The endangered species Tokudaia osimensis has the unique chromosome constitution of 2n = 25, with an XO/XO sex chromosome configuration (2n = 25; XO). There is urgency to preserve this species and to elucidate the regulator(s) that can discriminate the males and females arising from the indistinguishable sex chromosome constitution. However, it is not realistic to examine this rare animal species by sacrificing individuals. Recently, true naïve induced pluripotent stem cells were successfully generated from a female T. osimensis, and the (...) sexual plasticity of its germ cells was elucidated. This achievement constitutes the basis of an attractive research area, including embryonic fate determination, sex determination, and factor(s) that can replace the Y chromosome. In this essay, concrete strategies to conserve rare animal species and to reveal their specific characteristics using other compatible and abundant animals are proposed. -/- . (shrink)

In his early essay, “Must We Mean What We Say”, Cavell argues that the claims of ordinary language philosophers regarding “what we say when” are not empirical generalizations about a given group of speakers but are rather to be understood as measuring the limits of what counts as a coherent act of thinking and speaking. Cavell’s charge against the skeptic about the external world is that he seeks to think and speak beyond these limits. In this paper I compare Cavell’s (...) response to the skeptic to Davidson’s. Both base their responses on a broadly Kantian approach that appeals to the conditions under which thinking or speaking about objects is possible. On this approach the skeptic isn’t giving a false answer to an intelligible question, but rather, the question to which the skeptic is giving an answer is shown to be in some way unintelligible. But while Davidson’s critique of the skeptic is based on the conditions of ascribing meaning to one’s words, and contents to one’s beliefs, Cavell’s critique is based on the failure of the skeptic to mean the words he uses in the way that he needs. This difference expresses an underlying disagreement about the meaning of “meaning”: for Davidson the world comes into view through the meaning of our words and concepts, through the contents of our beliefs; for Cavell, the world comes into view through the agreement in “criteria” that are a condition of applying words and concepts to the world. This difference illuminates what Cavell calls “the truth of skepticism”: the idea that “my relation to the world and to others in general is not one of knowing”. (shrink)

The propositional fragment L 1 of Leniewski's ontology is the smallest class (of formulas) containing besides all the instances of tautology the formulas of the forms: (a, b) (a, a), (a, b) (b,). (a, c) and (a, b) (b, c). (b, a) being closed under detachment. The purpose of this paper is to furnish another more constructive proof than that given earlier by one of us for: Theorem A is provable in L 1 iff TA is a thesis of first-order (...) predicate logic with equality, where T is a translation of the formulas of L 1 into those of first-order predicate logic with equality such that T(a, b) = FblxFax (Russeltian-type definite description), TA B = TA TB, T A = TA, etc. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 32-36.

Some researchers on binary choice inference have argued that people make inferences based on simple heuristics, such as recognition, fluency, or familiarity. Others have argued that people make inferences based on available knowledge. To examine the boundary between heuristic and knowledge usage, we examine binary choice inference processes in terms of attribute substitution in heuristic use (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). In this framework, it is predicted that people will rely on heuristic or knowledge‐based inference depending on the subjective difficulty of (...) the inference task. We conducted competitive tests of binary choice inference models representing simple heuristics (fluency and familiarity heuristics) and knowledge‐based inference models. We found that a simple heuristic model (especially a familiarity heuristic model) explained inference patterns for subjectively difficult inference tasks, and that a knowledge‐based inference model explained subjectively easy inference tasks. These results were consistent with the predictions of the attribute substitution framework. Issues on usage of simple heuristics and psychological processes are discussed. (shrink)

Inspired by Rick Grush's emulation theory, we reinterpreted a series of our neuroimaging experiments which were intended to examine the representations of complex movement, modality-specific imagery, and supramodal imagery. The emulation theory can explain motor and cognitive activities observed in cortical motor areas, through the speculation that caudal areas relate to motor-specific imagery and rostral areas embrace an emulator for amodal imagery.

Real-world walking activity is important for poststroke patients because it leads to their participation in the community and physical activity. Walking activity may be related to adaptability to different surface conditions of the ground. The purpose of this study was to clarify whether walking adaptability on an uneven surface by step is related to daily walking activity in patients after stroke. We involved 14 patients who had hemiparesis after stroke and 12 healthy controls. The poststroke patients were categorized as least (...) limited community ambulators or unlimited ambulators. For the uneven surface, the study used an artificial grass surface. The subjects repeated even surface walking and the uneven surface walking trials at least two times at a comfortable speed. We collected spatiotemporal and kinematic gait parameters on both the even and uneven surfaces using a three-dimensional motion analysis system. After we measured gait, the subjects wore an accelerometer around the waist for at least 4 days. We measured the number of steps per day using the accelerometer to evaluate walking activity. Differences in gait parameters between the even and uneven surfaces were calculated to determine how the subjects adapted to an uneven surface while walking. We examined the association between the difference in parameter measurements between the two surface properties and walking activity. Walking activity significantly and positively correlated with the difference in paretic step length under the conditions of different surface properties in the poststroke patients and step width in the healthy controls. The strategy of increasing the paretic step length, but not step width, on an uneven surface may lead to a larger base of support, which maintains stability during gait on an uneven surface in poststroke patients, resulting in an increased walking activity. Therefore, in poststroke patients, an increase in paretic step length during gait on an uneven surface might be more essential for improving walking activity. (shrink)

Previous studies have shown that people often use heuristics in making inferences and that subjective memory experiences, such as recognition or familiarity of objects, can be valid cues for inferences. So far, many researchers have used the binary choice task in which two objects are presented as alternatives (e.g., “Which city has the larger population, city A or city B?”). However, objects can be presented not only as alternatives but also in a question (e.g., “Which country is city X in, (...) country A or country B?”). In such a situation, people can make inferences based on the relationship between the object in the question and each object given as an alternative. In the present study, we call this type of task a “relationships‐comparison task.” We modeled the three inference strategies that people could apply to solve it (familiarity‐matching [FM; a new heuristic we propose in this study], familiarity heuristic [FH], and knowledge‐based inference [KI]) to examine people's inference processes. Through Studies 1, 2, and 3, we found that (a) people tended to rely on heuristics, and that FM (inferences based on similarity in familiarity between objects) well explained participants' inference patterns; (b) FM could work as an ecologically rational strategy for the relationships–comparison task since it could effectively reflect environmental structures, and that the use of FM could be highly replicable and robust; and (c) people could sometimes use a decision strategy like FM, even in their daily lives (consumer behaviors). The nature of the relationships–comparison task and human cognitive processes is discussed. (shrink)