In the Western tradition, at least since the 14th century, the philosophy of knowledge has been built around the idea of knowledge as a representation [BOU 99]. The question of the evaluation of knowledge refers at the same time (1) to the object represented (which one does one represent?), (2) to the process of knowledge formation, in particular with the role of the knowing subject (which one does one represent and how does one represent it?), and finally (3) to the (...) relationship between the representation and the represented object. Criteria of evaluation such as “validity”, “adequacy” or “truth”, as mentioned in [AMB 07], make sense only with respect to these three dimensions. An evaluation can thus (1) depend on the ontological nature of the object of knowledge, (2) relate to the relationship between subject and object—including the structures (cognitive, social) which organize this relationship, or (3) relate to the relation of similarity between the object and its representation as well. The relevant criteria of evaluation thus depend on the points of view adopted on these questions. As there are indeed a plurality of points of view in this field, the goal of this appendix is to summarize, as briefly as possible, the various positions adopted by the philosophers and to refer to the relevant texts of reference for more information (for a first outline [CHA 76, SCH 01]). The first section 1 introduces useful discussions about the philosophy of theoretical knowledge and general epistemology, from a quasi-historical perspective. Section two 2 discusses the intermediary but central notion of models. Section three 3, more exploratory, introduces an approach to simulation as “concrete experiment”. It suggests that such a frequent claim in the literature, when precisely evaluated, can, to some extent, renew both the representational and the linguistic views on simulation. (shrink)

In the Western tradition, at least since the 14th century, the philosophy of knowledge has been built around the idea of knowledge as a representation [Boulnois 1999]. The question of the evaluation of knowledge refers at the same time (1) to the object represented (which one does one represent?), (2) to the process of knowledge formation, in particular with the role of the knowing subject (which one does one represent and how does one represent it?), and finally (3) to the (...) relationship between the representation and the represented object. Criteria of evaluation such as “validity”, “adequacy” or “truth”, as mentioned in chapter 4, make sense only with respect to these three dimensions. An evaluation can thus (1) depend on the ontological nature of the object of knowledge, (2) relate to the relationship between subject and object—including the structures (cognitive, social) which organize this relationship, or (3) relate to the relation of similarity between the object and its representation as well. The relevant criteria of evaluation thus depend on the points of view adopted on these questions. As there are indeed a plurality of points of view in this field, the goal of this appendix is to summarize, as briefly as possible, the various positions adopted by the philosophers and to refer to the relevant texts of reference for more information. The first section introduces useful discussions about the philosophy of theoretical knowledge and general epistemology, from a quasi-historical perspective. Section two discusses the intermediary but central notion of models. Section three, more exploratory, intro-duces an approach to simulation as “concrete experiment”. It suggests that such a frequent claim in the literature, when precisely evaluated, can, to some extent, renew both the representational and the linguistic views on simulation. (shrink)

_A mood for Philosophy_ __ _ _ _In this dialogue with Francois Laruelle Anne-Françoise Schmidt suggests that Laruelle's non-philosophy, which begins with an indecision, could be conceived as something that in the history of painting has been called figura serpentinata, "serpentine line". This line, which produces a kind of music by the use of concepts, is visible according her trough his whole work: from his first book on Ravaisson, _Phenomenon and Difference,_ through to his last one, _The Last Humanity: A (...) New Ecological Science_, published in French in 2015 and expected to appear in English in 2018._. (shrink)

The effects of non-standard Philosophy on Epistemelogy.

This article concerns the implementation of a non-anthropological, truly universal paradigm equal for all humans in place of sexual difference (which is not All-sexual), and not determined by it. Everything in human life relates to sexual difference, even Man-in-person as distinct from the subject. The theme of liberation is too restricted and narrow if we do not shift our focus back to the anthropological ? and as such, philosophical ? paradigm, the All-sexual; the All-masculine. Instead of projecting sexual difference onto (...) the human paradigm, we propose, first of all, a pre-sexual ?difference? or duality encompassing all humans, and enabling a certain usage or pragmatic of sexual representations. The utopian paradigm thus allows thinking a transformation of sexual difference. (shrink)

