If the Anthropocene represents a new epoch of thought, it also represents a new form of materiality and historicity for the human as strata and stratigrapher of the geologic record. This collision of human and inhuman histories in the strata is a new formation of subjectivity within a geologic horizon that redefines temporal, material, and spatial orders of the human. I argue that the Anthropocene contains within it a form of Anthropogenesis – a new origin story and ontics for (...) man – that radically rewrites material modes of differentiation and concepts of life, from predominantly biopolitical notions of life toward an understanding of life’s geophysical origination. Here, I use the term Anthropogenesis to suggest that two things explicitly happen in the nomination of the Anthropocene: 1) the production of a mythic Anthropos as geologic world-maker/destroyer of worlds, and 2) a material, evolutionary narrative that re-imagines human origins and endings within a geologic rather than an exclusively biological context. In contrast to the homogeneous geomorphizing of the Anthropocene, I suggest that socializing the strata needs a more nuanced notion of ‘geologic life’ that challenges the construction of the Anthropocene as an undifferentiated social stratification. (shrink)

The science of evolution acutely raises the perennial question of humankind’s place in the world. How does the theological anthropology of humans as imago Dei relate to an evolutionary anthropology with human beings derived from ancestral hominid species? Evolutionary biologists disclose ever greater similarities and continuity between animals and humans. Is human distinctiveness simply continuous with other ancestral forms of life or is there any kind of discontinuity? The answers to these questions depend not only on zoological considerations but also (...) on one’s philosophy of nature. The standard anthropology within the Catholic Church is the dual-origin model: the human body originates through evolution, but the human soul is directly created by God. This formulation, however, is not without difficulties, primarily for its seeming Cartesian dualism of a body and soul as distinct substances. This paper develops the anthropology of David Braine who, drawing upon Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, clearly situates humans as animals in great continuity with them. However, as linguistic animals who think in a medium of words, humans have a form of life—a soul—that transcends bodily processes. Braine’s anthropology provides a more coherent anthropology to understand the continuity and discontinuity of the human person in phylogenetic relationship to other species within an evolutionary perspective. (shrink)

The science of evolution acutely raises the perennial question of humankind’s place in the world. How does the theological anthropology of humans as imago Dei relate to an evolutionary anthropology with human beings derived from ancestral hominid species? Evolutionary biologists disclose ever greater similarities and continuity between animals and humans. Is human distinctiveness simply continuous with other ancestral forms of life or is there any kind of discontinuity? The answers to these questions depend not only on zoological considerations but also (...) on one’s philosophy of nature. The standard anthropology within the Catholic Church is the dual-origin model: the human body originates through evolution, but the human soul is directly created by God. This formulation, however, is not without difficulties, primarily for its seeming Cartesian dualism of a body and soul as distinct substances. This paper develops the anthropology of David Braine who, drawing upon Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, clearly situates humans as animals in great continuity with them. However, as linguistic animals who think in a medium of words, humans have a form of life—a soul—that transcends bodily processes. Braine’s anthropology provides a more coherent anthropology to understand the continuity and discontinuity of the human person in phylogenetic relationship to other species within an evolutionary perspective. (shrink)

The fall of the nineteenth century abounded in discoveries of natural laws, that is, strict and unequivocal rules of the development of life. These laws stated for example that ontogeny of individuals repeats, or recapitulates, phylogeny of the species; that big and specialized forms originate in evolution from small and unspecialized ones, while the reverse is not true; that endothermic animals are larger-sized and more compact in cool than in warm climates, and so on. Louis Dollo, a Belgian palaeontologist, proposed (...) the so-called law of irreversibility of evolution which stated that an organic structure lost in evolution cannot reappear with all the peculiarities of its design. This law seems indeed to be true but not particularly original. It was Heraclitus who first observed that one could not enter the same river twice. Dollo's law says essentially the same thing. The flow of evolutionary events combines so many processes in so many ways that past evolutionary events cannot recur exactly. “What is done, is done forever”. Time itself introduces asymmetry into the evolutionary process. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs L.S. Vygotsky’s account of anthropogenesis with respect to the work of anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan and late philosopher Bernard Stiegler, situating Vygotsky as a forerunner to recent theories that posit cultural scaffolding and niche construction as the main drivers of human cognitive evolution. One might think there is an immediate affinity between Vygotsky and the techno-centric accounts of Leroi-Gourhan and Stiegler. Following Leroi-Gourhan, Stiegler argues that “technics” is the main driver in the anthropogenic development of “reflective consciousness.” (...) Vygotsky likewise claims that “psychological tools” are responsible for the development of uniquely human forms of consciousness. However, closer inspection reveals deep disparities between Vygotsky and the French thinkers. In Stiegler’s philosophical redeployment of Leroi-Gourhan’s anthropology, “reflective” cognition is the product of a prehistorical rupture in which some threshold of technical-cortical complexification is breached. For Vygotsky, on the other hand, the inverse scenario obtains. Technical development initially proceeds in tandem with the complexification of biologically based signaling behavior until the introduction of signs, which then radically restructure the cognitive apparatus. Due to inconsistencies regarding the equivalency of the technical and semiotic in Stiegler and Leroi-Gourhan, I advance a Vygotskian account where anthropogenesis is the result of semiotic rather than technical intervention. This aims to establish Vygotsky’s “Cultural Historical” approach, and the Marxian-dialectical tradition from which he draws, as not only presaging recent naturalistic accounts of development, but offering a relevant theoretical program that may continue to inspire contemporary enculturated accounts of anthropogenesis. (shrink)

The co-evolutionary concept of tri-modal stable evolutionary strategy (SESH) of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctness) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to others ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the vectors of human evolution by two gear mechanism ˗ genetic and cultural co-evolution and techno-humanitarian balance. Explanatory model (...) and methodology of evaluation of creatively teleological evolutionary risk component of NBIC technological complex is proposed. The mechanism of influence of each module on the evolution of the two remaining modules of SESH a priori can be twofold: (1) informational co-evolution (direct selective pressure); (2) semantic co-evolution (time-varying semantic code, the compliance of the biological, socio- cultural and techno-rationalist adaptive modules of human stable evolutionary strategy). More rapidly evolving autonomous element of the co-evolutionary pair becomes making sense factor for the partner. Semantic co-evolution is the discrete acquisition of adaptive significance of individual alleles by changing socio-cultural types, manifested as an increase in the genetic variability of populations of Homo sapiens, and domesticated species parallel to socio-culturogenesis. The socio- cultural landscape leads to drastically difference of direction in biological evolution of Atlantic and East-Slavic ethnicities/civilizations. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to substantiate Agamben’s thesis that the originary experience of language as a performative speech-act, i.e. as an oath that guarantees the veridicality or efficacy of the speech-act, exposes the ethical relation to language as the origination of the human qua human, despite Agamben’s disenchantment rather than re-enchantment of language. This task first requires the elucidation of the seemingly magical and intimate connection between words and things, which will be proposed under the rubric of ”tautegory’. (...) Finally, I will seek to show how Agamben’s analysis of language as performative and anthropogenic is not just ethical, but also opens the space for a profane Messiah. Agamben’s profane messianism will be elucidated through an analysis of the Voice as the witness to the pre-linguistic. (shrink)

