In 1889, the German philologist Friedrich Blass isolated a section of Chapter 20 from Iamblichus’ Exhortation to Philosophy (mid- or late 3rd Century CE) as an extract from a lost sophistic or philosophical treatise from the late 5th Century BCE. In this article, I introduce the text, which is now known as 'Anonymus Iamblichi' (or 'the anonymous work preserved in Iamblichus') by appeal to its two main contexts (source preservation and original historical composition), translate and discuss all eight (...) surviving fragments in their entirety, and provide some closing remarks about its importance to this history of democratic thought. The text itself presents a series of very carefully interwoven arguments concerning the three “parts” of excellence (ἀρετή) – wisdom, courage, and eloquence – and their successful application in society. In the course of presenting this case, Anonymus Iamblichi comments on the conditions under which one should learn to be excellent (Fragments 1-2) and the ends to which one should direct one’s excellence (Fragments 3-4); he provides an anthropological discussion of the weaknesses of human psychology and its effects on the good man (Fragments 5-6) and an hypothetical thought experiment concerning the “Superman” (which naturally solicits comparison with Nietzsche’s übermensch) and his inability to overcome the multitude in a lawless state (Fragments 6 and 8); and a positive defense of law and justice, reflecting a pro-democratic philosophical perspective (Fragments 7-8) – a rara avis indeed in ancient philosophy. (shrink)

The paper challenges the traditional assumption that the fragments of ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ are best understood and interpreted against the intellectual and cultural background of the so-called ‘sophistic movement’. I begin by suggesting that we can distinguish, in the fragments, between two separate ‘discourses’ concerning nomos and its role in human life: an abstract ‘sophistic’ discourse, centered around the defense of nomos against the antinomian champions of natural pleonexia, and another, less abstract and more polemical discourse on nomos, which (...) is aimed at the author’s contemporary Athens. I argue that the author’s engagement with well-known sophistic ideas is best understood as instrumental to his polemical agenda: it provides him with a powerful intellectual framework in which to articulate his criticism of democratic society, especially with regard to traditional notions of social ‘benefaction’ and the relation between rich and poor. (shrink)

The political outlook of the so-called ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’ has been a subject of controversy in the scholarly literature, with some commentators judging him to be a committed democrat, while others see in him a partisan of aristocracy or even oligarchy. This disagreement is not surprising, for the text contains passages that seem to pull in opposite directions. The article suggests that we move beyond the one-dimensional oligarch-or-democrat model traditionally employed and instead approach the issue from a fresh angle, (...) applying the more nuanced typology for understanding ancient social criticism developed by Josiah Ober.The article begins by situating the author within the social landscape of classical Athens. The resulting characterization presents the author as a representative of a distinctive social type: the Athenian ‘rich quietist’, who prefers private economic endeavours to engagement in public affairs, and who is ideologically committed to democratic government but also highly critical of how democratic society treats its wealthy citizens. This characterization helps make better sense of the seemingly contradictory political indications in the text. In particular, fragments 6 and 7 should be read as a single line of argument, which takes the form of an ‘immanent critique’ of contemporary Athenian democracy. According to ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, democratic society rightly praises the rule of law as a distinctive democratic value, but it falls disappointingly short of that ideal in its treatment of its own wealthy elite citizens. (shrink)

In der Mitte des 10. Jahrhunderts verfasste ein anonymer Autor in Kaschmir ein literarisch meisterhaftes philosophisches Lehrgedicht zur Selbsterlosung, den "Moksopaya" ("Weg zur Befreiung"). Die in Kaschmir uberlieferte Sanskrit-Fassung dieses in der indischen Geistesgeschichte einzigartigen Welterklarungsentwurfs wird nun zum ersten Mal als historisch-kritische Textausgabe der sechs Bucher mit etwa 30.000 Strophen zuganglich gemacht. Teil I enthalt den auf der Grundlage aller verfugbaren Manuskripte kritisch edierten Text der ersten beiden Bucher "Vairagya" ("Uber die Leidenschaftslosigkeit") und "Mumuksuvyavahara" ("Uber das Verhalten einer erlosungswilligen (...) Person"). Zentrales Thema im ersten Buch ist die "Innere Distanz zur Welt", die der Protagonist, Prinz Rama, zwar aus eigener kritischer Reflexion, aber noch ohne zielfuhrende Erlosungspraxis entwickelt hat. Letztere wird im zweiten Buch vorgestellt; hier geht es um den Vorrang menschlicher Tat- und Entschlusskraft gegenuber blindem Schicksalsglauben und um die fur die Erlosung unabdingliche Gleichmut, Reflexion und Zufriedenheit. Teil II enthalt das dritte Buch "Utpattiprakarana". Die "Entstehung" ("utpatti") der Welt, das Thema dieses Buches, wird als schopferischer Akt des kosmischen wie auch individuellen Geistes beschrieben, bleibt jedoch ohne jede Realitat. Die Veranschaulichung dieser philosophischen Position durch die vom unbekannten Autor selbst verfassten Erzahlungen wie deren Erklarung in den jeweils folgenden Dialogen kennzeichnen sich durch eine aussergewohnliche intellektuelle wie poetische Originalitat und geben dem Text seinen einzigartigen Charakter. (shrink)

