In this paper I analyse different justifications for the claim that the minor premise of the libertarian argument is true, namely, intuition, van Inwagen’s argument from moral responsibility and an argument from rationality. I claim none of these is satisfactory. I conclude by suggesting a possible way of interpreting the meaning of the free will intuition libertarians claim we have.

Strategies purporting to determine the meaning of inner states of belief-content in terms of their inferential role usually assume the inner structure of the human inferential competence to be that of first order logic plus identity. Considerations of computational complexity and cumbersomeness of representation tend to undermine the plausibility of combining such strategies with this assumption. In this paper I contend that appealing to rules of default reasoning won’t make things turn out any better for the inferential role functionalist.

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents:IntroductionAntónio ZILHÃO: Folk-Psychology, Rationality and Human ActionJoão BRANQUINHO: The Problem of Cognitive DynamicsJ.P. MONTEIRO: Hume, Induction and Single ExperimentsMarco RUFFINO: The Primacy of Concepts and the Priority of Judgments in Frege's LogicJoão Vergílio Gallerani CUTER: Die unanwendbare Arithmetik des TractatusSílvio PINTO: Wittgenstein's Anti-PlatonismFernando FERREIRA: A Substitutional Framework for Arithmetical ValidityJ.R. CROCA & R.N. MOREIRA: Indeterminism Versus CausalismLuíz MONIZ PEREIRA: The Logical Impingement of Artifical Intelligence.

Evolutionary thinking has expanded in the last decades, spreading from its traditional stronghold – the explanation of speciation and adaptation in biology - to new domains. Fascinating pieces of work, the essays in this collection attest to the illuminating power of evolutionary thinking when applied to the understanding of the human mind. The contributors to_ Cognition, Evolution and Rationality_ use an evolutionary standpoint to approach the nature of the human mind, including both cognitive and behavioural functions. Cognitive science is by (...) its nature an interdisciplinary subject and the essays in this collection investigate the workings of the mind through a variety of disciplines including the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind, game theory, robotics and computational neuroanatomy. Topics covered range from general methodological issues to long-standing philosophical problems such as how rational human beings actually are. With contributions from leading experts in the areas involved, this book will be of interest across a number of fields, including philosophy, evolutionary theory and cognitive science. (shrink)

Evolutionary thinking has expanded in the last decades, spreading from its traditional stronghold – the explanation of speciation and adaptation in biology - to new domains. Fascinating pieces of work, the essays in this collection attest to the illuminating power of evolutionary thinking when applied to the understanding of the human mind. The contributors to_ Cognition, Evolution and Rationality_ use an evolutionary standpoint to approach the nature of the human mind, including both cognitive and behavioural functions. Cognitive science is by (...) its nature an interdisciplinary subject and the essays in this collection investigate the workings of the mind through a variety of disciplines including the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind, game theory, robotics and computational neuroanatomy. Topics covered range from general methodological issues to long-standing philosophical problems such as how rational human beings actually are. With contributions from leading experts in the areas involved, this book will be of interest across a number of fields, including philosophy, evolutionary theory and cognitive science. (shrink)

Ramseyan decision theory is the best explication of the philosophical model of folk-psychology. Davidson contends that its basic axioms are synthetic a priori truths of human psychology. This contention admits being reduced to the claim that human agents have to be regarded as rational betters. Tversky and Kahneman challenge this claim. Consideration of the evidence indicates that theory-contradicting interpretations of human actions make frequently more cognitive sense and are more 'commonsensical' than theory-preserving interpretations. Thus, the philosophical model of folk- psychology (...) fails in two ways: as an empirical theory of human action and as a model of our folk-psychological interpretive practices. (shrink)

Ramseyan decision theory is the best explication of the philosophical model of folk-psychology. Davidson contends that its basic axioms are synthetic a priori truths of human psychology. This contention admits being reduced to the claim that human agents have to be regarded as rational betters. Tversky and Kahneman challenge this claim. Consideration of the evidence indicates that theory-contradicting interpretations of human actions make frequently more cognitive sense and are more 'commonsensical' than theory-preserving interpretations. Thus, the philosophical model of folk- psychology (...) fails in two ways: as an empirical theory of human action and as a model of our folk-psychological interpretive practices. (shrink)