Purpose. The purpose is to prove the synchronicity of anthropogenesis, noogenesis and sociogenesis based on emotions, which are their self-organizational principles, as well as to reveal the synergistic essence of these processes. Theoretical basis. The study is based on the self-organizational paradigm, the theory of autopoiesis, labour theory, pananthropological concept, as well as on the concept of synergy of biological and mental phenomena. Originality. The concept of synchronicity of anthropogenesis, noogenesis and sociogenesis based on the emotions is substantiated. (...) The concept of self-organizational emergence of emotions on the basis of hormones is developed. It is established that anthropogenesis is a process of anthropologisation of life based on biochemical reactions in the form of hormones and emotions, which are a synergy of genetic information, biochemical processes, instincts, and physiological phenomena. It was outlined that noogenesis has an emotional dimension, because emotions are the basis for self-organization of rationality, which begins at the level of emotional consciousness. The author shows the specifics of sociogenesis, which self-organizes based on social emotions, which in their turn "distinguish" a man from the sphere of natural existence based on the ability to control emotions. Conclusions. Emotions arise self-organizationally on the basis of hormones. They are self-organizational factors of anthropogenesis, noogenesis and sociogenesis based on the synergistic effect that arises through the combination of emotions and hormones at the biochemical level. The basic principle of anthropology is emotions that synchronize anthropogenesis, noogenesis and sociogenesis, which manifests themselves on the physical, mental, and spiritual levels. At the bodily level, emotions are expressed as biochemical and hormonal reactions. At the spiritual level emotions create the basis for the development of the mind, which originates as emotional consciousness. Emotions self-organize the process of anthropologisation of life, which is possible based on the synergy of human genome, biochemical, physiological phenomena and instincts. The concepts of synchronicity of anthropogenesis, noogenesis and sociogenesis and self-organizational emergence of emotions based on hormones initiate a promising direction of further research of the role of emotions in the processes of self-organization of social phenomena. (shrink)

The article explores the manifesto of the Moscow Anthropological School, emphasizing the primacy of hallucinations in anthropogenesis. The current predicament of modern humanity urges the anticipation of something genuine and substantial. However, the essence of philosophy does not always align with the prevailing “spirit of the times.” Its mission is to pursue autopoiesis, scrutinizing society for its inherent flaws that impede progress. From this viewpoint, F.I. Girenok’s hallucinatory theory is entirely pertinent and justified. The narrative of civilization is typically (...) portrayed as a chronicle of discoveries and triumphs of rationality over irrationality. The history of fears and misconceptions, which not only persist from the past but also resurface, is less well-documented. Therefore, the program of the Moscow Anthropological School is far from being peripheral; on the contrary, it holds significant relevance. It furthers the tradition of inversion anthropology, initially established by N.Ya. Danilevsky, the first Russian critic of Darwinism. This anthropological tradition was particularly advanced by the concept of B.F. Porshnev and the research of contemporary authors like Yu.M. Boroday and V.A. Podoroga. Each, in their unique way, contributed to the critique of evolutionism and reductionism. F.I. Girenok’s concept evokes schizoanalysis, albeit devoid of Marxist influence, unlike G. Deleuze. All these aspects warrant a comprehensive philosophical discourse on the manifesto. Meanwhile, reports and discussions concerning F.I. Girenok’s theory revealed that not all participants are readily prepared to tread the path suggested by the founder of this theory, confining themselves to theological explorations instead. This, as per the author of the article, inherently signifies that hallucinatory and messianic anthropologies are complementary to each other. (shrink)

Catholic evolutionists have proposed to reconcile evolutionary anthropogenesis with Catholic doctrine by suggesting that a created soul could be infused into a body produced by evolution from an animal body. Could such an infusion yield not just a Platonic composite but a being with the unity of substance required by a Thomistic philosophy of nature? How could such a soul be the form of the body into which it was infused? This paper suggests that animals seem to have sense-powers (...) with a level of complexity, if not sufficient to underlie the abstraction of concepts in a being that also has a rational soul, then at least nearly so. The burden of proof lies rather on those who think that evolutionary development of such powers is not possible. In its final section, the paper argues that the existence of Eve as a second, and the only additional, initial rational being does not create special problems for the view here articulated. (shrink)

Purpose of the present work is to attempt to give a glance at the problem of existential and anthropological risk caused by the contemporary man-made civilization from the perspective of comparison and confrontation of aesthetics, the substrate of which is emotional and metaphorical interpretation of individual subjective values and politics feeding by objectively rational interests of social groups. In both cases there is some semantic gap present between the represented social reality and its representation in perception of works of art (...) and in the political doctrines as well. Methodology of the research is evolutionary anthropologicalcomparativistics. Originality of the conducted analysis comes to the following: As the antithesis to biological and social reductionism in interpretation of the phenomenon of bio-power it is proposed a co-evolutionary semantic model in accordance with which the described semantic gap is of the substantial nature related to the complex module organization of a consistent and adaptive human strategy consisting of three associated but independently functional modules. Evolutionary trajectory of all anthropogenesis components including civilization cultural and social-political evolution is identified by the proportion between two macro variables – evolutionary effectiveness and evolutionary stability, i.e. preservation in the context of consequential transformations of some invariants of Homo sapiens species specificity organization. It should be noted that inasmuch as in respect to human, some modules of the evolutionary strategy assume self-reflection attributes, it would be more correctly to state about evolutionary correctness, i.e. correspondence to some perfection. As a result, the future of human nature depends not only on the rationalist principles of ethics of Homo species, but also on the holistic and emotionally aesthetic image of «Self». In conclusion it should be noted that there is a causal link between the development of High Hume technologies and the totality of the trend in the anthropological phenomenon of bio-power that permeates all the available human existence in modern civilization. As a result, there is a transformation of a contemporary social risk in the evolutionary civilization risk. (shrink)

The subject of the essay is the genesis of the evolutionary strategy of стратегииHomo sapiens(SESH)as a carrier element of the transformation of technology and ethics into the main factors of anthropogenesis and the evolution of complex, self-organizing human-dimension systems.

