Inspired by Jill Kraye's many contributions to European intellectual history, this volume presents a diverse collection of studies in Renaissance philosophy and humanism by leading experts in the field.

Ever since it was first published 1930, William Empson's "Seven Types of Ambiguity" has been perceived as a milestone in literary criticism - far from being an impediment to communication, ambiguity now seemed an index of poetic richness and expressive power. Little, however, has been written on the broader trajectory of Western thought about ambiguity before Empson; as a result, the nature of his innovation has been poorly understood. This book remedies this omission. Starting with classical grammar and rhetoric, and (...) moving on to moral theology, law, biblical exegesis, German philosophy, and literary criticism, the author explores the many ways in which readers and theorists posited, denied, conceptualized, and argued over the existence of multiple meanings in texts between antiquity and the twentieth century. This process took on a variety of interconnected forms, from the Renaissance delight in the "elegance" of ambiguities in Horace, through the extraordinary Catholic claim that Scripture could contain multiple literal - and not just allegorical - senses, to the theory of dramatic irony developed int he nineteenth century, a theory intertwined with discoveries of the double meanings in Greek tragedy. Such narratives are not merely of antiquarian interest: rather, they provide an insight into the foundations of modern criticism, revealing deep resonances between acts of interpretation in disparate eras and contexts. This book lays bare the long tradition of efforts to liberate language, and even a poet's intention, from the strictures of a single meaning. (shrink)

Since the early decades of the sixteenth century, Pomponazzi has been a name to conjure with: to some, the first of the modern atheists; to others, a hero of the new philosophy. But how much direct influence did his work have? This question is explored in terms of the way in which oracular divination is treated. In the sixteenth century, the range of conceptual categories available to explain such phenomena was threefold: natural, supernatural or simply unreal. In some cases, such (...) as those of demonic possession, the person was able to be examined directly. But the same conceptual triad was also applied to another kind of case, one whose subject could not be examined, since she had long been consigned to history ? the Pythia or priestess of the ancient Delphic oracle, who had famously foamed and babbled during her prophetic frenzy. For some writers on divination, this subject was of particular interest, since it had been explicitly discussed by ancient sources: whether the Pythia's ravings were real or invented, natural or supernatural, could be analysed with categories borrowed from Cicero, Plutarch and, above all, Aristotle. Within the sixteenth?century territory disputes over Aristotle's corpus, the pagan oracles, represented above all by the Pythia, offered a test case for the broader problem of the place of divination within the natural world. The central antagonist in this tussle was Pietro Pomponazzi, whose treatment of the ancient oracles, although brief, played an important part in his radical interpretation of Aristotle. For many of his contemporary readers, it was this subject, with its specific historical dimension, that highlighted the faults in his positions on nature and divination. (shrink)

If academic monographs were covered by the Trade Descriptions Act—and why not?—then Elisa Tamarkin’s new book would be the greatest publisher’s liability since Steven Shapin’s A Social History of T...