In Aristotle's Rhetoric, logos must be conceived as enthymematical argumentation relative to the issue of the case. Ethos and pathos also can take the form of an enthymeme, but this argumentation doesn't relate (directly) to the issue. In this kind of enthymeme, the conclusion is relative to the ethos of the speaker or (reasons for) the pathos of the audience. In an ideal situation — with a good procedure and rational judges — logos dominates and in the real situation of (...) Aristotle's time — with an imperfect procedure and irrational judges — ethos and pathos prevail. (shrink)

Researchers are required to seek consent from Indigenous communities prior to conducting research but there is inadequate information about how Indigenous people understand and become fully engaged with this consent process. Few studies evaluate the preference or understanding of the consent process for research with Indigenous populations. Lack of informed consent can impact on research findings. The Picture Talk Project was initiated with senior Aboriginal leaders of the Fitzroy Valley community situated in the far north of Western Australia. Aboriginal people (...) were interviewed about their understanding and experiences of research and consent processes. Transcripts were analysed using NVivo10 software with an integrated method of inductive and deductive coding and based in grounded theory. Local Aboriginal interpreters validated coding. Major themes were defined and supporting quotes sourced. Interviews with Aboriginal leaders were facilitated by a local Aboriginal Community Navigator who could interpret if necessary and provide cultural guidance. Participants were from all four major local language groups of the Fitzroy Valley; aged 31 years and above; and half were male. Themes emerging from these discussions included Research—finding knowledge; Being respectful of Aboriginal people, Working on country, and Being flexible with time; Working together with good communication; Reciprocity—two-way learning; and Reaching consent. The project revealed how much more there is to be learned about how research with remote Aboriginal communities should be conducted such that it is both culturally respectful and, importantly, meaningful for participants. We identify important elements in community consultation about research and seeking consent. (shrink)

