Although moral distress is now a well-recognized phenomenon among all of the healthcare professions, few evidence-based strategies have been published to address it. In morally distressing situations, the “presenting problem” may be a particular patient situation, but most often signals a deeper unit- or system-centered issue. This article describes one institution’s ongoing effort to address moral distress in its providers. We discuss the development and evaluation of the Moral Distress Consultation Service, an interprofessional, unit/system-oriented approach to addressing and ameliorating moral (...) distress. (shrink)

The notion of virtue in general, and courage in particular, has had a hard time integrating itself into the everyday lexicon of bioethics. Following the lead of enlightenment moral philosophy, which concentrates on the theory of right action as opposed to the ancient Greeks' emphasis on the development of good character, bioethics, with some notable exceptions, has tended to relegate consideration of the virtues to the sidelines of moral argument. Recently, however, there have been calls for the necessity of “moral (...) courage” in the context of clinical ethics. As nurses, physicians, and other health care professionals confront a variety of moral contexts in which the virtue of courage is invoked to "do the right thing," stand up for patients' rights, and uphold the ethical standards of their professions, they are increasingly reminded of their moral duty to exhibit courage in the face of institutional obstacles to the proper care of their patients. For example, a nurse's hesitation to approach a physician to request increased sedation for an agitated patient out of fear of retaliation is represented in one article as a lack of courage.In this paper we offer a critical assessment of such invocations of courage. While we find courage to be an indispensable virtue in some challenging contexts, in other settings we find invocations of courage to be both an unfortunate endorsement of an oppressive status quo that can divert attention from the real problems and an undesirable and potentially destructive strategy within health care institutions whose goal is medically excellent and morally good clinical practice. As we shall argue, a call to virtuousness is not always virtuous. (shrink)

Since 1992, institutions accredited by The Joint Commission have been required to have a process in place that allows staff members, patients, and families to address ethical issues or issues prone to conflict. While the commission's expectations clearly have made ethics committees more common, simply having a committee in no way demonstrates its effectiveness in terms of the availability of the service to key constituents, the quality of the processes used, or the outcomes achieved. Beyond meeting baseline accreditation standards, effective (...) ethics resources are requisite for quality care for another reason. The provision of care to the sick is a practice with profound moral dimensions. Clinicians need what Margaret Urban Walker has called “moral spaces,” reflective spaces within institutions in which to explore and communicate values and ethical obligations as they undergird goals of care. Walker proposed that ethicists needed to be concerned with the design and maintenance of these moral spaces. Clearly, that concern needs to extend beyond ethicists to institutional leaders. This essay uses Walker's idea of moral space to describe individuals and groups who are actual and potential ethics resources in health care institutions. We focus on four requisite characteristics of effective resources and the challenges to achieving them, and we identify strategies to build them. In our view, such moral spaces are particularly important for nurses and their colleagues on interprofessional teams and need to be expanded and strengthened in most settings. (shrink)

In their article “A Broader Understanding of Moral Distress,” Campbell, Ulrich, and Grady (2016) correctly assert that moral distress is well established in the nursing literature and is gaining at...

Abstract Studying a concept as complex as moral distress is an ongoing challenge for those engaged in empirical ethics research. Qualitative studies of nurses have illuminated the experience of moral distress and widened the contours of the concept, particularly in the area of root causes. This work has led to the current understanding that moral distress can arise from clinical situations, factors internal to the individual professional, and factors present in unit cultures, the institution, and the larger health care environment. (...) Corley et al. ( 2001 ) was the first to publish a quantitative measure of moral distress, and her scale has been adapted for use by others, including studies of other disciplines (Hamric and Blackhall 2007 ; Schwenzer and Wang 2006 ). Other scholars have proposed variations on Jameton’s core definition (Sporrong et al. 2006 , 2007 ), developing measures for related concepts such as moral sensitivity (Lutzen et al. 2006 ), ethics stress (Raines 2000 ), and stress of conscience (Glasberg et al. 2006 ). The lack of consistency and consensus on the definition of moral distress considerably complicates efforts to study it. Increased attention by researchers in disciplines other than nursing has taken different forms, some problematic. Cultural differences in the role of the nurse and understanding of actions that represent threats to moral integrity also challenge efforts to build a cohesive research-based understanding of the concept. In this paper, research efforts to date are reviewed. The importance of capturing root causes of moral distress in instruments, particularly those at unit and system levels, to allow for interventions to be appropriately targeted is highlighted. In addition, the issue of studying moral distress and interaction over time with moral residue is discussed. Promising recent work is described along with the potential these approaches open for research that can lead to interventions to decrease moral distress. Finally, opportunities for future research and study are identified, and recommendations for moving the research agenda forward are offered. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-11 DOI 10.1007/s10730-012-9177-x Authors Ann B. Hamric, School of Nursing, Virginia Commonwealth University, P.O. Box 980567, Richmond, VA 23298-0567, USA Journal HEC Forum Online ISSN 1572-8498 Print ISSN 0956-2737. (shrink)

Ethics raises questions about what kind of society we ought to be, questions that are at the heart of this case. Increasingly, inequalities in healthcare fueled by lack of access, inadequate insurance coverage, and rising costs are creating dilemmas in the proper distribution of healthcare resources. Questions of distributing scarce and valuable resources are fundamentally questions of justice. The classic definition of justice is the duty to give to each person what they deserve and can legitimately claim so that justice (...) is understood as a moral obligation to help persons exercise their rights. Distributive justice, i.e., what distribution of resources is fair, equitable, and appropriate, thus turns on the concept of rights. One of the key questions in this case is whether and to what extent this patient has a right to treatment for his heart disease. In the classic understanding of justice, he must assert and we as a society must agree that he has a right to treatment for his heart condition before we are morally obligated to provide this care. Are there limits to this patient's right to healthcare? If so, what are they? The differing principles of distributive justice use different criteria to rank or weight decisions regarding the proper and just distribution of healthcare services. In this case, at least two competing but ethically valid principles can be identified: the humanitarian principle and the libertarian principle. (shrink)

Moral distress is a phenomenon increasingly recognized in healthcare that occurs when a clinician is unable to act in a manner consistent with his or her moral requirements due to external constraints. We contend that some experiences of moral distress are self-inflicted due to one’s under-assertion of professional authority, and these are potentially avoidable. In this article we outline causes of self-inflicted moral distress and offer recommendations for mitigation.