Nietzsche once proclaimed himself the 'Buddha of Europe', and throughout his life Buddhism held enormous interest for him. While he followed Buddhist thinking in demolishing what he regarded as the two-headed delusion of Being and Self, he saw himself as advocating a response to the ensuing nihilist crisis that was diametrically opposed to that of his Indian counterpart. In this book Antoine Panaïoti explores the deep and complex relations between Nietzsche's views and Buddhist philosophy. He discusses the psychological models and (...) theories which underlie their supposedly opposing ethics of 'great health' and explodes the apparent dichotomy between Nietzsche's Dionysian life-affirmation and Buddhist life-negation, arguing for a novel, hybrid response to the challenge of formulating a tenable post-nihilist ethics. His book will interest students and scholars of Nietzsche's philosophy, Buddhist thought and the metaphysical, existential and ethical issues that emerge with the demise of theism. (shrink)

Zygon®, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 846-873, December 2021.

This paper seeks to lay down the theoretical groundwork for the emergence of holistic cross-cultural philosophical investigations of personal identity ¾ investigations that approach the theoretical, phenomenological, psychological, and practical-ethical dimensions of selfhood as indissociable. My strategy is to discuss three closely connected conceptual distinctions that the Buddhist approach to personal identity urges us to draw, and a lucid understanding of which is essential for the emergence of appropriately comprehensive and thus genuinely cosmopolitan discussions at the cross-road between Western and (...) Buddhist philosophical traditions. The first, primary distinction is that between the “visceral sense of self” and the “substance view of self”. This in turn gives rise to two derivative distinctions, namely between “harbouring VSS” and “believing SVS”, and between “overcoming VSS” and “rejecting SVS”. After discussing these distinctions, I consider and respond to three philosophical objections to features of Buddhist approach to selfhood that are thrown into sharper relief when attention is paid to these three distinctions. I then discuss some of the ways the foregoing may inform research in cross-cultural philosophy of personal identity. This discussion focuses on: the primacy of the first-person stance in matters of personal identity; the relationship between numerical identity and narrative identity; interdisciplinarity in the study of selfhood; and personal identity and egoism. (shrink)

In the psychological sciences, mindfulness practices are increasingly being used, studied, and theorized, but their indigenous theoretical foundations in Buddhist accounts of the dynamics and psychology of personal identity tend to be overlooked. This situation is mirrored in the discipline of philosophy: here, Buddhist views on personal identity are beginning to draw attention, but almost invariably in a way which entirely blanks out the role of mindfulness practices in cultivating Buddhist insights on selfhood. The aggregate result is a failure, in (...) the West, to reflect upon and seriously consider Buddhist theory and Buddhist practice in an integrated, holistic fashion. In its effort to overcome the compartmentalization of Buddhist theory (in philosophy) versus Buddhist practice (in psychology) and to embrace the challenges this might pose to fundamental Western beliefs about the self, this paper is intended both as a plea for and an exercise in greater, more venturesome cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:According to a common caricature, Nietzsche cuts the figure of an anti-Buddha who advocates a type of life affirmation that is the contrary of Buddhist or Schopenhauerian life negation. In this paper, I seek to demonstrate, through a rigorous study of some of his later works—most notably Beyond Good and Evil (1886), The Antichrist (1905[1888]), and Ecce Homo (1908[1888])—that Nietzsche does not at all present himself as an anti-Buddha stricto sensu, or as a figure whose teaching is diametrically opposed to (...) that of the Indian master. The late Nietzsche, more precisely, does not conceive of amor fati and nirvāṇa as opposed ethical poles—or negatives of one another. On the contrary, certain texts in Ecce Homo and The Antichrist make it clear that there are significant affinities between amor fati and nirvāṇa as Nietzsche understands it, with respect to both the relationship to the self (seeing oneself "as a fatum") and to the other (overcoming ressentiment) that it implies. This, I conclude, lends credence to Nietzsche's infamous hypothesis according to which, contrary to appearances, all ethical ideals might in fact be "insidiously consanguine, linked up, knotted with that bad thing which seems to be their contrary" (Beyond Good and Evil, §2, KSA 5:17). (shrink)

Keith Ansell-Pearson's latest book on Nietzsche is part of a broader genre in Nietzsche scholarship, which emerged roughly in the early 2000s and has been developing at a steadily accelerating pace since then. Call this the "middle period genre." Scholars whose work falls under this banner tend to be historically trained "close readers" with strong German and a good understanding of the intricacies of Nietzsche's reception on the Old Continent. What most fundamentally unites them, however, is a shared sense that (...) the three... (shrink)

pAt various junctures in its history, Buddhist thought has adapted in inventive ways to accommodate important ideological features of the new cultural spheres with which it came into contact. The concept of “skill-in-means” (upāya-kauśalya) played an important role in most of these syncretistic developments by facilitating critical reflexivity, doctrinal flexibility, and expositional creativity. It is surprising that a principle that has favored crosscultural dialogue, co-integration, and hybridization throughout Buddhism’s history should elicit little interest amongst contemporary philosophers wishing to syncretize Anglo-American (...) philosophy with precisely those Indian (and Indo-Tibetan) Buddhist philosophical traditions in which skill-in-means qua meta-doctrine features most prominently, that is, the various traditions falling under the broad banner of Madhyamaka. In this paper, I argue that failure to give due consideration to skill-in-means in “fusion philosophy” methodology and hermeneutics is expressive of lingering metaphilosophical parochialism in what ought to be--and may yet become--a more reflective and cosmopolitan field of research. I further argue that paying heed to skill-in-means makes it clear that, if “fusion” with Madhyamaka philosophical traditions really is the goal, then philosophers engaged in this project will have to expand their metaphilosophical horizons such as to respect and accommodate these traditions’ irreducibly therapeutic orientation./p. (shrink)

What a Philosopher Is: Becoming Nietzsche, by LampertLaurence. London: University of Chicago Press, 2017. Pp. x + 349.