Biological evolution provides a creative fount of complex and subtle adaptations, often surprising the scientists who discover them. However, because evolution is an algorithmic process that transcends the substrate in which it occurs, evolution’s creativity is not limited to nature. Indeed, many researchers in the field of digital evolution have observed their evolving algorithms and organisms subverting their intentions, exposing unrecognized bugs in their code, producing unexpected adaptations, or exhibiting outcomes uncannily convergent with ones in nature. Such stories routinely reveal (...) creativity by evolution in these digital worlds, but they rarely fit into the standard scientific narrative. Instead they are often treated as mere obstacles to be overcome, rather than results that warrant study in their own right. The stories themselves are traded among researchers through oral tradition, but that mode of information transmission is inefficient and prone to error and outright loss. Moreover, the fact that these stories tend to be shared only among practitioners means that many natural scientists do not realize how interesting and lifelike digital organisms are and how natural their evolution can be. To our knowledge, no collection of such anecdotes has been published before. This paper is the crowd-sourced product of researchers in the fields of artificial life and evolutionary computation who have provided first-hand accounts of such cases. It thus serves as a written, fact-checked collection of scientifically important and even entertaining stories. In doing so we also present here substantial evidence that the existence and importance of evolutionary surprises extends beyond the natural world, and may indeed be a universal property of all complex evolving systems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 347 Anoelus Silesius, le POlerin ChOrubinique. By Eugene Susini. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964. 2 vols.) "II a fallu pratiquement attendre le vingti~me si~cle pour que ffit donn~e sa vdritable place Angelus Silesius (de son vrai nom Johannes Scheffier) tomb~ dans l'oubli ou presque pendant plus de deux cents ans," ~crit M. Eugene Susini, Professeur en Sorbonne, dans son introduction au P$lerin Ch~rubinique. Mais si les (...) travaux consacr~s ~ ce podte mystique sont ddj~ nombreux, on n'avait jusqu'~ present ~ditd en France que quelques fragments, ~parpill~s dans des anthologies. Depuis l'ouvrage de M. Henri Plard (1943), il n'y avait pas eu d'ddition qui present ~t ~ nouveau le texte original et une traduction en regard. C'est maintenant chose faite, et M. Susini fair plus que combler cette lacune. En effet, les textes d'Angelus Silesius (16241677 ) sont prdcddds d'une introduction historique, biographique et litt~raire, dtude substantielle sur le milieu off v~cut Angelus Silesius, et sur son itin~raire spirituel. L'originalitd profonde de ce catholique converti se ddgage de cette dtude, dont l'ampleur et la concision forcent l'admiration. Ce n'est pas tout. Ace premier volume un second fait suite, consaer~ ~ d'abondantes notes (178 p.) relatives aux distiques et aux quatrains; ces derni~res s'~elairent les unes les autres, et grace ~ une minutieuse critique interne et externe, ces vers sont replaces dans un contexte plus vaste que le prdsentateur a pris soin d'~clairer par de constantes r~f~rences ~ des passages d'autres oeuvres mystiques, ou des Ecritures elles-mdmes. Enfin, un index alphabdtique complete tr~s utilement ces notes (p. 179 s 257). On ne salt ce qu'il convient d'admirer le plus, le travail de l'~rudit et de l'historien, ou celui du traducteur. La t~iche n'dtait pas aisde; il fallait rendre en alexandrins ce qui avait dt~ compos~ de m~me, afin de laisser aux sentences non seulement leur saveur, mais aussi leur forme d'dpigrammes-proverbes. I1 faut dire que la r~ussite est totale. Le P~lerin Ch~rubinique est en m~me temps un ouvrage ddfinitif, car on ne volt pasce que pourrait apporter une nouvelle traduction, une prgsentation du texte original different, ou un nouveau recueil de notes--ces derni~res ~tant ici d'une grande ampleur. C'est un ouvrage important, non seulement pour le germaniste, mais aussi pour l'historien des litt~ratures, et celui des religions. ANTOINE F~IVRE The Sense oj Decadence in Nineteenth-Century France. By Koenraad W. Swart. (Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Idles, 7; The Hague : M. Nijhoff, 1964. Pp. xi + 272. Gld. 27.50.) "Seek and ye shall find!" Scholars have generally followed this injunction and found in history pretty much what they set out to discover. For a long time, the nineteenth century was seen as an age of progress, its own self-image seeming to bear this out. More recently our own concern with decadence has led us to discover similar views in earlier times. After A. E. Carter, 1 Professor Koenraad Swart has given us The Sense o] Decadence in NineteenthJCentury France (The Hague : 1964), the seventh volume to appear in Martinus Nijhoff's International Archives of the History of Ideas. This is a broader chronicle than Carter's. It presents the antecedents of the idea of decadence from antiquity to the French Revolution, its modern forms rooted in a diversity of romantic reactions, its fin-de-si~cle culmination and its (temporary) waning before the brief affirmative revival that preceded World War I. In terms of present preoccupations, this is a timely book. A solid concluding chapter sketches "the foreign perspective," in which French developments appear as part of a broader context. The study provides a mine of information, a convenient companion and counterindicator to Bury's Idea o] Progress. Why, then, is it a dull and unsatisfactory book? In the first place because, having suggested the existence of another dimension to the histoire de grand-papa, the history of ideas cannot be written as, simply, another version of the serial chronicle of events. It... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Two NarractsAntoine Volodine (bio)1. DögbruzDögbruz dépassa le dernier lampadaire de l'avenue et il s'arrêta pour calmer sa respiration haletante. Derrière lui, la ville semblait déserte. La nuit était tombée depuis des heures, de longues heures, un grand nombre d'heures, et, alors que cette idée prenait naissance dans l'esprit de Dögbruz, la phrase bourgeonna et devint quelque chose d'inquiétant, une réflexion qui n'appartenait pas totalement à notre monde : la (...) nuit, pensa soudain Dögbruz. Elle est tombée depuis plusieurs jours.Plusieurs jours sans soleil ni lune, sans crépuscule, plusieurs longues tranches noires de vingt-quatre heures. La noirceur n'avait connu aucune interruption.– Je... Mais qu'est-ce que... bougonna Dögbruz.L'air était tiède, le sol sous ses pieds était chaud, de temps en temps une ombre minuscule voletait en silence autour de sa tête, puis disparaissait. Un flocon charbonneux. Une mouche, pensa-t-il. Elle est épuisée ou déjà morte, pensa-t-il.– Non, non, pas ça, murmura-t-il, effrayé par ce qui faisait des allées et venues entre sa sous-conscience et sa conscience, des images et des expressions qui avaient rompu avec la logique du réel.Il avait besoin de bouger les lèvres et les cordes vocales pour les chasser, ces images et ces expressions désagréables.– Non, pas morte, cette sale bestiole, corrigea-t-il à voix basse. Très fatiguée, peut-être. Comme moi, très, très fatiguée. Mais pas encore morte. Autrement elle serait au sol. Elle ne pourrait pas voler.Comme moi, pensa-t-il. Moi aussi je suis au sol. Et, s'il y a au moins une certitude ici cette nuit, c'est que je ne vole pas.Il resta quelques minutes immobile, sans rien faire d'autre que combattre les petites intuitions délirantes qui traversaient les couches inférieures de son intelligence et montaient sans hâte, comme des bulles de méthane cherchant, dans un marécage, la surface de la vase. Il reprenait son souffle en observant l'avenue, devant et derrière lui : une vallée d'obscurité monotone, deux parois de maisons non éclairées, quelques arbres qui agonisaient sous la poussière, des palmiers en phase terminale, quatre ou cinq, dans la distance, et, pour le reste, une vilaine coulée [End Page 60] de bitume, qui donnait l'impression d'avoir pour origine le ciel sans la moindre étoile, d'une épaisseur et d'une opacité repoussantes. Les lampadaires étaient rares. À la fin de l'image, rien ne brillait. Pas d'horizon, pas de séparation entre le monde des nuages et le ruban bitumeux, les maisons noyées dans le rien, plus de différence entre la nuit du haut et la nuit du bas.Il s'aperçut soudain qu'il ne respirait plus et il s'empressa de mettre un terme à ce moment d'apnée indésirable.– Saletés de poumons de merde, jura-t-il.De nouveau, ses sacs pulmonaires se gonflaient et se dégonflaient. Certes. Mais il devait y veiller, leur donner l'ordre de s'emplir puis de se vider. Sans cesse il devait contrôler cela. Il haussa les épaules au bout d'une minute.– Tu parles d'un organisme pourri, protesta-t-il, s'adressant à lui-même, ou plutôt à on ne sait quelle divinité familière qu'il associait à son destin, une divinité camarade et, face à l'adversité, aussi impuissante que lui.Alors qu'il essayait de confier son alimentation en oxygène à des réflexes qui fonctionnaient avec réticence, il distingua au bout de l'avenue une forme que d'abord il se refusa à identifier, puis qu'il fut bien obligé de reconnaître. C'était loin, à plus de cent cinquante mètres, noyé d'obscurité, mais le doute n'était pas possible. Non, non, je ne peux pas me tromper, pensa-t-il.Un lama.L'univers ici est en noir et blanc, pensa-t-il. Aucune couleur et presque aucune nuance de gris. Mais... (shrink)

