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Anna Cremaldi
Appalachian State University
  1. ‘It’s Just a Story’: Pornography, Desire, and the Ethics of Fictive Imagining.Christopher Bartel & Anna Cremaldi - 2018 - British Journal of Aesthetics 58 (1):37-50.
    Is it ever morally wrong for a consumer to imagine something immoral in a work of fiction, or for an author to prompt such imagining? Brandon Cooke has recently argued that it cannot be. On Cooke’s account, fictive imagining is immune to moral criticism because such cases of imagining do not amount to the endorsement of the immoral content, nor do they imply that the authors of such fictions necessarily endorse their contents. We argue against Cooke that in fact fictively (...)
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  2.  23
    Bitterness Without Hope.Anna Cremaldi & Jack M. C. Kwong - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.
    This paper develops and defends an anger-based account of bitterness. In particular, it argues that contrary to what some scholars have maintained, an adequate account of bitterness does not require the concept of hope. That is, bitterness is neither disappointed hope (McFall) nor hopeless anger (Stockdale). Instead, it proposes that bitterness is better understood as unresolved anger, an emotion experienced when a lack of resolution to our violated moral expectations forces us to swallow our anger. Construing the emotion this way (...)
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  3.  47
    Is Open‐Mindedness a Moral Virtue?Anna Cremaldi & Jack M. C. Kwong - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):343-358.
    Is open-mindedness a moral virtue? Surprisingly, this question has not received much attention from philosophers. In this paper, we fill this lacuna by arguing that there are good grounds for thinking that it is. In particular, we show that the extant account of open-mindedness as a moral virtue faces an objection that appears to show that exercising the character trait may not be virtuous. To offset this objection, we argue that a much stronger argument can be made for the case (...)
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  4.  26
    The Unity of Definition in the Nicomachean Ethics.Anna Cremaldi - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2):95-113.
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    Why Are So Few Generous?Anna Cremaldi - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2):127-145.
    To be generous, by Aristotle’s lights, one does not have to be a saint. Rather, Aristotle’s criteria for generosity are ordinary and consistent with the norms of his day. It is surprising, then, to find Aristotle claiming that very few people succeed in being generous. This claim generates a puzzle: if generosity is not extraordinarily demanding, why are so few fulfilling its criteria? The puzzle is not addressed by the literature on generosity, but it is worth addressing for its surprising (...)
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    Is Aristotelian Generosity a Unified Virtue?Anna Cremaldi - 2016 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):17-29.
    Commentators worry that Aristotelian generosity is a conglomeration of distinct virtues, rather than a single, unified virtue. This paper argues that the virtue of generosity is unified if we recognize that the generous person’s goal lies in promoting friendship — in particular, in ensuring that there is sufficient wealth to support a community of friends. One of the important consequences of this reading is that it reverses the standard interpretation according to which Aristotelian generosity resembles our modern conception of generosity (...)
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