Both Quine and Davidson put forth programs of empirical semantics satisfying the conditions that characterize the so-called “standpoint of interpretation.” Quine’s less ambitious program of radical translation rests upon two buttresses: causality and empathy. Davidson’s more ambitious program of radical interpretation replaces causality with truth and empathy with rationality. Although the replacement of causality with intersubjective truth seems to me to be a fully justified move, I nevertheless contend that it is more realistic to develop the work of interpretation drawing (...) upon Quine’s less ambitious requirement of empathy than upon Davidson’s view of human agency as rational agency. In order to substantiate this contention, I present an argument to the effect that Davidson’s characterization of human agency as rational is not compatible with his other requirement that truth should pro-vide the essential link connecting speech with environment and action. (shrink)

INCONTINENCE, HONOURING SUNK COSTS AND RATIONALITY According to a basic principle of rationality, the decision to engage in a course of action should be determined solely by the analysis of its consequences. Thus, considerations associated with previous use of resources should have no bearing on an agent’s decision-making process. Frequently, however, agents persist carrying on an activity they themselves judge to be nonoptimal under the circumstances because they have already allocated resources to that activity. When this is the case, agents (...) are said to be honouring sunk costs. Honouring sunk costs is thus typically viewed as irrational economic behaviour. Two striking findings of the psychological literature on the sunk cost effect are that it is, in general, not lessened by having taken previously courses in economics, and that agents who did take such courses and that do honour sunk costs seem to be frequently aware of a cognitive dissonance in their behaviour. Davidson’s account of the possibility conditions of incontinent action renders continent action materially unfeasible. The very idea of incontinent action becomes thus a hollow one. I’ll present an alternative description of these possibility conditions that renders continent action materially feasible, and both, continent and incontinent action, cognitively plausible. In a nutshell, my proposal rests upon the drawing of an essential cognitive contrast between explicit processes of deliberative reasoning and lower level heuristic procedures. I conclude the paper arguing that my redescription of incontinent action accounts for the above mentioned cognitive dissonance effect better than the alternatives and that viewing at least an important subset of behaviours of honouring sunk costs as incontinent actions will enable us to consider them as peculiar manifestations of a more general and meaningful pattern in human behaviour. (shrink)

Esta dissertação encontra-se construída em torno de um núcleo central - a exposição, aná-lise e discussão do chamado 'Argumento da linguagem privada', de Wittengstein. A dinâmica própria da abordagem e discussão do tema leva necessariamente a percorrer o conjunto da obra de Wittengstein, o que motiva um notável aprofundamento do assunto e torna ainda mais aliciante este ensaio.

In this paper I suggest a reconstruction of the traditional concepts of con-tinent and incontinent action. This reconstruction proceeds along the lines of a standpoint of bounded rationality. My suggestion agrees with some relevant aspects of Davidson’s treatment of this topic. One of these aspects is that incontinent action is typically signalled by the following two subjective experiences: a feeling of surprise towards one’s own action and a difficulty in understanding oneself; another is that incontinence cannot simply be disposed of (...) in terms of some inability of the agent to avoid “succumbing to temptation”; still another is the view that inconti-nent action is common in real human affairs. But my suggestion dis-agrees with other relevant aspects of Davidson’s treatment of inconti-nence too. In particular, it avoids what I take to be its two major draw-backs. These are a view of continent action that falls prey to a com-pletely unrealistic concept of psychological rationality and the idea that incontinence necessarily involves a dimension of essential irrationality. (shrink)

The debate concerning human rationality has been revolving around four main standpoints: 1) Unbounded rationality, 2) Optimization under constraints, 3) Heuristics and biases, and 4) Ecological rationality. Typically, proponents of 3) and 4) criticize models 1) and 2) for their cognitive unrealism. However, many ethologists contend that it makes sense to account for data gathered in animal behaviour research along the lines defined by the latter models. Elaborating upon this contention, Stanovich suggested recently a fifth standpoint in this debate – (...) I’ll call it ‘Brute Rationality’. According to it, traditional rational choice models are more appropriate to account for the behaviour of creatures endowed with simple cognitive architectures rather than to account for human behaviour. In my talk, I´ll contend that the term ‘rationality’ is being used in this debate to cover too wide a semantic area. In fact, once one distinguishes the different meanings associated with it, the positions defining this debate reveal themselves to be much less clear than what is usually taken to be the case. (shrink)