Existe-t-il une chose de tel qu'une conception herméneutique du langage? C'est à cette question que cet ouvrage se propose de répondre, de façon positive, en opérant une mise en dialogue des herméneutiques de Hans-Georg Gadamer et Paul Ricoeur. Malgré les différences indéniables entre les oeuvres de ces deux philosophes, l'auteur montre qu'elles ont en commun de penser le langage comme étant un principe fondamental de notre expérience du monde et de tout événement de compréhension. Une articulation entre les deux oeuvres, (...) qui mise sur une dialectique entre les notions d'appartenance et de distanciation, est possible à partir de cet accord de fond sur notre appartenance essentielle au langage. De ce point de vue, tout effort pour mettre à distance le langage afin d'en faire un objet d'étude doit tenir compte du caractère premier et irréductible de cette appartenance, s'il veut éviter de n'offrir qu'une vision réductrice du langage. Comme le révèlent les analyses de ce livre, les recherches de Gadamer et Ricoeur se caractérisent par la prise en compte de ce fait dans leurs réflexions sur le dialogue, le texte et la traduction, ainsi que dans leurs travaux sur la puissance créatrice du langage qui se manifeste dans la métaphore, le dire poétique et le récit. Cependant, le plus important pour l'herméneutique est que cette appartenance fondamentale ne soit pas synonyme d'un enfermement dans le langage, mais que le langage offre au contraire une ouverture sur l'être et permette à ce qui est de se dire et de se penser. (shrink)

Le néant ne se laisse pas facilement approcher par la pensée, car il constitue pour elle une limite. Limite interne à la pensée chez Hegel, c'est-à-dire son extrémité la plus abstraite, ou encore limite externe chez Heidegger, ce voile qui marque la finitude de ce qui se déclôt et qui le fait se tenir en retrait de la pensée. Dans les deux cas cependant, cette limite doit être pensée pour elle-même, de manière à mettre au jour la vérité à laquelle (...) peut et doit accéder la pensée pour se mettre en branle. Cette vérité fait se joindre le néant à son autre, que cet autre soit l'être ou l'Ereignis, et selon ce que commande l'épreuve héraclitéenne. En effet, Hegel et Heidegger ont tous les deux cherché à penser le néant avec Héraclite, encore plus selon la processualité qui se trouve affichée dans ses fragments et parfois au-delà des propos de ceux-ci. Mais s'approcher du néant avec Héraclite suppose l'indépassabilité de l'un, qui provient déjà de Parménide. La limite de la pensée ne devient-elle donc pas plutôt l'un que le néant? Et le néant, s'il est toujours pensé comme le néant de son autre en unité avec lui, est-il véritablement pensé pour lui-même? En suivant le détail des interprétations respectives de Hegel et de Heidegger à l'égard d'Héraclite, ce livre veut diriger la pensée vers un néant indifférent à l'un, au-delà de toute approche héraclitéenne."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

