This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Hegel's Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference Hegel's Justification of His Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference in “Consciousness” “Self‐Consciousness,” Thought, and the Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference Hegel's Interim Critique of the Ego‐Centric Predicament Conclusion References.

Despite its internal divisions and the uncertainty surrounding many of its foundations, there is a growing consensus that the on‐going search for an alternative model of the mind finds a minimal theoretical identity in the pursuit of an anti‐Cartesian conception of mental phenomena. Nevertheless, this anti‐Cartesianism remains more or less explicitly committed to the neo‐Brentanian idea that intentionality is an essential feature of the mental—an idea that has prevailed since the advent of modern cognitive science in the (...) 1950s. An issue of compatibility is thereby raised, as neo‐Brentanism arguably sides with cognitive Cartesianism. The main goal of the paper is to put into full light one specific aspect of this largely unperceived problem of compatibility by arguing that the neo‐Brentanian property of intentionality is an essentially representational one that runs counter to the salient anti‐representationalism of anti‐Cartesianism. And, that this representational essence confronts the search for alternative models of the mind of an anti‐Cartesian kind with the following theoretical issue: To what extent is it possible to devise a non‐Brentanian property of intentionality, particularly one that is fully dissociated from the property of representation? This issue is shown to be much deeper and more difficult than it looks once the nature of representation is properly apprehended; it seems to be still waiting for an answer in the current search for an alternative model of the mind, if only because it has not yet be set in fully adequate terms. (shrink)

There have been many criticisms of “nativism” in “Cartesian linguistics,” attacking positions that neither Chomsky nor any well-known generative grammarian has ever thought to defend. Shanker's polemic is no exception. It involves two spurious claims: Cartesian linguistics vitiates understanding language structure and use; nativism permits linguistic anthropology only to “validate” and “apply” generative principles. Briefly, Chomsky's outlines a language system, LS, of the human brain. LS reflexively discriminates and categorizes parts of the flux of human experience as “language,” and develops (...) complex abilities to infer and interpret this highly structured, and structurally peculiar, type of human production. There is nothing intrinsically different about LS – concerning innateness, evolution or universality – than the visual system, immune system, respiratory system, or any other complex biological system. Much polemic is driven by distaste for “innateness,” “genes,” and “evolution.” Historical and ideological reasons explain this aversion - some well-justified. None bear on universal grammar. Biologists believe all life consists of universal, highly structured codings of biological information. Still, biologists go on to explore diversity at many different levels. Similarly, linguistic anthropology can use generative grammar to better comprehend the diversity of languages and the cultural worlds they describe. This includes the very issues about proper names that Shanker highlights. (shrink)

If Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology is to justify our capacity to know the world as it is, by examining a complete series of forms of consciousness, why and with what justification does he omit the Cartesian ego-centric predicament? By augmenting Franco Chiereghin’s explication of Hegel’s concept of thought, and of why Hegel provides it only at the start of the second half of ‘Self-Consciousness’, this paper shows how Hegel showed that Pyrrhonian, Cartesian and Humean scepticism, and also mental content internalism, all (...) depend upon the deductivist model of rational justification (scientia), and that this model is suited only to strictly formal domains, not to the non-formal substantive domain of empirical knowledge. Hegel thus refutes the epistemological presuppositions of the ego-centric predicament; hence he may omit it from the forms of consciousness examined in the Phenomenology. (shrink)

This paper addresses two methodological paths in Artificial Intelligence: the paths of Babbage and anti-Cartesianism. While those researchers who have followed the latter have attempted to reverse the Cartesian dictum according to which machines cannot think in principle, Babbage’s path, which has been partially neglected, implies that the replacement of humans—and not the creation of minds—should provide the foundation of AI. In view of the examined paths, the claim that we support here is this: in line with Babbage, (...) AI researchers have recently concentrated upon the replacement of human labour, and thus upon the creation of Machine Learning systems. After presenting and analysing the paths, we characterise Machine Learning via its developments and an illustrative example. Then, we put forward an argument that shows that total replacement of human labour will not be feasible for practical and conceptual reasons despite the successful developments in recent AI systems. Our discussion finally leads to optimism and awareness: AI’s advances allow humans to dedicate themselves to higher level tasks, but these advances also require that we be vigilant about the responsibilities granted to ML-based systems. (shrink)

