Dans le cadre de ce travail, nous présentons une expérimentation menée auprès d’un public allophone inscrit à une formation universitaire. Ce travail a pour objectif de relever, d’une part, les spécificités dans les productions orales de ce public, et d’autre part, de démontrer l’intérêt d’un apprentissage sur corpus afin de construire un exposé structuré. Cette étude permet de s’ouvrir à d’autres perspectives didactiques en partant d’un corpus d’apprenants.

Considering the persisting disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics, it seems that they are faced with a deep epistemic disagreement. Taking stock from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, one generally thinks that deep epistemic disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. Hinge epistemology, inherited from Wittgenstein, is also considered as an illuminating detour to understand common sense epistemology. But is there really a deep epistemic disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics? Could it not be considered that they share (...) a common background? If so, is the rational resolution of their disagreement logically possible? What rational means can common sense use to convince someone of the privileged status of an epistemic principle? Relying on Reid’s, Alston’s and Lynch’s arguments, I show that common sense epistemology is a more promising approach than hinge epistemology, because it is driven by an optimism about reason in the solving of deep epistemic disagreements. (shrink)

The pivotal problem of comorbidity research lies in the psychometric foundation it rests on, that is, latent variable theory, in which a mental disorder is viewed as a latent variable that causes a constellation of symptoms. From this perspective, comorbidity is a (bi)directional relationship between multiple latent variables. We argue that such a latent variable perspective encounters serious problems in the study of comorbidity, and offer a radically different conceptualization in terms of a network approach, where comorbidity is hypothesized to (...) arise from direct relations between symptoms of multiple disorders. We propose a method to visualize comorbidity networks and, based on an empirical network for major depression and generalized anxiety, we argue that this approach generates realistic hypotheses about pathways to comorbidity, overlapping symptoms, and diagnostic boundaries, that are not naturally accommodated by latent variable models: Some pathways to comorbidity through the symptom space are more likely than others; those pathways generally have the same direction (i.e., from symptoms of one disorder to symptoms of the other); overlapping symptoms play an important role in comorbidity; and boundaries between diagnostic categories are necessarily fuzzy. (shrink)

The building of a global model of carcinogenesis is one of modern biology’s greatest challenges. The traditional somatic mutation theory is now supplemented by a new approach, called the Tissue Organization Field Theory. According to TOFT, the original source of cancer is loss of tissue organization rather than genetic mutations. In this paper, we study the argumentative strategy used by the advocates of TOFT to impose their view. In particular, we criticize their claim of incompatibility used to justify the necessity (...) to definitively reject SMT. First, we note that since it is difficult to build a non-ambiguous experimental demonstration of the superiority of TOFT, its partisans add epistemological and metaphysical arguments to the debate. This argumentative strategy allows them to defend the necessity of a paradigm shift, with TOFT superseding SMT. To do so, they introduce a notion of incompatibility, which they actually use as the Kuhnian notion of incommensurability. To justify this so-called incompatibility between the two theories of cancer, they move the debate to a metaphysical ground by assimilating the controversy to a fundamental opposition between reductionism and organicism. We show here that this argumentative strategy is specious, because it does not demonstrate clearly that TOFT is an organicist theory. Since it shares with SMT its vocabulary, its ontology and its methodology, it appears that a claim of incompatibility based on this metaphysical plan is not fully justified in the present state of the debate. We conclude that it is more cogent to argue that the two theories are compatible, both biologically and metaphysically. We propose to consider that TOFT and SMT describe two distinct and compatible causal pathways to carcinogenesis. This view is coherent with the existence of integrative approaches, and suggests that they have a higher epistemic value than the two theories taken separately. (shrink)

Systems biology is today such a widespread discipline that it becomes difficult to propose a clear definition of what it really is. For some, it remains restricted to the genomic field. For many, it designates the integrated approach or the corpus of computational methods employed to handle the vast amount of biological or medical data and investigate the complexity of the living. Although defining systems biology might be difficult, on the other hand its purpose is clear: systems biology, with its (...) emerging subfields systems medicine and systems pharmacology, clearly aims at making sense of complex observations/experimental and clinical datasets to improve our understanding of diseases and their treatments without putting aside the context in which they appear and develop. In this short review, we aim to specifically focus on these new subfields with the new theoretical tools and approaches that were developed in the context of cancer. Systems pharmacology and medicine now give hope for major improvements in cancer therapy, making personalized medicine closer to reality. As we will see, the current challenge is to be able to improve the clinical practice according to the paradigm shift of systems sciences. (shrink)

This book arose out of a conference organised by the Fay Gale Centre for Research on Gender at The University of Adelaide honouring Carol Bacchi's work and is intended to make that work accessible to a range of audiences. - from the ...