Purpose of the present work is to attempt to give a glance at the problem of existential and anthropological risk caused by the contemporary man-made civilization from the perspective of comparison and confrontation of aesthetics, the substrate of which is emotional and metaphorical interpretation of individual subjective values and politics feeding by objectively rational interests of social groups. In both cases there is some semantic gap present between the represented social reality and its representation in perception of works of art (...) and in the political doctrines as well. Methodology of the research is evolutionary anthropologicalcomparativistics. Originality of the conducted analysis comes to the following: As the antithesis to biological and social reductionism in interpretation of the phenomenon of bio-power it is proposed a co-evolutionary semantic model in accordance with which the described semantic gap is of the substantial nature related to the complex module organization of a consistent and adaptive human strategy consisting of three associated but independently functional modules. Evolutionary trajectory of all anthropogenesis components including civilization cultural and social-political evolution is identified by the proportion between two macro variables – evolutionary effectiveness and evolutionary stability, i.e. preservation in the context of consequential transformations of some invariants of Homo sapiens species specificity organization. It should be noted that inasmuch as in respect to human, some modules of the evolutionary strategy assume self-reflection attributes, it would be more correctly to state about evolutionary correctness, i.e. correspondence to some perfection. As a result, the future of human nature depends not only on the rationalist principles of ethics of Homo species, but also on the holistic and emotionally aesthetic image of «Self». In conclusion it should be noted that there is a causal link between the development of High Hume technologies and the totality of the trend in the anthropological phenomenon of bio-power that permeates all the available human existence in modern civilization. As a result, there is a transformation of a contemporary social risk in the evolutionary civilization risk. (shrink)

If anthropogenesis was a transition from nature to society and the Neolithic revolution culminated in the breakthrough of human beings into history, then the appearance of cities on our planet, the "urban revolution," marked the rise of civilization, mankind's induction into the spiritual universe. The rise of cities marks the onset of what K. Jaspers called the Axial Period" (eighth-second centuries B.C.). This is the period in which the spiritual preconditions of humanity took shape: the Bible, the Iliad and (...) Odyssey, ancient philosophy and Greek culture, the Upanishads, Zoroastrianism, Taoism, and Confucianism. In world culture the city proved itself as a powerful mediator between the earth and the heavens. (shrink)

The article advances the notion that contemporary philosophy exists not as an ontology, but rather as an anthropology. The author posits that our understanding of being is contingent upon our comprehension of the human condition. Through an examination of the intellectual debate between M. Foucault and A. Badiou, the author demonstrates that I. Kant was the pioneer in European philosophy to interrogate the essence of humanity, thereby inaugurating an anthropological mode of philosophical thought. Building upon Kant’s proposition, the author presents (...) the intriguing hypothesis that the essence of humanity, or humanitas, is encapsulated within its capacity for hallucination, or hallucinatas. This perspective leads the author to introduce the novel philosophical concepts of “hallucenosis” and “explosion of hallucinations.” Here, “hallucenosis” refers to a collective of individuals engaged in a shared dream state, while “explosion of hallucinations” denotes the primal self-representation of humans as depicted in the rock art of the late Paleolithic era. The author gives particular emphasis to the concept of “double inversion” in human nature, a notion originally proposed in Russian philosophy by B.F. Porshnev and Yu.M. Borodai. Double inversion is interpreted as the emergence of self-consciousness, on one hand, and a speech event, on the other. The author further develops the idea that in contemporary human behavior, consciousness and intelligence are fundamentally disconnected. The conclusion drawn is that while intelligence facilitates animal existence in space, consciousness enables human life in time. In the author’s view, to hallucinate is essentially to live in time. The article substantiates the claim that organic intelligence and human intelligence operate within distinct sensoriums. Meanwhile, artificial intelligence, lacking its own sensorium, is argued to be non-existent in this context. (shrink)

One can rightly say of Peter Sloterdijk that each of his essays and lectures is also an unwritten book. That is why the texts presented here, which sketch a philosophical physiognomy of Martin Heidegger, should also be characterized as a collected renunciation of exhaustiveness. In order to situate Heidegger's thought in the history of ideas and problems, Peter Sloterdijk approaches Heidegger's work with questions such as: If Western philosophy emerged from the spirit of the polis, what are we to make (...) of the philosophical suitability of a man who never made a secret of his stubborn attachment to rural life? Is there a provincial truth of which the cosmopolitan city knows nothing? Is there a truth in country roads and cabins that would be able to undermine the universities with their standardized languages and globally influential discourses? From where does this odd professor speak, when from his professorial chair in Freiburg he claims to inquire into what lies beyond the history of Western metaphysics? Sloterdijk also considers several other crucial twentieth-century thinkers who provide some needed contrast for the philosophical physiognomy of Martin Heidegger. A consideration of Niklas Luhmann as a kind of contemporary version of the Devil's Advocate, a provocative critical interpretation of Theodor Adorno's philosophy that focuses on its theological underpinnings and which also includes reflections on the philosophical significance of hyperbole, and a short sketch of the pessimistic thought of Emil Cioran all round out and deepen Sloterdijk's attempts to think with, against, and beyond Heidegger. Finally, in essays such as "Domestication of Being" and the "Rules for the Human Park," which incited an international controversy around the time of its publication and has been translated afresh for this volume, Sloterdijk develops some of his most intriguing and important ideas on anthropogenesis, humanism, technology, and genetic engineering. (shrink)

This article questions Balibar’s claim that Simondon’s concept of the transindividual does not fulfil all the requirements for a materialist ‘philosophical anthropology’. In fact, we demonstrate that Simondon’s philosophy of individuation, and notably his concept of the transindividual, can be, as it were, included in a genealogy of aleatory materialism. Simondon’s philosophy of individuation is indeed a philosophy of the transindividual insofar as it involves the constant revision of the different historical forms taken by social relations in the coevolution of (...) human beings and their techno-social and natural milieu. Simondon’s way of conceiving anthropogenesis as an open and ‘metastable’ field in which individuals and processes relate to each other maintaining their own knowledge in motion, marks, in our view, a materialist style of thinking. Against this background we analyse Simondon’s overcoming of the dichotomy between the individual and society through a ‘double rejection’, we sketch his theory of a ‘double source’ for social relations, and we explain in what sense, from his perspective, the transindividual ‘can be said in many ways’. (shrink)

In the perspective of the philosophical archaeology proposed, here, the arkhé towards which archaeology regresses must not be understood in any way as an element that can be situated in chronology ; it is, rather, a force that operates in history—much in the same way in which Indoeuropean words express a system of connections among historically accessible languages, in which the child in psychoanalysis expresses an active force in the psychic life of the adult, in which the big bang, which (...) is supposed to have originated the universe, continues to send towards us its fossil radiation. But the arkhé is not a datum or a substance. It is much rather a field of bipolar historical currents within the tension of anthropogenesis and history, between point of emergence and becoming, between arch-past and present. And as such—that is to say, to the extent to which it is something that it is necessarily supposed to have factually happened, and which yet cannot be hypostatized in any chronologically identifiable event—it is solely capable of guaranteeing the intelligibility of historical phenomena, of ‘saving’ them archaeologically within a future perfect, yet not grasping its origin, but rather its history, at once finite and untotalizable. (shrink)

