proper scope of ontology is subject to a striking form of voluntary choice, yielding a new and transformative conception of scientific ontology. (shrink)

There have been many images of experiment. The contemplative narratives of Aristotle served to illustrate hypotheses and arguments. There was no expectation that they be performed. Even in Galileo's dialogues, the distinction between real experiments and imaginary ones is not sharp (see galileo). During the seventeenth century, performance and public description became essential to the probative power of experiment. These made its methods and procedures transparent, allowing any reader of the narrative to be a virtual witness of an active (...) demonstration (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, pp. 22–79). Thus, by the end of the scientific revolution, illustrative narratives were distinguished from public accounts of experiment as the disciplined, systematic study of phenomena. Eventually this made the efficacy of thought experiments problematic (see Kuhn 1977, pp. 241–2, and thought experiments). As a source of experience of realms previously beyond the reach of the senses, real‐world experiment contributed to the rise of objective scientific knowledge. Harvey, Galileo, Hooks, Boyle, Newton, and other proponents of experimental natural philosophy established an important new mode of argumentation. (shrink)

Eine weit verbreitete Auffassung über die wissenschaftlichen Naturverständnisse besagt, dass ihre historische Entwicklung von einer zunehmenden Abgrenzung gegenüber der Magie begleitet gewesen sei. Ursprünglich eng mit der Magie verbunden, hätten sich die wissenschaftlichen Naturverständnisse in einem langwierigen Prozess immer weiter von der Magie entfernt, bis sie ihre heutige amagische Gestalt erhalten hätten. Mein Beitrag diskutiert einige Argumente zur Stützung dieser, wie ich meine, plausiblen Auffassung. / A whitespread view of the natural sciences holds that their historical development was accompanied (...) by a constantly widening gap between them and magic. Originally closely bound up with magic, the sciences are supposed to have distanced itself from it in a long-drawn-out process, until they attained their present magic-free form. This essay discusses some arguments in support of this plausible view. (shrink)

Ruth Myrtle Patrick was a pioneering ecologist and taxonomist whose extraordinary career at the Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia spanned over six decades. In 1947, an opportunity arose for Patrick to lead a new kind of river survey for the Pennsylvania Sanitary Water Board to study the effects of pollution on aquatic organisms. Patrick leveraged her already extensive scientific network, which included ecologist G. Evelyn Hutchinson, to overcome resistance within the Academy, establish a new Department of Limnology, (...) and carry out the survey, which was a resounding success and brought much needed money to the Academy. As demand for her expertise grew among industrial companies, such as the chemical company DuPont, Patrick became more active in the world of applied science. She repurposed data and instruments from her river surveys to run new experiments, test ecological theories, and conduct long-term ecological studies. Through these studies, she advanced an argument that biologist Thomas Lovejoy dubbed the “Patrick principle,” the idea that the ecological health of a body of water could be measured by the relative abundance and diversity of species living there. Patrick was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1970, became a board member of DuPont in 1975, and received two of the most prestigious awards in ecology: the Eminent Ecologist Award from the Ecological Society of America in 1972 and the Tyler Ecology Award in 1975. This article analyzes Patrick’s unusual success in bridging the worlds of science and industry and her unusual ability to cross, and redefine, the perceived boundary between basic and applied fields in biology. It argues that Patrick’s position at the Academy, an institution of natural history that was both willing and able to accept money from industrial corporations, is key to understanding her success in, and influence on, the field of river ecology. (shrink)

Hacking has maintained that in experiments phenomena are created, not discovered, and that scientific entities are tools for doing. These claims undermine the distinction between the natural and the artificial: phenomena and scientific entities become artifacts. Hacking's view raises the question whether the distinction between the natural and the artificial has to be given up. The paper argues 1) that phenomena are created, but in a sense that does not undermine the distinction between the (...) class='Hi'>natural and the artificial, 2) that scientific entities are used as tools instead of being tools, and 3) that Hacking's view on experiments may be reconciled with the traditional view provided the concept of nature be reinterpreted. (shrink)