Kartezjanizm i antykartezjanizm locke’owskiej koncepcji tożsamości osobowej Niniejszy artykuł koncentruje się na zależnościach pomiędzy Locke’owskim i kartezjańskim pojmowaniem tożsamości osobowej. Wbrew częstym odczytaniom, różnica pomiędzy nimi nie daje się sprowadzić do prostego przeciwstawienia substancjalizmu i empiryzmu. Locke nie rezygnuje ze stanowiska substancjalistycznego, jednakże rozgranicza dwie sfery — naturalnego, bazującego na doświadczeniu poznania oraz filozoficznych spekulacji, w których stara się przedstawić racjonalną i zgodną ze swym programem epistemologicznym interpretację dogmatów religijnych. Krytyka Locke’a dotyczy możliwości istnienia rzeczy myślącej jako substancji istniejącej niezależnie (...) od ciała, natomiast rozbudowaniu w stosunku do filozofii kartezjańskiej ulega opis różnicowania się doświadczenia i ludzkiej subiektywności, zaś pojęcie tożsamości osobowej zyskuje eksplikację na czterech uzupełniających się poziomach: psychologicznym, biologicznym, społeczno-prawnym i religijnym. (shrink)

La référence au cartésianisme est constante dans les travaux contemporains de philosophie de l’esprit et de sciences cognitives. Sa fonction n’est pas de fournir une exégèse historique de Descartes ; elle est plutôt de dégager certains aspects de la conception cartésienne de l’esprit, ceux qui informeraient encore la recherche philosophique et scientifique actuelle, et qu’il resterait à dépasser. Ainsi l’adjectif cartésien n’est-il pas seulement utilisé pour faire directement référence à Descartes, mais aussi pour désigner les théories et les approches modernes (...) de l’esprit qui, tout en rompant avec le cartésianisme sur plusieurs points, auraient néanmoins hérité d’importantes erreurs cartésiennes. On remarquera en outre que dans cette logique, l’adjectif cartésien revêt un sens essentiellement critique. Et pour la plupart des théoriciens contemporains en effet, le cartésianisme est bien l’ennemi à combattre. La présente contribution se propose de dresser un portrait de cet ennemi, à partir de quelques-uns des usages qui sont faits de la notion de cartésianisme en philosophie de l’esprit et en sciences cognitives. Cette analyse, qui ne prétend pas à l’exhaustivité, nous permettra de faire apparaître les raisons et les enjeux de la référence à la figure cartésienne dans les réflexions des deux champs mentionnés. (shrink)

Receptions of Descartes is a collection of work by an international group of authors that focuses on the various ways in which Descartes was interpreted, defended and criticized in early modern Europe. The book is divided into five sections, the first four of which focus on Descartes' reception in specific French, Dutch, Italian and English contexts and the last of which concerns the reception of Descartes among female philosophers.

Kant was the first great anti-Cartesian in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He criticised five central tenets of Cartesianism and developed sophisticated alternatives to them. His transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience invokes externalism about justification and proves externalism about mental content. Semantic concern with the unity of the proposition—required for propositionally structured awareness and self-awareness—is central to Kant’s account of the unity of any cognitive judgment. The perceptual (...) ‘binding problem’ is central to Kant’s account of the unity of the object in perception. This paper outlines Kant’s development and justification of his a rationalist account of our active intellect and its roles in perceptual consciousness and in rational judgment, including our consciousness of our rational freedom, all through a radically innovative transcendental inquiry into the necessary a priori conditions for us to be conscious at all. Kant’s anti-Cartesianism is a major philosophical breakthrough far surpassing contemporary anti-Cartesian efforts. It behoves us to give Kant his due and avail ourselves of his profound insights into the nature of human mindedness. (shrink)