As documented in Part I, monogenism, the descent of all human beings from Adam and Eve, was closely linked to the Catholic doctrine of original sin throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Theological reservations about polygenism, the more scientifically supported account of human origins through a transitional population, was brought to a head by Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical Humani generis. Although the encyclical allowed discussion of human evolution, polygenism was prohibited because “It does not appear how such a (...) view can be reconciled with the doctrine of original sin.” Nevertheless, during and after Vatican II de facto theological acceptance of polygenism became commonplace even though the prohibition was not withdrawn. While some modern conceptions of original sin make a reliance upon monogenism unnecessary, another school of thought emphasizes a spiritual rather than a biological understanding of the concept. It remains to be seen whether polygenism can be unanimously accepted as a scientific phenomenon that is not theologically threatening. Reflection on the Vatican’s long period of ambivalence about the motion of the earth suggests that a similar prospect can be foreseen for polygenism even though it is subject to development in a manner that geostasis was not. (shrink)

Part one: the act of speaking -- The speaker as performing artist -- The absolute performative -- The repetition of anthropogenesis -- Part two: toward a critic of interiority -- Second-degree sensualism: a physiognomic project -- In praise of reification -- Part three: from the beginning and right now -- Natural history -- The multitude and the principle of individuation -- Appendix: Wittgenstein and the question of atheism.

The first volume in Peter Sloterdijk's monumental Spheres trilogy: an investigation of humanity's engagement with intimate spaces. An epic project in both size and purview, Peter Sloterdijk's three-volume, 2,500-page Spheres is the late-twentieth-century bookend to Heidegger's Being and Time. Rejecting the century's predominant philosophical focus on temporality, Sloterdijk, a self-described “student of the air,” reinterprets the history of Western metaphysics as an inherently spatial and immunological project, from the discovery of self to the exploration of world to the poetics of (...) plurality. Exploring macro- and micro-space from the Greek agora to the contemporary urban apartment, Sloterdijk is able to synthesize, with immense erudition, the spatial theories of Aristotle, René Descartes, Gaston Bachelard, Walter Benjamin, and Georges Bataille into a morphology of shared, or multipolar, dwelling—identifying the question of being as one bound up with the aerial technology of architectonics and anthropogenesis. Sloterdijk describes Bubbles, the first volume of Spheres, as a general theory of the structures that allow couplings—or as the book's original intended subtitle put it, an “archeology of the intimate.” Bubbles includes a wide array of images, not to illustrate Sloterdijk's discourse, but to offer a spatial and visual “parallel narrative” to his exploration of bubbles. Written over the course of a decade, the Spheres trilogy has waited another decade for its much-anticipated English translation from Semiotext. Volumes II, Globes, and III, Foam, will be published in the coming seasons. (shrink)

The monograph shows that in the last 50 years theoretical linguistics remains a compendium of mutually contradicting doctrines on multiple levels: the level of general theories of language, the level of its main constituents (the lexicon, syntax, and the lexical-syntactic interface that connects them), and the lower levels of specific linguistic problems (such as lexical polysemy, grammatical meanings, etc.). The contradictions of contemporary linguistic theories are indicative of a deep crisis. Evolutionary-synthetic theory of language is aimed at overcoming this crisis. (...) It implements a multidisciplinary approach that describes the language a) in evolutionary and ontogenetic development and b) in close interaction with other human subsystems: the mental representation of the world, human activity and social interaction. Language is defined as a dual system developing in ontogeny: 'universal sensory sublanguage + ethnically specific functional sublanguage' where the sensory sublanguage is used to describe the 'visible' world (accessible to the senses), and the functional sublanguage is employed to describe the conceivable world ('comprehended by human mind'). Within the framework of the approach presented, many problems are solved: 1) the cognitive (non-verbal) language for representing language meanings; 2) diversity and unity of languages (using the structure alternative to Chomsky's Universal Grammar); 3) the main (original) function of the language; 4) the cognitive language of thought (its basis is the lexical and grammatical meanings of the sensory sublanguage); 5) dual (functionally prototypical) structure of human categories; 6) mechanisms in the early acquisition of lexical and grammatical meanings; 7) the meaning (assignment) of the syntactic structure of a sentence, etc. The book deals with a wide range of issues related to human cognition, glottogenesis and anthropogenesis, universal cognitive structures for the representation of objects, actions and situations, so it will be of interest not only to linguists, but also to psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers. (shrink)

The Anthropocene must also be seen as the convergence of the historicization of nature and human historicity, not simply metaphorically, but factually. As historical time is injected in nature through anthropogenesis, resulting in our having to see nature as a product of a historical process, our understanding of time is being transformed. The Anthropocene must be understood as a temporalization of time tout court. The key concern is what could be called an Anthropocenic matrix of intelligibility and its corresponding (...) image of Anthropos. In the time of the end of time and the time of the end, the new image of humanity is that of a destroyer of world. (shrink)

Le mythe participe à la fois du vécu et du réel transcendés par le symbole, qui fait appel autant au visible qu’à l’immatériel. Exprimant une fiction selon certains, ou des vérités profondes pour d’autres, il traduit des croyances sur la cosmogenèse et l’anthropogenèse. Il a pour objet de dévoiler un mystère, et l’événement fondateur du cosmos et de l’humain.Le symbole, dans sa moitié signifiante, est toujours lié au concret, c’est-à-dire au matériel, au visible et au fini. Selon Paul Ricœur, un (...) symbole possède trois dimensions concrètes : cosmique, onirique et poétique. L’autre moitié du symbole exprime la part d’invisible et d’immatériel qui a sa logique propre. Mêlant la perception sensorielle à l’immatériel et au mystère, les mythes canaques précoloniaux traduisent aussi bien la réalité descriptive du monde visible, que la création de mondes imaginaires. Nous analyserons dans l’oralité canaque ces deux notions et leurs applications dans les domaines de la nature, de l’humain et du sociétal. Nous verrons comment s’articulent le visible et l’invisible dans le mythe canaque, quelle est la place respective du réel et de l’imaginaire impliqués dans chaque mythe, et leurs fonctions respectives. Sont-ils oppositionnels comme l’indique leur définition, ou bien forment-ils un ensemble de termes indissociables et complémentaires? Nous déterminerons in fine quelles sont l’interférence et la corrélation du réel et de l’imaginaire dans les fonctionnalités qui confèrent leur originalité aux mythes canaques. A myth is involved in both the living and real transcended by the symbol that appeals as much to the visible than the intangible. Expressing fiction for some, or deep truths for other, myth reflects beliefs about cosmogenesis and anthropogenesis. It aims to unveil a mystery, and the founding event of the cosmos and the human.The symbol, in its signifying half, is always linked to the concrete, i.e. the material, visible and finish. According to Paul Ricœur a concrete symbol has three dimensions: cosmic, oneiric and poetic. The other half of the symbol expresses the invisible hand and intangible that has its own logic. Combining sensory perception to the immaterial and mystery, precolonial Kanak myths reflect both the descriptive reality of the visible world, and the creation of imaginary worlds. We will analyze in Kanak orality these two concepts and their applications in the fields of nature, human and societal. We’ll see how articulate the visible and invisible in the Kanak myth, what is the respective role of the real and the imaginary involved in each myth, and their respective functions. Are they oppositional as indicated by their definition, or do they form a set of interrelated and complementary terms? We shall determine in fine which are the interference and the correlation of the reality and the imagination in the features which confer their originality on the Kanak myths. (shrink)