We argue that ecology in general and biodiversity and ecosystem function research in particular need an understanding of functions which is both ahistorical and evolutionarily grounded. A natural candidate in this context is Bigelow and Pargetter’s evolutionary forward-looking account which, like the causal role account, assigns functions to parts of integrated systems regardless of their past history, but supplements this with an evolutionary dimension that relates functions to their bearers’ ability to thrive and perpetuate themselves. While Bigelow and Pargetter’s account (...) focused on functional organization at the level of organisms, we argue that such an account can be extended to functional organization at the community and ecosystem levels in a way that broadens the scope of the reconciliation between ecosystem ecology and evolutionary biology envisioned by many BEF researchers. By linking an evolutionary forward-looking account of functions to the persistence-based understanding of evolution defended by Bouchard and others, and to the theoretical research on complex adaptive systems, we argue that ecosystems, by forming more or less resilient assemblages, can evolve even while they do not reproduce and form lineages. We thus propose a Persistence Enhancing Propensity account of role functions in ecology to account for this overlap of evolutionary and ecological processes. (shrink)

This paper analyzes community ecologist Charles Elton’s ideas on animal communities, and situates them with respect to the classical opposition between organicist–holistic and individualistic–reductionist ecological views drawn by many historians of ecology. It is argued that Elton espoused a moderate ecological holism, which drew a middle way between the stricter ecological holism advocated by organicist ecologists and the merely aggregationist views advocated by some of their opponents. It is also argued that Elton’s moderate ecological holism resonated with his preference for (...) analogies between ecological communities and human societies over more common ones between communities and individual organisms. I discuss, on the one hand, how the functionalist-interactionist approach to community ecology introduced by Elton entailed a view of ecological communities as more or less self-maintaining functionally organized wholes, and how his ideas on this matter were incorporated into their views by organicist ecologists Frederic Clements, Victor Shelford, and Warder C. Allee et al. On the other hand, I identify some important divergences between Elton’s ecological ideas and those of organicist ecologists. Specifically, I show how Elton’s ideas on species distribution, animal migrations, and ecological succession entailed a view of animal communities as exhibiting a weaker degree of part-whole integration than that attributed to them by Clements and Shelford; and how Elton’s mixed stance on the balance of nature idea and his associated views on community stability attributed to communities a weaker form of self-regulation than that attributed to them by Allee et al. (shrink)

The Rhetoric to Alexander (about 340 B.C.) contains a list of proofs (pisteis) and other types of argumentation which may be seen as the oldest surviving typology of argumentation schemes (avant la lettre). In the present article this typology is derived and compared with modern proposals. The conclusion is that the oldest typology is surprisingly similar to the most recent classifications.

This paper reinforces the current consensus against the applicability of the selected effect theory of function in ecology. It does so by presenting an argument which, in contrast with the usual argument invoked in support of this consensus, is not based on claims about whether ecosystems are customary units of natural selection. Instead, the argument developed here is based on observations about the use of the function concept in functional ecology, and more specifically, research into the relationship between biodiversity and (...) ecosystem functioning. It is argued that a selected effect account of ecological functions is made implausible by the fact that it would conflict with important aspects of the understanding of function and ecosystem functional organization which underpins functional ecology’s research program. Specifically, it would conflict with (1) Functional ecology’s adoption of a context-based understanding of function and its aim to study the functional equivalence between phylogenetically-divergent organisms; (2) Functional ecology’s attribution to ecosystems of a lower degree of part-whole integration than the one found in paradigm individual organisms; and (3) Functional ecology’s adoption of a physiological or metabolic perspective on ecosystems rather than an evolutionary one. (shrink)

