Edmund Husserl’s critique of using the natural scientific method to investigate meaningful human experience remains relevant to recent debates in psychology. Discursive Psychology (DP) claims to draw upon phenomenological insights to critique quantitative psychology for studying theoretical concepts rather than the actual practices of the lived social world. In this paper, I will argue that DP overlooks the important distinction that can be made between the theoretical attitude and the natural scientific attitude in Husserlian Phenomenology and hence, once again, loses (...) sight of the meaningfully constituted life-world. In doing so, I will demonstrate the continued relevance of Husserl’s critique of natural science to the discipline of psychology. (shrink)

This edited collection discusses phenomenological critiques of formalism and their relevance to the problem of responsibility and the life-world. The authors deal with themes of formalisation of knowledge in connection to the life-world, the natural world, the history of science and our responsibility for both our epistemic claims and the world in which we live. Readers will discover critiques of formalisation, the life-world and responsibility, and a collation and comparison of Patočka's and Husserl's work on these themes. Considerable literature on (...) Husserl is presented here and the two themes of epistemic responsibility and the life-world are discussed together. This work specifically emphasises the interrelatedness of these existential aspects of his work - self-responsibility and the crisis - as not only epistemological, but also related to human life. This volume also introduces Jan Patočka to English-speaking readers as a phenomenologist in his own right. Patočka shows us, in particular, the significance of the modern abyss between our thinking and the world. Readers will discover that this abyss is of concern for our everyday experience because it leads to a rupture in our understanding of the world: between the world of our living and its scientific construct. We see that Patočka continually emphasised the relevance of Husserl's work to existential questions relating to human responsibility and the life-world, which he admits is left largely implicit in Husserl's work. This edited collection will spark discussion on the question of responsibility against the backdrop of formalised knowledge which is increasingly inaccessible to human understanding. Despite the complexity of some of the analysed ideas, the authors discuss these themes in a clear and readable way. This work is scholarly, exact in its discussion and authoritative in its reading, but at the same time accessible to anyone motivated to understand these debates. (shrink)

This book revisits psychology's appropriation of natural scientific methods. The author argues that, in order to overcome ongoing methodological debates in psychology, it is necessary to confront the problem of formalisation contained in the appropriation of methods of natural science. By doing so, the subject matter of psychology - the human being - and questions about the meaning of human existence can be brought to the centre of the discipline. Drawing on Garfinkel, Sacks, Edwards and Potter, the author sees ethnomethodologically (...) informed qualitative methods, which stem from phenomenology, as a possible alternative to statistical methods, but ultimately finds these methods to be just another method of formalisation.She returns to Husserlian phenomenology as a way to critique the centrality of method in psychology and shows that the adoption of natural scientific methods in psychology is part of the larger push to formalise and objectify all aspects of human existence. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPatočka highlights the central role of Cartesianism in our tradition of thinking. Yet, today, brain scientists often claim to have overcome Cartesian dualism. In this paper, I argue that the Cartesian conceptions of human nature and sensory perception remain presuppositions of brain science, where perception is largely equated with thinking. Equating perception and thinking means that thinking is a determined process, which leads to an erosion of critique. Critique, and the freedom of thought it entails, is essential to Descartes, Husserl (...) and Patočka. I examine the differences, as well as the relationship, between Descartes method of doubt, Husserl’s phenomenological epochē and Patočka’s universalization of the epochē. I also show how Descartes’, Husserl’s and Patočka’s way into critique present different ways to understand self, things and the world. In conclusion, I suggest that Patočka presents a promising way to critique mechanistic understandings of thinking by rethinking both subject and object. (shrink)

New technologies, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging and transcranial magnetic stimulation, are currently touted as, not only giving us a better picture of the structure of the brain, but also a better understanding of our thinking. As Alan Snyder demonstrates when he claims his aim is to understand the ‘architecture of thought’ by investigating the brain. Against this backdrop, I will argue that new technologies present a worrying extension of mathematical natural science into the domain of human affairs. Extrapolating (...) upon Heidegger, I will put forward that neuroscientific experiments force thinking to conform to the mathematical conception of nature, rather than reveal something about the ‘true’ nature of our thinking. In a time when the expansion of mathematical natural science threatens to reduce every domain to that which is quantifiable, I will conclude by suggesting that the responsibility of the philosopher is to question the presuppositions of modern science and psychology.Nuevas tecnologías como la imagen de resonancia magnética funcional y la estimulación magnética transcranial se consideran presumiblemente capaces de darnos no solo una mejor imagen de nuestro cerebro, sino también una mejor comprensión de nuestro pensamiento, tal como demuestra Alan Snyder cuando afirma que su objetivo es entender la “arquitectura del pensamiento” mediante la investigación del cerebro. Contra este marco general, argumentaré que las nuevas tecnologías nos presentan una preocupante extensión de la ciencia natural matemática al dominio de los asuntos humanos. Extrapolando a partir de Heidegger, propondré que los experimentos neurocientíficos fuerzan al pensamiento a conformarse a la concepción matemática de la naturaleza en vez de revelar algo sobre la verdadera naturaleza de nuestro pensamiento. Nos encontramos en un momento en que o la expansión de la ciencia natural matemática amenaza con reducir todos los dominios a lo que es cuantificable. Concluiré sugiriendo que la responsabilidad del filósofo es cuestionar los presupuestos de la ciencia moderna y de la psicología. (shrink)