Schmaltz’s excellent book tells a story unfamiliar to most English speaking historians of philosophy. The historical aspect of the story centers on Louis XIV’s 1671 decree opposing anti-Aristotelianism. The decree spoke to the growing popularity of Descartes’s philosophy during the twenty years after his death. Schmaltz examines two figures central to the dissemination and reinterpretation of Descartes’ philosophy at this time: Robert Desgabets and Pierre-Sylvain Regis. The Benedictine Desgabets played an important role in defending Descartes’s controversial views on the (...) eucharist, arguably the catalyst for the 1671 decree. His disciple, Regis, elaborated and propagated Desgabets’s brand of Cartesianism in the face of the political firestorm generated by the decree. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBernard Lamy is frequently included among the Cartesian Empiricists of the second half of the seventeenth century. He has also been described as an Augustinian who dabbled in Cartesianism. While acknowledging that there are both empiricist and Augustinian elements in his thought, I argue that it ought not be forgotten that there are central components of his philosophy that are both anti-empiricist and in opposition to Augustine. My aim in this paper, though, is not critical; I hope to (...) show that Lamy provides us with one more example of the diversity present among the various thinkers labelled as ‘Cartesian’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Has Cartesianism To Do with Jansenism?Tad M. SchmaltzMy title is modeled on the famous query of the third-century theologian, Tertullian: “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” Tertullian’s question asks what pagan Greek learning has to do with the theology of the early Church. By comparison my question asks what philosophical Cartesianism has to do with theological Jansenism, and more specifically what these movements had to (...) do with each other in the France of Louis XIV. To anticipate, the answer is: not much and plenty. I say not much, in the sense that there are profound differences in the approaches and interests of the namesakes of these two movements: in the case of Cartesianism, the French critic of scholastic natural philosophy, René Descartes, and in the case of Jansenism, the Louvain critic of Jesuit theology, Cornelius Jansen (Jansenius). Yet I also say plenty, in the sense that there was in the second half of the seventeenth century a fairly widespread belief in France of an intimate link between the two movements that the work of Descartes and Jansen inspired. What we need here is a story that shows how despite the differences between these two thinkers, their French followers were commonly associated with each other.In order to tell such a story I need to consider some basic difficulties in pinning down the nature of the movements themselves. There are of course familiar problems with the appeal to generic “isms” in the history of ideas, but I also want to consider special concerns pertaining to the definition of French Jansenism and French Cartesianism. In the course of this consideration I suggest that since both movements are to some extent constructs that emerged from intellectual battles in late-seventeenth-century France, they must be understood in light of the political, theological, and philosophical goals of the polemicists involved in these battles.Perhaps the most obvious reason for the connection between the Jansenist and Cartesian movements is that one of the most prominent of the Jansenist theologians, the Port-Royalist Antoine Arnauld, was also an enthusiastic defender [End Page 37] of Descartes’s metaphysical system. But while Arnauld undoubtedly played an important role in the emergence of this link, I think that the full story of its emergence must include a consideration of the different role played by a somewhat neglected figure in the history of early modern Cartesianism, namely, the Lorraine Benedictine Robert Desgabets (1610–78). Desgabets was more deeply involved than Arnauld in the 1671 “Eucharist affair,” which was important for the polemical linkage of Jansenism to Cartesianism in France. Whereas Arnauld attempted to separate Jansenist theology from Cartesian philosophy, Desgabets tried to provide Cartesian foundations for a theology with strong Jansenist overtones. It was Desgabets more than Arnauld, then, who was concerned to apply Cartesian principles to issues of importance for the Jansenist theologian.What Has Descartes To Do with Jansen?A primary trigger for the bitter “Jansenist controversies” in France during the seventeenth century was the posthumous publication in 1640 of the Augustinus of Jansen, the late Bishop of Ypres in the Spanish Netherlands. This technical three-volume work attempts to draw from Augustine responses to Pelagian and semi-Pelagian views concerning the prelapsarian state of innocence, the fall from this state, and the grace required to overcome that fall. Jansen’s emphasis is on the pervasive corruption of original sin and on the impossibility of meritorious action that does not derive from God’s grace to the elect. The Jesuits in Louvain saw the work as a throwback to the theses of Michel du Bay (Baius) that Pope Paul V had condemned in 1567 due to pressure exerted by their order, and they made an unsuccessful attempt to stop the publication of the book. 1 After its publication this text drew the suspicion of Cardinal Richelieu, who (correctly) believed Jansen to be the author of Mars Gallicus, an anonymous pamphlet protesting Richelieu’s anti-Habsburg policies. Richelieu chose a theologian of Notre-Dame-de-Paris, Isaac Habert, to launch an attack against the Augustinus. In a series of sermons starting in 1642 Habert criticized Jansen’s assertion of the necessity of contrition... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science by Andrea StrazzoniAaron SpinkAndrea Strazzoni. Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019. Pp. ix + 245. Hardback, $124.99.Andrea Strazzoni's Dutch Cartesianism and the Birth of Philosophy of Science is a clear step forward in our understanding of the rise and fall of Cartesianism. The work, limited to the (...) Dutch context with one notable German excursion, covers roughly one hundred years starting from the 1630s. While the time frame is rather large in scope, the majority of the work is narrower in focus, with a heavy emphasis on the academic circles in mid-to-late seventeenth-century Leiden and Utrecht. It is thus a welcome addition to the growing body of literature dealing with the unique political, religious, and academic contexts in which Dutch Cartesians found themselves. While much of the book deals with the philosophy of Descartes and then Newton, Strazzoni is not concerned with giving any novel interpretations of either figure; instead, he sheds a great deal of light on a cast of characters who are only now coming to be appreciated for their contributions and influence on philosophical movements of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The book has two main explicit goals. First, Strazzoni wants to show why foundationalism came to play such a prominent role in Dutch Cartesian circles and what foundationalism's effects were. Second, through this examination, Strazzoni hopes to show that the multiplication of worldviews [End Page 154] shaped a new function for metaphysics and logic as tools for examining principles, which in turn determined a change in the function of philosophy itself that eventually gave birth to a kind of philosophy of science familiar to us today.Strazzoni divides this project into eight chapters, with a focus on six figures: Henricus Regius, Johannes Clauberg, Johannes de Raey, Arnold Geulincx, Burchard de Volder, and Willem Jacob's Gravesande. In addition to a brief overview of the goals and structure of the work, the first chapter includes a survey of how methodologies have changed in the history of philosophy and the history of the philosophy of science, which will be helpful background for those less familiar with the fields.The following two chapters deal with the crises that emerged in Utrecht and Leiden over the spread of Cartesian philosophy. In chapter 2, building on Theo Verbeek's work, Regius takes center stage. While some context of the Utrecht crisis is given, Strazzoni spends much of the chapter detailing how Regius's medical background led to a more empirical approach and lack of metaphysical foundation. While Regius's own controversial positions embroiled both himself and Descartes in the Utrecht Crisis, ripple effects spread to Leiden, resulting in prohibitions against discussions of Cartesian philosophy. In the third chapter, Strazzoni highlights a group of anti-Cartesians, with Jacob Revius as the primary antagonist, and the responses from De Raey and Clauberg. Clauberg, the subject of Strazzoni's only sustained discussion of Cartesianism from Germany, coordinated with de Raey on both a positive campaign of promotion and strategizing responses to the anti-Cartesian front. Outside of discussing Clauberg's explicit role in Leiden, Strazzoni studies his logic and Ontosophia, neatly explaining his shift to more metaphysical foundations.Chapters 4, 5, and 6 continue exploring the various approaches and roles for foundational philosophy in more detail, delving into how these controversies motivated renewed analysis of core Cartesian principles with integration into an academic curriculum in mind. Apart from de Raey's efforts to show that Cartesianism was aligned with Aristotelianism, Strazzoni claims a period of Cartesian physics without an explicit preoccupation with metaphysical questions, especially in light of the restrictions imposed by the curators of Leiden's university. However, as Spinoza and Hobbes came to prominence, multiplying the number of philosophical worldviews, foundational arguments were needed to combat them. Strazzoni highlights how varied these responses could be, as Geulincx's own take on foundations leaned heavily toward ethics rather than epistemology, metaphysics, or logic. However, the discussion of Geulincx is much broader, also including illuminating expositions of Geulincx's theology, epistemology, and metaphysics.Chapter 5 expounds further... (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Descartes and Cartesianism comprises fifty specially written chapters on Rene Descartes and Cartesianism, the dominant paradigm for philosophy and science in the seventeenth century, written by an international group of leading scholars of early modern philosophy. The first part focuses on the various aspects of Descartes's biography and philosophy, with chapters on his epistemology, method, metaphysics, physics, mathematics, moral philosophy, political thought, medical thought, and aesthetics. The chapters of the second part are devoted to (...) the defense, development and modification of Descartes's ideas by later generations of Cartesian philosophers in France, the Netherlands, Italy, and elsewhere. The third and final part considers the opposition to Cartesian philosophy by other philosophers, as well as by civil, ecclesiastic, and academic authorities. This handbook provides an extensive overview of Cartesianism - its doctrines, its legacies and its fortunes - in the period based on the latest research. (shrink)