This article offers an analysis of ecologist Charles Elton’s “functional” concept of the niche and of the notion of function implicitly associated with it. It does so in part by situating Elton’s niche concept within the broader context of the “functionalist-interactionist” approach to ecology he introduced, and in relation to his views on the relationship between ecology and evolution. This involves criticizing the common claim that Elton’s idea of species as fulfilling functional roles within ecological communities committed him to an (...) idea of communities as units of selection. While such a claim implicitly attributes to Elton an understanding of function along the lines of the selected-effects theory of function advocated by many biologists and philosophers of biology, Elton’s use of the niche concept, I maintain, involves an understanding of function more along the lines of alternative nonselectionist theories such as the causal-role, goal-contribution, and organizational theories. I also briefly discuss how ecologists after Elton also tend to have typically adopted a nonselectionist understanding of the function concept, similar to his. (shrink)

In the present article I attribute to the common topic in the Rhetoric a two-fold suggestive function and a guarantee function. These three functions are possible because this type of topic, while often quite abstract, nevertheless contains thought-steering, substantial terms, and formulates a generally empirical or normative endoxon. Assuming that according to Aristotle an enthymeme has at least two premises, it would appear that a common topic is the abstract principle behind the often implicit major premise. This means that the (...) topic may be regarded as the – generalizing – if-then statement in a modern argumentation scheme. Therefore it should be possible to see the enthymemes of Rhetoric 2.23 as a combination of a logical argument form (which can usually be reconstructed as modus ponens) and an argumentation scheme – even though we may not attribute this idea to Aristotle himself. (shrink)

Christopher Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory of Health has been the main contender among naturalistic accounts of health for the last 40 years. Yet, a recent criticism of this theory, presented by Elselijn Kingma, identifies a dilemma resulting from the BST’s conceptual linking of health and statistical typicality. Kingma argues that the BST either cannot accommodate the situation- specificity of many normal functions or cannot account for many situation-specific diseases. In this article, we expand upon with Daniel Hausman’s response to Kingma’s dilemma. (...) We propose that recalling Boorse’s specification that health is an intrinsic property of its bearers and explicating this intrinsic property in relation to the concept of homeostasis can illuminate how proponents of naturalistic accounts of health should deal with the situation- specificity of normal functions. We argue that beyond what Boorse and Hausman have delineated, the situation- specificity of normal function cannot be fully captured in a simple dichotomy between normal and abnormal environment or between relevant and irrelevant situations. By bringing homeostasis to the fore of the analysis of health, we set out a richer picture of what the various situations that affect living organisms’ functional performance can be. Accordingly, we provide a broader classification of these various situations which, we contend, better accounts for the main intuitions that philosophers of medicine have sought to accommodate than previous naturalistic theories of health. (shrink)

This paper discusses Millstein’s criticism of the consensus view formed against selected-effects ecological functions. I argue that Millstein’s defense of coevolution-based selected-effects ecological functions applies to a notion of function as an activity, whereas proponents of the consensus view are concerned with a notion of ecological function as the contribution of an organism, population, species, or abiotic item to the maintenance of its community and/or the functioning of its ecosystem. Millstein’s arguments hence do not invalidate the consensus view but draw (...) attention to a notion of function that has been neglected in philosophical discussions and that deserves more attention. (shrink)

This paper criticizes Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder by arguing that the conceptual linkage it establishes between the medical concepts of health and disorder and the prudential notions of well-being and harm makes the account inapplicable to nonsentient organisms, such as plants, fungi, and many invertebrate animals. Drawing on a previous formulation of this criticism by Christopher Boorse, and noting that Wakefield could avoid it if he adopted a partly biofunction-based account of interests like that often advocated in (...) the field of environmental ethics, I argue that integrating such an account of interests into the HDA would generate serious concerns. Specifically, it would make dysfunction sufficient for disorder and so reestablish between dysfunction and disorder precisely the kind of sufficiency relation that harm-requiring accounts of disorder strive to avoid; blur the line between the HDA’s dysfunction and harm components and, in so doing, deprive the HDA of its alleged main advantage over monistic dysfunction-based accounts of disorders like Boorse’s; and tie the HDA to an understanding of harm that is in itself problematic. I argue that these three concerns, and the dilemmas they generate, rob the HDA of much of its prima facie appeal, ultimately indicating that a satisfactory account of disorder should most likely eschew all references to prudential notions of well-being and harm. (shrink)

