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Anthony L. Brueckner [33]Anthony Leo Brueckner [1]
  1. Brains in a vat.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.
    In chapter 1 of Reason, Truth, and History, Hilary Putnam argues from some plausible assumptions about the nature of reference to the conclusion that it is not possible that all sentient creatures are brains in a vat. If this argument is successful, it seemingly refutes an updated form of Cartesian skepticism concerning knowledge of physical objects. In this paper, I will state what I take to be the most promising interpretation of Putnam's argument. My reconstructed argument differs from an argument (...)
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  2. Why is death bad?Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
    It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...)
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  3. What an anti-individualist knows A Priori.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1992 - Analysis 52 (2):111-18.
  4.  94
    Prenatal and Posthumous Non-Existence: A Reply to Johansson.John Martin Fischer & Anthony L. Brueckner - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (1):1-9.
    We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible worlds).
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  5. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (3):89-117.
  6.  15
    Charity and Skepticism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (4):264-268.
  7.  20
    Branching in the psychological approach to personal identity.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):294-301.
    In this introduction to the special issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics on the topic of personal identity and bioethics, I provide a background for the topic and then discuss the contributions in the special issue by Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Tim Campbell and Jeff McMahan, James Delaney and David Hershenov, and David DeGrazia.
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  8. Transcendental arguments I.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1983 - Noûs 17 (4):551-575.
    A Kantian transcendental argument is an argument which purports to show that the existence of physical objects of a certain general character is a condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. Both the Transcendental Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism satisfy this characterization. But we have seen that even a successful Kantian transcendental argument would be somewhat disappointing. Even though such an argument would refute the extreme Cartesian skepticism about the very existence of physical objects, it would not certify any (...)
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  9.  22
    Death's badness.Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):37-45.
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  10. Transcendental arguments II.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1984 - Noûs 18 (2):197-225.
    In part I of the present work, I used the term 'Kantian transcendental argument' to refer to any argument which purports to establish that the existence of outer objects is a logically necessary condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. In this second part, then, I examine Kantian transcendental arguments which proceed from the premise that one is the subject of widely construed self-conscious experience.
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  11.  37
    Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent?Anthony L. Brueckner - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):287-290.
    Gary Ebbs has argued that skepticism regarding knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states cannot even be coherently formulated. This articles is a reply to that argument.
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  12. Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument Against Metaphysical Realism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1984 - Analysis 44 (3):134--40.
  13.  72
    (1 other version)Two recent approaches to self-knowledge.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:251-71.
  14. Externalism and privileged access are consistent.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Wiley-Blackwell.
     
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  15.  38
    Ambiguity and knowledge of content.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):257-260.
  16. (1 other version)The omniscient interpreter rides again.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1991 - Analysis (October) 199 (October):199-205.
  17. Another failed transcendental argument.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1989 - Noûs 23 (4):525-530.
  18.  28
    A. J. Ayer.Anthony L. Brueckner & John Foster - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (1):97.
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  19.  34
    Externalism and the a prioricity of Self-knowledge.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):132-136.
    Michael McKinsey has argued that content externalism has the absurd consequence that one can know a priori that water exists. Richard W. Miller responds that when a prioricity is properly understood, McKinsey's argument should not be seen as a _reductio of externalism. This paper disputes Miller's understanding of a prioricity.
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  20.  18
    12. Why Is Death Bad?Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer (ed.), The Metaphysics of death. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. pp. 219-230.
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  21.  33
    Noordhof on McKinsey-Brown.Anthony L. Brueckner - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):86-88.
  22.  68
    Humean fictions.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):655-664.
    In "Of Personal Identity,", Hume attempts to explain how one arrives at the fiction of a substantial self which retains its numerical identity through time. In "Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses," Hume offers a similar explanation of the origin of another fiction - that of objects which enjoy a continued and distinct existence. In this paper, I will argue that his pair of parallel explanations does not jointly account for the pair of fictions to be explained.
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  23.  85
    Problems with internalist coherentism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 54 (1):153-160.
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  24. Transmission for knowledge not established.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (139):193-195.
    In "Nozick on Scepticism", Graeme Forbes attempts to establish a Transmission Principle for knowledge which has been challenged by a number of anti-sceptical philosophers (such as Nozick). This principle (or something like it) seems to be required by Cartesian sceptical arguments, so if it could be refuted, this would apparently rid us of such scepticism. I do not believe that Nozick or anyone else has refuted the principle, yet I will argue that Forbes has certainly failed to establish it.
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  25. McGinn on consciousness and the mind-body problem.Anthony L. Brueckner & E. Beroukhim - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  26.  14
    Harman's naturalistic study of reasoning.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1989 - Metaphilosophy 20 (3-4):356-370.
  27.  50
    Begging the skeptic's question.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (4):523-529.
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  28. Losing Track of the Sceptic.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1985 - Analysis 45 (2):103 - 104.
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  29.  48
    McKinsey redux?Anthony L. Brueckner - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 2--377.
  30. Self-knowledge via inner observation of external objects?Anthony L. Brueckner - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):118-122.
    Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.
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  31.  42
    The failure of an a priori argument for realism.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):491-498.
  32.  72
    Why Nozick is a sceptic.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1984 - Mind 93 (370):259-264.
  33.  31
    Philosophical Relativity by Peter Unger. [REVIEW]Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (9):509-517.
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