Riassunto: Reificazione presenta notevoli discontinuità rispetto alle precedenti e alle successive trattazioni honnethiane e costituisce un tentativo audace di fondare una teoria sociale normativa su strutture ontologiche e antropologiche. Per salvare la pregnanza di questa prova, cercheremo di conciliare gli aspetti più contraddittori dell’opera, mostrando l’unitarietà di fondo dell’intero percorso honnethiano. Innanzitutto, occorre mettere a fuoco lo statuto del riconoscimento, preso di per se stesso, al fine di comprendere l’unità che si gioca alle spalle delle diverse versioni elaborate da Honneth. (...) Poi, ci concentreremo sul riferimento alla psicoanalisi e alla psicologia evolutiva, cercando di mettere in relazione i concetti di simbiosi e di imitazione neonatale. In terzo luogo, intendiamo illuminare la duplice dimensione del paradigma honnethiano del riconoscimento: da un lato, esso viene caratterizzato normativamente; dall’altro, ha una pretesa più propriamente ontologica e antropogenetica. Infine, occorre ridefinire l’orizzonte sorgivo del conflitto. Parole chiave: Axel Honneth; Riconoscimento; Intersoggettività; Antropogenesi; Teoria Critica Honneth’s Paradigm of Recognition: Interaction, Anthropogenesis, and Normativity: Reification demonstrates a number of discontinuities with Honneth’s earlier and later works and constitutes a bold attempt to ground a social normative theory on ontological and anthropological grounds. In order to respect the importance of this effort, I try to reconcile some of the more incompatible aspects of this work by pointing to the deep unity of the Honnethian path as a whole. First, I focus on the status of recognition itself, in order to reveal the unity of thought behind the different versions proposed by Honneth. Then, I concentrate on his references to psychoanalysis and evolutionary psychology, in an attempt to bring together the ideas of symbiosis and neonatal imitation. Third, I highlight the dual nature of the Honnethian recognition paradigm: on the one hand, it can be characterized as normative; on the other, it makes a truly ontological and anthropogenic claim. Finally, I redefine the source of the conflict between this and Honneth’s other work. Keywords: Axel Honneth; Recognition; Intersubjectivity; Anthropogenesis; Critical Theory. (shrink)

: This article focuses on cognitive enhancement technologies and their possible anthropological implications, and argues for a reconsideration of the human-technology relation so as to be able to better understand and assess these implications. Current debates on cognitive enhancement consistently disregard the intimate intertwinement of humans and technology as well as the fundamentally technogenic nature of anthropogenesis. Yet, an adequate assessment of CET requires an in-depth and up-to-date re-conceptualization of both. Employing insights from the work of Bernard Stiegler, this (...) article proposes an organology and pharmacology of CE. What is typical about new CET is their interiorizing nature, which can be expected to fundamentally reshape organological configurations. Starting from the premise that CE is a phenomenon that predominantly unfolds within the current conjuncture of cognitive capitalism, I will present the issue of cognitive proletarianization as being of crucial importance for considering CE. I conclude by providing some methodological guidelines for the development of a positive pharmacology of CET and by suggesting that CET should be considered as technologies of the self sensu Michel Foucault. (shrink)

As documented in Part I, monogenism, the descent of all human beings from Adam and Eve, was closely linked to the Catholic doctrine of original sin throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Theological reservations about polygenism, the more scientifically supported account of human origins through a transitional population, was brought to a head by Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical Humani generis. Although the encyclical allowed discussion of human evolution, polygenism was prohibited because “It does not appear how such a (...) view can be reconciled with the doctrine of original sin.” Nevertheless, during and after Vatican II de facto theological acceptance of polygenism became commonplace even though the prohibition was not withdrawn. While some modern conceptions of original sin make a reliance upon monogenism unnecessary, another school of thought emphasizes a spiritual rather than a biological understanding of the concept. It remains to be seen whether polygenism can be unanimously accepted as a scientific phenomenon that is not theologically threatening. Reflection on the Vatican’s long period of ambivalence about the motion of the earth suggests that a similar prospect can be foreseen for polygenism even though it is subject to development in a manner that geostasis was not. (shrink)

v. 1. Cosmogenesis.--v. 2. Anthropogenesis.

According to Leontiev’s “activity approach,” the external world is not something available to be “worked over” according to a subject’s inner or “ideal” representations; at stake instead is the emergence of an “idealized” objective world that relates to a subject’s activity both internally and externally construed. In keeping with a Marxian account of anthropogenesis, Leontiev links the emergence of “ideality” with social activity itself, incorporating it within the general movement between the poles of ‘inner’ cognition and ‘external’ action. In (...) this manner, Leontiev both parallels and goes beyond Hutto and Myin’s recent “enactivist” account of “content-involving” cognition, where representational thought depends on socio-cultural scaffolding and, as such, is uniquely human. What traditionally comes to be called representational content is for Leontiev the result of the transition from a primitive cognitive apparatus of “image-consciousness” to a one which is mediated by social activity. For the being endowed with “activity-consciousness,” mental content is something apprehended by assimilating “the objective world in its ideal form” [Leontiev, 1977, p. 189]. And the precondition for such assimilation is the apprehension of meanings from their origin in the social-material system of activity. The genesis of content-involving cognition is thus coeval with the development of socializing activity systems, replete with the external representations of values and norms as described in enactivist literature as publicly scaffolded symbol systems. Leontiev thus offers an anti-internalist account of cognition commensurate with Hutto and Myin but with the added dimension of a developmental scale of analysis with which to explain the origin of human-specific cognition. (shrink)

This article explores the shadow side of transhumanist aspirations to transform humanity using cognitive enhancement technologies (CET). The central problem concerns how the desired transhuman anthropogenesis alters the ethical capacities of the human person. Focusing on the intersection between autonomy and equity, the article posits that inequity enhances individual autonomy for some at the expense of others, hence degrading collective autonomy. This process is already unfolding under neoliberalism, as analyzed via Byung-Chul Han’s theory of psychopolitics. Han’s psychopolitics reveals how (...) the imagined increases in autonomy brought by CET would not yield an authentic enhancement of autonomy, but rather result in further undesirable permutations of humanity. It would erode autonomy while increasing inequity, thus degrading empathy and solidarity. Franco Berardi’s critique of semiocapitalism nuances Han’s theory in support of collective autonomy and an anthropogenesis guided by contemplative empathy. Conjoined, they amplify the possibilities for alternative therapeutic forms of transformational CET. (shrink)