This is an edition of an extensive Latin commentary on Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations composed about 1205 by an anonymous Parisian master who was a philosophically perceptive close reader of the Aristotelian text. The only extant manuscript of his work is now in Cambridge. The commentary is an important source of information about the development of logic at the time when the masters in Paris were beginning to organize themselves into what was to become the University of Paris.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anonymus Defensorium Ockham Ms. Romae, bibl. Angelica 1017 ff. 21r-36r Conspectus siglorum: = addendum censeo [....] = delendum censeo«..» = litterae illegibiles factae sive propter codicis corruptionem deperditae [[..]] = scriptor delevit Y.../ = in margine sive supra lineam inserta (?) = lectio incerta t...-t = corrupta esse videntur I22rl = incipit pagina 22 recto codicis«cCapitulum 15. De novem praedicamentis denominativis> Praedicamenta (adn. in mg.: Capitulo 15) alia (...) a substantia sunt quaedam denominationes substantiae. Denominatur enim substantia a qualitate 'qualis', a quantitate 'quanta', a relatione 'relata', \ab/ actione 'agens', et sic de singulis. Unde sicut conceptus ordinati in praedicamento substantiae sunt univoci, habentes univocam praedicationem de substantia prima, ita conceptus ordinati in praedicamentis accidentalibus sunt conceptus denominativi respectu substantiae, habentes praedicationem denominativam de ipsa—licet possunt esse univoci in suo ordine, et de suis inferioribus univoce praedicari. Est autem (adn. in mg.: Quaestio bona quarta) hic investigandum, utrum secundum multitudinem denominationum de substantia sit multitudo realitatum; ut, sicut sunt denominationes secundum novem genera distinctae, ita res et realitates novem generum distinctae. Quae est utrum novem denominantia substantiam sint dispositiones distinctae realiter a substantia, aut sint 111 Franciscan Studies (54) 1994-1997 112ANONYMUS dispositiones distinctae tantum ratione, sicut Commentator1 innuit. (adn. in ima pag.: Utrum secundum multitudinem denominationum de substantia sit multitudo realitatum, id est utrum novem praedicamenta distinctas habent realitates.) Et ista dubitatio de praedicamentis denominativis consimilis est dubitationi superius2 factae de praedicatis univocis et de correspondentia praedicamentorum et realitatum. Et videtur hie conformiter dicendum sicut de praedictis, scilicet quod multitudo rerum non est secundum multitudinem coneeptuum quiditativorum. Et hoc manifestum est, sumentibus nobis suppositiones has: Primo (adn. in mg.: Prima suppositio) quod substantia habet entitatem propriam. Ex illo sequitur evidenter intentum, nam si praedicamenta denominantia substantiam distinguerentur ab ea realiter, circumscriptis illis realitatibus, nulla remaneret realitas substantiae propria. Si enim substantia materialis haberet [[aliunde figuram puta a qualitate]] aliunde extensionem, puta a quantitate, aliunde figuram, puta a qualitate, aliunde positionem, et ita de alus, istis circumscriptis, quaero quid remaneret pro entitate substantiae? Non apparet quod aliquid, nisi fingas totam realitatem substantiae materialis posse habere esse punctuale et in puncto salvari, quod non capit imaginario. Quia de ratione substantiae materialis et corporeae, quae distinguitur contra immaterialem et incorpoream, est quod habeat partem extra partem.3 Et ita videtur quod substantia materialis erit seipsa quanta, et seipsa terminata, et per consequens seipsa figurata. Seipsa, inquam, et per se, perseitate excludente rem aliam. Secunda suppositio (adn. in mg.: Secunda suppositio) est quod non est contradictio realitatem unam esse, realitate ab ea distincta non existente. Patet, quia non est contradictio nisi affirmetur et negetur idem de eodem,4 implicite vel explicite. Et ista suppositio 1Cf. Averroës In Metaph. V com. 14 (1562) 148EF. 2Cf. supra cap. 11 'De univocis'; cf. cap. 12 (f. 24v): Et manifestum est, quoniam non oportet multitudinem esse in conceptibus, sicut nec multitudo in conceptibus sequitur multitudinem eorum quae sunt in vocibus, necessario sumentibus nobis suppositiones has. 3Cf. Guillelmus de Ockham Summa logicae I c. 44 (OPh I 137): quantitas continua permanens nihil aliud est nisi res una habens partem situaliter distantem a parte. 4Cf. Aristot, De interp. 9, 18a29-30: In his ergo quae sunt et facta sunt necesse est affirmationem vel negationem veram vel falsam esse; Anal. post. 1,11 77a30; Tópica VI,6 143bl6: Nam de omni vel affirmatio vel negatio vera est; Metaph. IV,9 1005bl9- THE DEFENSORIUM OCKHAM1 1 3 concludit similiter intentum. Nam quia contradictio est corpus de genere substantiae (id est substantiam materialem) esse, et non esse quantum (id est non habere partem extra partem); ideo quantitas non est alia res a corpore. Item quia contradictio est magnitudinem esse, et ipsam non esse terminatam et figuratam; ideo figura non est alia res a corpore sive magnitudine. Item quia contradictio est totum esse, et non esse maius parvus distinguerentur specie cum sint plures partes materiae in magno quam in parvo. Solet etiam dici quod magnum et parvum non variant speciem. Istae viae (adn. in mg.: Quod quantitas continua non sit res distincta) non concludunt de quantitate continua, quia non repugnaret sibi unitas; nec ex parte sui, quin scilicet possit habere unitatem formae accidentalis convenientem, nec ex parte subiecti, quin scilicet posset habere subiectum unum. Sed sufficienter videtur convinci quod... (shrink)

