We shall defend two theses: (a) if a decision situation exhibits a certain causal structure, then decision theory is in trouble, because the derivation of expected utilities fails; (b) this causal structure in fact obtains in a specific, but very common kind of situation, namely, when the intrinsically evaluated psychological states are in the domain of the utility function. It will be apparent that the problem is but a variant of Joseph Butler's criticism of hedonism. Thus, in a sense, the (...) point of our paper is that modern theorizing about practical deliberation has not dealt seriously with Butler's criticism. (shrink)

Modern environmental thought is characterized by a paradox. The value of environmental goods seems to transcend all purely human values. At the same time environmental goods have to be placed within an overall ranking if there is to be rational environmental policy. It is argued that J. Foster's concept of value-judgement cannot solve this paradox.

In the Platonic tradition, weakness of will is not the failure to implement a practical judgement, but a different sort of failure. In describing that different failure, philosophers typically supplement the phenomenon of akrasia by an additional judgement. It is argued that with this supplementation, the experience of weakness of will becomes distorted. Using instead a suitably designed distinction between evaluation and motivation allows for a more direct description. On the basis of this description akrasia may be understood as an (...) experience which helps persons to find their true subjective values. (shrink)