Which properties are characteristic of the enthymeme in Aristotle's Rhetoric? There is no consensus on this point. The present discussion centres on three properties. 1. Is there always an implicit premise? (Answer: Above all, a pragmatic level and a logical level must be distinguished.) 2. Do the premises consist by definition of probabilities and signs? (Answer: No.). 3. Are all enthymemes reducible to a syllogistic form? (Answer: The literature pertaining to this question is dominated by a false dilemma: an enthymeme (...) does not have either a topical or a syllogistic structure). In general, Aristotle's approach to the enthymeme in the Rhetoric appears to shift from argumentation theory to logic. (shrink)

In a series of papers, J. Baird Callicott criticizes the wilderness concept of nature and the associated approach to environmentalism which focuses on the preservation of areas of land free of human intervention. As he notes, this concept rests on a human/nature dualism which defines the natural in opposition to the cultural and the artefactual, and thus in principle places humans outside the natural realm. This makes it conceptually impossible for humans to intervene in nature without denaturing it. Callicott rejects (...) this concept of naturalness for two general kinds of reasons. First, because it is socio-politically oppressive, as it is frequently applied to areas where some aboriginal... (shrink)

One aspect of J. Baird Callicott’s foundational project for ecocentrism consists in explaining how moral consideration for ecological wholes can be grounded in moral sentiments. Some critics of Callicott have objected that moral consideration for ecological wholes is impossible under a sentimentalist conception of ethics because, on both Hume and Smith’s views, sympathy is our main moral sentiment and it cannot be elicited by holistic entities. This conclusion is premature. The relevant question is not whether such moral consideration is compatible (...) with the moral psychologies elaborated by Hume and Smith themselves, but, rather, whether it is possible given the moral psychology human beings actually possess. To answer this question, we must turn to empirical moral psychology and consider the possibility of a sentimentalist ecocentrism based on the community, autonomy, divinity model, a very promising model of human moral psychology developed by psychologists Richard Shweder, Paul Rozin, and Jonathan Haidt. This model can be used to assess the possibility of grounding ecocentrism in human moral sentiments. In light of this assessment, ecocentrism should be understood as a new form of naturalistic ethics informed by the moral emotions of disgust, shame, awe, and wonder. (shrink)

This paper discusses a challenge to the claims made by biocentrists and some ecocentrists that some nonsentient biological entities qualify as candidates for moral considerability. This challenge derives from Wayne Sumner’s critique of “objective theories of welfare” and, in particular, from his critique of biocentrists’ and ecocentrists’ biofunction-based accounts of the “good of their own” of nonsentient biological entities. Sumner’s critique lends support to animal ethicists’ typical skepticism regarding those accounts, by contending that they are more plausibly interpreted as accounts (...) of the perfectionist value than of the welfare of nonsentient biological entities. In response to this critique and its implication that those function-based accounts would fail to qualify nonsentient biological entities as candidates for moral considerability, it is argued that those accounts should be interpreted as ones of the health of biological entities rather than ones of their perfectionist value. It is suggested that their being bearers of health may be sufficient for nonsentient biological entities to qualify as candidates for moral considerability, such that biocentrists and ecocentrists could grant Sumner and animal ethicists’ contention that the function-based accounts of the good of their own of nonsentient biological entities are not accounts of their welfare, while not giving up on the project of defending those entities’ moral considerability. | : Cet article discute d’une objection à la thèse défendue par plusieurs biocentristes et écocentristes selon laquelle les entités biologiques non sentientes se qualifieraient comme candidates à la considérabilité morale. Cette objection découle de la critique des « théories objectives du bien-être » formulée par Wayne Sumner et, plus particulièrement, de sa critique des théories du « bien propre » défendues par les biocentristes et les écocentristes, lesquelles définissent ce bien en relation avec les concepts biologiques de fonction et de téléologie. La critique de Sumner offre un certain appui au scepticisme généralement suscité par ces théories chez les auteur-e-s oeuvrant dans le domaine de l’éthique animale, en ce qu’elle fait valoir que celles-ci sont plus plausiblement interprétées comme concernant une forme de valeur perfectionniste s’appliquant aux entités biologiques non sentientes que comme concernant leur bien-être. Cet article soutient que la manière la plus prometteuse de répondre à cette critique pour les biocentristes et les écocentristes consiste à faire valoir d’une part, que les théories du bien propre qu’elles et ils défendent doivent être interprétées comme des théories de la santé des entités biologiques plutôt que comme des théories de leur valeur perfectionniste, et d’autre part, que la possibilité pour les entités biologiques non sentientes d’être en plus ou moins bonne santé suffit à les rendre candidates à la considérabilité morale. (shrink)