This paper is devoted to computer modelling of the development and regeneration of multicellular biological structures. Some species are able to regenerate parts of their body after amputation damage, but the global rules governing cooperative cell behaviour during morphogenesis are not known. Here, we consider a simplified model organism, which consists of tissues formed around special cells that can be interpreted as stem cells. We assume that stem cells communicate with each other by a set of signals, and that the (...) values of these signals depend on the distance between cells. Thus the signal distribution characterizes location of stem cells. If the signal distribution is changed, then the difference between the initial and the current signal distribution affects the behaviour of stem cells—e.g. as a result of an amputation of a part of tissue the signal distribution changes which stimulates stem cells to migrate to new locations, appropriate for regeneration of the proper pattern. Moreover, as stem cells divide and form tissues around them, they control the form and the size of regenerating tissues. This two-level organization of the model organism, with global regulation of stem cells and local regulation of tissues, allows its reproducible development and regeneration. (shrink)

Large sets of elements interacting locally and producing specific architectures reliably form a category that transcends the usual dividing line between biological and engineered systems. We propose to call them morphogenetically architected complex systems. While taking the emergence of properties seriously, the notion of MACS enables at the same time the design of operational means that allow controlling and even, paradoxically, programming this emergence. To demonstrate our claim, we first show that among all the self-organized systems studied in the field (...) of Artificial Life, the specificity of MACS essentially lies in the close relation between their emergent properties and functional properties. Second, we argue that to be a MACS a system does not need to display more than weak emergent properties. Third, since the notion of weak emergence is based on the possibility of simulation, whether computational or mechanistic via machines, we see MACS as good candidates to help design artificial self-architected systems but also harness and redesign living ones. (shrink)

Lindquist et al. present a strong case for a constructionist account of emotion. First, we elaborate on the ramifications that a constructionist account of emotions might have for psychiatric disorders with emotional disturbances as core elements. Second, we reflect on similarities between Lindquist et al.'s model and recent attempts at formulating psychiatric disorders as networks of causally related symptoms.

In this article we present a new kind of computing device that uses biochemical reactions networks as building blocks to implement logic gates. The architecture of a computing machine relies on these generic and composable building blocks, computation units, that can be used in multiple instances to perform complex boolean functions. Standard logical operations are implemented by biochemical networks, encapsulated and insulated within synthetic vesicles called protocells. These protocells are capable of exchanging energy and information with each other through transmembrane (...) electron transfer. In the paradigm of computation we propose, protoputing, a machine can solve only one problem and therefore has to be built specifically. Thus, the programming phase in the standard computing paradigm is represented in our approach by the set of assembly instructions that directs the wiring of the protocells that constitute the machine itself. To demonstrate the computing power of protocellular machines, we apply it to solve a NP-complete problem, known to be very demanding in computing power, the 3-SAT problem. We show how to program the assembly of a machine that can verify the satisfiability of a given boolean formula. Then we show how to use the massive parallelism of these machines to verify in less than 20 min all the valuations of the input variables and output a fluorescent signal when the formula is satisfiable or no signal at all otherwise. (shrink)

This article examines women who have been antinuclear activists at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant for two decades. Qualitative interviews focus on their perceived transformations over time that are based on gender and everyday experiences. They perceive gender as both a barrier and a facilitator to activism, even after 20 years. Women describe their technological education as one strategy to overcome the barrier of gender. On the other hand, they consider the gendered role of motherhood as a primary (...) catalyst for action. In addition, they discuss individual everyday experiences focused on the health concerns for family members that influenced their political activity. Over time, women linked personal transformations with increased political understanding and involvement. (shrink)

The majority of commentators agree on one thing: Our network approach might be the prime candidate for offering a new perspective on the origins of mental disorders. In our response, we elaborate on refinements (e.g., cognitive and genetic levels) and extensions (e.g., to Axis II disorders) of the network model, as well as discuss ways to test its validity.

