A method is presented for deciding whether correct predictions about other people are based on simulation or theory use. The differentiating power of this method was assessed with cognitive estimation biases (e.g. estimating the area of Brazil) in two variations. Experiments 1 and 2 operated with the influence of response scales of different length. Experiment 3 used the difference between free estimates that tended to be far off the true value and estimates constrained by an appropriate response scale, where estimates (...) became greatly more realistic. The critical question is how well observer subjects can predict these target biases under two different presentation conditions. Response scale biases (Experiments 1 and 2) were more strongly predicted when observer subjects were presented with the two scales juxtaposed, than when responses for each scale were given independently. This speaks for the use of a theory, since simulation should, if there is any difference at all, be made more difficult by the juxtaposition of conditions. The difference between free and constrained estimations (Experiment 3) was more strongly predicted under independent than under juxtaposed presentation. This speaks for the use of simulation since use of a theory should, if anything, be helped by juxtaposition of problems since it helps highlight the theoretically relevant factor. Results are discussed in view of recent proposals about when simulation is likely to be used, i.e. for belief fixation but not action prediction (Stich and Nichols, 1995b), for content fixation (Heal, 1996a), and for rational effects only (Heal, 1996b). (shrink)

The discussion of whether people understand themselves and others by using theories of behaviour (theory theory) or by simulating mental states (simulation theory) lacks conclusive empirical evidence. Nichols et al. (1996) have proposed the Langer effect (Langer, 1975) as a critical test. From people's inability accurately to predict the difference in the subjective value of lottery tickets in choice and no‐choice conditions, they argued that people do not simulate behaviour in such situations. In a series of four experiments, we consistently (...) failed to replicate the original difference between choice and no‐choice under the conditions used by Nichols et al. We conclude that the replicability of the effect depends on an unknown combination of factors. As long as the target effect is not better understood and under better experimental control, it is difficult to use it as a yardstick against which the accuracy of simulation can be assessed. (shrink)

Empirical research on counterfactual thinking has found a closeness effect: people report higher negative affect if an actual outcome is close to a better counterfactual outcome. However, it remains unclear what actually is a ?close? miss. In three experiments that manipulate close counterfactuals, closeness effects were found only when closeness was unambiguously defined either with respect to a contrasted alternative, or with respect to a categorical boundary. In a real task people failed to report greater negative affect when encountering a (...) close numerical miss, while they predicted greater negative affect hypothetically. These results show that counterfactual closeness effects on affect depend on closeness being accessible and unambiguously defined. (shrink)

We introduce a particular way of drawing the distinction between the use of theory and simulation in the prediction of people's decisions and describe an empirical method to test whether theory or simulation is used in a particular case. We demonstrate this method with two effects of decision making involving the choice between a safe option (take amount X) and a risky option (take double the amount X with probability 1/2). People's predictions of choice frequencies for trivial (€ 0.75) as (...) opposed to substantial (€ 18) amounts in Experiment 1 are quite accurate when they are presented with both conditions juxtaposed but are less accurate when only given one of the conditions. This result is interpreted to speak for the use of theory in prediction. In contrast people's predictions of the framing effect for substantial amounts (more risk seeking for positively than negatively framed problems) are accurate only for independent predictions but not for juxtaposed predictions, which speaks for the use of simulation. (shrink)

We investigate whether risky choice framing, i.e., the preference of a sure over an equivalent risky option when choosing among gains, and the reverse when choosing among losses, depends on redundancy and density of information available in a task. Redundancy, the saliency of missing information, and density, the description of options in one or multiple chunks, was manipulated in a matrix setup presented in MouselabWeb. On the choice level we found a framing effect only in setups with non-redundant information. On (...) the process level outcomes attracted more acquisitions than probabilities, irrespective of redundancy. A dissociation between acquisition behavior and choice calls for a critical discussion of the limits of process-tracing measures for understanding and predicting choices in decision making tasks. (shrink)

We contribute to the empirical debate on whether we understand and predict mental states by using simulation (simulation theory) or by relying on a folk psychological theory (theory theory). To decide between these two fundamental positions, it has been argued that failure to predict other people's choices would be challenging evidence against the simulation view. We test the specific claim that people prefer the rightmost position in choosing among equally valued objects, and whether or not this position bias can be (...) correctly predicted. A series of experiments shows that the bias appears only in a specific spatial arrangement and that it can be correctly predicted given adequate imaginative input. In concert with other recent findings on the correct prediction of choices these findings do actually strengthen, rather than challenge, the simulation account on the prediction of mental states. (shrink)

In their use of correlations as a means to distinguish between different views on the normative/descriptive gap, Stanovich & West discuss the competence component but neglect the activation-utilization component of performance. Different degrees of motivation may introduce systematic variation that is confounded with the variation explained by cognitive capacity.

When communication is not disinterested, seemingly inconsistent preferences are predictable from language pragmatics and information non-equivalence. In addition, the classic risky choice framing effect found in the Asian disease task – risk-aversion with gains and risk-seeking with losses – applies to gambles, but tends to be overgeneralized to non-gambling situations.

Decision making can be studied using hypothetical payoffs because it is hypothetical to its very core. However, the core process can be influenced by contextual features. As there is no theory for these contextual features, a “do-it-both-ways” rule amounts to a waste of money. If we had such a theory, doing it both ways would be unnecessary.