One aspect of J. Baird Callicott’s foundational project for ecocentrism consists in explaining how moral consideration for ecological wholes can be grounded in moral sentiments. Some critics of Callicott have objected that moral consideration for ecological wholes is impossible under a sentimentalist conception of ethics because, on both Hume and Smith’s views, sympathy is our main moral sentiment and it cannot be elicited by holistic entities. This conclusion is premature. The relevant question is not whether such moral consideration is compatible (...) with the moral psychologies elaborated by Hume and Smith themselves, but, rather, whether it is possible given the moral psychology human beings actually possess. To answer this question, we must turn to empirical moral psychology and consider the possibility of a sentimentalist ecocentrism based on the community, autonomy, diversity model, a very promising model of human moral psychology developed by psychologists Richard Shweder, Paul Rozin, and Jonathan Haidt. This model can be used to assess the possibility of grounding ecocentrism in human moral sentiments. In light of this assessment, ecocentrism should be understood as a new form of naturalistic ethics informed by the moral emotions of disgust, shame, awe, and wonder. (shrink)

Although Boorse’s and Wakefield’s accounts of health are generally regarded as competing ones, they are in fact so only if they are aimed at the same concept. Some remarks made by Boorse and Wakefield, however, leave it unclear whether they are. On one possible interpretation, Boorse’s account aims at analysing a theoreticalconcept of abnormality, which ought to be distinguished from a more clinicalor therapeuticconcept, whereas Wakefield’s account aims at analysing a clinicalor therapeuticconcept. The debate between Boorse and Wakefield would then (...) either be merely terminological, or would boil down to whether Boorse is correct to assert the existence of a theoreticalconcept of abnormality which ought to be distinguished from a clinicalor therapeuticone. This paper aims to clarify what is at stake between Boorse and Wakefield, by maintaining that their accounts are most plausibly interpreted as both being aimed towards a theoreticalconcept of abnormality. (shrink)

This paper presents the interpersonal variability of harm challenge to Jerome Wakefield’s harmful-dysfunction account (HDA) of disorder. This challenge stems from the seeming fact that what promotes well-being or is harmful to someone varies much more across individuals than what is intuitively healthy or disordered. This makes it at least prima facie difficult to see how judgments about health and disorder could, as harm-requiring accounts of disorder like the HDA maintain, be based on, or closely linked to, judgments about well-being (...) and harm. This interpersonal variability of harm challenge is made salient by the difficulty faced by harm-requiring accounts of disorder in dealing satisfactorily with cases of intuitively disordered conditions that seem harmless because they do not deprive the individuals that they affect of anything that they value (e.g., desired infertility). I argue that this challenge is made more serious for the HDA by some clarifications Wakefield has recently made on harm. In recent publications, Wakefield dissociates himself from the sheer cultural-relativist view of harm attributed to him by some critics based on his linkage of harm to social values, and adopts a more qualified social-values-based view of harm that leaves room for criticism of the values endorsed by members of a cultural group at a given time. I show how Wakefield’s qualified view makes it more difficult for the HDA to deal with the interpersonal variability of harm challenge, at least when applied to a Western cultural context where a high value is placed on autonomy and individual choice. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the common claim that the ascription of ecological functions to organisms in functional ecology raises issues about levels of natural selection is ill-founded. This claim, I maintain, mistakenly assumes that the function concept as understood in functional ecology aligns with the selected effect theory of function advocated by many philosophers of biology (sometimes called “The Standard Line” on functions). After exploring the implications of Wilson and Sober’s defence of multilevel selection for the prospects of defending a (...) selected effect account of ecological functions, I identify three main ways in which functional ecology’s understanding of the function concept diverges from the selected effect theory. Specifically, I argue (1) that functional ecology conceives ecological functions as context-based rather than history-based properties of organisms; (2) that it attributes to the ecological function concept the aim of explaining ecosystem processes rather than with that of explaining the presence of organisms within ecosystems; and (3) that it conceives the ecological functions of organisms as use and service functions rather than design functions. I then discuss the extent to which the recently proposed causal role and organizational accounts of ecological functions better accord with the purposes for which the ecological concept is used in functional ecology. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je présenterai la stratégie adoptée par J. B. Callicott pour ancrer l’écocentrisme dans les sciences biologiques et écologiques tout en restant en accord avec la méta-éthique humienne selon laquelle on ne peut directement inférer un jugement portant sur le devoir-être à partir d'un jugement portant sur l'être. Je le ferai en rappelant d’abord quelques caractéristiques importantes de la méta-éthique humienne quant à la relation entre la raison, les émotions et les jugements de valeur. Je montrerai ensuite comment (...) cette méta-éthique, revisitée en relation avec l’explication évolutionnaire de l’éthique, permet de concevoir l’écocentrisme comme une évolution morale. Finalement, ces caractérisations méta-éthiques me permettront de montrer comment Callicott parvient à justifier la supériorité de l’écocentrisme sur les conceptions rivales en s'appuyant sur des considérations scientifiques, mais sans toutefois commettre le sophisme humien consistant à inférer directement des jugements portant sur le devoir-être à partir de jugements portant sur l'être. (shrink)