This paper argues that self-consciousness and associated psychic consciousness emerges as a consequence of a recursive selfdirecting on itself of the cognitive centre in the human brain. The neural mechanisms and circuits underlying self-consciousness appeared and developed during biological evolution as an adaptation that increased the fitness of our social ancestors, chances of their survival, and reproduction. These mechanisms/circuits strengthened the efficiency of individuals in various social relations, enabled separation of 'I' from 'he/she' or 'them' and the formation of firstand (...) higher-order theory of mind, stimulated development of complex, recursive language, facilitated forming temporary coalitions directed to achieve a particular goal, helped to establish social hierarchies, and increased coherence and cooperativity of a social group. The reciprocal reinforcement of the development of the neural network in the brain underlying self-consciousness and of the network of various social relations and aspects was a self-driving process, one of positive feedbacks abundant in anthropogenesis. (shrink)

Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit kulturanthropologischen und literarischen Reflexionen auf den Bewegungsmodus des Gehens. Er diskutiert die Frage, inwieweit das Gehen in diesen Diskursen als Linienpraxis aufgefasst wird. Ausgangspunkt ist die Beobachtung, dass die Kulturanthropologie, die dem aufrechten Gang eine Schlüsselfunktion für die Anthropogenese zuweist, diesen zugleich als Produkt eines ›Begradigungsprozesses‹ markiert und an die dichotomische Gegenüberstellung von Natur und Kultur koppelt. In literarischen Texten, aber auch in neueren ökoanthropologischen Ansätzen wird die Natur-Kultur-Opposition und die damit verbundene Privilegierung der geraden (...) Linie kritisch hinterfragt. Setzt die literarische Peripatetik mithin eine alternative Form der Beziehung zwischen Mensch und Umwelt in Szene? Entwirft sie eine Ökologie des Denkens und Wahrnehmens, die sich jenseits der Natur-Kultur-Dichotomie bewegt? Diese Fragen werden an ausgewählten Fallbeispielen beleuchtet. The essay deals with the peripatetic mode of movement as reflected in cultural anthropology and literature. It asks to what extent these discourses view walking as a practice of line-making. The point of departure is the observation that cultural anthropology ascribes a key role to the upright gait within anthropogenesis while associating it with a process of rectilinearization on the one hand and a sharp dichotomy between nature and culture on the other hand. Certain literary texts and recent approaches in ecologically oriented anthropology have, however, challenged the validity of this dichotomy and the concomitant privilege of the straight line. Does literary peripatetics thus propose an alternative way to grasp the relationship between human beings and the environment? Does it outline a new ecology of the mind that supersedes the binary relation between nature and culture? These questions are discussed with reference to selected case studies. (shrink)

What does it mean to re-read Camus today? First of all, one must emphasize that he was a thinker of crisis and, despite appearances and abductions, a radical thinker of the refusal of domination and of resistance. It is this critical aspect which I seek to elucidate, in texts dating from 1937, and from the immediate post-war, Liberation period. In these writings one finds a reflection on anthropogenesis in a twofold relation to a monstrosity which must be defended, and (...) an emerging political monstrosity, faced with which Camus strives to re-think the activity of resistance. (shrink)

Based on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Alexandre Kojève produces a theory of an "anthropogenesis" that allocates the constitution of self-consciousness in a markedly historical and social field centered on the "dialectic of the master and the slave". More than this, it emerges in a domaine seized by the conflictuality of such a central operator of socialization, namely the desire, which is always, in the last case, a desire for recognition. Aware of this idea and on the path of the (...) development of an imaginary’s theory, Lacan was pursuing the necessity to reallocate certain points of the Freudian constitution’s theory of the ego. He was aiming to bypass Freud’s supposed “biologism” by emphasizing the fundamental dependence of the other’s figure on the process of "hominization", in which "aggressiveness" plays an inherent role. If the projects of Kojève and Lacan present undeniable convergences, it is necessary, however, to better understand them, as well as to establish the uniqueness of their distances, inflections and objectives. (shrink)

ResumenEl trabajo propone un análisis crítico de la hipótesis agambeniana de la «máquina antropológica», que desde Aristóteles a Heidegger, opera una escisión en el interior del viviente y produce lo humano a partir de la oposición entre hombre y animal. Este análisis contribuirá, en primer lugar, a la ubicación de Agamben en el contexto de las consideraciones filosóficas actuales acerca de la «animalidad» y, en segundo lugar, a la comprensión de la importancia del concepto de «vida» en este autor.Palabras claveVida, (...) genealogía, antropogénesis, animalizaciónAbstractThis work attempts to examine the Agambenian hypothesis of the «anthropologic machine» that, from Aristotle to Heidegger, brings a separation inside the living and produces the «human» from the opposition between man and animal. This examination will contribute, on the one hand, to locate Agamben’s thought in the present context of philosophical considerations on «animality», and, on the other hand, to understand the importance of the concept of «life» to this author.KeywordsLife, genealogy, anthropogenesis, animalization. (shrink)

ResumenEl trabajo propone un análisis crítico de la hipótesis agambeniana de la «máquina antropológica», que desde Aristóteles a Heidegger, opera una escisión en el interior del viviente y produce lo humano a partir de la oposición entre hombre y animal. Este análisis contribuirá, en primer lugar, a la ubicación de Agamben en el contexto de las consideraciones filosóficas actuales acerca de la «animalidad» y, en segundo lugar, a la comprensión de la importancia del concepto de «vida» en este autor.Palabras claveVida, (...) genealogía, antropogénesis, animalizaciónAbstractThis work attempts to examine the Agambenian hypothesis of the «anthropologic machine» that, from Aristotle to Heidegger, brings a separation inside the living and produces the «human» from the opposition between man and animal. This examination will contribute, on the one hand, to locate Agamben’s thought in the present context of philosophical considerations on «animality», and, on the other hand, to understand the importance of the concept of «life» to this author.KeywordsLife, genealogy, anthropogenesis, animalization. (shrink)

The concept of natural, common life is distinguished from life as political existence in the opening lines of Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer – a schism within ‘life’ that has profound consequences for Agamben’s political theory and ontology. Agamben claims that bare life now “dwells in the biological body of every living being” . As such, it is necessary to ascertain what the ‘life’ of biopolitics is – the life capable of politicization. The notion of natural living being is central to (...) Agamben’s account, and yet it remains an ambiguous and indeterminate concept. This conceptual ambiguity is informed by Agamben’s account of anthropogenesis and the relation between the ‘human’ and the realm of animality, to which the concept of negativity is pivotal. Negativity is also central to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. However, for Merleau-Ponty the ontology of Nature and man constitute “the leaves of one sole Being” . Animality and human being are emergent; Merleau-Ponty adamantly maintains, “there is no rupture” . This paper analyzes the notion of negativity in Agamben and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of Being and life, and contends that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy gives rise to an ontology that offers a more open and productive account of animality and nature. In Agamben’s account, negativity is constitutive of man, which gives rise to an irreducible disjuncture between Being and life. For Merleau-Ponty, negativity is ‘in’ Being. There is no tension between Being and ‘life’: Nature is “a leaf or layer of total Being,” and we must conceive of “the ontology of Nature as the way toward ontology”. (shrink)

