In this article, I define solidarity as the willingness to share with people we do not know personally but whom we consider to be equal to ourselves on the basis of some common feature allowing for identification. In the spirit of David Hume, I explain how identification can be developed through a learning process that leads us to ever more encompassing forms of sympathy. Then I show how solidarity, thus defined, is implemented in the institutions of the welfare state. Finally, (...) I present arguments for not making solidarity too much dependent on responsible behaviour. (shrink)

In the previous issue of Ethical Perspectives David Heyd defends the permissibility of sex selection for non-medical reasons. He tries to show that there is nothing inherently wrong with this practice and that allowing it does not lead to undesirable consequences. There are several difficulties with his analysis, but the main objection is that it ultimately relies on a crude form of utilitarianism. Along with some critical comments on his article, we provide ethical arguments in support of the intuitive condemnation (...) of sex selection for non-medical reasons. (shrink)

Professor Jeurissen’s paper contains some interesting insights, but is disappointing by its very high level of generality. The relationship between micro, meso and macro levels in business ethics is an elusive topic and I have doubts about the usefulness of stories with such a very comprehensive scope. What is challenging in the field of business ethics — at least in my opinion — is not so much general or methodological stories, but the presentation and treatment of particular issues. General stories (...) in this field mostly yield contestable or even doubtful statements expressing the benevolence of the author rather than the state of the world. (shrink)

The collapse of communism and the transition to a market economy and political democracy in Eastern and Central Europe have been accompanied by an outburst of nationalist and patriotic passions. Most commentators see this as a negative phenomenon, a narrow-minded reaction to the void after a long period in which politics was inspired by ideological excess, or a retreat toward a mythical past when confronted with a highly uncertain future. Others look at it in a more positive way: after all (...) those years of mindless abstractions, should we not welcome this return to concrete, tangible commitments? But of course, especially in the Balkans, nationalism is so tangible that we would rather have a void than this frightening concrete reality. From an ethical point of view, patriotism and nationalism are suspect because most moral philosophers would like authentic ethical rules to be inspired by universalistic schemes of thought. On their view, morality and ethics are rational matters and as such they are threatened by strong emotional attachments.Although I distrust all forms of fanaticism and romanticism, I would like to argue that the communitarian criticism against universalistic ethical and contractarian political theory should be taken seriously. At the same time, I believe that the reference to communitarianism cannot be a permit for irrationalism, the glorification of unquestioned tradition or the creation of scapegoats. In an unmitigated form, neither a strict universalism or contractarianism, nor a myopic communitarianism look very attractive. The former neglects the problem of the motivation of the actors, the latter can be suspected of underestimating or completely ignoring the question of pluralism in contemporary society. Therefore I would plead for an amended communitarianism, and I would like to show that patriotism has some very desirable consequences as well, especially for an individualistic society. (shrink)

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Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

In his Law of Peoples, Rawls severely restricts our duties of justice towards the global poor. Many of his critics have replied that there actually exists a global basic structure and that hence the difference principle applies on a global scale.However the shipwrecked of globalization do not contribute in any substantial way to the creation of global wealth. We show that Martha Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan solution to this problem is unsatisfactory because it ignores scarcity as one of the circumstances of justice.If (...) the marginalized of progress want to raise a claim of justice rather than appeal to our beneficence, they can only do so on the basis of a principle of compensation: their fate has been deteriorated by the development of a global economy they did not ask for. Towards the end of the article we point at some typical blind spots in the treatment of these problems in the literature on international distributive justice: the idea that development problems can be solved merely by transfers of money and the presupposition that the gulf between rich and poor is growing all the time. (shrink)