This paper revisits the debate over whether the study of facilitation requires ecologists to revise their understanding of the relationship between realized and fundamental niches as conceptualized by Hutchinson. Following Rodriguez-Cabal et al., I argue against Bruno et al.’s claim that facilitation can make a species’ realized niche larger than its fundamental niche. However, I also maintain that the abstract Hutchinsonian conceptualization of the niche makes a whole range of facilitative interactions—which I propose to call ameliorative facilitation—invisible to niche-based approaches (...) to the study of ecological communities. I propose a way to incorporate ameliorative facilitation into such approaches. My proposal involves supplementing the Hutchinsonian realized/fundamental dyad with a third concept: the potential niche. This concept was introduced by ecologists studying the effects of environmental change on species distributions, but I show how it could also be fruitfully used in facilitation studies. I argue that this proposed solution is more appealing than Stachowicz’s suggestion that Hutchinson’s realized/fundamental contrast be applied to a spatial-geographical, as opposed to an abstract-conceptual, notion of the niche. (shrink)

Functional diversity holds the promise of understanding ecosystems in ways unattainable by taxonomic diversity studies. Underlying this promise is the intuition that investigating the diversity of what organisms actually do—i.e. their functional traits—within ecosystems will generate more reliable insights into the ways these ecosystems behave, compared to considering only species diversity. But this promise also rests on several conceptual and methodological—i.e. epistemic—assumptions that cut across various theories and domains of ecology. These assumptions should be clearly addressed, notably for the sake (...) of an effective comparison and integration across domains, and for assessing whether or not to use functional diversity approaches for developing ecological management strategies. The objective of this contribution is to identify and critically analyze the most salient of these assumptions. To this aim, we provide an “epistemic roadmap” that pinpoints these assumptions along a set of historical, conceptual, empirical, theoretical, and normative dimensions. (shrink)

À propos de : Catherine et Raphaël Larrère, Penser et agir avec la nature : Une enquête philosophique, Paris, La Découverte, 2015. -/- L’idée d’une nature sauvage à protéger des avancées techniques ne prend en compte ni la complexité des artefacts, ni ce qu’implique aujourd’hui la protection de la nature. En mettant l’accent sur la notion de biodiversité, C. et R. Larrère cherchent à donner un nouveau fondement à l’écologie politique.

The concept of biological inheritance has recently been extended so as to integrate, among other elements, parts of organisms’ environments. The literature refers to the trans-generational reconstruction of these parts in terms of environmental or ecological inheritance. This article’s main objective is to clarify the different meanings of "environmental inheritance," to underline so far unnoticed theoretical difficulties associated to this polysemous notion and to consequently argue that inheritance, even when extended, should be theoretically distinguished from trans-generational environmental stability. After disentangling (...) the different meanings of environmental inheritance, I underline that studies dealing with this concept place themselves in the wake of earlier contributions about biological environment and elaborate on the role of organisms in the determination of their relevant developmental and selective surroundings. This leads me to question the legitimacy of the category shift operated by niche inheritance proponents—from environment to inheritance—and to explain why the very concept of inherited environment shows important and so far unnoticed theoretical limitations. In this context, I assert the necessity to distinguish two related but different research programs: the construction of a finer-grained theory of environment and the elaboration of an extended theory of inheritance. (shrink)

Related Works: Part II: C. T. Chong, Yue Yang. $\Sigma_2$ Induction and Infinite Injury Priority Argument, Part II: Tame $\Sigma_2$ Coding and the Jump Operator. Ann. Pure Appl. Logic, vol. 87, no. 2, 103--116. Mathematical Reviews : MR1490049 Part III: C. T. Chong, Lei Qian, Theodore A. Slaman, Yue Yang. $\Sigma_2$ Induction and Infinite Injury Priority Argument, Part III: Prompt Sets, Minimal Paries and Shoenfield's Conjecture. Mathematical Reviews : MR1818378.