Descartes and his early followers were widely seen to be enemies of superstition and the occult. This was particularly visible in the Cartesian movement’s antagonism to astrology. However, why Descartes and his early followers were so pitted against astrology is less than clear given the flexibility afforded to them through their system of philosophy and various mechanical explanations. Claude Gadroys (1642-1678), for example, produced a short treatise that provided a mechanical explanation consistent with Cartesian physics to allow for celestial influence (...) on Earth. In doing so, he exposed a contradiction in Cartesian vortex theory that seemed to disallow any such influence. In this way, Gadroys brought against himself and then dispelled one of the strongest objections to a Cartesian astrology. Oddly, no other Cartesian relied on principles specific to Cartesianism to argue against astrology as a legitimate science. This paper’s goal is to give a survey of some of the most prominent anti-astrological influences on Descartes, as well as some of the most prominent anti-astrological Cartesians in the second half of the 17th century. In doing this, I hope to show two things. First, in mainstream Cartesianism of the period, the anti-astrological sentiment was in no way part of the debate surrounding Descartes’ philosophy. Instead, ‘Cartesian’ anti-astrological arguments were based on well-worn arguments with an emphasis on experimental difficulties in establishing an astrological science. Second, the explanation for the curious lack of distinctly Cartesian anti-astrological arguments reflects an inherent flaw in Cartesianism; namely, it lacked the theoretical tools to completely rule out ‘occult’ sciences such as astrology. (shrink)