The following article is the result of a collaboration between a painter and a woman philosopher. They worked previously on an experimental documentary film about objects and art objects, which was realized at Palais de Tokyo. The painter had illustrated in black and white fictions of philosophy, written during a festival on lost films organized by UNdocumenta in South Korea, and then he made photographs of oil paintings of the English translation. This article about painting and philosophical ethics is their (...) first common text. It aims to show that there is no interdiscipline or passage known between the philosophical work and the painting. The philosopher can not imitate the recognition of the painter nor the painter to repair the philosophical non-encounter. The question then is: What can ethics in this non-symmetrical space? Rather than being a product of philosophy, it is what organizes this space between recognition and non-encounter. It is an ethics for philosophy, rather than the other way around. Ethics force to greet the other philosophers without the grudge of the loss necessary to the invention and allows the painter to know the distances that make him feel the recognition. This ethical space is unknown and can not be covered by the artist's philosophy of access or pre-nomination by indexes. Ethics is this unknown, i.e. it is a sense-without-sign, it is without rules-said but process of indexation and acceptance of the loss. (shrink)

This text proposes a generic epistemology, relatively independent of any discipline, with the aim of understanding newly emerging scientific objects and disciplines, as well as new logics of interdisciplinarity. This epistemology is also relatively independent of the present, requiring a thinking of the future as something other than the realization of the present ; somewhat like that suggested by the practice of scenario planning. It does not supplant ?disciplinary; epistemology, but seeks to demonstrate, through their simultaneous exercise, the passage from (...) a critical to a fictional paradigm, where disciplines are decentred and philosophies immersed in the sciences ; not the ?established; sciences we know from descriptions constructed along the lines of classical disciplines, but emergent or future sciences, for which the intention of the researcher is constitutive. The question is no longer that of the criteria of scientificity, but that of the identity of science. (shrink)

Le logicisme de Russell consiste en une thèse affirmant que toutes les mathématiques pures peuvent être exprimées à l’aide de constantes logiques et de variables. Il est compris habituellement comme une réduction des mathématiques pures à la logique. Pourtant cette thèse est une garantie de non-réduction des mathématiques au nombre et à la grandeur, de l’arithmétique aux seuls nombres finis, de la géométrie à celle d’Euclide, de la logique à la syllogistique. Le logicisme ne peut donc être interprété comme doctrine (...) positive et dogmatique d’un fondement logique des mathématiques. L’œuvre philosophique de Russell poursuit par ailleurs une critique des thèmes liés aux fondements. L’ensemble des points de vues de Russell sur les liens de la lo­gique et des mathématiques ne peut être compris qu’en considérant la logique comme une science à part entière et non comme un langage formel. Cette façon d’aborder le logicisme fait voir des perspectives « hétérodoxes » auxquelles est amené Russell, qui n’est pas partout le « classique » que la littérature décrit trop vite. Cette lecture s’appuie notamment sur la correspondance récemment éditée entre Bertrand Russell et Louis Couturat (1897-1913). (shrink)

Le logicisme de Russell consiste en une thèse affirmant que toutes les mathématiques pures peuvent être exprimées à l’aide de constantes logiques et de variables. Il est compris habituellement comme une réduction des mathématiques pures à la logique. Pourtant cette thèse est une garantie de non-réduction des mathématiques au nombre et à la grandeur, de l’arithmétique aux seuls nombres finis, de la géométrie à celle d’Euclide, de la logique à la syllogistique. Le logicisme ne peut donc être interprété comme doctrine (...) positive et dogmatique d’un fondement logique des mathématiques. L’œuvre philosophique de Russell poursuit par ailleurs une critique des thèmes liés aux fondements. L’ensemble des points de vues de Russell sur les liens de la lo­gique et des mathématiques ne peut être compris qu’en considérant la logique comme une science à part entière et non comme un langage formel. Cette façon d’aborder le logicisme fait voir des perspectives « hétérodoxes » auxquelles est amené Russell, qui n’est pas partout le « classique » que la littérature décrit trop vite. Cette lecture s’appuie notamment sur la correspondance récemment éditée entre Bertrand Russell et Louis Couturat (1897-1913). (shrink)