Présentation des articles qui suivent : invoquer le sens commun, ce n’est pas supposer un abandon de la philosophie et de la raison, mais faire droit à une conception ajustée de la rationalité humaine. Les articles ici réunis s’inscrivent dans l’approche du sens commun comme instance régulatrice.

The Enzymatic control reactions model was presented within the scope of fractional calculus. In order to accommodate the usual initial conditions, the fractional derivative used is in Caputo sense. The methodologies of the three analytical methods were used to derive approximate solution of the fractional nonlinear system of differential equations. Two methods use integral operator and the other one uses just an integral. Numerical results obtained exhibit biological behavior of real world problem.

RÉSUMÉLe mot «migrants» n'existait pas dans la langue des Hellènes; ils étaient plus familiers avec le vocable de l'exil et de l'asile. D'ailleurs, l'exil ne saurait se penser sans son corollaire, l'asile, comme le citoyen antique sans le barbare et la démocratie sans la tyrannie. À travers une métaphore située au carrefour de la fiction historique, de la philosophie politique et de la psychanalyse, cet article propose une réflexion sur l'exil comme condition fondamentale du sujet. L'exil est d'origine, car la (...) langue de l'enfance, la langue dite maternelle est d'abord une langue étrangère. L'exil intime porte la marque d'une universalité qui fonde l'expérience subjective.ABSTRACTThe word ‘migrants’ did not exist in the language of the Hellenes; they were more familiar with the terms ‘exile’ and ‘political asylum.’ Indeed, exile cannot be thought of without its corollary, political asylum, as the Ancient citizen cannot be thought of without the barbarian, and democracy without tyranny. Through a metaphor located at the crossroads of historical fiction, political philosophy and psychoanalysis, this article offers a reflection on exile as a fundamental condition of the subject. Exile is originary because the language of childhood, the so-called mother tongue, is originally a foreign language. Intimate exile bears the mark of a universality that founds subjective experience. (shrink)

Natalie Z. Davis est une historienne bien connue pour ses recherches sur la France moderne (Les Cultures du peuple, rituels, savoirs et résistances au XVIe siècle, Aubier, 1979 ; Le Retour de Martin Guerre, Laffont, 1982 ; Pour sauver sa vie, Seuil, 1988) et son intérêt pour les femmes de cette époque (elle a notamment co-dirigé le volume 3 de l'Histoire des femmes, Plon, 1991). Quittant ici la Renaissance française sur laquelle ont porté l'essentiel de ses travaux, elle entre (...) plus ava... (shrink)

Natalie Z. Davis est une historienne bien connue pour ses recherches sur la France moderne (Les Cultures du peuple, rituels, savoirs et résistances au XVIe siècle, Aubier, 1979 ; Le Retour de Martin Guerre, Laffont, 1982 ; Pour sauver sa vie, Seuil, 1988) et son intérêt pour les femmes de cette époque (elle a notamment co-dirigé le volume 3 de l'Histoire des femmes, Plon, 1991). Quittant ici la Renaissance française sur laquelle ont porté l'essentiel de ses travaux, elle entre (...) plus ava... (shrink)

In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why reductionist approaches in (...) psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First, symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause. Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett's (1987) notion ofreal patterns, and suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders. (shrink)

We generally consider that we should not believe on the basis of insufficient evidence. Yet there are many beliefs which are deprived of adequate epistemic evidence. In such cases, James recommends the “subjective method” which allows us to hold beliefs for practical reasons. This pragmatist move is rejected by evidentialists who think that beliefs must be grounded on adequate epistemic evidence. My contention is that Reid’s approach to irresistible beliefs we do not hold for epistemic reasons offers a persuasive means (...) to escape the contemporary stalemate between evidentialism and pragmatism. Are we rational in holding beliefs for which we don’t possess sufficient epistemic evidence? Reid and James subscribe to a permissivist ethics of belief, according to which we are allowed to hold a belief even if we cannot show its epistemic credentials. Yet I show that the abandonment of the stringent evidentialist requirement (which is tied to a form of internalism) does not necessarily commit one to a pure form of pragmatism (which offers practical reasons instead of epistemic ones). If Reid proposes arguments built on a pragmatist line, he does not reject the evidentialist demand per se, only its internalist form. Moreover, in his view, immediate beliefs are carried by a kind of instinctive epistemic trust. On the whole, pragmatism and common sense do not defend the same kind of epistemic permissivism. (shrink)