The article provides a reading of Baltasar Gracian El Criticón in the key of an allegorical ontology that has its central focus in an immanent anthropogenesis. On the basis of the classic monograph of H. Jansen on Gracian’s fundamental concepts, we appraise that a theory based on the search for a solid glory, on the honest exercise of virtue and on the meditation motivated by disillusion, draw the boundaries of the ethical discourse held in El Criticón . According to (...) this author, history confirms the loss of the paradigm of order that nature embodies, but also provides the opportunity to develop human prudence and to generate dispositives of community free from the dialectic of appearance. The central task for Gracián is to overcome the tribulation where man is aware to be worldly embedded, after having been imposed upon him. And to get it, only the direction of heroic virtue and value can be taken in order to obtain the esteem of others and to achieve immortality to eyes of an aesthetic community. (shrink)

The image of dead person returning to life was the most ancient source of irrational fear appeared in culture. This conclusion is argued with empirical data from archeology and ethnography. Fear has been expressed in funeral rites, the tying of extremities, burning and dismemberment of dead bodies, and ritual cannibalism etc. At the same time, it was attended by effective care for helpless cripples, which seems to descend to the Lower Paleolithic as well. Dread of posthumous revenge played a decisive (...) regulative role at the earliest stage of anthropogenesis, as the disparity between artificial weapons and natural aggression-retention mechanisms became self-destructive. In the new conditions, individuals with normal animal mind were doomed to catastrophe. Those hominid groups proved viable, in which mystical fear, a product of unnaturally developed imagination, bounded lethal conflicts among kinsmen. The phobias corresponded to the psycho-nervous system's “strategic pathology”; that was a condition for early hominids’ self-preservation. As a result, a causal connection between instrumental potential, cultural regulation quality and social sustainability was formed, which has been a mechanism of social selection for all of human history and prehistory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Guide to Personal Knowledge: The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi: Tacit Knowledge, Emergence and the Fiduciary Program by Dániel Paksi and Mihály HéderAlessio TartaroPAKSI, Dániel and Mihály Héder. Guide to Personal Knowledge: The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi: Tacit Knowledge, Emergence and the Fiduciary Program. Wilmington, Del.: Vernon Press, 2022. xxiii + 209 pp. Cloth, $65.00Famous for the concept of "tacit knowledge," Polanyi is a figure who looms over twentieth-century (...) philosophy without ever establishing himself as one of its major protagonists. Yet, Polanyi tackled central problems in twentieth-century Western philosophy and offered [End Page 358] insightful and original analyses thereof. In Personal Knowledge, Polanyi articulates ideas about metaphysics, mathematics, evolution, philosophy and sociology of science, epistemology, philosophy of language, political theory, theology, and more. The richness of the contents, but also their deep unity, make Polanyi's work a unique piece in the philosophical landscape of his time, full of fruitful insights that are still relevant nowadays.Guide to Personal Knowledge, written by two of the leading experts on Polanyi's philosophy, deserves the merit of providing an accessible introduction to this complex work. The book is divided into thirteen chapters, each corresponding to the respective chapter of Personal Knowledge. In each chapter, Paksi and Héder clearly explain Polanyi's main ideas, presenting them in the same order as they appear in Personal Knowledge. The chapters are introduced by a "Goals of the chapter" section that provides a series of key points, where the authors summarize Polanyi's objectives in the corresponding chapter of Personal Knowledge.The Guide is interspersed with many direct quotations from Personal Knowledge that allow the reader to link the Guide to the original text. The use of figures and tables illuminates even the most complex concepts, such as "tacit integration" and the difference between "random and ordered systems." The Guide is enriched by twenty-five boxes that provide information on ideas, authors, and concepts directly or indirectly referenced by Polanyi in Personal Knowledge. These boxes are a valuable supplement. In some cases, they offer insight into contemporary events, theories, and scholars to which Polanyi alludes but that he does not elaborate on, for example, about the role of the Michelson-Morley experiments in Einstein's development of the theory of relativity. In other cases, boxes develop a comparison between Polanyi's ideas and related philosophical figures, such as Thomas Kuhn and Samuel Alexander. Thanks to the boxes, the reader gains a richer and more complete view of Polanyi's thought.In the preface, Paksi and Héder preliminarily introduce some key concepts for understanding Polanyi's work, including "objectivity," "trust" and "fiduciary program," "tacit knowledge," "intellectual passions," "deceptive substitution," "moral inversion," "operational principles," "logic of achievement," and "emergence." Their analysis always proves faithful to Polanyi's thought, and the authors show how these concepts are interrelated and constitute the pillars of Personal Knowledge's argumentative structure. Other equally crucial concepts in Polanyi's work, for example, "commitment," "indwelling," "tradition," "conviviality," "anthropogenesis," "ultrabiology," are not introduced in the preface, but they are explored in depth in the respective chapters.The thirteen chapters of the book recapitulate in detail the main thematic segments of Personal Knowledge. The critique of objectivism and positivist views of science is explained and analyzed in chapters 1 to 4. This critique is articulated on several levels. Polanyi first criticizes [End Page 359] objectivism because it attempts to remove the personal element from scientific knowledge in order to pursue ever higher degrees of formalism, neutrality, and impersonality. Polanyi asserts, however, that the personal element is irreducible, and then proceeds to demonstrate how it operates: in the evaluation of probability statements (chapter 2), in the appreciation of ordered patterns (chapter 3), and in the practice of skills (chapter 4). The ineliminability of the personal element shows that objectivism is false. Paksi and Héder brilliantly retrace the train of thought that leads Polanyi to this conclusion.The second theme that runs across Personal Knowledge concerns the tacit foundation of human intellectual abilities and, consequently, of science and society. In chapter 6, the authors follow Polanyi's disparate arguments about animal intelligence, human... (shrink)

This article puts forward the thesis that the contemporary global movement against capitalism, and the post-Fordist regime it is responding to, is best understood in terms of the emergence of ‘human nature’ as the crux of political struggle. According to Virno, the biological invariant has become the raw material of social praxis because the capitalist relation of production mobilizes to its advantage, in a historically unprecedented way, the species-specific prerogatives of Homo sapiens. Through the concept of ‘natural-historical diagrams’, the article (...) explores the significance of socio-political states of affairs which directly display key aspects of anthropogenesis, and, making use of Ernesto De Martino’s concept of ‘cultural apocalypses’, considers the different relations that a biological ‘background’ and a socio-political ‘foreground’ entertain in traditional and contemporary societies. The attempt to develop a ‘natural history’ of such diagrams leads Virno to reflecting on the importance of the language faculty, neoteny, non-specialization and the absence of a predetermined natural environment for political action. This reflection on the contemporary importance of political anthropology leads Virno to a set of concluding remarks on the role of ethics and the idea of the ‘good life’ in the practice of the ‘new global’ movement. (shrink)