The rich blend of theories and experiences that made the history of physics possible still now enlightens the scientific method. We stress the need to learn from this method the force of making its principles explicit, while developing a rich diversity of theories, which are often incompatible. Unity is preserved by common founding principles and their mathematical form, such as the understanding of conservation properties (energy, momentum etc.) in terms of symmetries. When moving from the inert to the living (...) state of matter, new challenges are posed, beginning with biological “heterogenesis”, as “genesis of and from diversity” in a changing space of pertinent observables and parameters: the Darwinian ecosystem. The question that is posed is how we may consistently embed the theories of the inert into biology. By naturalization we mean an analysis of physics as part of the sciences of nature, not as the science governing them all. In particular, the founding symmetry principles of physical theories, often used to “naturalize” (but, actually, to “physicalize”) other sciences, will instead be framed in more general dynamics which deal with fundamental changes of symmetries, as they apply, in our views, in all historical sciences, beginning with biology. This paper will accordingly explore the notion of (non-)conservative extension of theories in a precise mathematical sense. We stress a perspectival epistemology that promotes a dialogue of theories, in search for bridges or even unity, inspired by the method of “unification” at the core of major theoretical inventions in physics. Our main motivation is the need to go beyond the strong dualistic separation of space (or of the more general “phase space”) as a pre-given container of the dynamics of matter, that biased physics from Aristotle to Newton and, in a technically different way, even Einstein. (shrink)

This volume addresses the question of time from the perspective of the time of nature. Its aim is to provide some insights about the nature of time on the basis of the different uses of the concept of time in natural sciences. Presenting a dialogue between philosophy and science, it features a collection of papers that investigate the representation, modeling and understanding of time as they appear in physics, biology, geology and paleontology. It asks questions such as: whether or (...) not the notions of time in the various sciences are reducible to the same physical time, what status should be given to timescale differences, or what are the specific epistemic issues raised by past facts in natural sciences. The book first explores the experience of time and its relation to time in nature in a set of chapters that bring together what human experience and physics enable metaphysicians, logicians and scientists to say about time. Next, it studies time in physics, including some puzzling paradoxes about time raised by the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. The volume then goes on to examine the distinctive problems and conceptions of time in the life sciences. It explores the concept of deep time in paleontology and geology, time in the epistemology of evolutionary biology, and time in developmental biology. Each scientific discipline features a specific approach to time and uses distinctive methodologies for implementing time in its models. This volume seeks to define a common language to conceive of the distinct ways different scientific disciplines view time. In the process, it offers a new approach to the issue of time that will appeal to a wide range of readers: philosophers and historians of science, metaphysicians and natural scientists - be they scholars, advanced students or readers from an educated general audience. (shrink)

Hume’s Science of Human Nature is an investigation of the philosophical commitments underlying Hume's methodology in pursuing what he calls ‘the science of human nature’. It argues that Hume understands scientific explanation as aiming at explaining the inductively-established universal regularities discovered in experience via an appeal to the nature of the substance underlying manifest phenomena. For years, scholars have taken Hume to employ a deliberately shallow and demonstrably untenable notion of scientific explanation. By contrast, Hume’s Science of Human (...) Nature sets out to update our understanding of Hume’s methodology by using a more sophisticated picture of science as a model. (shrink)

The paper points to quite a surprising change of the attitude among general public towards science and scientific progress that seems to have happened at the turn of the 20th century, and, to an extent, stays on: from holding scientific enterprise in high esteem to treating scientists and fortune˗tellers on a par, from hopes that science will eventually resolve our problems, both theoretical and practical, to anxiety and fear of what scientific experiments can bring about in (...) nature and human life. After considering, in Part 1, possible reasons for this change, the paper focuses on supposedly real dangers associated with some particular scientific achievements. Part 2, “Physicist’s nightmares”, recalls some historical instances of the progress in physics, from the Manhattan Project to the opening of the Large Hadron Collider at CERN in 2008, fears that those experiments raised, and arguments ˗ both convincing and not quite so ˗ that were offered to reassure the public of their safety. Part 3, “Biologist’s dangerous plays”, turns to genetic engineering and certain fears this discipline raises which are captured in the term the “Frankenstein Syndrome”, e.g. the danger of genetically modified organisms getting to an unintended environment, or unexpected results of intended modifications. Here the paper offers some considerations regarding the notions of “intention” and “expectation”, which leads to fundamental doubts about plausibility of the conviction of the dangerous character of the research in question. Final conclusions point to a quite fundamental discrepancy between the power of science and the power of nature as the ultimate argument against exaggerated fears of scientific progress, and the post˗concluding remark offers additional support for it in terms of a brief theological observation for those who share Christian tradition. (shrink)