What is "race"? What role, if any, should race play in our moral obligations to others and to ourselves? Ethics along the Color Line addresses the question of whether black Americans should think of each other as members of an extended racial family and base their treatment of each other on this consideration, or eschew racial identity and envision the day when people do not think in terms of race. Anna Stubblefield suggests furthermore that white Americans should consider the same (...) issues. She argues, finally, that for both black and white Americans, thinking of races as families is crucial in helping to combat anti-black oppression. Stubblefield is concerned that the philosophical debate—argued notably between Kwame Anthony Appiah and Lucius Outlaw—over whether or not we should strongly identify in terms of race, and whether or not we should take race into account when we decide how to treat each other, has stalled. Drawing on black feminist scholarship about the moral importance of thinking and acting in terms of community and extended family, the author finds that strong racial identification, if based on appropriate ideals, is morally sound and even necessary to end white supremacy. (shrink)

White on White/Black on Black is a unique contribution to the philosophy of race. The text explores how 14 philosophers, 7 white and 7 black, philosophically understand the dynamics of the process of racialization.

: The aim of the eugenics movement in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century was to prevent the degeneration of the white race. A central tactic of the movement was the involuntary sterilization of people labeled as feebleminded. An analysis of the practice of eugenic sterilization provides insight into how the concepts of gender, race, class, and dis/ability are fundamentally intertwined. I argue that in the early twentieth century, the concept of feeblemindedness came to operate (...) as an umbrella concept that linked off-white ethnicity, poverty, and gendered conceptions of lack of moral character together and that feeblemindedness thus understood functioned as the signifier of tainted whiteness. (shrink)

The aim of the eugenics movement in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century was to prevent the degeneration of the white race. A central tactic of the movement was the involuntary sterilization of people labeled as feebleminded. An analysis of the practice of eugenic sterilization provides insight into how the concepts of gender, race, class, and dislability are fundamentally intertwined. I argue that in the early twentieth century, the concept of feeblemindedness came to operate as (...) an umbrella concept that linked off-white ethnicity, poverty, and gendered conceptions of lack of moral character together and that feeblemindedness thus understood functioned as the signifier of tainted whiteness. (shrink)

The aim of the eugenics movement in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century was to prevent the degeneration of the white race. A central tactic of the movement was the involuntary sterilization of people labeled as feebleminded. An analysis of the practice of eugenic sterilization provides insight into how the concepts of gender, race, class, and dislability are fundamentally intertwined. I argue that in the early twentieth century, the concept of feeblemindedness came to operate as (...) an umbrella concept that linked off-white ethnicity, poverty, and gendered conceptions of lack of moral character together and that feeblemindedness thus understood functioned as the signifier of tainted whiteness. (shrink)

There are three serious problems in the ongoing debate over whether or not to grant ethical significance to race. First, although disagreement over whether or not "race" is a "real" or "objective" concept is only part of the debate, exchanges have increasingly concentrated on this issue. The result is that currently, the question of whether or not to grant ethical significance to race is most often presented as primarily a metaphysical rather than a normative one. This is misleading because the (...) metaphysical disagreement reflects underlying normative concerns, rather than the other way around. Second, the normative debate centers on whether or not people of African descent in the United States are justified in granting ethical significance to race by treating members of their race as if they were family. I argue, however, that choosing to treat members of one's race as family is a right. Like other rights, it entails concomitant obligations to act upon it only in ways that do not infringe upon other rights of other people. The important question, therefore, is whether and how people can treat members of their race as family without infringing upon the rights of others. I argue that this is possible and delineate the responsibilities and limitations involved. Third, much of the debate is a consequentialist debate over whether strategies that promote granting ethical significance to race or strategies that promote denying ethical significance to race will help to mitigate anti-black oppression. Yet neither side offers an adequate analysis of anti-black oppression to support their claims. I present and defend an analysis that suggests that granting ethical significance to race is important for fighting anti-black oppression. While I do not intend this as a justification for granting ethical significance to race, because I argue that justification is not required, I offer it to persuade those who deny ethical significance to race to reconsider their position. (shrink)