The field of synthetic biology is looking forward engineering framework for safely designing reliable de-novo biological functions. In this undertaking, Computer-Aided-Design environments should play a central role for facilitating the design. Although, CAD environment is widely used to engineer artificial systems the application in synthetic biology is still in its infancy. In this article we address the problem of the design of a high level language which at the core of CAD environment. More specifically the Gubs language is a specification (...) language used to describe the observations of the expected behaviour. The compiler appropriately selects components such that the observation of the synthetic biological function resulting to their assembly complies to the programmed behaviour. (shrink)

Supposons un sceptique qui doute qu’il ait deux mains. Je montre tout d’abord que si on le compare au fou, cela coupe court à toute tentative de le comprendre. La raison en est non pas qu’il ne partage pas les mêmes croyances-charnières que nous, mais qu’il n’effectue aucun partage entre des croyances-charnières et des croyances susceptibles d’être révisées. Puis je propose un autre modèle à partir duquel le discours d’un sceptique peut apparaître comme intelligible : le modèle de la compréhension (...) interculturelle. Dans ce cadre, un sceptique n’est intelligible que s’il adhère à un système partagé de distribution entre des croyances-charnières et des croyances révisables, quand bien même il n’a pas les mêmes croyances-charnières que nous. (shrink)

A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented withthisthing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to (...) me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa. (shrink)

Quiconque veut croire de manière appropriée devrait obéir à la règle de l’évidence qui veut que l’on croie que p si et seulement si l’on a des raisons suffisantes de croire qu’il est vrai que p. En tout autre cas, le doute s’impose. Pourtant, il existe des croyances qui ne respectent pas cette règle : les principes du sens commun. Même si nous croyons en eux sans disposer de raisons suffisantes pour attester de leur vérité, cette attitude n’est pas intellectuellement (...) illégitime. Ainsi, nous sommes en droit de croire que nos pouvoirs intellectuels sont fiables, à défaut de disposer de raisons suffisantes, et même en dépit de raisons de douter. Nous n’avons pas à choisir entre la suspension du jugement et la thèse fidéiste selon laquelle les principes du sens commun relèvent de la foi, conçue comme étant distincte des croyances. L’idée de Reid que les principes du sens commun sont des croyances authentiques en lesquelles nous avons confiance ou foi permet d’échapper à ce dilemme : la foi n’est pas une réponse au doute, un saut qu’on décide de faire faute de mieux. C’est une foi primitive, sans laquelle on ne peut pas évaluer l’évidence. Il en résulte que 1) une telle foi peut être conservée en dépit de raisons de douter, car elle n’est pas acquise du fait de raisons et 2) la compatibilité avec les principes du sens commun est une règle doxastique qui a priorité sur la règle de l’évidence. (shrink)

The classic model of blood pressure regulation by Guyton et al. set a new standard for quantitative exploration of physiological function and led to important new insights, some of which still remain the focus of debate, such as whether the kidney plays the primary role in the genesis of hypertension. Key to the success of this model was the fact that the authors made the computer code freely available and eventually provided a convivial user interface for exploration of model behavior (...) on early microcomputers. Ikeda et al. developed an offshoot of the Guyton model targeting especially the regulation of body fluids and acid–base balance; their model provides extended renal and respiratory functions and would be a good basis for further extensions. In the interest of providing a simple, useable version of Ikeda et al.’s model and to facilitate further such extensions, we present a practical implementation of the model of Ikeda et al., using the ODE solver Berkeley Madonna. (shrink)

On Inception is a translation of Martin Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe 70. This work belongs to the crucial period, before and during WWII, when Heidegger was at work on a series of treatises that begins with "Contributions to Philosophy" and includes "The Event" and "The History of Beyng." These works are difficult, even hermetic, but represent a crucial development in Heidegger's thinking. On Inception deepens the investigation underway in the other volumes of the series and provides a unique perspective on Heidegger's (...) thinking of Being and of Event. Here, Heidegger asks, with a greater insistence than anywhere else in his work, what it might mean to think of being as event, and not as presence. Event cannot be thought without the sense of a beginning - an inception - and so, Heidegger insists, we must try to think of being as inception, as fundamentally inceptive. On Inception pursues rigorously the difficult and puzzling implications of this speculation. It does not merely extend work already undertaken but also opens doors onto wholly other pathways. (shrink)

Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence (AI) system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with (...) the particular argument, which leads us to move to a different one. We leave the idea of indirect duties aside since these duties do not imply considering an AI system for its own sake. The paper rejects the relational argument and the argument from intelligence. The argument from life may lead us to grant a moral status to an AI system, but only in a weak sense. Sentience, by contrast, is a strong argument for the moral status of an AI system—based, among other things, on the Aristotelian principle of equality: that same cases should be treated in the same way. The paper points out, however, that no AI system is sentient given the current level of technological development. (shrink)

Over the past three decades, the philosophy of biology has emerged from the shadow of the philosophy of physics to become a respectable and thriving philosophical subdiscipline. The authors take a fresh look at the life sciences and the philosophy of biology from a strictly realist and emergentist-naturalist perspective. They outline a unified and science-oriented philosophical framework that enables the clarification of many foundational and philosophical issues in biology. This book will be of interest both to life scientists and philosophers.

We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...) aetiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows. But we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy reflects his famous philosophical "turning." In this work, Heidegger returns to the question of being from its inception in Being and Time to a new questioning of being as event.

What exactly is hope and how does it influence our decisions? In How We Hope, Adrienne Martin presents a novel account of hope, the motivational resources it presupposes, and its function in our practical lives. She contends that hoping for an outcome means treating certain feelings, plans, and imaginings as justified, and that hope thereby involves sophisticated reflective and conceptual capacities. Martin develops this original perspective on hope--what she calls the "incorporation analysis"--in contrast to the two dominant philosophical (...) conceptions of hope: the orthodox definition, where hoping for an outcome is simply desiring it while thinking it possible, and agent-centered views, where hoping for an outcome is setting oneself to pursue it. In exploring how hope influences our decisions, she establishes that it is not always a positive motivational force and can render us complacent. She also examines the relationship between hope and faith, both religious and secular, and identifies a previously unnoted form of hope: normative or interpersonal hope. When we place normative hope in people, we relate to them as responsible agents and aspire for them to overcome challenges arising from situation or character. Demonstrating that hope merits rigorous philosophical investigation, both in its own right and in virtue of what it reveals about the nature of human emotion and motivation, How We Hope offers an original, sustained look at a largely neglected topic in philosophy. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger is one of the most important and influential philosophers of the 20th Century. A major figure in the development of phenomenology, his work also profoundly influenced many of the intellectual movements that followed in his wake, from Sartre's Existentialism to Derrida's deconstructionism. Towards the Definition of Philosophy brings together two seminal lectures that mark a breakthrough moment in Heidegger's thought and introduces the major themes that he would develop in his opus Being and Time.

A landmark discussion between two great thinkers, vital to an understanding of twentieth-century philosophy and intellectual history.

Eric Martin and Daniel N. Osherson present a theory of inductive logic built on model theory. Their aim is to extend the mathematics of Formal Learning Theory to a more general setting and to provide a more accurate image of empirical inquiry. The formal results of their study illuminate aspects of scientific inquiry that are not covered by the commonly applied Bayesian approach.

A ‘lottery belief’ is a belief that a particular ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, based on nothing more than the odds against it winning. The lottery paradox brings out a tension between the idea that lottery beliefs are justified and the idea that that one can always justifiably believe the deductive consequences of things that one justifiably believes – what is sometimes called the principle of closure. Many philosophers have treated the lottery paradox as an argument against the (...) second idea – but I make a case here that it is the first idea that should be given up. As I shall show, there are a number of independent arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified. (shrink)

This paper proposes a view of time that takes passage to be the most basic temporal notion, instead of the usual A-theoretic and B-theoretic notions, and explores how we should think of a world that exhibits such a genuine temporal passage. It will be argued that an objective passage of time can only be made sense of from an atemporal point of view and only when it is able to constitute a genuine change of objects across time. This requires that (...) passage can flip one fact into a contrary fact, even though neither side of the temporal passage is privileged over the other. We can make sense of this if the world is inherently perspectival. Such an inherently perspectival world is characterized by fragmentalism, a view that has been introduced by Fine in his ‘Tense and Reality’ (2005). Unlike Fine's tense-theoretic fragmentalism though, the proposed view will be a fragmentalist view based in a primitive notion of passage. (shrink)