The article opens (§ 1) with the paradoxical situation of philosophical anthropology between a heralded destiny of decadence (W. Schulz) and the surge of its argumentations and notions in the present-day debate on ethical themes and on the very idea of “human nature,” as well as in the redefinition of social philosophy (J. Habermas and P. Sloterdijk). It seeks, then (§§ 2-5), to trace a sort of “metaphilosophy” of philosophical anthropology, discussing the principal interpretations (H. Schnädelbach, H. Paetzold, O. Marquard, (...) W. Lepenies, etc.) that characterize it as reactive, open to a broader range of disciplines (the natural, human, social and cultural sciences) and installed in the clash between nature and history, intertwining empirical and theoretical elements and capable of providing a descriptive base for moral choices. It then takes up (§§ 6-8) the more recent perspectives of a philosophical anthropology for the twenty-first century that oscillate between its reconstruction around a strong theoretical core – excentric positionality – as a current of unitary thought and the divergent interpretation that focuses on the biopolitical approach, in order to redefine the specifically human along the vertical axis of anthropogenesis and evolutionary comparison and the horizontal axis of the analysis of diverse cultures in search of the premises of human vital practice. It concludes (§ 9) by suggesting an exploration – through the articles that follow – of the role of stimulus that philosophical anthropology and its authors play in the most disparate currents on the scene of contemporary German philosophy, such as critical theory, historical anthropology, neopragmatism, social philosophy, and the philosophy of culture. (shrink)

The co-evolutionary concept of Three-modal stable evolutionary strategy of Homo sapiens is developed. The concept based on the principle of evolutionary complementarity of anthropogenesis: value of evolutionary risk and evolutionary path of human evolution are defined by descriptive (evolutionary efficiency) and creative-teleological (evolutionary correctly) parameters simultaneously, that cannot be instrumental reduced to others ones. Resulting volume of both parameters define the trends of biological, social, cultural and techno-rationalistic human evolution by two gear mechanism ˗ gene-cultural co-evolution and techno- humanitarian (...) balance. The resultant each of them can estimated by the ratio of socio-psychological predispositions of humanization/dehumanization in mentality. Explanatory model and methodology of evaluation of creatively teleological evolutionary risk component of NBIC technological complex is proposed. Integral part of the model is evolutionary semantics (time-varying semantic code, the compliance of the biological, socio-cultural and techno-rationalist adaptive modules of human stable evolutionary strategy). (shrink)

The adoption of the Legal Codes has generated a debate regarding use therein of the concept of family. Today, the family is in an area of decline due to profound socio-economic mutations, which have caused several processes to become acute, such as individualization, divorce, abandonment of the prospect of marriage, increase in number of abortions, deterioration of the condition of children and adolescents. In spite of all this, the Legal Codes have preserved the traditional concepts. Likewise, the development of NRTs, (...) insemination, surrogate mothers, demands for rights for the gay couples and their fight for acknowledgement have also contributed to this socio-cultural shift. We use the concept of family in its classical meaning; any other meaning configurations remain in the area signifying a couple/pair that do not have the possibility of procreation in themselves. Under the circumstances, we plead for the reconstruction of the family. (shrink)

The article tends to clarify the possibilities of philosophical interpretation of migration concept in terms of its meanings in the sciences. The concept of migration appears as an empirical generalization and as a metaphor in different disciplines. In the first case, one dwells upon moving of the real living agents in space, in the second one it deals with the dynamics of quasi-agents (cells, programs, ideas). In order to clarify the conceptual status of migration, the author undertakes its contextualization in (...) the process of anthropogenesis. Hence the archetypical character of migration is displayed as ontological framework of key developments of the emergence of the humans and as catalyst of socio-cultural development in general (E. Cassirer). The paper clarifies the possibility of identifying the structure of migration as a journey and adventure (A.N. Whitehead) in the form of uneven development and recurrence of the original event. The paradox of its legitimation is formulated. Philosopher’s “vnenahodimost” (M.M. Bakhtin), the ambivalence of philosophy (T.I. Oiserman) is the discovery of the philosopher as a stalker between the worlds. (shrink)

The article discusses the place of leisure in Hans Blumenberg’s philoso- phical anthropology, focusing on “Theorie der Unbegrifflichkeit” (2007). According to Blumenberg, the tradition of philosophical anthropology unjustly reduces human rationality to the attempt of self-preservation. Not only is the actual process of anthropogenesis better described as led by a logic of prevention, not of preservation. Sedentary life, product of preventive behavior, not only secures survival but grants leisure as the condition of culture. Yet cultural practices, although an eminent (...) product of human rationality, cannot be explained by the logic of either self- preservation or prevention. Blumenberg thus argues that within philosophical anthropology, rationality can best be explained in is orientation towards happiness, an orientation encompassing not only preventive, conceptual forms of reason, but also contemplative, non-conceptual uses, such as in myth and mysticism. As the condition for articulating a self-understanding more adequate than self-preservation or prevention, leisure thus assumes a central place in determining human nature. It is in leisure that rationality is experienced as a source of happiness. (shrink)

An epic project in both size and purview, Peter Sloterdijk's three-volume, 2,500-page Spheres is the late-twentieth-century bookend to Heidegger's Being and Time. Rejecting the century's predominant philosophical focus on temporality, Sloterdijk, a self-described "student of the air," reinterprets the history of Western metaphysics as an inherently spatial and immunological project, from the discovery of self to the exploration of world to the poetics of plurality. Exploring macro- and micro-space from the Greek agora to the contemporary urban apartment, Sloterdijk is able (...) to synthesize, with immense erudition, the spatial theories of Aristotle, René Descartes, Gaston Bachelard, Walter Benjamin, and Georges Bataille into a morphology of shared, or multipolar, dwelling--identifying the question of being as one bound up with the aerial technology of architectonics and anthropogenesis.Sloterdijk describes Bubbles, the first volume of Spheres, as a general theory of the structures that allow couplings--or as the book's original intended subtitle put it, an "archeology of the intimate." Bubbles includes a wide array of images, not to illustrate Sloterdijk's discourse, but to offer a spatial and visual "parallel narrative" to his exploration of bubbles.Written over the course of a decade, the Spheres trilogy has waited another decade for its much-anticipated English translation from Semiotext. Volumes II, Globes, and III, Foam, will be published in the coming seasons. (shrink)

In this article I develop two arguments, taking Max Scheler’s phenomenology as a starting point. The first one is that emotions are not private and internal states of consciousness, but what makes us come into contact with the expressive dimension of reality, by orienting our placement in the world and our interaction with others. The second thesis is that some emotions have an “anthropogenetic” nature that is at the roots of the ontology of a person and of social ontology: it (...) is through practices of “sharing” certain emotions that the humanity has been born and that the various forms of social realities are established. In accordance with one of María Zambrano’s phrases, I propose to trace these anthropogenetic emotions back to the «hambre de nacer del todo» («hunger for being fully born») of a being that never stops being born again. (shrink)