The following essay explores critical post-humanism as elaborated by Stephan Herbrechter. Avoiding the simplistic, deterministic accounts of new technological developments—whether they predict impending apocalypse or future communication systems in which all of humanity becomes perfectly and peacefully united—Herbrechter's analysis reminds us that the democratization of subjects requires an ongoing, persistent deconstruction of the anthropocentric values all too often linked to recent trends in social media, artificial intelligence, genetic enhancements, predictive analytics, digital surveillance, and so on.

This book develops a new methodological approach to infinite otherness that explains how the affirmation of this otherness, despite our best intentions, tends to create a conflictual aspect in social values.

In Slavoj Žižek’s work two forms of violence, mythic and divine, are distinguished from one another by virtue of instrumental ends. In the former case violence serves the establishment of the social order, whereas in the latter case, which is non-instrumental, the violence is an expression of pure justice. It is also important to observe that these two forms of violence respond differently to the singularity of our existence, insofar as the instrumental disavows and neutralizes the inhuman dimension that exists (...) within each of us. But if there is something limitless or immeasurable apropos of the inhuman, then such distinctions between the mythic and the divine become problematic. I will therefore contend in the essay below that the catastrophic predictions derived from such distinctions need further interrogation. (shrink)

There are two concepts of sovereignty in Derrida’s work: the classical form that posits itself as absolute mastery, whether by means of surveillance, technology, or “truth”; and the more paradoxical, subversive form inspired by Nietzsche and Bataille that simultaneously inhabits and exceeds the control mechanisms imposed upon it. One of the questions that I will pursue throughout this essay is whether such a distinction is valid. As there is something immeasurable apropos of Derrida’s second concept, I will contend that any (...) distinction between it and the first concept is not only “undecidable” but ultimately impossible to make. (shrink)

There are two concepts of sovereignty in Derrida’s work: the classical form that posits itself as absolute mastery, whether by means of surveillance, technology, or “truth”; and the more paradoxical, subversive form inspired by Nietzsche and Bataille that simultaneously inhabits and exceeds the control mechanisms imposed upon it. One of the questions that I will pursue throughout this essay is whether such a distinction is valid. As there is something immeasurable apropos of Derrida’s second concept, I will contend that any (...) distinction between it and the first concept is not only “undecidable” but ultimately impossible to make. (shrink)

This essay elaborates and engages an influential reading of the late Derrida as put forth in J. Hillis Miller's book For Derrida. Sensitive to the complicated ambiguities and nuances of Derrida's deconstructive philosophy, Miller elucidates how our common preconceptions are intimately bound up with the very facts of life which we do our best to marginalize and reject. Mourning, for example, cannot be so easily distinguished from melancholy when the loss of the other is impossible for us to completely work (...) through. Miller thus provides us with a careful analysis of precisely that which so often resists analysis, and does so in an accessible manner. I will nonetheless argue that the deconstructive project is susceptible to its own reifications, and that Miller's sharp delineation between the individual and community is one such example. (shrink)