Descartes' works were not allowed to be read at Leiden University, even his name could not be pronounced. Read the compelling story about how his pupil Johannes de Raey has had the opportunity to preach Descartes fully in philosophy, but also in medicine, in a hostile anti-Cartesian climate during 20 years (1647-1668). This book is not only meant for philosophers and medical historians, but for all who want to take a look at the extensive menu of Cartesian cuisine. The (...) 17th-century philosopher René Descartes turned established science upside down by doubting all certainties. His critical mind rejected statements that could not be proven by the Ratio. The Ratio was the metaphor for the roots, the physics for the trunk and the medicine for the branches and leaves of the Cartesian tree. This premise was directly opposed to the established aristotelian theory in which observation formed the basis of knowledge. De Raey, who once called Descartes his best student, synthesized a hybrid model of the old Aristotelian and the new Cartesian concept. From 1658 to 1662 he gave private lessons in medicine at Leiden University and tried to use his model as a basis for explaining human physiology. Until now, nothing was known about the content of these lectures. The author recently found a dispute. It is a new dish on the Cartesian menu. (shrink)

Abstract: Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (SZ) is commonly viewed as one of the 20th century's great anti-Cartesian works, usually because of its attack on the epistemology-driven dualism and mentalism of modern philosophy of mind or its apparent effort to ‘de-center the subject’ in order to privilege being or sociality over the individual. Most who stress one or other of these anti-Cartesian aspects of SZ, however, pay little attention to Heidegger's own direct engagement with Descartes, apart from the compressed (...) discussion in SZ§§19–21. I here show through a careful reading of Heidegger's lectures on Descartes from the years immediately preceding SZ that, while he has sharp criticisms of Descartes and certain ‘Cartesian’ aspects of modern philosophy along the lines commonly recognized, he also aims to disclose what he calls the ‘positive possibilities’ in Descartes and the philosophy he inspired. I detail a number of these and then show that they force us to see Heidegger's own early project as largely unconcerned with dualism and mentalism per se, and much more with questions of the philosophical methodology that gives rise to them. Moreover, I show that a careful reading of Heidegger's treatment of the cogito makes clear that he is no serious way attempting to ‘de-center the subject’ and that the fundamental question of the ‘analytic of Dasein’ is one that takes Descartes as an immediate jumping off point: how can I articulate what I understand myself to be as the general kind of entity I am, and on what besides me does my being depend? (shrink)

La référence au cartésianisme est constante dans les travaux contemporains de philosophie de l’esprit et de sciences cognitives. Sa fonction n’est pas de fournir une exégèse historique de Descartes ; elle est plutôt de dégager certains aspects de la conception cartésienne de l’esprit, ceux qui informeraient encore la recherche philosophique et scientifique actuelle, et qu’il resterait à dépasser. Ainsi l’adjectif cartésien n’est-il pas seulement utilisé pour faire directement référence à Descartes, mais aussi pour désigner les théories et les approches modernes (...) de l’esprit qui, tout en rompant avec le cartésianisme sur plusieurs points, auraient néanmoins hérité d’importantes erreurs cartésiennes. On remarquera en outre que dans cette logique, l’adjectif cartésien revêt un sens essentiellement critique. Et pour la plupart des théoriciens contemporains en effet, le cartésianisme est bien l’ennemi à combattre. La présente contribution se propose de dresser un portrait de cet ennemi, à partir de quelques-uns des usages qui sont faits de la notion de cartésianisme en philosophie de l’esprit et en sciences cognitives. Cette analyse, qui ne prétend pas à l’exhaustivité, nous permettra de faire apparaître les raisons et les enjeux de la référence à la figure cartésienne dans les réflexions des deux champs mentionnés. (shrink)

A survey of the skepticism of Simon Foucher, with particular attention to his objections to Descartes' philosophy.

Guillaume St-Laurent | : Dans ses récentes méditations philosophiques, Claude Romano soutient non seulement que la phénoménologie ne devrait plus être cartésienne, mais qu’elle ne peut plus l’être, car un doute universel serait lui-même foncièrement absurde du point de vue phénoménologique. L’objectif du présent essai est de contester qu’une telle réfutation phénoménologique du cartésianisme soit possible. En ce sens, nous soutiendrons que les arguments anti-sceptiques de Romano s’avèrent insuffisants parce que le doute hyperbolique est une possibilité de pensée qui, (...) bien que spéculative, demeure à la fois intelligible et plus radicale que toute description d’essence ou « réduction eidétique ». | : In his recent philosophical contributions, French phenomenologist Claude Romano maintained not only that phenomenology should not be Cartesian, but that it cannot be Cartesian because the very idea of a universal doubt would be utterly absurd from a phenomenological perspective. Our objective is to show that such a phenomenological refutation of Cartesianism is impossible. After reviewing the two main anti-skeptical arguments propounded by Romano, we will support a simple critical thesis : the hyperbolical doubt is an irreducible possibility of thought which, although “speculative,” remains nevertheless actual and more radical than any phenomenological description. (shrink)

This book explores various connections of John Stuart Mill's thought to ancient Greek philosophy primarily in relation to his conception of happiness. It argues that a better understanding of Mill's background in ancient Greek thought and his reading(s) of Plato's dialogues leads to innovative interpretations of his moral and political thought.

The rise and fall of the historian of British India -- A classical education -- History, philosophy, and history -- Induction and deduction -- Rational persuasion -- Good government.

This chapter contains sections titled: Kant's Anti‐Cartesianism Kant on the Highest Good and the Practical Necessity of Belief in God's Existence The Moral Proof at the Tübinger Stift and Its Fate Self‐Positing and the “Only True and Thinkable Creation out of Nothing” The Way to Absolute Knowing in Hegel's Phenomenology.