This five volume Routledge Library Editions set is dedicated to the life and work of Adam Smith, the founding father of modern economics and pioneer of free markets. With individual volumes originally published between 1974 and 1988, this five volume collection looks to determine Smith’s impact and significance by placing his work within the context of the historical development of economic thought. These volumes also consider Smith’s scientific approach to the study of morality and the sociological foundation of his economic (...) theory, whilst offering pioneering insights into his life and the context of the society in which he lived. (shrink)

At the beginning of Republic 2 (358e–359b), Plato has Glaucon ascribe a social contract theory to Thrasymachus and ‘countless others’. This paper takes Glaucon’s description to refer both within the text to Thrasymachus’ views, and outside the text to a series of works, most of which have been lost, On Justice or On Law. It examines what is likely to be the earliest surviving work that presents a philosophical defence of law and justice against those who would prefer their opposites, (...) On Excellence by an anonymous author usually referred to as ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’; the views on these topics among the Socratics, including Crito, Simon the Cobbler, Aristippus of Cyrene, and Antisthenes; and Socrates’ debate with Hippias ‘On Justice’ in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (4.4.5–25). Its main contention is that the ‘countless others’ referred to by Glaucon points chiefly, but not solely, to the members of the circle of Socrates, who themselves espoused a range of views on justice and law, and their relations. (shrink)

Il s'agit du temoin le plus ancien d'un cours portant sur les livres II et III au complet du Traite de l'ame d'Aristote. Le cours, enseigne a la Faculte des Arts d'une Universite difficile a preciser (Paris?), est un exemple paradigmatique de la methode litterale (ce qui a permis de reconstituer la version de la Vetus utilisee par le maitre, que l'on pourra ajouter au dossier de l'Aristoteles Latinus) et un temoin precieux de la premiere reception d'Aristote. Le texte permet (...) de constater le retrait d'Avicenne et l'influence croissante d'Averroes (dont le role est cependant purement instrumental, subordonne a l'intelligence purement philosophique du texte d'Aristote). Aucune des grandes doctrines personnelles du commentateur n'est retenue par le maitre. Dans l'etude doctrinale du texte on met en valeur les points du commentaire (nature et puissances de l'ame, l'intellect et les modes de connaissance), et on offre un tableau des doctrines psychologiques professees par les maitres des arts avant 1250 : John Blund, Pierre d'Espagne et d'autres maitres anonymes (tableau complete par un apparat de sources tres riche). On critique la notion de premier Averroisme, car la notion de l'intellect agent comme puissance de l'ame semble etre une contribution proprement latine a l'exegese du De anima. Finalement, on prouve que saint Thomas a eu connaissance de ce commentaire anonyme et qu'il en depend dans sa propre lecture d'Aristote. Cela met en perspective l'originalite de saint Thomas et souligne la contribution des maitres des arts a l'histoire de l'Aristotelisme medieval. (shrink)

Name and notion -- Protagoras -- Xeniades -- Gorgias -- Lycophron -- Prodicus -- Thrasymachus -- Hippias -- Antiphon -- Critias -- Anonymus Iamblichi -- Dissoi Logoi or Dialexeis -- Appendix: Euthydemus of Chios.

The preoccupation evinced by Italian scholars for Protagoras and the Sophistic movement is extraordinary and somewhat comparable to the interest which American philosophers have recently shown in Parmenides and the Eleatics. Since the Protagoras revival in the 'Forties' numerous Italian editions of the Sophistic fragments have been published and a constellation of contradictory reconstructions of Protagoras' thought has been offered to a perhaps unduly tolerant public. In the present study Zeppi intends to refute all extant historiography from Gomperz to Capizzi (...) in the name of a unitary interpretation based upon the internal consistency of Protagoras' ethical and epistemological doctrines. Such an interpretation will do justice, Zeppi believes, to the complexity of Protagoras' thinking while revealing the central position he occupies in the philosophical tradition before Plato. Accordingly Zeppi devotes the first part of his essay to Protagoras' doctrines and the second to earlier Presocratics and the Sophists in general. Finally he offers thought-provoking studies on the Anonymus Iamblichi, on the Cyrenaic school, on Democritus' ethics and on its bearing on Protagoras. On the whole Zeppi is more convincing in demolishing the views of his predecessors than in presenting his own ideas. Nevertheless his hypothesis of Protagoras as an ethical emotivist, a sense-datum theorist and a thinker divorcing truth from morality is refreshingly questionable.--L. M. P. (shrink)

The fragments of Iamblichus' commentaries on Plato's dialogues (Sophist, Phaedo, Phaedrus and Timaeus). Greek text with English translation and notes.

Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist’s edition of the Anonymus Aurelianensis III – the earliest known Latin commentary on Aristotle’s Prior analytics –, offers the critical text and a systematic comparison with the ancient Greek commentary tradition.

Edition of the commentary on Aristotle's De interpretatione by an anonymous Parisian master from the first half of the 13th century.

Editions of difficult, obscure Latin philosophical texts from the Middle Ages rarely receive reviews in general History of Philosophy journals. An exception might be made for an important new editi...

Edizione con introduzione delle nove questioni anonime sugli Elenchi Sofistici conservate nel ms Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 3523, ff. 70rb-72rb . Nell'introduzione l'A. esamina le convergenze fra queste e le questioni sugli Elenchi conservate nel ms. Praha, Méstska Lidova Knihovna, L. 76 . L'ed. affronta anche il problema, irrisolto, di riferimenti interni ad autori, verosimilmente maestri, non identificati: Albertus , Robertus e Antonius. Su quest'ultimo si concentra l'attenzione dell'ed., per il quale Antonius commentò gli Elenchi attorno al 1260, probabilmente a Parigi. (...) Antunius e Albertus sono ricordati anche in due scholia nella copia dei Sophistici Elenchi in Wien, ÖNB, 2377, f. 49r. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Rhizomata Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 2 Seiten: 148-176.

In hindsight, it is not surprising that the exegesis of Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi developed into one of the most substantial parts of the Latin commentary tradition. To make a long story short, in its customary capacity as the art of arts and the science of sciences, medieval logic was primarily concerned with discerning the true from the false in arguments as they occur in natural, ordinary speech as opposed to the more formalised parlance later logicians will resort to. It makes (...) perfect sense, then, that medieval logicians paid special attention to everything that threatens sound reasoning and that prevents us from speaking the truth. Indeed, they were second to none and better than most at exposing and elucidating arguments’ flaws and shortcomings. After all, as John Buridan – faithful to a long and illustrious tradition – aptly put it, «rooting out errors» is logic’s first order of business. As early as the 1140s, Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi provided the most fertile ground for such keen interest in fallacies; which, in turn, explains etc. This much is uncontroversial or, at any rate, can withstand any amount of scrutiny we care to throw at it. Courtesy – first and foremost – of Sten Ebbesen, whose long-standing interest in medieval writings on bad arguments has turned the Byzantine and Latin aftermath of Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi into well-charted territory, by all standards. The Anonymus Cantabrigiensis has played no small part in shaping this picture. As a matter of fact, time and again over the last forty years or so, quotes and insights from the anonymous work have kept showing up in Ebbesen’s editions and studies: since he first discovered the commentary in the late 1970s and brought it to the general attention, Ebbesen has routinely drawn on the Anonymus as an early witness of the circulation of Aristotelian logical works and related texts, as a convenient illustration of major trends and distinctive features of the Latin literature on fallacies, and as a sensible interpreter in his own right. (shrink)