Summary John Stuart Mill's classic tale of disillusionment from a ‘narrow creed’, an overt as much as a covert theme of his Autobiography (London, 1873), has for many years served as a guide to the search for the causes and sources of his ‘enlargement-of-the-utilitarian-creed’ project. As a result, in analyses of Mill's mature views, Samuel Taylor Coleridge—and friends—commonly take centre stage in terms of influence, whereas John's father—James Mill—is reduced either to a supernumerary or a villain in the last act (...) of John's intellectual development. However, students of Mill's works should not take at face value the story presented in Autobiography. Mill's own emphasis on the role of his ‘new influences’ has led scholars to disregard the role of his ‘old influences’ in his attempt to create a broader theory of living—one which takes into account both the intellectual and the emotional capacities of individuals. A close look at key aspects of John Stuart Mill's ‘enlargement project’ suggests that James Mill may have played a more positive role than is usually acknowledged. A way into the intellectual affinity of the two Mills is the person they both kept returning to for guidance and inspiration throughout their lives: Plato. (shrink)

The article views the development of the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school from the analysis of texts to the study of spatial entities (semiosphere being most well known of them). It comes to light that ‘culture’ and ‘space’ have been such notions in Tartu–Moscow School to which, for instance, the ‘semiosphere’ does not add much. There are studied possibilities to join Uexküll’s and Lotman’s basic concepts (as certain grounds of Estonian semiotics) with Tartu–Moscow School’s treatment of culture and space through the notion (...) of ‘semiotic subject’. Such an approach allows to see transdisciplinarity, which has come to issue only during the last decade, already in the first conceptions of Tartu–Moscow School where transdisciplinarity revealed itself in the symbiotic use of ‘culture’ and ‘space’. (shrink)

It seems that eudaimonistic reconstructions of John Stuart Mill's conception of happiness have fallen prey to what they thought Mill should have done with regard to the role of pleasure in his notion of happiness. Insisting that utility and eudaimonia make conflicting claims, something which mirrors Mill's ‘conflicting loyalties’, they downgrade pleasure to just one of the ingredients of happiness. However, a closer look at Mill's intellectual development suggests otherwise. By focusing on Mill's radical background, this paper argues that pleasure (...) retains a central role in his conception of happiness – even from a eudaimonistic point of view. (shrink)

Contemporary sociosemiotics is a way to transcend borderlines between trends inside semiotics, and also other disciplines. Whereas semiotics has been considered as an interdisciplinary field of research par excellence, sociosemiotics can point directions at transdisciplinary research. The present article will try to conjoin the structural and the processual views on culture and society, binding them together with the notion of signification. The signification of space will illustrate the dynamic between both cultures and metacultures, and cultural mainstreams and subcultures. This paper (...) pays attention to the practice of sociocultural semiotisation of space and territorialisation by diverse examples and different sociocultural levels that imply semiotic cooperation between several members of groups that can be characterised as socii. We analyse territorialisation by graffiti, by furnishing spatial environment through artistic manners, by shaping the semiotic essence of cities through naming, renaming and translating street names, by pinning and structuring territories with monuments, by landmarking and mapping cultural space through individualisation of cities. We will see how principles of semiotisation of space are valid on different levels and how these principles form a transdisciplinary object of study as ‘semiotisation of space’, and how space can be regarded as a genuinely transdisciplinary research object. Individual, culture, and society are connected in such an object both as constituents and as a background of study. (shrink)

The article analyses the position of sociosemiotics in the paradigm of contemporary semiotics. Principles of studying sociocultural phenomena are discussed so as they have been set for analysing the inner mechanisms of sign systems in the semiology of F. de Saussure on the one hand, and for studying sign systems and semiotic units as related to referential reality in the semiotics of C. S. Peirce on the other hand. Three main issues are touched upon to define the scope of sociosemiotics: (...) the general methodology of sociosemiotics. its particular methods, and possible objects of analysis. The relevance of the features of objects in different humanitarian disciplines (cultural unit, historical fact, social fact, institutional fact, social process, etc.) is surveyed to define the object of study in sociosemiotics. Also, the article comments on the description of social organisations via cultural processes and on relations between an individual and society as controllable by social action models. (shrink)